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PREFACE 
Today)1ighway exgansion occupies the dominant and leading 
role in the law of eminent domain . With the increased highway 
expansion in Iowa as in the entire United States , encouraged by 
numerous ·Federal Aid Highway Acts, it is necessary to reappraise 
and review the law of eminent domain in Iowa. 
This work is not intended to be a full and complete survey of 
the field of eminent domain . It is intended to cover elementary 
materials and "common problems .. in Iowa eminent domain proceed-
ings . The majority of cases cited and considered are Iowa cases, 
and rightly so because this work was prepared primarily for Iowa 
practice. 
The reader is cautioned that the law of eminent domain is not 
reduced to a fix ed and crystallized formula. This review is pre-
pared as afl aid to the trial attorney and not as an authority unto 
itself. 
The nucleus of this work came from material gathered by the 
Honorable Henry N . Graven , now U .S . District Judge for the 
Northern District of Iowa , who served as Special Assistant 
Attorney General and Counsel to the Iowa State Highway Commis-
sion (1936-1937) . That material along with additional research 
was correlated and compiled by Merle L. Royce, now a practicing 
attorney in Marshalltown , Iowa. 
Using the original study as a foundation this office has 
undertaken to review and reappraise many areas in the law of 
eminent domain in Iowa and to set it down in a concise and 
orderly fashion. The task of research and compilation was 
assigned to Wayne Johnson of the Iowa and Harvard Law Schools, 
now with the law firm of Ross, McGowan & O'Keefe, Chicago, 
Illinois . All work was reviewed and edited by this office and by 
ii 
staff attorneys James E. Thomson, John L. McKinney and Hugh V. 
Faulkner. It was further reviewed and edited by Donald L. Beving, 
Keith E . McWilliams, and Donald C. Swanson, practicing attorneys 
in Des Moines, Iowa. 
iii 
Norman A. Erbe 
Attorney General of Iowa 
C. J. Lyman 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
and Counsel to Iowa State Highway 
Commission 
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DIVISION I 
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND IrS CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
The power of eminent domain is based on the sovereignty of 
the State over all property within its dominion as distinguished 
from a property right , or an exercise by the State of an ultimate 
ownership of the soil . 1 It is an inherent power necessary to the 
very existence of the government. 2 Any statutory provision de-
claring that certain property shall not be subject to the power of 
eminent domain is invalid. 3 This rule applies with equal force to 
municipal and private corporations to whom the legislature has 
granted the ·powen of eminent domain , 4 and their authorities cannot 
lawfully contract with any person or group of persons that the pow.er 
will not be exercised in a particular manner. 5 When the power of 
eminent domain has been e~pressly granted , its extent will be con-
strued strictly ·against the grantee, and the grantee will not be 
allowed to take the lands of another unless such right comes 
clearly and unmistakably within the limits of the authority granted. 6 
1. Nichols·, On Eminent Domain, Sec. 1.13(4) (3d ed. 1950) . See 
also Lowden v. Star, 171 Iowa 528, Dickinson Ct. v. Pause, 
112 Iowa 21. 
2 . '·Reterv. Davenport, R.I. &N.W. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112,54 
N. W.2d 863, 866 (1952); Liddick v . Council Bluffs , 232 Iowa 
197, 5-N.W.2d 361 0 371 ·(1942); Sisson VJ Board of Supervisors , 
128Iowa442, 104 N. W. 454 (1905); Nollv. DubuqueR. Co. , 
3 2 I ow a _ 6 6 ( 18 71) • 
3. Nichols, Ibid. Sectionl.141(3) (3ded. 1950) . 
4 . Cf.Reter v . Davenport , R.I. & N.W. Ry . Co. o 243 Iowa 1112, 
54 N.W. 2:d 863 (1952). 
5. Nichols , Ib id. Section 1.;141(4) (3d ed. 1950); Herman v. Board 
of Park Commissioners, 200 Iowa 1, 206 N .W. 35 (1925) (A con-
tract made by park commissioners not to appropriate any more 
of the grantor' s land by eminent domain proceedings is; 
absolutely void.) 
6. Nichols , Ibid . Section 3.213(1) (3d ed. 1950); Gilbride v. City 
of Algona, 237 Iowa 20, 20 N. W. 2d 905 (1945.); Gano v . Minnea-
polis Ry. Co ., 114 Iowa 713, 87 N. W . 714 (1901). 
1 
2 
However, it has been held that where a statute clearly and plainly 
confers the power of eminent domain , the strict rule is inapplicable 
and a liberal and reasonable construction should be adhered to so as 
to effectuate the ~tatutory purpose. 7 In acting pursuant to a conceded 
power of eminent domain, the grantee's procedure is strictly con-
strued in the light of the authorizing statute . 8 
SECTION 1. PROPERTY TAKEN MAY BE PUBLIC AS WELL AS PRIVATE. 9 
It is within the power of the General Assembly to make the same 
property subservient to different public uses, or even to take it from 
one public use and devote it to another . This rule has been univer-
sally_ accepted by the courts of the United . States and England, 10 
Thus , a city may extend .its streets across the depot grounds of a 
railroad company, 11 or the state may authorize the construction 
of a highway in lieu of a railway on the same land.12 However , 
in the absence of expressed language by the legis.lative body, such 
power will not ·be implied when it tends to substantially interfere 
or defeat the prior use or is inconsistent with the continuance of 
such use . 13 For illustration , in Town of ALvord v . Great Northern 
7. Nichols, Ibid. Section 3. 213(1); Warren v. Highway Commission, 
Iowa , 93 N. W . 2d 60 (1958); cf. Butterworth v. High-
way Commission, 210 Iowa 1231, 232 N.W. 760 (1930). 
8. Nichols, Ibid. Section 3. 213(3) (3d ed. 1950); Finke v. Zeigel-
miller , 77 Iowa 253, .42 N.W. 183 (1889). 
9. See Comment , 43 Iowa Law Review 290 (1958); 3 Iowa L. Bul. 
185 ( 191 7). 
10. Nichols I Ibid . Section: 3 sr· f2d \ed ' )";I.:;Albla' "!oJ. Gh~c" •. Ry.o .Co. 
HJ.2 ,I6wa: ··624 , 71 .. N:W.. 54•.1; sc·.Paul &. N.D. 'vR. G;c>:., ,v ;_ ·State, 
li4:·.: Minn ', ,221 ,· ·-z5 N .~w~ .345. 
11. Chi. M. & St . Paul Ry. Co. v. Starkweather, 97 Iowa 159, 
66N.W. 87; Diam. Jo. Linev. Davenport,_ll4Iowa432, 
87 N. W. 3 99 (1901); Chic. etc . Ry . v . Mason City , 155 
I ow a 9 9 , 13 5 N. W . 9 . 
12. Toledo A.A. & N . M . Ry. Co. v. Detroit , 62 Mich 564 , 29 
N.w . sao. 
13. 29 C.J. S. Section 74; Connolly v. Des Moines & Cent. Iowa Ry. 
Co., 246 Iowa 874, 68 N . W. 2d 320 (1955); Lage v. Potta-
. wattamie County, 23 2 Iowa 944; 5 N. W . 2d 161 (194 2). 
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Ry. Co. ;.l79 ·Iowa 465, 161 N.W. 467 (1917), the town was denied 
the right to condemn a twenty foot str ip from the raJlroad ' s three 
hundred foot wide depot grounds for the purpose of running an alley 
parallel to the railroad , the court saying that such alley would sub-
stantially impair the present and future use of the gr~unds for depot 
purposes and would be inconsistent with such use . 1 None of the 
Iowa cases cited in the discussion above deal with attempts by the 
state to condemn land already devoted to a public purpose. It is be-
lieved that a different principle applies to the sovereign than is 
applicable to private agencies with authority to condemn or inferior 
political bodies such as municipalities or county boards of super-
visors , and that the sovereign may condemn land already devoted 
to a public purpose for another public purpose which will. totally 
destroy the first . 15 Private agencies have no governmental powers 
except those specifically delegated to them, and inferior govern-
mental agencies are creatures of the state by definition. Therefore, 
14 . The court emphasized the difference between the implied power 
to build across railroad tracks bottomed on necessity 1 and the 
right to extend streets and alleys parallel to the tracks which 
may destroy loa_ding platforms and other facilities, and 
greatly impair the use of the depot grounds. 
15. 29 C . J.S. Section 74. Both Connolly v. Des Moines & Cent. Ry. 
Co., 2~6 Iowa 874, 68 N.W. 2d 320 (1955) and Lage v . Potta-
wattamie County,232 Iowa 944 , 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942} quote the 
general rule from C. J. S. that public property may not be con~ 
demned for an inconsistent use. However, they stop before 
the exception to that rule is stated in the following language, 
"However, the general rule does not ordinarily apply where 
the power of eminent domain is. being exercised by the sovereign 
itself, such as the state or federal government, for its immediate 
purposes, rather than by a public service corporation or a muni-
cipality. " Apparently this exception was not stated because 
neither case involved a party, such as the state, which would 
have a superior right . However 1 the court in Connolly did 
state at 326 of 68 N. W. 2d, "The city of Des Moines has no 
superior right of eminent domain over the right possessed by 
the defendant railroad•.•;• which would seem to imply that the 
court might recognize a superior right in a proper case. Also 
see State v. Superior Court, 44 Wash 2d 607 1 269 P.2d 560 
(1954). 
4 
the superior right of the sovereign would appear to permit the 
condemnation by it of property already devoted to a public use by 
a private agency or an inferior political body even though the use 
by the sovereign would destroy the existing use, 16 
It should be noted that Iowa Code Section 471.1 (1958) which 
.gives the state the authority to condemn land speaks only of 
private property and makes no mention of public property. 
While this omission in the statute does not seem to have been 
employed as a defense to condemnation in any case, the pos-
sibility of its use may still exist. It can have no application 
to the condemnation of land for controlled access highways' be-
cause Iowa Code Section 306A. 5 (1958) gives authority to take 
both public and private land for such purposes. Moreover, it is 
suggested that the omission in Iowa Code Section 471.1 (1958) 
would not be a bar to the state in any event, since the Iowa 
courts have twice held that "public" property may be called 
"private" property for condemnation purposes. 17 Consequent-
ly, it would appear that the state has authority to condemn 
public as well as private property for all public purposes, 
provided, of course, that compensation is paid. 
Even in the case of expressed grant, there is some limita-
tion on the power. It is firmly established that property of a 
private corporation devoted to one public purpose cannot be con-
demned by another for the same purpose and used in the same 
16. It would seem that the biggest weakness in this position may 
be the possibUity that an express statute would have to be 
shown. No authority seems to exist one way or another on 
this subject. 
17. State ex rel. Board v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co. , 216 Iowa 43 6, 
249 N.W. 366 (1933) (held that state highways were private 
property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment for which 
compensation must be paid where a taking occurs); Ferguson 
v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 202 Iowa 508, 210 N.W. 604 (1926) 
(held that a railroad's property was private in the sense that 
it could not be taken without compensation.) Also see Platts-
mouth Bridge Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 232 Iowa 1118 
7 N.W. 2d 409 (1943). 
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power of eminent domain to purposes involving a public use . 26 
Once a private use is demonstrated, the statute or the governmental 
action, as the case may be, is held invalid . 27 Condemnation of 
property is also disallowed where the necessity of the property 
for puplic use is not demonstrated. 28 ·Article I , ·section 9, provid-
ing that 11 • • • • no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law 11 is also available as a 
defense to a taking where no compensation is given , 29 or where 
the proper procedures are ignored. 3 0 It is probably also available 
26 . Bankhead v . Brown , 25 !owa 540 (1868}; accord, Emmetsburg 
v. Central Iowa Telephone Co . , Iowa , 96 N-. W . 2d 
445, 451 (1959). DePenning v. Iowa Power & Light Co ., 239 
Iowa 950, 33 N.W. 2d 503 (1948}; Heinz. v. City_of Davenport, 
230 Iowa 7, 296 N. W. 783 (1941); Wertz v . City of ·Ottumwa , 
201 Iowa 947, 208 N.W. 511, 513 (1926). This requirement 
has also been e~plained in terms of the unwritten constitutional 
doctrine that the state may not take property from A and give it 
to B. Stewart v . Board of Supervisors, 30 Iowa 9, 19 (1870). 
27 . Fergusonv. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 202Iowa508, 210N. W . i04 
(1926) (state regulation of rents of property located on r9il-
road right-of-way_ involved since coal shed involved was of a 
private character); Richards v . Wolf, 82 Iowa 358, 4 7 N. W . 
1044 (1891) (road established was essentially private because 
it went only to one person and that individual already had a 
means of access); Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540 (1868) 
(statute held invalid which authorized mining companies to 
acquire roads to connect mines to public roads but apparently 
the company was to have title to the roads.) 
28. Hoover v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 230 Iowa 1069, 
300 N.W. 287 (1941) (apparent intent of condemnation was to 
prevent erection of filling station abutting the ~ighway); 
Creston Waterworks v. McGrath, 89 Iowa 502, 56 N.W. 680 
(1893). 
29. Stoner McCray System v . City of Des Moines, 24 7 Iowa 1313, 
78 N. W . 2d 843. (195 6); Witke v . State Conservation Commis-
sion, 244 Iowa 261, 56 N. W. 2d 582 (1953); Plattsmouth 
Bridge Co . v . Globe Oil & Refining Co. , 23 2 Iowa 1118, 7 N . W. 
2d 409 (1943) 
30 . Taylor v. Drainage District #56, 167 Iowa 42, 148 N.W. 1040 
(1914); in re Bradley, 108 Iowa 476, 79 N ~W . 280 (1899); 
Fleming v. Hull , 73 Iowa 598, 35 N.W. 673 (1887) . 
8 
where arbitrary action is taken. 31 Although no case seems. specifi-
cally ·to have turned on the Federal Constitution, the provisions of 
the 14th· Amendment are also available to the property owner. 3 2 
b. Judicial Review of Qonstitutional Determinations 
Basically the review which is available is of two different 
types of actions: (1) the determination made by the Legislature that 
a certain purpose is public; and (2) the determination made by the 
condemning authority that a particular use fits within the general 
area approved by the Legislature and the manner in which this 
.determination. is arrived at and carr ied out . The general rule 
which .. prevails with regard to determinations· made by· the Legis-
lature itself is that the determination by that body as to the neces-
sity of the project, which is the key issue in determining whether or 
not the project is actually of a public character is fundamentally 
the province of that body . 33 However I where there is a manifest 
absence of publicpurpose, the courts will review even a deter-
mination by-the Legislature . 34 However, judicial intervention 
... in the legislative process is · solely in. the constitutional sense and 
. vyould not occur at all but for the constitutional provisions qiscus-
31. Cf. Pederson v. Town of Radcliffe , 226 Iowa 166, 284 N. W. 145 
(1939) (no basis for decision given but presumably it was consti-
tutional) . 
32. Carroll v. City of Cedar Falls o 221 Iowa 277, 261 N . W" 652, 
656 .(1935); Ferguson v. Ill. Cent. R. Co . , 202 Iowa 508, 210 
N.W. 604 (1926). 
33. Reterv. Davenport, R. I . & N . W . Ry . Co. , 243 Iowa lll2, 54 
N. W. 2d 863, 867 (1952) (legislature has .... .. the initial duty 
of determining what constitutes a public use"); Sisson v. Board 
of Supervisors, 128 Iowa 442 , 104 N . W . 454 4 460 (1905); 
Bennettv. CityofMarion, 106Iowa 628, 76N. W . 844 (1898)-; 
Stark v . Sioux City & Pac . R. Co . , 43 Iowa 501 (1876). 
34 . Ermels v. Webster City , 246 Iowa 1305, 71 N.W.2d 9ll 
(1955); Reter v . Davenport, R.I. & N.W. Ry . Co. , 243 Iowa 
lll2 , 54 N.W. 2d . 863 (1952). 
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sed above. 3 5 Acting _'in this capacity , the court has held statutes in-
VQ.lid which involved a taking of property for private use. 3 6 
However, the Legislature usually designates a broad area as 
involving a public purpose and delegates to various state agen-
cies, local governments , and private concerns the power to 
determine the necessity for specific actions within the de.signated 
area. When such subordinate bodies condemn, the courts have said 
that their actions are the same as if the s t ate itself were condem-
ning the land . 3 7 Great discretion is allowed .to such grantee, 3 8 
whether it be a state agency, 3 9 a county board of supervisors, 40 
35 . Reter v. Davenport , R. I. & N. W . Ry. Co . , 243 Iowa 1112, 54 
· N.W.2d 863 (1952) . 
3 6. 
3 7. 
38. 
3 9. 
40. 
Bankhead v. Brown , 25 Iowa 540 (1868}; accord . Ferguson v. 
Ill. Cent. R. Co . , 202Iowa508, 210N . W. 604 (1926}. 
Connolly v. Des Moines & Cent . Iowa Ry . Co . , 246 Iowa 764 , 
57 N.w. 2d 320 (1955); Bennett v. City of Marion , 106 Iowa 
628 , 76 N. W. 844 (1898}. The language apparently refers to 
state agencies and. not the Legislature . 
Minear v . Plowman, 197 Iowa 1188, 197 N. W. 67 (1924). 
Porter v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 241 Iowa 1208, 
44 N.W. 2d 682 (1950); Hoover v. Iowa State Highway Com-
mis·sion, 23 0 Iowa 1069 , 3 00 N. W. 287 (1941) . In the latter 
case the court held no necessity existed .for the taking while 
in the former the opposite :result was reached. It is felt that 
these two cases are not inconsistent in that in Porter a com-
pelling need existed, and a definite standard in the form of 
federal regulations existed . In the Hoover case the impression 
existed that the condemnation was only a thinly qisguised at-
tempt to prevent the establishing of a filling station abutting 
the right-of-way. See also Warren v . Highway Commission, 
Iowa , 93 N. W . 2d 60 (1958). 
--=----'17' --
Denny v. Des-Moines County, 143 ·Iowa 466, 121 N. W. 1066 
(1909}; Temple v . Hamilton County, 134 Iowa 706, 112 N. W. 
174 (1907). However, the action of such a body was over-
turned in Richards v. Wolf, 82 Iowa 358, 47 N.W. 1044 
(1891} where a private use was involved . 
10 
a municipality, 41 township trustees, 42 or a private organization, 
such as a railroad . 43 However, since such· bodies and organiza-
tions are essentially subordinate, their exercise of the powers 
granted. to them.is .. .subject to.review by the courts . 44 ·Thus, actions 
tak:ern~ h:y.uiu):>ordinate,bodfe-s 'are subjected to one ad<;:litional type of 
review than are the determinations of the legislature. 
c . Standards for Determining What Is A Public Use 
The problem of laying down a standard for determining what is 
a public use has been a very perplexing one for the court~ . This is 
reflected in the f.ollowing statement by the court in Sisson v. Board 
41. Mook v . Sioux City, 244 Iowa 1124 , 60 N. W. 2d 92 (1953); 
Brush v . Town of Liscomb, 202 Iowa 1155, 211 N.W. 856 
(1927); Ce!lt· Life . Assur . Soc . v . City of Des Moines, 185 
Iowa 573, 171 N.W. 31 (1910); Chicago , G.W. Ry. Co. v. 
Mason City, 155 Iowa 99, 135 N.W. 9 (191·2); Kemp v. City 
of Des Moines , 125 Iowa 640, 101 N. W. 474 (1904); Dewey v. 
City of Des Moines, 101 Iowa 416, 70 N. W . 605 .(1897). How-
ever, the discretion of a city council was interfered with in 
Pederson v. Town of Radcliffe, 226 Iowa 166, 284 N. W. 145 (1939) 
where the action .of the council was clearly arbitrary . 
42. Minear v. Plowman, 197 Iowa .1188, 197 N.W. 67 (1924); 
Barrett v. Kemp, 91 Iowa 296, 59 N. W. 76 (1894). 
43. Connolly v. Des Moines & Cent. Iowa Ry. Co., 246 Iowa 
• 
764 , 57 N. W. 2d 320 (1955); Town of Alvord v. Great Northern 
R. Co., 179 Iowa 465, 161 N.W. 467 (1917); Stark v. Sioux 
City & Pac. R. Co . , 43 Iowa 501 (1876). 
44. Cent. LifeAssur . Soc . v . City.ofDes Moines, 185 lowa 573, 
17:1 N :W . 31 (1919) (containing the best discussion, ,of this 
principle in the Iowa cases); accord. Town of Alvord v. Great 
Northern Ry . Co . , 179 Iowa 465 , 161 N.W. 467 (1917); Sisson 
v. · Board of Supervisors, 128 Iowa 442, 104 N.W. 454 (1905) 
(containing the implication that the general declaration of a 
public use does not guarantee that each particular use will .be 
of the same ,character); Bennett v. City of Marion, 106 Iowa 
628, 76 N. W . 844 (1898) . 
( ( 
l 
l 
/ 
1 
f 
r 
l 
\ 
\ 
( 
t 
i 
I f 
\ } 
J 
of Supervisors, 45 
"It must be confessed that there is no standard 
by which to determine in all cases what· is a 
public use or what can fairly be regarded as a 
• • 1.- pubiic beii"E:}fit, and therefore conducive to the 
public health, welfare, etc. . The Constitution 
contains no words of definition, and it seems 
to remain for each act which is brought forward , 
aided, of course, by the disclosed purpose and 
object thereof, and by the conditions stated or 
well known, upon which it is to operat e, to 
furnish an answer to the test , " 
11 
Perhaps it is this perplexity which has led the court at one 
time to declare that "public convenience" is enough to .justify con-
demnation, 46 and at others to say that "mere public convenience" 
is not enough. 4 7 It is clear, however, that absolute necessity 
need not be. shown nor need it be demonstrat ed that everyone will be 
benefitied',_4g In fact , a spur track may be laid to one industry49 or 
a road established which leads to only one farm. 50 It has also been 
45 . 128 Iowa 442, 104 N. W . 454, 459 (1905) . This language was 
also quoted in Ferguson v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 202 Iowa 508, 
210 N.W. 604 (1926) indicating that the problem of finding a. 
standard has been a continuing one. 
46. Minear v . Plowman, 197 Iowa 1188, 197 N. W . 67 (1924). 
47. Bennett v. City of Marion, 106 Iowa 628, 76 N. W •. 844 (1898}; 
Creston Waterworks v. McGrath 4 89 Iowa 502, 56 N. W . 680 
(1893} . 
48. Minear v. Plowman, 1~7 Iowa 1188 , 197 N.W. 67 (19.24); 
Sisson v . Board of Supervisors , 128 Iowa 442 , 104 N.W. 454 
(1905} 
49 . Reter v . Davenport, R. I. & N. W . Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 
N. W , 2d 863 (195 2) (containing an excellent discussion of public 
use and railroads) . 
50. Pagel v . Oaks, 64 Iowa 198, 19 N.W. 905 (1884); Johnson v. 
Supervisors of Clayton County, 61 Iowa 89, 15 N.W. 586 
(1883}. The opposite result was reached in Richards v. Wolf, 
82 Iowa 35 8, 4 7 N. W . 1044 (1891}, but in that case the bene-
ficiary of the road owned land which already abutted on a road . 
12 
a long-accepted principle that the use is not rendered private simply 
.because private profit is derived from it. 51 The statement which pro-
bably best harmonizes the conHicting positions taken by the courts 
and provides the most flexible guide for making these determinations 
is found in Si~son v. Board of Supervisors , 52 
11 Perhaps no nearer approach to accuracy in the way 
0 of a general statement can be had than to say that 
the mandate of the Constitution will be satisfied if 
it shall be made reasonably to a ppear that to some ' 
appreciable extent the propo sed improvement will 
inure to the use and benefit of parties concerned, 
considered a s members of the community or of the 
state, and not solely as individuals. While, how-
ever, the benefit must be common in respect of the 
right of use and participation , it cannot be material 
that each user shall not be affected in precisely 
the same manner or in the same degree . 11 
SECTION 3·. COMPENSATION MUST BE SECURED. 
Article I, Section 18 of the Iowa Constitution req1,1ires that 
private property shall not be t aken for public use without just com-
pensation first being made or secured to the owner thereof. 53 The 
landowner is not required t o rely on the personal solvency of the 
condemnor. Insolvency or solvency is not an issue . 54 On the 
failure of the company or governmental agency which is already in 
possession and use of the premises for a right- of- way to pay the 
amount assessed, it may be restrained by injunction from further use 
51. Carroll v. Cedar Falls, 221 Iowa 277, 261 N.W. 652 (1935); 
Stewart. v. Board of Supervisors , 3 0 Iowa 9 (1870). 
52. 128 Iowa 442, 104 N. W . 454, 459 (1905) . 
53 . Nichols, Ibid. Section 4 . 8 (3d ed. 1950) Due process. under the 
Constitution insures the right of compensation to the property 
owner when his property is taken by eminent domain . Dinwiddie 
v. Roberts, 1 Greene 313 .(Iowa); DeCastello v. Cedar Rapids 1 
1 71 low a 18 1 15 3 N. W. 3 53 • 
54. Gr iffith v . Drainage District 1 182 Iowa 1291 1 166 N. W. 5 70; 
Scott v. Price Bros ., 207 Iowa 91, 217 N.W. 75. 
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13 
of the right-of- way. 55 In fact, both injunction and ejection seem to 
be available to enforce the landowner's rights. 56 The purpose of 
these drastic remedies is to coerce payment, and the court gives a 
reasonable time to the company or governmental agency to pay com-
pensation before the decree becomes effective . 57 The fact that the 
owner permitted the company to enter on the land and construct the 
improvement does not estop him from maintain·ing an· abtton of eject-
ment or securing an injunction writ . 58 
However, if an appeal is taken by the condemnor, the con-
stit4tional provision is not violated by Iowa Code Section 4 72 . 25 
(195 8} permitting the condemnor to enter upon the land pending 
the appeal, if the damages first assessed have been deposited with 
the sheriff. Under the laws of the 58th G . A. (1959), the court may 
direct disposition to persons entitled thereto of such part of the 
damages on deposit as the court finds just and proper . 59 But if on 
appeal the amount of the original assessment is increased, the con-
demnor may be enjoined from further prosecuting the work or use of 
55. Scott v. Price Bros., 207 Iowa 91, 217 N. W. 75; Gates v. 
Colfax Northern Ry. Co., 177 Iowa 690 , 159 N.W. 456 (1916). 
56. Henry v. Dubuque, 10 Iowa 540; Richards v. D. M. Valley R. 
Co., 18 Iowa 259; Irish v. B.S.W. Ry. Co., 44 Iowa 380; 
Hibbs v. C . & W. Ry. Co., 39 Iowa 340; Holbert v. St. L., K.C . 
etc. Ry. Co., 45 Iowa 23; Congerv. B. & S.W. Ry . Co . , 41 Iowa 
419. 
57. Conger v. B. & S. W . R. Co . , 41 Iowa 419,422 (a railway com-
pany appropriated a right- of-way without compensating the owner 
therefor, although damages had been assessed. Held: that 
ejectment would lie but that execution for possession should not 
issue until the company had been granted a reasonable time fixed 
by the court in which to pay the assessed damages and interest 
thereon}; Scott v. Price ·Bros., 207 Iowa 191, 217 N.W. 75 
(injunction subject to the condition that in the absence of pay-
ment of the award to the landowner, the injunction should take 
effect}. 
58 . Hibbs v. c . & W.R. Co. , 39 Iowa 340; . conger v. B. & S. S . Ry . 
Co ., 41 Iowa 419 . 
59. Section 1, Chapter 318, 58th G.A. (1959) . 
14 
the premises until the increased amount is paid. 60 
If an appeal is taken from the award and the damages awarded 
are greater than those allowed by the commissioners, the condemnor 
must deposit the new amount with the sheriff if he desires to appeal 
to the Supreme Court; he is not relieved from this obligation by 
giving a supersedeas bond. 61 
A rather difficult problem arises when the compensation is de-
posited with the sheriff and possession is taken, but the condemnor 
immediately thereafter abandons the land. In Hasting v. B. & M. R. 
Go., 38 Iowa 316, it was held that the condemnor in such instances 
could not recover the deposit. His only remedy or recourse is by an 
appeal showing this fact as a justification for reducing the damages. 
If on appeal the amount of the sheriff jury's assessment is notre-
duced, it is an adjudication that the landowner is entitled to that 
much for the temporary occupancy. However, the jury is unwarrant-
ed in finding a conditional judgment as to the amount in case of 
reoccupancy. An abandonment, once made, is permanent and pre-
cludes a re-entry. 62 
The effect of depositing the compensation with the sheriff is 
to give the condemnor immediate right to possession, 63 but bestows 
60. Peterson v. :rerreby, 30 Iowa 327; Richard v. D.M. Valley R. 
Co., 18 Iowa 259. 
61. Downing v. D.'M.N.W. R. Co., 63 Iowa 177, 179, 18 N.W. 
862. The law requires money "and it is not within the power 
of the corporation to substitute bonds where the law requires 
money and thus compel the landowner to resort •••• to an 
action on the bond". A warrant deposited by public authori-
ties is sufficient. See Iowa Code Section 472.30 (1958). 
62. Note that where the sheriffs jury allows no damages for the 
appropriation of land for a street, the owners are entitled to 
an injunction pending the appeal. Connelly v. Creswold, 
7 Iowa 416; Iowa College v. Davenport, 7 Iowa 213. 
63. White v. Wabash Ry. Co., 64 Iowa 281, 20 N.W. 436; Beal 
v. Highway Commission, 209 Iowa 1308; 230 N.W. 302. 
Also see Iowa Code Section 472.25 (1958). 
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on him no greater right. Such deposit is merely security for the ob-
ligation to pay for the land takenb Although in the early case of 
Ruppert v. C. Q. & St. J, Ry . Co.~ it was intimated that title passed 
to the condemnor on depositing of the amount of the commissioners' 
award with the sheriff, this holding has been substantially repudiated 
by White v . Wabash Ry . Co. 65 and· Burns v . Fort Dodge & Des Moines 
Ry. Co . 66 These later decisions enunciated the rule that the sheriff is 
the condemnor's agent and that the owner is not divested of title until 
he receives actual payment. However, the landowner has a definite 
interest in the deposit , and the sheriff is bound to retain it . If he 
returns such fund to the condemnor, the landowner may sue him for 
the surrender of it. 6 7 
Compensation must be paid in money, and an offer to grant 
64. 43 low a 4 9 0, 4 94. "It is further claimed by the appellee that 
the subsequent partition of the premises was good ground .for 
dismissing the appeal. But the right- of- way was acquired when 
the damages were paid to the sheriff. All conveyances made 
afterwards were made subject to the right-of- way so acquired, 
Nothing remained to be determined except the question as to 
whether the damages assessed should be increased or diminish-
ed." 
65. Whitev. WabashRy. Co . , 64 Iowa 281, 20 N.W. 436 (holding 
that the payment of the assessment to the sheriff did not ex-
tinguish the landowner's title, that it merely allows the con-
demnor to take possession of the land , that if the sheriff con-
verts the fund, it is the condemnor's loss, and the landowner 
can recover possession for non-payment.) 
66. Burns v. Railway Co ., 110 Iowa 385, 387, 81 N.W. 794 (1900) . 
"We are not inclined to ppallirfor further consideration the ques-
tion determined .in White v. Railroad Co. • • • • It was there held 
that money paid to the sheriff in ad quod damnum proceedings 
was by way of security to the landowner and was not payment to 
him , and that the latter's title and right to possession can be 
extinguished only by the payment of the damages assessed." 
67. Bannister v. Mcintire, 112 Iowa 600, 84 N.W. 707 (sheriff is 
bound to retain the money for the landowner and may be sued 
for the failure to do S'()); Northwesternl'·. M.fg. ·0o. v . Basset, 
205 Iowa 999, 218 N. W . 932; Lower v. Miller , 66 Iowa 408, 
23 N.W. 897 . 
16 
certain privileges or to build something for the owner to replace a 
convenience that he has lost cannot be the basis of miti(!ating 
damages ?8 However, an owner may lose his right to compensation 
by release or by agreement not to claim the same. 69 A parol release 
or agreement not to claim compensation has been held valid. 70 
In case of fire, war, or other great calamities i private property 
may be taken or destroyed without compensation. 7 
SECTION 4. WHAT CONSTITUTES A "TAKING" 
·<ilk- The' .. J3asic Concept of A "Taking" 
At the outset of an examination of this rather confusing area of 
condemnation law, it would be well to discuss briefly the background 
of the present Iowa position as to what actions by a condemnor con-
stitutionally require compensation to the property owner. State con-
stitutions providing for compensation when the power of eminent 
domain is exercised are traditionally categorized into those providing 
for compensation where a "taking" has occurred and those which allow 
compensation for "damages" as well as for a taking. Originally the 
state constitutions allowed recovery only for a taking, but some states 
felt that a more liberal rule was necessary and added "or damages" to 
their constitutions. Even at that time it was not at all clear that the 
concept of a taking did not embrace"damages" as well. 72 In addition, 
over the years the interpretations by the courts of both "taking"c arid 
"damages" have varied so much from state to state that what is a tak'-· 
ing in one state may not be in another, arrl that what is a taking under 
68. Nichols, Ibid. Section 205 (2d ed.); Kemmerer v. Highway 
Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 241 N.W. 693; DePenning v. 
Iowa Power & Light Co., 239 Iowa 950, 33 N.W.2d 503 (1948). 
69. 20 C.J. 868; Chic. etc. Ry. Co. v. Snyder, 120 Iowa 532, 95 
N.W. 180; Burlington v. Gilbert, 31 Iowa 356. 
70. 20 C.J. 869; Pratt v. Des Moines Ry. Co., 72 Iowa 249, 33 N.W .. 
666; Wapsipincon Power Co. v. Waterhouse, 186 Iowa 524, 167 
N.W. 623 (1918). 
71. Field v. Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575 (destruction to prevent 
spread of fire}. 
72. See discussion on pp. 369, 370 of 5 N.W. 2d in Liddick v. 
Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W. 2d 361 (1942). 
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one constitution may not even be a damage under another . 73 Con-
sequently, the traditional categorization of the states into two 
groups depending on their constitutional phra s e is a pt to be mis-
leading . 
As previously noted , the Iowa ·c onstitution provides in Article 
I, Section 18, that, "private property shall not be t aken (emphasis 
supplied) for public use without just compensation • ••• ", which 
seems to put Iowa in the category of stat es whic h limit -recovery 
to the situation in which there has been a t a king . Indeed, for a 
great many years the Iowa court in deny ing compensation oft en 
based its reasoning on the statement that t he re had been no actual 
taking and therefore there was no const itutional damage . 74 How-
ever, even during this period there were indications that certain 
types of injury suffered by property owners would b e c ompensable 
even though there was no actual physical taking of the land . 75 
In the landmark case of Liddick v . Council Bluffs, 23 2 Iowa 197, 
5 N. W . 2d 361 (1942}, the court seems t o have taken a new position . 
In that case and the Anderlik case which clar ified and reaffirmed it/6 
the court re-examined the early Iowa cases . Three cases denying 
recovery because no "taking" had occurred w ere overruled, 77 and a 
73. See Orgel, Ibid . Section 6 . 
74. Lingo v. Page County, 201 Iowa 906, 208 N. W . 327 (1926}; 
Pillings v. Pottawattamie County, 188 Iowa 448, 176 N. W . 314 
(1920}; Higgins v. Board of Supervisors , 188 Iowa 448, 176 N.W. 
268 (1920); Hubbell v . Des Moines, 173 Iowa 55, 154 N. W . 337 
(1915); Talcott Bros . v . Des Moines, 134 Iowa 113, 109 N. W . 
311 (1906} . 
75 . Nalon v. Sioux City , 216 Iowa 1081 , 250 N. W . 166 (1933}, (loss 
of access); Watson v . Mississippi River Power Co . , 174 Iowa 
23, 156 N. W . 188 (1916) (concussion damage from blasting); 
Borghart v . Cedar Rapids, 126 Iowa 313 , 101 N.W. 1120 (1905) 
(loss of access); Longv. Wilson, 119 Iowa 267, 93 N. W . 282 
(1903} (loss of access). 
76 . Anderlik v . Highway Commission, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N. W . 2d 605 
(1949} ; the Ander:lik case also dispels any doubt that the discus-
sion of "property" and "taking" in Liddick is pure dictum . 
77 . The overruled cases were: Lingo v . Page County, 201 Iowa 906, 
208 N.W. 327 (1926}; Pillings v. Pottawattamie County, 188 Iowa 
448, 176 N. W . 314 (19 20}; Talcott Bros . v . Des Moines, 134 
Iowa 113 , 109 N. W. 311 (1906). In addition on pp , 376 and 377 
of 5 N. W . 2d the court severely criticizes the language in Hubbell 
v . Des Moines, 173 Iowa 55, 154 N . W. 337 (1915)whichappears 
to base that decision on the fact that no "taking" occurred . 
18 
considerably broader view of the constitutional clause was introduced 
into Iowa constitutional law. The court discusses the distinction be-
tween a taking and damages and indicates that some courts have felt 
that "taking" includes "damages". Throughout the opinion, the court 
takes a broad view of "taking" and hence it is possible to argue that 
"taking" in Iowa now extends to "damages", although the court has 
never explicitly taken position. The more likely conclusion concern-
ing the effect of the Liddick case is that the court by its suggestion 
that the taking clause might include damages, intended simply to bol-
ster its decision to reject the strict taking cases which had for some 
time confused Iowa law. The main emphasis of the opinion seems to 
be placed on a broad concept of "property" embodying the bundle of 
rights theory. Property is viewed not as a material object but 
rather as a series of rights, no one of which may be appropriated by 
the state without compensation. Although the court did not enumerate 
all the rights involved, they must certainly include the right to undis-
burbed possession, the right of access, the rights to air and light, 
the right of lateral support, the right to unaltered flow of surface 
water across one's land, the right to continuation or riparian interests, 
as well as every other right with which the state may interfere in a 
substantial manner. 7 8 
Consequently, it would appear that the Iowa court has reject-
ed a strict view of "taking" and adopted a broad view of what 
constitutes "property". Decisions subsequent to the Liddick case 
seem to indicate that the court did not lntend to hold that any damage 
constitutes a "taking". Thus alleged damages resulting from loss of 
anticipated profits, 79 alteration of traffic patterns, 80 obstruction of a 
78. It is clear that the interference must be a material one. Liddick 
v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361,380 (1942). 
(dictum); Randall v. Christiansen, 76 Iowa 169, 40 N.W. 703 
(1888). 
79. Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 245 Iowa 763, 
61 N.W.2d 687 (1954); Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W. 
2d 85,96 (1948)(dictum). 
80. Wilson v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W. 2d 161 
(1958); Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W. 
2d 755 (1957). 
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road during construction, 81 and vacation of non- abutting highways, 82 
have been rejected. It is noteworthy , however , that this argument 
was not made by counsel. in arguing any of these cases. 
In conclusion, it may be seen that the distinction which has 
often been insisted upon between states whose constitutions allow 
recovery only for takings and those whose provisions go beyond to 
damages is now of considerably less importance than at one time 
believed. Before comparing d .ecisions of various jurisdictions, it 
is still of the utmost importance to determine the scope of the 
constitutional requirement for compensation; however , it is now 
clear that this determination must be based on an examination of 
the judicial interpretations of the constitutional. phrase , whether it 
be broad or narrow, rather than upon an arbitrary division of the 
states according to ,the constitutional language involved. 
b. Types of Estates for Which Compensation Must Be Paid 
When Rights Appurtenant Thereto Are Appropriated 
(1) Fee Simple 
The great majority of the cases involving condemnation deal 
with property held in fee and there appar.?pt1y.J .I1eyendlas been the 
slightest doubt that the constitutional protections were designed. to 
safeguard. the interests of the fee holder . This protection extends 
to one whose title is derived ~~m adverse possession as well as by 
conveyance or original grant. 
(2) Leasehold Interests 
Leasehold interests have received recognition by the courts 
for sometime as estates for which compensation must be paid when 
81. Wilson v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994 , 90 N. W. 2d 
161 (1958) . · 
82. Warren v. Highway Commission, 
60 (1958). 
Iowa I 93 N. w. 2d 
83 . Independent School District v. Timmons , 187 Iowa 1201, 175 
N.W. 499 (1919) . 
20 
their use is appropriated by a condemnor . 84 It is also clear that 
the rights appurtenant to ownership for which a fee holder would 
be entitled to recover are also deemed t o be property of the lease-
holqer for which appropriate compensation must be paid. 85 
· (3) Easements 
Although regarded in property law as a seryient estate, an ease-
ment is another of the types of estates which may not be taken 
except on payment of just compensation . 86 This is the case even 
where access to an easement i s cut off. 87 
(4} . Vested Interest in a Bus iness 
Another type of compensable interest is the vested interest in 
a business, which may be composed of several different types of 
property interests but which has a specia l character as a business 
because of governmental recognition . Thus in Stoner McCray System 
84 . Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 
198 N. W . 486 (1924); Werthman v. Mason City & Ft . Dodge Ry. 
Co. , 128 Iowa 135, 103 N.W. 135 (1905}; Renwick v . Daven-
port & N. W. R. Co . , 49 Iowa 664 (1878}. See also Division 
IV, infra, Compensation to Lessees . 
85. Highway Commission v . Smith, 248 !owa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 
(195 7) (leasehold interest must also be compensated for loss 
of access) . 
86 . Licht v ~ Ehlers, 234 Iowa 1331, 13 N.W. 2d 688 (1944) (plain-
tiff had an easement for a cattle pass under a county road} . 
Dawson v. McKinnon , 226 Iowa 756, 285 N.W. 258 (1939}; 
cf. State ex rel Board of Railroad Commissioners v. Stanolind 
Pipe Line-Co . , 2[ 6 Iowa 436, 249 N. W. 366 (1933) cert. den. 
290 U. S. 684 (intimating that compensation would have to be 
paid for crossing an easement owned by the state) . Also see 
1928 Report of the Attorney General, p. 112 and cases cited 
therein to the effect that the holder of an easement has a com-
pensable interest . 
87. Prymek v . Washington County, 229-Iowa 1249, 296 N. W . 467 
(1941} (road abandoned to which plaintiff had only access to 
his easement) . 
f 
1 
I 
' 
l 
( 
( 
I 
l 
{ 
( 
21 
v. City of Des Moines, 88 24 7 Iowa 1313, 78 N. W. 2d 843 (1956), 
the court held that the business of maintaining advertising signs 
had become vested because of permits issued by the city and that 
an ordinance which rendered established billboards non- conforming 
uses without compensation to the owners was unconstitutional. 
c. Property Rights Appurtenant to Estates in Land for 
Which Compensation Must Be Paid 
(1) Right of Undisturbed Possession 
The right of undisturbed possession is probably the most 
basic right which attaches to the concept of property. Any direct 
taking of property, of course, deprives the landowner of this right 
and compensation must be paid . This is true although the injury to 
the land results from flooding of the propert~ rather than through 
establishment of a public facility thereon. 8 Even though there is 
no physical encroachment on the land, the right of undisturbed pos-
session may be taken by actions or conduct which interfere with the 
use of the property o 90 ';I'he right to possession also includes the 
88. This is a difficult case to analyze because although specifically 
designafe9.:properties· were •. i.RiVGbiE)d; , it was' . .the·_businessJ. of out-
door advertising against which the ordinance was directed. The 
court does not make clear just what type of "vested interest or 
property right" was involved but the court's discussion seems to 
indicate that the protected right is the business of advertising, 
composed as it would be of fee simple properties, leaseholds, 
personal property, etc •• 
89 o Lage v o Pottawattamie County, 23 2 Iowa 944 , 5 N. W . 2d 161 
(1942); Iowa Power Co. v. Hoover, 166 Iowa 415, 147 N.W. 
858 (1915). However, a flooding in time of heavy rain is not 
a taking where no facility could have handled the water. Grimes 
v. Polk County, 240 Iowa 228, 34 N. W . 2d 767 (1948). 
90. Cf. Wilson v . Mississippi River Power Co., 174 Iowa 23, 156 
N.W. 188 (1916) (action at law for damages) . Also see United 
States v. Causby, 328U.S. 256 (1946) (flights of government 
owned airplanes over plaintiff's chicken farm at low altitude 
held to be a taking within the terms of the Fifth Amendment, 
which,through the Fourteenth Amendment, would also apply to 
state actions) . 
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right to receive the income t herefrom, a nd t hi s interest in property 
may not be appropriated without compensation" 91 
{2), Riparian Rights 
Two questions are presented in connection with -the taking of 
land adjoining a river or lake . The first deals with the ownership of 
the land upon which the improvement i s t o be.located . The stat e has 
undoubted title to the land from the b ed of t he r iver or lake to the 
high\water mark . 92 The difficulty ar ise s in determining the stat e 
of the title to land at a given time as a result of the c onstant shift-
ing of river boundaries . Thus the state apparently may be divested 
of title where the high water is altered , even t hough the new bank 
is established artifically by a third party; in such a c.ase the riparian 
owner takes title to the newly accreted land, which may not be taken 
from him without compensation. 93 However , where the boundaries 
of the river are clear . it would seem t hat t he s tate may erect facUl-
ties on it without compensation to riparian owners. 94 However, 
there may be :some que$tion as to whether the state may erect facilities 
not in aid of navigation upon the land it owns below high water mark~5 
91. Grant v. City of Davenport, 18 Iowa 179 (1865.) . 
92. State v . Dakota County, Iowa , 93 N. W. 2d 5 95 (195 8}; 
Solomon v. Sioux City, 243 Iowa 634 , 51 N.W. 2d 472 (1952}; 
State v . Betz, 232 Iowa 84 , 4 N.W. 2d 872 (1942); Peck v. 
Alfred Olsen Constr . Co . , 216 Iowa 519 , 245 N. W . 131 (1932) . 
93 . Solomon v. Sioux City, 243 Iowa 634, 51 N. W. 2d 4 72, 4 76 
(1952). 
94. Cf. Peck v. Alfred Olsen Constr . Co" , 216 Iowa 519, 245 N. W . 
131 (1932). 
95. A typical stat ement of the nature of the state's interest in this 
land describes. it as a "trust for navigation and commerce•r. State 
v . Dakota County , Iowa , 93 N. W. 2d 595, 599 (l958)p 
Query whether this extends to cover such facilities as highways and 
r_ailroads . Clearly a great many railroad tracks· have been laid on 
such lands I apparently based on the authority of Iowa Code Section 
1328 (1860), now repealed . See C . B. & Q. R. Co . vs Porter, 72 
Iowa 426 0 34 N. W . 286 (1887}. However , if construction oiJ.i'm-
provements on such land is limited to navigational facilities, it is 
: ) 1. doubtful if anyone would have standing to contest the use of land 
which is admitt edly the s t ate's . 
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It has been held that the construction of an artificial embankment 
by a railroad to protect its tracks laid on state land below high water 
mark cuts off accretion, and the landowner can take no interest in the 
land, 96 ·G>therwise the embankment would presumably constitute a new 
high water mark, thus divesting the state of title to the land and giving 
the abutting owner title to the highway. 
A more difficult question arises. in connection with the riparian 
owners'97 so-called "right of access". It was originally held. that an 
owner had no right of access to a river where a railroad was construct-
ed on land lying between the high and low water marks which by law 
belongs to the state. 98 However, Iowa Code Section 477.3 (1958) 
specifies certain types of facilities to which access cannot be cut 
off without paging compensation as required in Iowa Code Section 
477.4 (1958) . 9 Presumably, however, if these facilities do not 
exist, the landowner has no right of access to the river where high 
and low water marks are involved. 0his view receives support from Peck v. Alfred Olsen Constr . Co . , 1 0 which appears to hold that the 
96 . C. B. & Q. R. Co. v . Porter, 72 Iowa 426, 34 N. W. 286, 289 
(1887}. 
97. It should be noted that the term riparian owner is property used 
to describe only one whose property abuts on a. river; property 
around a lake is held by a littoral owner. Apparently the dis-
tinction is only one of terminology and is without legal effect . 
See Peck v . Alfred Olsen Constr. Co. , 216 Iowa 519, 245 N. W • 
131, 137 (1932}. 
98. Tomlin v . The Dubuque, Bellewe & Miss . R. Co., 32 Iowa_l.06 
(1871). See discussion of this ·case in Peck v. Alfred Olsen 
Constr . Co . , 216 Iowa 519, 245 N.W. 131, 137 (1932}. 
99. Accord, Renwick, Shaw & Crossett v . The D. & N. W . R. Co., 
49 Iowa 664 (1878) aff'd 102 U.S. 180. It should be noted, how~ 
ever, that this statute covers only the rights of railroads . 
100. 216 Iowa 519 , 245 N. W . 131 (1932). On its facts, this case 
need only have held that reasonable access to the lake was not 
denied. 
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right of the state to further navigation i s paramount to any "property" 
which an abutting owner may have in the right of access; presumably 
the same policy would be applied to highways cutting off access even 
though they are not technically in aid of navigation. 
(3) Right of AccesslOl 
At the outset it should be noted that although change of grade 
and right of access cases are closely related and although some 
change of grade cases are considered herein, the bulk of them are 
considered in Division VII which deals specifically with change of 
grade . 
First of all, the legal concept of the right of access should be 
understood. The best view seems to regard it as an easement.l02 
However, this easement exists only to roads which, at the time of 
their establishment , were not designated as controlled access roads. 
Where a new highway or a section of relocated highway is designat-
ed as a controlled-access facility at the time . of its construction , no 
right of access vests and no compensation should be allowed there-
for . 103 The landowner may, of course, still recover damages to his 
land caused by the fact that the road separates two tracts which are 
now divided; however, he may not recover for loss of access to the 
highway itself. 
However, once a right of access vests in the landowner, it is 
regarded as one of the rights appurtenant to ownership which may 
not be appropriated by the state without compensation. This is the 
case where access to a road is cut off, 104 a road is vacated or 
101. On this general subject 8 see note, Controlled Access Highways 
in Iowa, 43 Iowa ·L. Rev. 258 (1958); Cunningham, The Limited-
Access Highway from a Lawyer's Viewpoint, .13 Mo. L. Rev. 19 
(1948); Note, Freeways and the Rights of Abutting Owners, 3 
· Stanford L. Rev. 298 (1951); Clarke, The Limited- Access High-
way, 27 Wash. L. Rev. 111 (1952) . · 
102. State v. Burk, 200 Ore . 211, 265 P. 2d 783 (1954). 
103. State v . Burk , 200 Ore . 211 , 265 P. 2d 783 (1954); Carazalla v. 
Wisconsin, 269Wis. 593, 70 N.W. 2d 208, rehearing 71 N.W.2d 
276 (1955) . Lehman v. Hyvw. Comm., (Op~riim.n: N:ov~mber 17, 1959). 
104. Hd.ghway Commission v . Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N. W. 2d 755 
(1957) . 
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abandoned, 105 lateral support is destroyed, 106 a river channel i s 
straightened , 107 a public square is sold to private interests, 108 
a viaduct is erected, 109 or a bus stop is created, 110 so long as 
access to the property by means of a road , street , or other publicly 
owned property is cut off or substantially impaire<;l . Recovery may 
also be allowed where plaintiff' s business is cut off from the free 
course of trade . 111 
However, only those persons who suffer a special damage apart 
from injury shared by the public as a whole are entitled to receive 
compensation for interference with their rights of access. The is sue 
usually arise~ in connection with what is known as •r circuity of travel" 
and landowners are denied compensation unless t hey can show. that 
their damages are special and not shared by the general public . Thus 
105 . Prymek v. Washington County , 22 9 -Iowa 1249, 296 N.W. 467 
(1941) (access to an easement cut off); Magdefrau v. Wa~hington 
County, 228 Iowa 853 , 293 N.W. p74 (1940); Hubbell v. De s 
Moines , 173 Iowa 55, 154 N.W. 337 (1915) (dictum); McCann 
v. Clarke County , 149 Iowa 13, 127 N. W . 1011 (1910) (also 
abolishing a distinction which had formerly existed between 
olosures in a city and those in the country); Ridgway v. City of 
Osceola, 139 Iowa 590 , 117 N. W . . 974 (1908); Lopg v . Wilson , 
119 Iowa 267, 93 N. W . 282 (1903) . 
1 0€> . Cf. Hathaway v. Sioux City, 244 Iowa 5 08, 57 N. W . 2d 228 
(1953) . 
107. Nalon v . Sioux City, 216 Iowa 1041, 250 N.W. 166 (1933) , 
108, Borghart v. Cedar Rapids, 126 Iowa 313, 101 N. W . 1120 (1905) . 
109. Anderlik v. Highway Commission, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W. 2d 605 
(1949) (the extent to which this case deals with right of access is 
questionable; in . its statement of facts the court says that plain-
tiff had. to travel further to get to town but does not ~;Uscuss that 
fact at any point in the opinion, ) • 
110 . Gates v . City of Bloomfield, 243 Iowa 671, 53 N.W. 2d 279 
(195 2). 
111. Cf. Young v. Rothrock, 121 Iowa 588 , 96 N. W . 1105 (1903); 
Platt v. C . B. & Q. , 74 Iowa 127 1 ;37 N. W . 107 (1888); Ewell v. 
Greenwood , 26 Iowa 3 77 (1868). All of these cases involved 
actions to abate nuisances; however, they were cited by the court 
inBryanv. Petty, 162 Iowa 62, 143 N. W . 987 (1913), whichwas 
a condemnation type case. Since the decision in Warren v. High-
way Commission , Iowa , 93 N. W .2d 60 (1958), they must 
be regarded with some suspicion however . 
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the 'fabt that iplairltiff must make a sli~ht detour in going to a nearby 
town112 or to his business interest}! or pass over a road which is 
less desirable 114 has been held insufficient to give plaintiff a 
special interest. The Iowa position on the matter seems to have been 
rather clearly spelled out by Warren v. Iowa State Highway Commis- · ., , 
sian, ll5 which reconciles conflicting precedents and establishes the 
rule that compensability hinges on whether or not the plaintiff's 
access to the highway is cut off as a result of the vacation. If plain-
tiff still has access to the general road system, he has suffered no 
legal injury even though it may be more inconvenient for him to use 
such system as a result of the vacation. Although his damage may 
be greater in degree than that suffered by the general public, it is 
not different in kind;, and hence, under .the test employed by the 
court, the injury is non-compensable. 
In addition to showing that he is damaged specially, plaintiff 
must show that he is deprived of more than reasonable access. The 
qualification imposed on the right of access that it extends only to 
"reasonable" access seems to have been first introduced into Iowa 
112. Hansell v. Massey, 244 Iowa 969, 59 N.W. 2d 221 (1953); 
Heery v. Roberts, 186 Iowa 61, 170 N.W. 405, rehearing 172 
N.W. 161 (1919); Chrisman v. Brandes, 137 Iowa 433, 112 
N.W. 833 (1907); Lorenzen v. Preston, 53 Iowa 580, 5 N.W. 
764 (1880); Brady v. Shinkle, 40 Iowa 476 (1875). 
113. Accord, Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 
N. W. 2d 755 (195 7) (landowner argued in>his brief that he was 
damaged bv virtue of the fact that access from his home to his 
business across the street was impaired by virtue of the erection 
of" jiggle bars" in the middle of the street requiring considerable 
circuity of travel; however, the court rejected this contention); 
cf. Livingston v. Cunningham, 188 Iowa 254, 175 N.W. 980 
(1920) (plaintiff hauled ice for his business by means of the 
road in question from an adjacent river; however, the court 
said plaintiff had no vested interest in the ice. 
114. Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W. 925 (1914); Bryan 
v. Petty, 162 Iowa 62, 143 N.W. 987 (1913). 
115. _Iowa_, 93 N.W.2d 60 (1958), 
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law by Wegner v. Kelly , 116 although there are in.dications of such a 
position in earlier Iowa cases. 117 This rule was firmly adopted by 
Iowa ·State Highway Commission v. Smith, 118 anq it is now necessary 
to determine what constitutes "reasonable" access. It is clear that 
the determination of this question is regarded by the courts as a ques-
tion of fact , 119 although sometimes the court has made the determina-
tion itsel£.120 One test of reasonable ingress and egress is prior 
existence of an exit which was used in connection with the normal 
operations of .the business of the property. 121 Also, it seems to be 
established that one entrance is the minimum rea-sonable access. for 
a residential property122 and that two are required for a filling 'sta-
tion . 123 Future decisions will no doubt speil out in greater detail 
the content of "reasonable access" in specific fact situations . 
The area of protection afforded by the "reasonable access" 
doctrine is still largely undetermihect. The court has, for example, 
expressly reserved. its decision as to whether a service road, as 
U6. 182 Iowa 259, 165 N.W. 449 (1917). The action in this case 
was for an injury caused by a sagging telephone wire. The case 
turned upon the extent of the duty of defendant to allow access 
to the farm free of sagging wires, and the court held that the 
plaintiff was entitled only to reasonable access to his land at 
which points only defendant owed him a duty . 
117. Louden v . Starr, 121 Iowa 528, 154 N.W . 336 (1915); Ridgway 
v . CityofOsceola, 139Iowa590, 117N. W. 974 (1908) . 
118 . 248 Iowa 869, 82 N. W . 2d 755 (1957). 
119 . Wilson v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N. W . 2d 161 
(1958); Highway Commission v . Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N . W . 2d 
755 (1957); accord, Ridgway v. City of Osceola, 139 Iowa 590, 
117 N.W. 974 (1908) . 
120 . Wilson v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W. 2d 161 
(19.58). . 
121. Perkins v. Palo Alto County, 245 Iowa 310, 60 N. W . 2d 562 
(1953). 
122 . Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N. W .2d 
755 (1957) . 
123 . Wilson v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N. W. 2d 
161 (-195·8h ··Highway Commission v . Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 
N. W . 2d 755 (1957) . 
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authorized by Iowa Code Section 3 06A. 8 (195 8), would constitute 
reasonable access. 124 A major problem exists as to what point in 
time the doctrine of reasonable access refers. If plaintiff is to be 
cut off from any possibility of acquiring access in the event that 
future developments of his use would make ingress reasonable at that 
time, then his claim for damages would seem to be a much stronger 
one. In the· Smith case, supra, a Des Moines city ordinance provided 
a procedure for obtaining additional access if such should be required 
by the future development of the property; consequently the issue was 
not raised in this case. The court has thur far refused to rule on the 
question of whether or not prospective damages may be recovered; 125 
future loss of access may well fall within this category when the de-
cision is made, There have been several cases, however, which shed 
some light on the problem. In Hubbell v. Des Moines,l2!) the court 
determined damages by reference only to the present use of the pro-
perty. · Thus it would appear that damages for loss of access may be 
measured only in terms of the present use; this does not preclude the 
possibility that an action might be allowed for additional damages in 
the future when the use of the property was changed. The general 
presumption, of course, is that condemnation is total, and that future 
ac;:tions will not lie. However, in Liddick v. Council Bluffsl27 the 
court held this presumption would not apply where "unusual or out of 
the ordinary changes or improvements" were made by the condemnor. 
124. Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755, 
761 (1957). California seems to have taken the position that 
such roads do represent a taking of the right of access. People 
v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P. 2d. 799 (1943). This case 
is highly criticized in 3 Stanford 1. Rev. 298, 3 06 (1951). How-
ever, .this article also indicates that juries have repeatedly 
found no damages in such cases with the result that the new 
rule has cost the state very little. However, see Gilmore v. 
State, 208 Misc. 427, 143 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1955) denying damages 
where a service road was provided. 
125. Hathaway v. Sioux City, 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 228 (1953), 
126. 173 Iowa 55, 154 N.W. 337, 340 (1915), "At the present time, 
there are no means provided for ingress or egress from the alley ••• 
The vacation of this alley does not, as this record disclosed, 
substantially interfere with the full enjoyment of all means of 
access which have been provided, or were in existence at the 
time the ordinance was passed." (Emphasis supplied). 
127. 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942), Also see Kucheman & 
Hinke v. C. C. & D. Ry. Co., 46 Iowa 366 (1877). 
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The fact situation in Liddick is, of course, distinguishable in that 
Liddick involved a change of use of the road by the condemnor while 
the problem under consideration involves a change. of us.e of the abut-
ting property by the lan<iowner. However, the general principle of the 
Liddick case is available to the court should it vyish .to decide that the 
original condemnation was not total and that a landowner whose use 
of the land has expanded is entitled to additional access or compensa-
tion for the absence thereof. Whether or not t he court could develop a 
workable rule for handling the innumerable cases which would arise 
involving allegations of enlarged use of t he land is another matter; 
perhaps the court could content itself with reviewing cases involving 
allegations of an abuse of discretion on t he part of the appropriate 
state officials in denying access because of the expanded use. It 
would seem to be open to the condemnor to argue that on analogy to 
the cases involving original construction of non- access highways, 
the landowner had no easement to the highway other than that which 
was previously reasonable, and therefore is not entitled to damages 
or further access. 128 
(4). Right to Air and Light129 
Recognition of the right of air and .light as one of the rights ap-
purtenant to property has come only recently in Iowa law. For a long 
time the court denied recovery,lon the grounds that there was no actual 
taking of property, 13 0 although apparently in certain circumstances 
plaintiff's Witnesses might take into account the loss of 9-ir and light 
where such was necessary to the prosecution of the business . 131 
128, See second. paragraph of this subsection, p. 24. 
129 . Also see Division VII, infra, dealing w ith change of grade. 
13 0. Lingo v. Page County , 201 Iowa 906, 208 N. W. 3 27 (1926); 
Pillings v. Pottawattamie County, 188 Iowa 567, 176 N.W. 
314 (1920); Talcott Bros. v. Des Moines, 134 Iowa 113, 109 
N. W. 311 (1906); Also see Callahan v . City of Nevada, 170 
Iowa 719, 153 N.W. 188 (191-5) where the court held that 
a property owner had no legal right to the maintenance in 
the sidewalk of a w iridowl)illlurhina'tio.g his basement . Dictum 
to the effect that the situation was analogous to private law. in 
which one landowner may cut off the light and air of another 
by his building . 
131. Western Newspaper Union v . Des Moines, 15 7 Iowa 685, 14 0 
N. W. 367 (1913) . 
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However, in Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 13 2 the court squarely held 
that an abutting property owner has a right to air and light which may 
not be taken without compensation. Anl indications to the contrary 
in prior cases were expressly rejected. 33 In Anderlik v. Iowa State 
Highway Commission, 134 the court reaffirmed the Liddick case and 
held that recovery for loss of air and light might be had for property 
located in the country as well as in the city. Both of these cases 
involved the construction of viaducts in front of an abutting ownets 
property. The court seems never to have dealt with a situation 
where a non-abutting owner sought: to oHiim :compensation for loss 
of light and air, although where the loss was severe enough, it 
would seem.that recovery would be allowed. 
(5) Right to Natural Flow of Surface Water 
The courts have declared that where in completing a project of 
one type or another a condemnor diverts the natural flow of water 
across plaintiff's land, plaintiff is entitled to recover ~amages for 
a taking within the meaning of the Iowa Constitution. 1 5 However, 
the Highway Commission may acquire a prescriptive right in the 
altered drainage course if no complaint is made by the landowner. 13 6 
(6) Right of Lateral Support 
Although there are indic~tions that the right of lateral support 
was previously recognized, 1 7 the only case in Iowa awarding dam-
ages for deprivation of such support is Hathaway v. Sioux City, 13 8 
132. 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942). 
13 3. The cases overruled insofar as they conflict with :[..iddick are 
those cited in footnote 13 0, supra, with the exception of Cal-
lahan v. City of Nevada. 
134. 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605 (1949), 
135. Beers v. Gilmore City, 197 Iowa 7, 196 N.W, 602 (1924); 
McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336 (1868). See also Section 39, 
infra. 
136. Grimes v. Polk County, 240 Iowa 228, 34 N.W. 2d 767 (1948). 
13 7. Talcott Bros, v. Des Moines, 134 Iowa 113, 109 N. W. 311 
(1906) (dictum). 
138. 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 228 (1953). 
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which allowed compensation for depriving the landowner of right of 
access when the street, upon which plaintiff had an easement, col-
lapsed due to the withdrawal of lateral support. The court indicated 
that the right pertains to the property itself as well as to the easement 
in the street but awarded no compensation for damage to the property 
itself because no injury had yet occurred. 13 9 However, recovery of 
damages has been allowed as part of a showing of injury to adjoin-
ing property when land for a street which would necessitate ex-
cavation was originally condemned. 140 
d. Extent of Original Taking 
The contention was made by the condemnor in Liddick v. 
Council Bluffs 141 that no compensation need be made for deprivation 
of the. rights of access, air, and light because the property owner 
had. been fully compensated therefor when the roadway was originally 
condemned, purchased, or dedicated, However, the court held that 
these rights were reserved to the landowner at.the time of the original 
acquisition of the street and that these rights ran with the land for 
the benefit of all future owners even though not mentioned in the 
granting instrument. The court viewed the fee interest held by the 
city in the street as subject to easements running to the abutting 
owners of way, light and air.· The construction of the viaduct re-
presented an interference with these rights as represented by 
easements for which compensation need be paid. The Liddioj< cas:e. 
is ap~arantly the only Iowa decision dealing directly with this pro-
blem, 42 and the court relied solely on foreign authority, However, 
there is some authority in the related area involving questions con-
cerning the extent of the condemntJt's ownership of a condemned 
easement. 143 
139. However, the existence of such a right was clearly recognized 
by dictum in Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 23 2 Iowa 197, 5 N. W. 2d 
361, 383 (1942). 
140. Kukkuk v. Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209, 214 (1922). 
141. 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W. 2d 361, 380 (1942). 
142. Cf. Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 
(1942). 
143. See Section 3 9, infra, and especially those sections dealing 
with additional servitudes in Subsection (b). 
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e. No Recovery for Rights Common to Public 
The basic theo/y behind denying recovery in this situation is that 
where the loss suffered by plaintiff is not peculiar to himself but is 
simply the loss of a right shared by the public generally, there can be 
no recovery bedause the public interest requires that the improvement 
be made. This is the theory behind the cases denying recovery for 
allege'\~I){Pairment of the right of access as a result of circuity of 
travel. The same theory has also been applied in totally dif-
ferent cases. Thus, it has been held that where the ice on the Des 
Moines River was the property of the city, it might prohibit the tak-
ing of ice in. order to allow skating on the river without "taking" any 
property right within the meaning of the Iowa Constitution.l45 
Neither is the enlargment of the boundaries of a city a taking even 
though as a citizen of the new city, the landowner may be subject to 
the general taxes of the city; 146 there is authority to the effect that 
the inclusion of a landowner within a drainage district or other simi-
lar entity which can impose a tax for the very purpose of the creation 
of the entity may be objected to ifthe landowner is not accorded due 
process of law. 14 7 
f. Exercise of Police Power Not A Taking 
The role of the police power in American jurisprudence is an 
extraordinarily large and complex one, The present inquiry, however, 
is directed primarily to one small facet of that problem, i.e. the 
interrelationship between the police power and the power of eminent 
domain, subject as it is to. prescribed state and federal constitution-
al inhibitions, 
Basically, the term "police power", when it is used in opinions, 
seems to contain two fundamental elements which, although distinct, 
frequently prove difficult to separate: (1) the concept of the police 
power as a justification for action by the State, and (2} the concept 
of the police power as rendering that act non-compensable, 
Judicial inquiry concerning the first element will basically in-
144. see Section 4(c}(3), supra. 
145. Board of Park Commissioners v. Diamond Ice Co., 130 Iowa 
603, 105 N.W. 203 (1905). 
146. Wertz v. City of Ottumwa, 201 Iowa 947, 208 N.W. 511 (1926), 
147. Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396 (1926}; Beebe v. Magoun, 
122 Iowa 94, 97 N. W. 986 (1904}(no provision for notice). 
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volvekthe question of whether initially such action may be taken by 
the state. The limits of the police power have never been specifical-
ly delineated by the Iowa court; in fact, the .limits have deliberately 
been kept vague in order to provide for the unforeseen situations. of the 
future. Thus, in Des Moines v. Mahhaa::ten OiLOo, t48 the court said: 
"We shall not undertake any comprehensive definition 
of the police power of the state. No such definition 
has yet been accomplished by any court, nor i.s it 
possible or desirable that it should be accomplished. 
With the changing conditions necessarily attendant 
upon the growth and density of population and the 
ceaseless changes taking place in method and 
manner of carrying on the multiplying lines of human 
industry, the greater becomes the demand upon that 
reserve element of sovereignty which we call the 
police power for such reasonable supervision and 
regulation as the state may impose, to insure ob-
servance of the individual citizen of the duty to 
use his property and exercise his rights and 
privileges with due regard to the personal and 
property rights and privileges of others." 
• cin.condemnation law, the iSsue usually arises in c;onnection with 
the question of whether a purpose allegedly ju.stified by the police 
power is public or private. This problem is discussed at some length 
in Section 2, supra. 
The second concept above assumes that the action itself is 
proper but involves the question of whether damages must be paid. 
The latter question seems to be more clearly a question of whether 
a taking has occurred within the meaning of the law on eminent do-
main than a question of deciding that a certain exercise of the police 
power is non-compensable. At best, the second concept involves 
only a residual area into which fall actions of the state which the 
courts have first determined do not constitute takings. Once in this 
residual area, any damage is non-compensable, but the key factor 
in the decision is whether a compensable right of the landowner has 
148. 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N.W. 823, 826 (1921) (zoning case). 
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been taken, which is an eminent domain and not a police power. 
concept. Therefore, the most effective answer of the state to an 
allegation of a taking is the defense that the plaintiff has been 
deprived of no compensable right; it is not the very general con-
tention that the state's action is an exercise of the police power. 
Until the condemnor has 13hown that no legal right exists Jn the 
landowner, the latter p0 sition is essentially irrelevant. 1 9 
. The Iowa case law lends considerable support to the view out-
:Uned above that the police power concept does not lie at the heart 
of the compensability issue but is instead subordinate to the 
eminent domain issue of whether a taking of a legal right has 
occurred. Perhaps the most instructive case is warren v • .High-
way Commission •. 150 This case seems to say that the distinction 
between the police power and the power of eminent domain is in 
the initial sense procedural. Thus, the state may elect to base 
its action on its police powers or on the power of eminent domain. 
However, the state's choice of method is not necessarily conclu-
sive upon the courts. If the 13tate proceeds under the police power, 
its action must be: (1).."'a proper and reasonable one" (this is 
apparently a reference to element one discussed above), and 
(2) "must not amount to taking of property without due process". 
The latter quotation is presumably a reference to Article I, Section 
18 of the Iowa Constitution. Since the power of eminent domain 
is an inherent power of the state, 151 and since this constitutional 
provision is in essence nothing but a limitation upon that power, it 
would seem that the decision as to compensability will depend upon 
the nature of the power of eminent domain and not on.the police 
power. This conclusion is made abundantly clear by the method of 
analysis employed by the court in deciding the Warren case, supra. 
149. In Hohfeldian terms the answer to an argument that a "right" 
exists, e.g. a right appurtenant to property, must always be a 
"no-right" argument. The use of the concept of the police power 
is not on its face a denial of the existence of a legal right but 
instead an argument based on a "power", which will be essen-
tially irrelevant to the real area of controversy. 
150. Iowa_, 93 N.W.2d 60 (1958). 
151. See Section 1, supra, and cases cited therein. 
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Following its discussion of the above principles, the court refers the 
reader to Division II of its opinion which deals exclusively with the 
question of whether plaintiff suffered a compensable damage, which 
is an eminent domain,and ·not>ia police power concept, The only re~ 
ference to the power of the state comes after the court has decided·: .. 
that plaintiff's damage is no different than that of the general public 
and hence is not compensable. Clearly then, it is the determination 
of whether or not plaintiff has a legal right which determines the 
issue of compensability and not the existence of a police power. 
Other decisions of the Iowa court indicate a similar view. 
Thus in Lacey v. City of Oskaloosa, 152 the court held that the 
police power was validly exercised because the objecting parties 
could acquire no vested property interest in hitching racks erected 
under a "mere license" on the street fronting the city .square. 
In the Smith153 and Wilson 154 cases the contention was made by 
the highway commission that its action was simply an exercise of 
the police power, The court agreed insofar as the regulations were 
reasonable because to that extent there was no taking ,155 However, 
where reasonable access was denied, there was a taking; and. the' , 
action of the state was held to fall without the immunity afforded by 
the police power doctrine. Also in the Smith case, supra, the con-
demnor urged the doctrine of police powers as a defense to plaintiff's 
cl<tim of damages for trafficcalteration. The court said on p. 762 of 
82N.W.2d, 
"They (plaintiffs) have no vested right (em-
phasis supplied) to the continuance of existing 
traffic past their establishment. " 
This concentration on "right" again illustrates the use of eminent 
152. 143 Iowa 704, 121 N.W. 542 (1909). 
153. Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W. 2d 
755 (1957). 
154. Wilson v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N. W. 2d 
161 (1958). 
155. It will be remembered that the right of access in Iowa extends 
not to unlimited access but only to "reasonable access". See 
Section 4(c)(3), supra. 
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domain and not police power concepts in the actual process of 
decision-making, The same sort of judicial reasoning seems to 
be present in the foreign cases which uphold as valid the designa-
tion by the state of a new or relocated highway as a controlled-
access facility; these courts take the position that since no prior 
right of access existed, the state may regulate access as it '· 
chooses • 156 Consequently, it would appear that although the 
court may sometimes choose to state its conclusion in terms of 
the immunity furnished by the police power, it will decide the 
case in terms of whether a legalright has been destroyed when-
ever the issue of compensability is at issue. 
g. Common Law Dedication Not A Taking 
The law seems to be clear that where a common law dedication 
can be shown, compensation need not be paid. Common law dedi-
cation is regarded as a donation to the public and therefore does not 
constitute a taking. l5 7 Consequently, in an appropriate situation, 
a condemnor should attempt to show that a common law dedication 
has occurred .. The dedication may be either express or implied,158 
but in any event the prime requisite is a manifestation of intent to 
so dedicate.159 Since the arrangement is essentially a gift, the 
usual requirements for a completed gift apply; thus there must be an 
156. State v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d 783 (1954); Carazalla 
v. Wisconsin, 269 Wis. 593, 70 N.W. 2d 208, rehearing 71 
N.W. 2d 276 (1955). 
157. Sioux City v. Tott, 244 Iowa 1285, 60 N.W. 2d 510 (1953); 
DeCastello v. Cedar Rapids, 171 Iowa 18, 153 N.W. 353 (1915). 
158. Dugan v. Zurmueh1en, 203 Iowa 1114, 211 N.W. 986 (1927); 
DeCastello v. Cedar Rapids, 171 Iowa 18, 153 N.W. 353 (1915); 
Louden v. Starr, 171 Iowa 528, 154 N.W. 336 (1915). 
159. Sioux City v. Tott, 244 Iowa 1285, 60.N.W.2d 510 (1953); 
Dugan v. Zermuehlen, 203 Iowa 1114, 211 N.W. 986 (1927); 
DeCastello v. Cedar Rapids, 171 Iowa 18, 153 N.W. 353 
(1915); Davis v. Town of Bonaparte, 137 Iowa 196, 114 N;W. 
896, 898 (1908) ("the intention of the owner to set apart the 
lands for the use of the public as a highway--the animus 
deditandi--is the fundamental principle, the very life of 
dedication"). 
l 
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intent to give which may be inferred from the conduct of the owner, 160 
and a present setting aside of the property . 161 The doctrine of dedi-
cation has also been analogized to that of contract vyith the requirement 
that an offer by the owner must occur and that this offer must be ac-
cepted by the public . 16 2 
As to problems of proof, the burden of proof, of course, rests 
on the public. 163 Parol evidence may be used by the party seek-
ing to assert the public's right even though such is not ·ordinarily 
the case when an interest in land .is involved; 164 the Statute of 
Frauds is also inapplicable . 165 . The key to the defense against 
a dedication is a showing that use by the public was permissive 
and that the owner retained some control over the property by 
160 ~ Dugan v. Zurmuehlen, 203 Iowa 1114, 211 N . W. 986, 988 
(1927) (''long acquiescence in user by the public may, under 
certain circumstances, operate as a dedication of land to the 
public use"); DeCastello v . Cedar Rapids, 171 Iowa 18, 153 
N.W. 353 (1915) . 
161. DeCastello v ." Cedar Rapids, 1 iZ 1 Iowa 18, 153 N. W. 3 53 
(1915). The analogy to gift is somewhat .inappropriate in 
that no specific grantee need be in esse at the time of the 
dedication. See DeCastello, supra , at pp. 354-355 of 
153 N. W . 
162 . Dugan v. Zurmuehlen, 203 Iowa 1114, 211 N.W. 986 (1927); 
DeCastello v. Cedar Rapids, 171 Iowa 18, 153 N.W. 353 
(1915); Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N. W . 928 (1914). 
This analogy to contract would not seem to be particularly 
felicitous in view of the rather uncertain. identity of the 
public which must "accept" and the period of time over which 
such "acceptance" must· be demonstrated. 
163 . Sioux City v . Tott, 244 Iowa 1285, 60 N. W . 2d 510 (1953); 
Dugan v . Zurmuehlen, 203 Iowa 1114, 211 N. W. 986 (1927); 
DeCastello v. Cedar .. Rapids, .171 Iowa 18, 153· N·.w. 353 
(1915); Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W. 925 (1914) . 
164. DeCastello v . Cedar Rapids, 171 Iowa 18, . 153 N.W. 353, · 
355 (1915). 
165. Dugan v. Zurmuehlen, 203 Iowa 1114.i 211 N.W. 986 (1927). 
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gates, 166 payment of taxes, 167 signsl68, etc •• Mere use by the pub-
lic in reaching or dealing with the owner is not sufficient to establish 
a dedication to' public use.l69 In general, it should be noted that the 
):)urden of proving an implied dedication is a very heavy one and can be 
met only by a clear showing of intent to dedicate and long and con-
tinuous use by the public under a claim of right of which the owner 
has notice. 
SECTION 5. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF 
EMINJ;NT DOMAIN 
In addition to the constitutional restrictions imposed on con-
demning authorities, the Legislature has created certain statutory 
restrictions upon the exercise of the power of eminent domain, In 
the absence of repeal or specific statutory exemption, they are bind-
ing upon a condemnor, and an il'ljunction will lie to compel conform-
ance w !th such statutory requirements. 17 0 
a. Trees--Ingress or Egress--Drainage 
Under Iowa Code Section 314.7 (1958) officers, employees, and 
contractors in charge of highway work are forbidden to cut down trees 
standing in front of ttllwn lots, farmyards, orchards, or feed lots 
which do not materially obstruct the road or work on it. Neither may 
they destroy or injure reasonable access to turn the natural drainage 
of the surface water to the injury of adjoining owners. 
One of the tests for determining what constitutes reasonable 
166. Culver v. Converse, 207 Iowa 1173, 224 N.W. 834 (1929); 
Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W. 926 (1914); State 
v. Green, 41 Iowa 693 (1875), 
167. Sioux City v. Tott, 244 Iowa 1285, 60 N.W. 2d 510 (1953); 
Culver v. Converse, 207 Iowa 1173, 224 N.W. 834 (1929); 
168. ~ .Sii:iu.x.'Oity-v:.;Tott .~ '.224 Iowa 1285·.; 60. N .. w: Z.d ;s1 o . .(l95:3)c.. 
169. Sioux City v. Tott, 224 Iowa 1285, 60 N.W. 2d 510, (1953); 
Bradford v. Fultz, 167 Iowa 686, 149 N.W. 925 (1914). 
170. Reed v. Highway Commission, 221 Iowa 501, 266 N.W. 47 
(1936); Hicks v. Highway Commission, 221 Iowa 509, 266 
N.W. 51 (1936); Butterworth v. Highway Commission, 210 
Iowa 1231, 232 N.W. 760 (1930); Hoover v. Highway Commis-
sion, 207 Iowa 56, 222 N.W. 438 (1928). 
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access is prior use.l71 
b. Cemeteries 
Construction of roads through cemeteries without consent is 
forbidden under the terms of Iowa Code Section 306,14 (1958), The 
same is true of Iowa Code Section 471.7 (1958) forbidding construc-
tion of railroads through cemeteries or burial grounds. 
c. Dispossession of Owner 
Under Iowa Code Section 472.26 (1958), "a landowner shall not 
be dispossessed, under condemnation proceedings, of his residence 
dwelling house, outhouse, orchard, or garden, until the damages 
thereto have been finally determined and paid ••••. " • 
The term "dwelling house" has been construed to mean a house 
capable of habitation and not just a house. 172 Certainly it does not 
apply to a temporary building, especially where its erection is under 
circumstances indicating bad faith. 173 The statutory protection of 
buildings and plantings of the type specified in the statute extend, 
of course, only to those put in place by good faith acts of the owner. 
Where the statutory protection is used as a "sword instead of a 
shield", its benefit is lost as a consequence of the bad faith of the 
owner. 1711 A garden within the meaning of this section refers to an 
actual cultivated growing garden, and not merely to a garden spot.l75 
An orchard also within the interpretation of this section means 
171. Perkins v. Palo Alto County, 245 Iowa 310, 60 N.W. 2d 562 
(1953). Also see Section 4(c)(3). supra, as to what constitutes 
"reasonable access", 
172. Oelwein v. Walrath, 162 Iowa 667, 144 N.W. 600 (1913). 
173. Hartley v. Board of Supervisors, 179 Iowa 814, 162 N.W. 48 
(1917). 
174. Hartley v. Board of Supervisors, 179 Iowa 814, 162 N.W. 48 
(1917); Ballou v. Elder, 95 Iowa 693, 64 N.W. 622 (1895), 
175. 20 C.J.S. 856-8, 18 AmJur 718-719. 
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something more than three or Jour scattered fruit trees. 176 
However, an orchard within the meaning of the statute need not be 
a perfect or idealistic orchard but only an "Iowa" orchard. 177 
176. Ballou v. Elder, 95 Iowa 693, 695, 64 N,W. 622; Hube1 v. 
McAdon, 190 Iowa 6.77, 180 N.W. 994 (1921). 
177. Junkin v. Knapp, 205 Iowa 194, 217 N.W. 834 (1928). 
{ 
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DIVISION II 
GENERAL'STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND PRACTICE 
SECTION 6 . NOTICE OF APPEAL 
a. Statutory Requirement 
In Iowa the original assessment of compensation for tb.~ taking of 
property under the power of eminent domain is left to an informal body 
of six freeholders. known as the. shetiff' s jury, condemnation jury or 
condemnation commission. The procedure for the appointment of the 
sheriff's jury or commission and the proceedings t_o be conducteq by 
such body are set forth in the Iowa Code ('l:.9.5 fl):.,l :.:Seiz:tio:ns. ~-Am2·, 1t 
thr'Olfgh '4 7'2 •1.1 7i.i inclusive . 
I ow a law provides a statutory method for perfecting an appeal from 
the fincUngs of this group. Section 472.18 of the Iowa Code (1958) 
provides that: 
11 Any party interest ed may, yvithin thirty days after 
the assessment· is made, appeal therefrom to the 
district court, by .giving the adverse party , his agent 
or attorney , and the sheriff, written notice that such 
appeal has been taken." 
Iowa Code, · Section 472 . 19 (1958) which deals with the Highway 
Commission and appeal, 1 states that: 
11 Such notice of appeal shall be served in the same 
manner as an original notice . In case of condem~ 
nation proceedings instituted by the state l)ighway 
commission, when the owner appeals from tl)e as-
sessment made, such notice of appeal shall be 
served upon the attorney general, or the special 
assistant attorney general acting as counsel to 
said commission, or the chief engineer for said 
commission •. When service of notice of appeal 
l. See Crawford v. Highway Commission,. 247 Iowa 736, 76 -N.W. 2d 
187 ·(195 6). See subsequent C;liscussion in this section. 
41 
42 
cannot be made as provided in this section, 
the district court of the county in which the 
real estate is situated 1 or a judge thereof, 
' on appUcation, ~>hall d'irect what notice 
shall be sufficient," 
b. Time Limitation 
The statute provides for a thirty day limitation on the right to 
institute an appeal, The period is not computec;l from the date when 
the premise is viewed by the jury, but from. the time when. the 
assessment is actually made, reduced to writing, and made public 
or in some legitimate manner brought to the knowledge of the parties 
involved. Whether such time may precede the filing or placing of 
the assessment in the hands of the sheriff has not been determined, 2 
but by practice the time is figured. from the date of assessment of 
damages. 3 The court has held that where the sheriff received 
notic<;J within the thirty day periqd, but no notice was given to the 
adverse party 4ntil after the expiration of th<;J period, the &ppeal 
failed for fi'\ilur<;J to comply with the statute. 4 · Iowa Rule of Civil 
Procedure 49, which allows service on the sheriff to toll the time 
requirement where an original notice is involved, was held in-
applicable because the court viewed the case as an appeal and not 
as an original action. 
c. Who May Appeal 
As a general rule the district court has no Juriscliction to try or 
deterlllline ah appeal taken. by a stranger to the initial appraisement, 
even though he be the real owner of the condemned lands. In order 
to have a right to appeal, a pi'\rty must either be served. with notice 
of the meeting of the sheriff's Jury or must voluntarUy app.ear before 
2. Jamison v. Burlington R.R. Go,, 69 Iowa 670, 672, 29 N.W, 
774, 775. 
3. Ma:<:r21oli v, City of Des Moines 1 :245;:.Iow!'t 57:h;.1;.63 N .W;;:2.1;1, 
QJ,~ Jw~,S,4)c; ;1;: ~· • · .• /:·' :X.J. :>;, ·'L. · :·>· . 
4. MCI:ill119H v. CitY of Des Moines 1 supra;, it should l:)e noted, 
however, that the decision was 5-4 w'ith a strong and well-
reasoned dissent by Smith, J., 
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such body and have an interest in the result . 5 Thus if a transfer of 
title is made and afterwards the condemnor mistakenly serves notice on 
the grantor instead of the grantee, the latter, not being served with 
notice , may acquire the right to appeal by coming in and declaring him-
self owner before the commissioners and rectifying the error, 6 but if he 
fails to assert his ownership until after the award has been determined, 
an appeal will be denied him. 7 In this latter instance, he may persuade 
his grantor to appeal and then enter his appearance as an intervenor , 8 
or may bring an action for trespass , or may enjoin the condemnor from · 
taking possession of the land , forcing an entirely new condemnation. 9 
However, it is clear that the district court may enter an order joining 
a co-owner who was not a party to the original proceedings before the 
sheriff~ titJry if necessary for the prompt determination of the litigation, 
5. CedarRapids, etc. R. Oo. v . Chic., etc. R.Co., 60Iowa35, 
14 N.W. 76; Jahr, Em. Dam., p . 422 ~ Sec. 277, Gibson v . 
Union County , 208 Iowa 314, 223 N.W. 111; Birge v. Chicago , 
etc. R. Co. , 65 Iowa 440; Gammel v. Potter , 2 Col e 562; Connable 
v. C. M. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 60 Iowa 27; Pingery v. Cherokee & 
Dakota Ry. Co. , 78 Iowa 438, 43 N.W. 285; Burns v. Chic. etc. 
R. Co., 110Iowa385, 81 N.W. 794. ButseeEgglestonv. Town 
of Aurora , 233 Iowa 559 , 10 N.W. 2d 104 (1943), in which co-owner 
who had not been a party to the sheriff's jury proceeding joined in 
an amendment to the petition for appeal to the district court. The 
court seems to have allowed the co-owner to join in the appeal, at 
least to the extent of holding that such action waived the right to 
object to faulty joinder of the original condemnation proceedings 
before the sheriff's jury. 
6. Connable v. C . M . & St . Paul Ry.Co., 60 Iowa 27, 14 N.W. 75 
(1882}. 
7. Connable v. C. Ivl. St. Paul Ry . Co., 60 Iowa 27, 14 N. W. 75 
(1882). 
8. Connable, supra, p . 28 . 
9. Birge v . Chic. etc . Ry. Co . , 65 Iowa 440. 
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even over the objections of the party brought in. 10 
Further, purchasers or grantees who acquire an interest in the con-
demned property after the instituting of the sheriff's jury proceeding have 
no right to appeal. 11 If their grantor or vendor appeals, they may inter-
vene but not otherwise. l2 It should be noted that a condemnation pro-
ceeding begun before sale by the venoor will be binding upon privies. 13 
However, where the condemnor's obligation to pay is not finally deter-
mined at the time of sale due to failure to depoi4t the compensation, 
the purchase price must be paid to the vendee. 
If the land is actually appropriated, that is, the award has been 
deposited with the sheriff and possession taken15 before the grantee 
acquires the tract from which the condemned portion is taken, the 
grantee has no interest in the award in the absence of a special agree-
10. Eggleston v. Town of Aurora, 233Iowa 559, 10 N.W. 2d 104 (1943). 
The present provision, I. R. C. P. 25(c), appears to be even strong-
er in its authorization of joinder over objlection than the statutory 
provision at the time of the Eggleston case. 
11. 30 C.J.S. 40, Section 356; Cedar Rapids etc. Land Co. v. Chic. 
etc. R. Co., 60 Iowa 35, 14 N.W. 76 (Where an award of damages 
has been assessed for a right of way over a tract of land, and a 
stranger to the procee<;lings afterwards purchases a portion of the 
tract, he cannot sustain an appeal from the award, nor a part 
thereof); Connable v. Chic. etc. R. Co., 60 Iowa 27, 14 N.W. 
75. 
12. Connable v. Chic. etc. R. Co. , supra. 
13. 30 C.J.S. 22, Section 344; Plumer v. Wausau Boom Co., 49 Wis. 
449, 5 N.W. 232; Forney v. Ralls, 30 Iowa 559 (in this case it 
was held that a sale and transfer of a mill during the pendency of 
a proceeding to assess the damages caused to the property of ad-
jacent landowners by reason of heightening the mill dam did not 
abate the proceeding, and that the purchaser might be substituted 
for the original owner). 
14. Griffeth v. Drainage District, 182 Iowa 1291, 166 N.W. 570, 
571 (1918). 
15. Ruppert v. Railway Co., 43 Iowa, 490,494. 
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ment with the grantor, and an appeal will be denied him . 16 
d . Who Must Be Joined 
On the problem of joinder, Chicago etc. Ry . Co . v . Hurst , 3 0 
Iowa 73, laid down the basic principle that where damages for the tak-
ing of certain property are assessed jointly to two (or more) persons as 
owners , an appeal cannot be taken or prosecuted by one of them with-
out uniting the other (or others} or making him (or them) a party thereto 
by notice. 17 However , where plaintiff's petition alleges that he is 
the sole owner of property and hence that notice to additional parties 
who were holders of record was not necessary , the petition has been 
held sufficient to withstand attack on a motion t o dismiss because the 
allegations were deemed to be admitted by the motion . 18 
The principl e requiring joint appeal by co- .owners has been modi-
fied by two later decisions, Ruppert v . St . Paul R. Co. , 43 Iowa 490, 
holding that when the condemnor had settled with one of the owners of 
an undivided half of the land, the owner could appeal from the half go-
ing to him without joining the co-owner who had settled; 19 and Lance 
v. C . M. & St. Paul Ry. Co . , 57 Iowa 636 , 11 N.W. 612 , enunciating 
the rule that where compensation had been jointly awarded to the owner 
and the mortgagee of the land upon notice to both of them, the owner 
16 . 20 C.J. 858 , Flichinger v. Omaha Bridge Co., 98 Iowa 358, 67 N.W. 
372; Stewart v . O'Hara , 273 N.W . 566 (Mich.}; Griffeth v. Drain-
age District , 182 Iowa 1291, 166 N .W. 570 , 571; see language of 
Pratt v. Des Moines R. Co., 72 Iowa 249, 33 N.W. 666. 
17. Accord, 20 C . J. 1108, Section 481; Simmons v. Ry. Co . , 128 
Iowa 139, 142, 103 N.W. 129 (although holding on its facts 
that a tenant and a landowner could prosecute separate appeals, 
it intimated by way of dictum that if the award had been joint, 
the other claimant should be served with notice and be bJought 
into court . On misjoinder, see Application of Long streets, 205 
N. W. 343 , 200 Iowa 723; Genco v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 203 
Iowa 1390, 214 N . W. 545, when the condemnor and the landowner 
both appeal, the suits should be consolidated and tried as a 
single action. Where the condemnation concerns both military 
personnel and civilians, see Gilbride v. City of Algona , 237 
Iowa 20 , 20 N. W. 2d 905. 
18. Bales v. Highway Commission , 249 Iowa 57 , 86 N. W. 2d 244 
(1957) . 
19. Accord, Hanrahn v . Fox , 47 Iowa 102 (holding that a joint owner 
who has taken the appeal may be permitted to introduce evidence 
showing the damages to the entire tract and will be entitled to his 
proportion thereof) , 
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may maintain 28 appeal from the award without making the mortgagee a 
party thereto. An additional exception exists in the peculiar situation 
where a landlord and tenant are involved, either of whom may appeal 
separately. 21 
e. Manner of Service 
As to the manner of giving notice of an appeal, personal service 
on the adverse party, his agent or attorney22 is contemplated by the 
statute, but an exception is now grafted on it for those instances of 
attempted eva:;;ion of service by the adverse party. Using the statute 
with regard to appeals to the Supreme Court as a model, the law pre-
sently states, 
"When service of notice of appeal cannot be made as 
provided in this section, the district court of the 
county in which the real estate is situated, or a judge 
thereof, on application, shall direct what notice shall 
be sufficient. "23 
f. Notice Jurisdictional 
Although the written notice of appeal need not meet the strict re-
20. Accord, Dixon v. Rockwell Ry. Co., 75 Iowa 367, 39 N.W. 646 
(this rule may be attacked as unsound in principle and is excus-
able, if at all, on the grounds of the extreme indulgence shown 
to the ·mortgagor when the security is adequate and encumbrance is 
small). · 
21. Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iqwa 718, 32 N.W.2d 393, 402 (1948); 
Simons v. Ry. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 143, 103 N.W. 129,131. 
22. Hahn v. Chic. etc. Ry. Co .• , 43 Iowa 333 (service on the presi-
dent of the condemning company sufficient); Robertson v. Eldora, 
etc. R., 27 Iowa 245 (service on a director of the condemnor may 
be proper); Jamison v. Burlington etc. Ry., 69 Iowa 670, 29 N.W. 
774 (a civil engineer of a railroad company is a proper agent upon 
whom to serve notice where he transacted business connected with 
the procuring of the right of way and had a local office in the county. 
See also Iowa Code Section 472.19 (1958), supra, p. l. 
23. Iowa Code Section 472.19 (1958). This section applied in Gil-
bridge v. City of Algona, 237 Iowa 20, 20 N.W.2d 905, 908 
(1945). 
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quirements of the statute relative to original notice, and although 
O'Neal v . State, 214 Iowa 977, 243 N . W. 60 l, holds that a very informal 
one will do, 24 still service of such notice is absolutely necessary to ob-
tain jurisdiction. 25 However, jurisdiction over a party not joined in the 
proce~ding before the sheriffs jury may be obtained by court order if his 
pres
2
ence is necessary to finally determine the outcome of the controver-, .. 
sy . 6 It is true that a party may be brought into court by the notice of 
the adverse party , but unless he served his own notice of appeal , he 
has no remedy against a subsequent dismissal at any state of the trial, 
if the other partt finds it advantageous to reinstate or abide by the 
original award. 7 
g . Notice to Sheriff 
Another absolute ;r9sential to the perfection of an appeal is serving 
notice on the sheriff . Although he is in no true sense a party to the 
proceedings and not d~squalified from serving notice in these cases, Z9 
a notice must be directed to him and served on him, presumably for the 
reason that he is under a duty to file with the clerk of the district court 
at once when the appeal is taken, a copy of the part of the assessment 
24 . See also In re Dugan, 129 Iowa 241, 105 N . W. 514; Searles v. Lux, 
86 Iowa 61, 52.N.W . 327·; Geyer v. Douglas , 85 Iowa 93, 52 N . W . 
111.. -" :/ ...,:." v t • 1 ' 1 1. '. 1. ( :-; f ~ r :•: ) • . t , ~ : •; 1 ~· ' t . ,. • •• • o 
25 . Mazzoli v. City of Des Moines , 245 Iowa 571 , 63 N.W. 2d 218 
(1954); Maxwell v . LaBrune, 68 Iowa 689, 28 N.W. 18; Ellis v. 
Carpenter, 89 Iowa 521, 56 N.W . 678; Hanley v . Iowa Electric 
Co . , 187 Iowa 594 , 174 N .W . 345 . 
26. Eggleston v . Town of Aurora , 233 Iowa 559, 10 N . W.2d 104 
(1943) . The modern provision for joinder in this circumstance would 
appear to be I.R.C . P. 25(c). 
27 . Hanley, supra, (the condemnor may dismiss his appeal in the dis-
trict court even after trial has begun, and the landowner who has not 
exercised his right of appeal cannot complain. 
28 . Thorsonv . CityofDesMoines 1 194Iowa565 1 188N. W . 9171918; 
Buckmiller v . Creston R. Co . 1 164 Iowa 5 02, 14 6 N. W. 44 7 . 
29 . C.R.F. etc . R. Co . v. C . M. & St. Paul R. Co., 60Iowa 35, 14 
N . W. 76; Buckmiller v. Creston R. Co., 164 Iowa 502, 146 N.W. 
447; Waltmeyer v. Wisconsin & Nebraska Ry. ·co . 1 64 Iowa 688, 
21 N.W. 139 (whether giving notice to the deputy would be suf-
ficient- - query) . 
48 
appealed from, 3 0 However, where the defendant is the Highway Commis-
sion, notice to the sheriff is not required under Iowa Code Section 
472.19 (1958).31 
The following form is an example of an appropriate notice of 
appeal:3 2 
FORM FOR NOTICE OF APPEAL 
. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IOWA,:. IN AND FOR----- COUNTY 
-...--TERM 19 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs 
DEFENDANT . 
* * * * * * * * * 
TO: , Defendant and to ·,Sheriff 
----------------- --------
of County, Iowa: 
---------. 
30. Iowa Code Section 472.20 (1958); Buckmiller v. Creston R. Co . , 
164 Iowa 502, 146 N . W . 447. However the failure of the sheriff 
to perform his duty and file with the clerk all papers pertaining 
to the appeal at . the time required by the statute does not pre-
judice the rights of a party who has properly given notice of 
appeal. Robertsonv. EldoraRy. Co., 27 Iowa 245;, (Simmons . 
v. 'Ry. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 129; Thorson v. Des 
Moines , 194 Iowa 565, 188 N . W . 915, 919; O'Neal v. State, 
214 Iowa 977, 243 N . W. 601 (does not deprive the court of 
jurisdiction.). 
31. Crawford v. Highway Commission, 247 Iowa 736, 76 N . W. 2d 187 
(1956). 
3 2 . The notice of appeal is held not to be an original notice and is 
not in any sense the commencement of an original action in the 
district court . Mazzoli v. City of Des Moines, 63 N. W. 2d 
218, 245 Iowa 571 (1954); O'Neal v. State, 214 Iowa 977, 
243 N . W . 601. 
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You and each of you are hereby notified that ____ as owner 
of the following describ.ed real estate situated in_ County, Iowa , 
to- wit: __ ~-------.,..--------.--has appealed and does appeal 
to the District Court in and for County , Iowa, from the award 
-----
of damages made by the condemnation commissioners on the 
---
day of------,-----,,....' 19_, in the sum. of------ dollars for 
the taking by the Defendant ....,......-----~ for -----,--------
purposes that part of the q.bove described real estate , specifically desig-
nated as follows: containing acres o 
~-~---------- ---
Said app~al will come on for hearing and trial at the 
------
Term of said District Court of------- County , Iowa , to be held 
at-----~--' Iowa , commencing on the ____ day of 
19 ·' • 
Dated this day of ________ , 19 
(address} 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SECTION 7 o BLEADINGS 
a . Who .Are Plaintiff and Defendant 
By statute the owner of the land. is classified as plaintiff and must 
file a petition and the condemnor is designated as defendant and must 
50 
file an answer, 33 irrespective of which party appeals, and the burden of 
allegation and proof is placed upon the landowner in these cases. 34 When 
the condemnor appeals and names itself plaintiff in the notice and files a 
petition instead of an answer, the error may be corrected on motion. 3 5 
But when the court omits to tell the jury that the burden of proof is on the 
landowner, it is reversible error. 3 6 
b. Necessity of Piling Petition 
Although Iowa Code Section 472.22 (1958) specifies that the peti-
tion should be filed on or before the first day of the term to which the 
appeal is taken, this requirement has been held directory only and a 
failure to file by the time designated by the statute is not fatal to the 
right of appeal. 3 7 
c. Damage Should Be Set Out 
According to the last cited enactment and recent decisions, the items 
of damage should be specifically set out in the petition but the amount of 
damages is only to be set out in lump sum which represents the difference 
in the fair and reasonable market value of the property as a whole im-
33. Iowa Code Section 472.21, 472.22 (1958). See Section 9(e), infra, 
for an examination of this statute in the federal courts. 
34. Nichols, Eminent Domain, 2d ed., Section 432, p. 1138; Randell 
v. Highway Commissic:m, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 685, 688, "the 
legislature by its act aforesaid c~early placed the burden of proof 
as well as the pleadings on the plaintiff (landowner)". 
Meyers v. Chic. & N.W. Ry. Co., 118 Iowa 312, 324; 51 N.W. 
1076; Millard v. N.W. Mfg. Co., 200 Iowa 1063, 205 N.W. 979. 
35. Wilcox v. City of Omaha, 220 Iowa 1131, 264 N.W. 5. 
36. Randell v. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa l, 241 N.W. 685. 
37. Wilcox v. City of Omaha, 220 Iowa 1131;, 264 N.W. 5, 7; 
O'Neal v. State, 214 Iowa 977, 243 N.W. 601, 604. 
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mediately before and immediately after the taki~g. 3 8 However, a 
failure to limit the jury to a consideration of the elements of damages 
specifically alleged in the pleadings is no error. 3 9 
d . Amendments and Additional Pleadings 
Amendments and additional pleadings may be filed , and the claimant 
may increase the amount of his prayer for damages as in other actions . 40 
38. Iowa Code Section 472.22 (1958); Welton v . Highway Commission, 
211 Iowa 625 , 638, 233 N. W. 876,884; Kemmerer v . Highway Com-
mission , 214 Iowa 136 , 241 N.W . 693; ·oean v . State, 214 Iowa 143, 
233 N . W . 36; Maxwell v. Highway Commission , 223 Iowa 159, 265 
N. W. 889,905, 506 , 271 N.W . 883 , 884 , 885,886 (1937) (leading 
case) . 
39. Maxwell v . Highway Commission , 223 Iowa 159, 271 N. W. 883, 
884-86 (193 7), "it is contended that the trial court .erred in not 
limiting the jury to a consideration of the element of damages 
specifically alleged in the pleadings as to the measure of damages , 
and that an instruction to that effect was required by the provi-
sions of Section 7841-cl of the Code (1935)(now Iowa Code Section 
472 . 22 (1958)) ••• we find no error in the court's failure to limit 
the jury to the specific elements of damage pleaded". 
40. Kemmerer v. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 241 N.W. 693 
(in this case the amount asked wa·s changed from $5000 to $9676 
and it was held no error}. See also Ball v , Keokuk, 71 Iowa 306; 
Wapsipinicon Power Co. v . Waterloo, 186 Iowa 524., 167 N. W. 
623; DePenning v . Iowa Power & Light Co . , 239 Iowa 950, 33 N. W . 
2d 5 03 ( 194 8) • 
52 
FORM FOR PETITION ON APPEAL FROM AWARD OF DAMAGES 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IOWA, IN AND FOR COUNTY 
______ TERM~------
PlAINTIFF, 
'VS PETITION AT lAW 
DEFENDANT. 
* * * * * * * * 
Comes now the Plaintiff and for cause of action 
against the Defendant states: 
1. That he is now and for years has been the owner in 
fee of 
----------------------------~-----------------
2. That each portion, part , an<,i parcel of said land has been 
used together as one complete tract or unit for farm purposes and 
exclusively devoted to the said one a ctual and permanent use. 
3. That on the day of , 19 __ , the Defendant 
------------- by eminent domain proceedings did condemn for ____ _ 
_________ .purposes a part of said land, specifically and particularly 
designated as follows: 
4. That immediately before said condemnation the fair and 
. reasonable market value of said farm as .a whole was the sum of 
$--.--------
. . -. . · :: : .. L · : ::.l L 
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5. That immediately after said condemnat ion the fair and reason-
able market value of said farm as a whole was the sum of $ 
----~ 
6. That the items of damage to said farm as a whole by reason 
of said condemnation are particularly specified as follows: 41 
(a) The injury to the remaining farm consisting of 
_ _ _ acres of well developed and improved lands; 
(b) The taking of approximately acres by 
for purposes; 
--------- ----------
(c) The destruction of a well loc.ated upon said 
condemned land, the main well and only water supply 
on said farm; 
(d) The appropriation of said land shortens the ;. 
barnyard and feed lot upon, which cattle and straw 
stacks are kept and will make said feed. lot so small 
an area that it will be of no practical value . 
7. That on account of all items hereinbefore set forth .the 
appropriation of said land by --------:-~-would cause this ~laintiff 
substantial damage . 
41 . Iowa Code Section 472.22 (1958) r·equires that specific items of 
damages must be set forth . Moran v . Highway Commission , 223 
Iowa 936, 274 N. W . 59 (1937) . 
54 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that the damages sustained by 
him by reason of the taking and appropriation of said land for said 
purposes be assessed in the sum of dollars with interest 
from the_ day of , 19_, and that the Plaintiff 
have judgment against the Defendant for the costs of this action, in-
cluding a reasonable attorney fee for the Plaintiff as provided by 
statute. 41 a 
(address) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FORM FOR DEFENDANT'S ANSWER 
·IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF IOWA, IN AND FOR ---,---COUNTY 
_____ TERM----
PLAINTIFF, 
vs ANSWER 
DEFENDANT. 
******* 
Comes now the (condemnor) and by way of answer to 
Plaintiff's Petition herein filed states: 
4la. Iowa Code Section 472.33 (1958). 
I 
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1. That he admits that 
~-----
, Plaintiff, owns the real 
estate described in the Petition . 
2. That he admits that the Defendant appropriated and condemn-
ed the land described in Plaintiff's Petition, to- wit: 
---------------
at the time therein designated. 
3 . That he admits that a fence along Plain~iff' s property has 
been destroyed but that specific damages for construction of new 
fencing as contained in Plaintiff's Petition may not lawfully be recover-
ed . 42 
4. That he admits that Plaintiff was temporarily inconven-
ienced by construction of the highway on the :;land condemned but that 
no damages may lawfully be recovered for such inconvenience. 4 2 
5 . That he denies for lack of information the loss of profits 
alleged to have occurred in the operation o! Plaintiff's farm by virtue of 
the condemnation of the land in question but that in any event such loss 
of profits does not constitute a legally compensable damage. 4 2 
6. That he admits the removal of borrow dirt from land ad-
joining the property condemned , but that such removal was rightfully 
42. The defenses relating to points of law may be raised in the 
answer under the provisions of I . R. C. P. 72, but in some situations 
defendant might prefer to raise this issue by a motion to strike . 
56 
made under the terms of a binding contract between Plaintiff and Defen-
dant, which is attached hereto. 
7. That he denies each and every allegation contained in 
Paragraph ( 7) of Plaintiff's Petition, 
8. That he denies Paragraph (8) of Plaintiff's Petition for lack 
of information, 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays that Plaintiff's action be dis-
missed or that in the alternative the Plaintiff be held to strict proof and 
that his damages be determined as provided by law. 43 
(Address) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SECTION 8. TRIAL 0:!\J APPEAL 
a. As an Ordinary Proceeding 
The trial on appeal is conducted as an ordinary civil proceeding, 44 
with the right of change of venue, 45 the l'ight of a continuance, 46 and 
43. Iowa Code Section 472.22 (1958) requires that the defendant shall 
file a written answer to the plaintiff's petition or other pleadings 
as may be proper. 
44. Iowa Code Section 472.21 {1958). 
45. Whitney v. Atlantic Southern Ry. Co. , 53 Iowa 651, 6 N. W. 3 2. 
46. Wilcox & Son v. City of Omaha, 220 Iowa 1131, 264 N.W. 5, 
l 
I 
I I 
1 
l 
[ l 
I J 
II 
[ J 
I J 
J 
II 
lJ 
l J 
J 
.57 
the right to a jury of twelve men. 4 7 In the court to which the appeal is 
taken, trial is de novo, and indeed all the proceedings so far as con-
cerns the trial are conducted as if the condemnation had been commenc-
ed or originated in that court. 48 Thus, the amount of the original 
assessment , 49 or errors and illegalities in computation of the same50 
are not to be considered on appeal. · 
b,.· Jury Assessment Not A Judgment 
In the district court no judgment is rendered except for costs . The 
finding of the jury merely fixes the price at which, upon actual payment 
or tender of payment, the condemnor may take the pr.operty assessed. 51 
It does not pass title to the condemnor, nor compel him to pay for or ac-
cept such property. 
c . Dismissal By Condemnor 
Condemnor may dismiss the proceeciings at any time on the payment 
of the cost." 52 No damages for the loss of a favorable lease ortthe like 
47 . Thorp v. Witham, 65 Iowa 566, 22 N.W. 677; Campbell v . Highway 
Commission, 222 Iowa .544, 269 N. W. 20, 21 (193 6}; Kirby v. Chic. 
N.W. R. Co., 106 Fed. 551. 
48 . Mississippi etc. Co. v. Rosseau, 8 Iowa 373; Wolf v. Iowa etc. 
Ry. Co., 173_ Iowa 277, 155 N.W. 324; Holn v. Chic. etc. Ry . 
Co., 43 Iowa 333; Hall v . Wabash Ry. Co . , 141 Iowa 250, 119 
N.W. 927 . . 
49 . Simmons v . Mason City etc . Ry . Co., 128 Iowa 13 9, 103 N. W. 
129. 
50. Signafous v. Talbot, 25 Iowa 214; Cedar Falls etc . Ry. Co. v. 
N. W. Ry. Co . , 64 I ow a 6 94 , 21 N. W. 141. 
51. Iowa Code Section 472.23 (1958); Richardson v. Centerville, 137 
Iowa 253, q4 N. W . 1071. 
52. DePenning v. Iowq Power & Light Co., :239 Iowa 950, 33 N.W.2d 
503 (1948}; Gear V. Des M. & s. Ry. Co. , 20 Iowa 55:3;, Iowa 
Electric Co. v. Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 33; Burrow v. 
Woodbury County, 200 Iowa 787, 205 N. W . 460 (1925); B & M. R. 
Co. v. Slater , 1 Iowa421; Kloppv. RailroadCo . , 142Iowa474 # 
119 N. W. 3 73 (can dismiss even after the verdict). See . Iowa Code 
Section 472.34 (1958) and discussion-in Section 11 , infra. 
58 
are allowed to the owner f!fJ such abandonment if possession of the pro-
perty has not been taken. However an action of tresspass will lie if 
the facts pleaded constitute a wrong. S4 It is the tender of the amount of 
the assessment that passes title, 55 and if there has been a great ad-
vance in price between the time of the appraisement and such tender, 
the owner may have a right to demand a reappraisement. 56 
d. Effect of Such Dismissal 
However, the finding of the trial jury has the binding force of a 
judgment in the sense that it prevents the condemnor from instituting 
subsequent eminent domain proceedings with a view of obtaining an 
award that would meet his personal satisfaction. 57 But an abandon-
ment of an entire project or plan in good faith by the condemnor does not 
preclude the prosecution of a new condemnation for a different public 
work. 58 
53. Mathiason v. State Conservation Comm. , 24 6 Iowa 9 05, 70 N. W. 2d 
158 (1955); Ford v. Board of Commissioners, 148 Iowa 1, 126 N.W. 
1030 (lapse of three months); contra, Gear v, Railway Co., 20 Iowa 
523,529. 
54 .. Eord v. Bd. ofPark Commissioners, 148 Iowa 1, 126 N.W. 1030 
(1910) (dictum). 
55. Mathiason v. State Conservation Comm., 246 Iowa 905, 70 N.W. 2d 
158 (1955). 
56. Gear v. Railway Co., 20 Iowa 523,532; Ruppert v. B. & M. R. Co., 
38 Iowa 3I6, 318. 
57. Robertson v. Hortenbower, 120 Iowa 410, 94 N.W. 857; Nichols 
On Eminent Domain, Sec. 418 (2d ed.); Hupert v, (\nderson, 35 Iowa 
578. See also Mason v. Iowa Central R. Co., 13.~ Iowa 468, 108 
N.W. 1096. 
58. Corbin v. Cedar Rapids, 66 Iowa 73, 23 N.W. 270; Robertson v. 
Hortenbower, supra. 
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e. Acceptance of Deposit by Landowner 
Prior to the Laws of the 58th General Assembly. (1959) an accept-
ance by the condemnee of the damages aw~rded by the commissioners 
barred hi§ right of appeal . Such acceptance after an appeal abated the 
appeal. 5 These provisions were repealed by the 58t h General Assembly , 
and by amendment to Iowa Code Section 472 . 25 (1958) the dis~rict court 
may, after appeal, direct that part of the damages deposited with the 
sheriff as it finds just and. proper be paid to the persons entitled there-
to , 60 . 
However, where. the landowner has accepted the full amount of the 
commissioners award either prior to or after the institution of his appeal, 
condemnor should urge that an appeal is barred or abated. ·61 
: SEGTION 9. RE.M'EDIES. IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS 
a. Appeal 
.. (1): Generally 
Basically, the method of introducing condemnation issues into the 
court system is through .the statutory remedy of appeal. While collater-
al remedies are available and are examined. herein, nearly all issues 
shou.ld be raised by ,appeal. Appeal is the exclusive remedy for in-
59. Iowaillode Section 472.29 (1958) repealed by Ohapter 318.of the 
Laws t>f the 58th General Assembly (~'.~59) . 
601• Chapter 318, 58th General As'sembly. (1959) . 
. 61. Hayes v. Chicago , R.I.~ P. R. Co . , 239Iowa 149 , 30 N.W. 2d 
743 (1948); Marling v . Burlington etc . Ry . Co . , 67 low a 331, 25 
N. W . 268 ("an owner who accepts the compensation awarded can-
not object to the amount of .the award or claim that the condemna-
tion proceedings were irregular''); Mississippi & M • R. Co. v • 
Burlington, 14 Iowa 5 72 . See also Burrow v . County, 200 Iowa 
787, 205 N.W. 4.60; Miller v. Iowa Power and Light, 239. Iowa 
1257, 34 N. W. 2d 627 (1948); Burns v. Ry ~ Co., 102 Iowa 7, 70 
N.W. ,728 . 
60 
creasing the amount of the sheriff• s juty award. 62 
(2) Lack of Power to. Condemn 
On appeal, the landowner may and should litigate the power to 
condemn. However I when the problem hinges on whether the condem-
nor lacks statutory authority or power to condemn , a question of law, 
such problems may be raised by certiorari; 63 in fact o where a legal 
issue is involved and no problem of valuation is present~ certiorari 
seems to be the preferred method for raising the matter " 4 
(3) Inadequacy of Public Purpose 
Once it ·is established that the condemnor has power to condemn 
land, the issue is sometimes raised that the condemnation proceedings 
are illegal because the condemnor is acting beyond his statu~ory : 
powers . 65 This , of course , will be basically a question of fact and 
therefore appropriate for a jury on appeal and not for other remedies . 66 
The most frequent question raised is whether or not the property in 
question is needed for the project authorized . The courts have held 
that the question of the necessity of a taking of property in condemna-
tion proceedings cannot be raised in an. independent suit to enjoin 
62 o Iowa Code Section 4 7 2. 17 (195 8); Mazzoli v. City of Des Moines , 
245 Iowa 571 , 63 N .. W . 2d 218, 219 (1954); Hagerla v. Mississippi 
R. Co., 202 Fed . 776. 
63. Jenkins v , Highway Commission, 205 Iowa 523, 218 N.W. 258 
(1928); Rockwell v . Bowers, 88 ·Iowa .88, · 55 N.W. 1 (1893) . · 
64 . Reter v. Davenport , R. L & N. W . Ry . Co., 243 Iowa 1112 o 54 
N. W . 2d 863 , 870 (1952)(dictum) o Certiorari will not lie in an 
action against the commissioners for improper assessment. 
Forbes v , Delashmutt, 68 Iowa 164 , 26 N. W . 56,57 (1885). 
65 . See Section 5, supra . 
66 . Heinz v , City of Davenport, 230 Iowa 7, 296 N.W. ' 783, 786 
(1941) o But see dictum to the effect that only the issue of 
valuation may be raised on appeal in Stellingwerf v o Lenihan, 
249 Iowa 179 , 85 N. W.2d 912 (1957). This and related cases 
are discussed in Section 9(b) , infra . 
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condemnation. 67 This is also the case where the allegation is made that 
the purpose for which the land is being condemned is actually private 
instead of public, 68 or for a different purpose than that for which it was 
condemned. 69 In such cases the courts hold that plaintiffs must be 
denied equitable relief because they have an adequate remedy at law in 
the statutory remedy of appeal. 7 0 
(4) Error in Sheriff's Jury Proceeding 
The problem of what remedy, if any, is available in case of error 
. in the sheriff's jury proceeding is a difficult one, and it is a problem 
for which the Supreme Court has never provided a complete rationale. 
Nevertheless, the cases seem to fall into certain patterns. The most 
basic determination which has to be made is whether there ·is a remedy 
at all for error committed by the sheriff's jury. Where the alleged error 
goes to the procedure in picking particular jurors, influence exercised 
during the proceeding, etc., no remedy is provided apparently, because 
these errors deal solely with the determination of a valuation figure by 
the sheriff's jury. 71 Since the issue of valuation will be raised and 
67. Ermels v. Webster City, 246 Iowa 1305, 71 N.W.2d 911 (1955); 
Connolly v. Des Moines & Central R. Co., 246 Iowa 874 , 68 N . W. 
2d 3 20 (1955); Heinz v. City of Davenport , 23 0 Iowa 7, 296 N. W . 
783 (1941}; Davis v. Des Moines & Ft. Dodge Ry. Co . , 155 Iowa 
51, 135 N.W. 356 (1912); LaPlant v. Marshalltown, 134 Iowa 261, 
265, 111 N.W. 816 (1907); Carlile v. Des Moines & K.C. Ry. Co. , 
99 Iowa 345, 68 N. W. 784 (1896)(collateral action was trespass); 
Waterloo Water Company v. Hoxie, 89 Iowa 317, 56 N . W. 499 
(1893}. 
68. Reter v. Davenport, R.I. & N.W. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112 , 54 
N. W. 2d 863, 8!ZO (1952); Heinz v. City of Davenport, 23 0 Iowa 7 , 
296 N.W. 783 (1941). 
69. Davis v. Des Moines & Ft . Dodge Ry. Co., 155 Iowa 51, 135 
N.W. 356 (1912). 
70. Heinz v. City of Davenport, 230 Iowa 7 , 296 N.W. 783 (1941}; 
Minear v. Plowman, 197 Iowa 1198, 197 N. W. 67 (1924); Town 
of Alvord v. Great Northern Ry. Co . , 179 Iowa .4 65, : · 161. :w. W. 
467 (1917}; Waterloo Water Co. v. Hoxie, 89 Iowa 317, 56 N . W. 
499, 501 (1893}; Keokuk & N.W. R. v. Donne!, 77 Iowa 221, 42 
N.W. 176 (1889} (issue raised sua sponte). 
71. Mill v. City of Denison, 237 Iowa 1335, 25 N.W.2d 323 (1946); 
Gray v. Iowa Cent. Ry. Co., 129 Iowa 68, 105 N.W. 359 (1905) , 
(error in description of property); Cedar Rapids, I. F. & N. W. R. 
Co . v. Whelan, 64 Iowa 694, 21 N.W. 141 (1884) (jury met at 
improper time); Phillips v . Watson, 63 Iowa 28, 18 N .W . 659 
(1884} (alleged partiality of appraisers and undue influence upon 
them); TheM. & M. R. Co. v. Rosseau, 8 Iowa 373 (1859)(im-
proper selection of jury members and bias by the members} . 
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tried de novo on appeal , no real need exists for review of errors in 
arriving at the first valuation figure . 72 C onsequently, there is no remedy 
in the sense that no procedure exists for reversing an error committed by 
an inferior body or trib1 . mal by an appeal or collateral proceeding; how-
ever, when the alleged error goes to the jurfsdictio.n of the sheriff! s 
jury , then the issue may be raised by specified remedies, principally 
appeal and certiorari . Error involving the jurisdiction of the sheriff's 
jury over subject matter may be raised on appeal ·if no waiver of the 
is sue has· occurred. 73 Also, where a valuation is sue is appealed 
along with a legal issue , the legal issue may be raised and decided 
on appeal. 74 For a discussion of certiorari and this problem, see 
Section -9(d), infra. 
b. Injunction 
Very difficult issues are presented when the question of the pro-
priety of an injunction is raised. Two ·conflicting lines of authority 
are available, and both have received support in recent decisions of 
the court. The stakes involved may be high , since ~n. improperly 
granted injunction, although it may be reversed on appeal , will in 
the interim cause long delays in construction 1tes'ttlltin_.g ::ilil. -. he~nr-~Tilosses 
due.i_d:o:. ·igling.~ot. exp:ens iv.e ..:me chin ei!Y -4r:.i)(\tetuup..tfdfu -of-; the :·.aantimt.ity , of 
ciett.taip. ty.pes~ 9f _projLe,qts)_:..qi.s:p~r'sal oLthe; .armti\a,ti:tor~ s laboll,:forpe 6 
72 . Cedar Rapids , I. F. & N. W. R. Co . v . Whelan , 64 Iowa 694 , 21 
N.W . 141 (1884); Phillips v . Watson, 63 Iowa 28, 18 N.W . 659 
{1884); theM . & M . R. Co . v. Rosseau, 8 Iowa 373 (1859} . 
73. Slough v. Chicago & N. W. Ry . Co . , 7I rowa 641 , 3'3 N.W . I49 
(1887}. Query whether this would be the result today in view of 
the fact that certiorari has been given broader scope. See Sec-
tion 9(d}, tnfra . 
74 . Reter v. Davenport , R. I . & N.W. Ry . Co . , 243 Iowa 112, 54 N.W. 
2d 863, 870 (195 2). But see Runner v . City of Keokuk, 11 Iowa 543 
(1861) (holding that only the issue of damages could be tried on 
appeal. · 
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etc. 
75 There seems to be little doubt that the necessity of a taking of 
property in condemnation proceedinGs cannot be raised in an indepen-
dent suit to enjoin condemnation. 7 It is also clear that where a clear 
case of fraud, illegality , or want of power is demonstrated, an injunc-
tion may be obtained . 77 It should be noted in passing that where a 
purely legal issue involving illegality or want of power is present, the 
75. Where a temporary injunction is sought, a bond ln the amount of 
125% of the probable damages must be posted . I.R. C . P. 327. 
It would seem to be open to counsel for the condemnor to contend 
that this figure would be a rather high one. However, once the 
injunction is made permanent, though improperly so, bond is not 
necessary pending appeal, and no damages may be recovered for 
the resultant interruption of work . 
76. · See cases cited under footnote 67 , supra. 
77. Rhodesv. HighwayCommission, Iowa , 94N.W. 2d97 
(195 9){dicturrt); Porter v. Board of Supervisors of Monona County , 
238 Iowa 1399 , 28 N.W.2d 841 (1947); Mill V. City of Denison , 
237 Iowa 1335, , 25 N . W . 2d 323 (1946}; Heinz v . City of Daven-
port , 230 Iowa 7 , 296 N.W. 783 (1941). An injunction may also 
be used where the conduct in question is illegal. Butterworth v. 
Highway Commission, 210 Iowa l23lr 232 N.W. 760 (1930} 
(attempt to round a corner which would isolate a farmhouse in 
violation of statute) . Hoover v. Highway Commission, 207 Iowa 
56 t 222 N.W. 438 (1928); Scott v. Price Bros. Co., 207 Iowa 191 , 
217 N. W . 75 (1927) {injunction will issue to protect statutory or 
constitutional remedies); Cf. Plattsmough Bridge Co. v . Globe Oil 
& Refining Co., 232 Iowa 1118 , 7 N.W.2d 409 {1943); Reed v. 
Highway Commission , 221 Iowa 5 01 , 266 N. W. 4 7 {193 6); Hicks 
v. Highway Commission , 221 Iowa 509 , 266 N . W . 51 ~ {,1936); 
Grant v. Cowan Township, 190 Iowa 1188, 181 N.W. 637 {1921) 
Injunction has also been used to restrain a fraudulent condemnation. 
Forbes v . Delashmutt , 68 Iowa 164 , 26 N . W. 56 {1885}. Also see 
Ermels v. W~bster City , 246 Iowa 1305, 71 N.W . 2d 911, 913 {1955) 
{dictum); Mook v. Sioux City , 244 Iowa 1124 , 60 N.W. 2d 92,99 
{l952}{dictum); Heinz v . City of Davenport , 230 Iowa 7, 296 N.W. 
783 , 786 {1941) {dictum); Davis v. D.M . Ft . D . R. Co . , 155 Iowa 
51, 135 N.W . 346 , 360 {1912) (dictum); LaPlant v . Marshalltown, 
134 Iowa 261 , 111 N.W. 816 , 818 (1907) (dictum) . 
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issue could also be raised by certiorari. 78 Furthermore, the enforcement 
of an ordinance which constitutes a taking without just compensation 
may be enjoined where the property owner is threatened with criminal 
proceedi~s which would result in irreparable injury and multiplicity 
of suits, 
An area of considerable doubt has risen where the facts are alleged 
to justify an injunction do not fall into either of these categories. The 
situation which is ordinarily present is an alleged want of power, il-
legality, or fraud which does not present a clear violation of statute, 
but instead will be determined by disputed facts, statutory interpre-
tation, inferences to be made from facts, or the application of non-
statutory legal principles. On the one hand it has been held that the 
only issue which may properly be raised on appeal is the item of damages 
and consequently that plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief since at any 
moment the condemnor may pay the money into court and take posses-
sion of the property. 80 On the other hand, there is a long line of 
cases to the effect that where a non-damage issue is presented, the 
question may be tried out on appeal along with the issue of 
78. See Section 9(d}, infra. 
79. Stoner McCray System v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 
78 N.W. 2d 843 (1956). 
80. Stellingwerf v. Lenihan, 249 Iowa 179, 85 N.W. 2d 912 (1957) 
(dictum) (court's holding went only to the issuance of a tempo-
rary injunction, but the court declared that plaintiff was entitled 
to equitable relief because on appeal the only issue triable would 
be damages; at issue was plaintiff's assertion that a private use 
of property to be condemned for a public purpose was threatened); 
Longstreet v. Town of Sharon, 200 Iowa 723, 205 N.W. 343 (1925); 
Witham v. Union County, 198 Iowa 359, 196 N.W. 605 {1924); 
Cowan v. Grant Township, 190 Iowa 1188, 181 N.W. 637 (1921); 
Burgess v. Bremer County, 189 Iowa 168, 178 N.W. 389 (1920). 
} 
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damages. 81 The former view is certainly subject to a great deal of 
criticism. It certainly is incorrect to say, as the court did in Stelling-
werf v. Lenihan , 249 Iowa 179 , 85 N . W. 2d 912 (1957), and other . 
cases, 82 that the only issue on appeal is the item of 
81. 
82. 
Ermels v . Webster City, 246 Iowa 1305, 71 N. W . 2d 911 (1955) 
(the dismissal by district court of an action based on alleged 
unconstitutionality upheld; case illustrates the trying of non-
damage issues on appeal); Reter v. Pavenpo.rt, R. I. & N.W. 
Ry. Co . , 243 Iowa 1112, 54 N. w_. 2d ~63 , 870 (1952) (issue of 
alleged private instead of public use tried on appeal; issue 
tried as a separate question of law under R. C. P. 1 OS); Heinz 
v. City ot Davenport, 230 Iowa 7, 296 N. w. 783 (1941} (holding 
the issue of alleged private instead of public use should be 
tried on appeal, and no injunction should issue}; Minear v. 
Plowman , 197 Iowa 1188, 197 N. W. 67 (1924} (holding that the 
issue of necessity of a taking may be tried. on appeal}) Town of 
Alvord v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 179 Iowa 465, 161 N.W. 
467 (l917} (court stated that issue of necessity of taking 
should be raised by appeal); Davis v. Des Moines & Ft. Dodge 
Ry. Co., 155 Iowa 51, 135 N.W. 36 (1912} (leading case hold-
ing that issue of alleged private instead of public 4se should be 
raised by appeal, and therefore in.junction should be denied}; 
Waterloo Water Co. v. Hoxie, 89 Iowa 317, 56 N.W. 499 
(1893} (defense that property was already devoted to a public 
use should be raised on appeal and not by injunction; Keokuk 
& N.W. Ry . Co . v. Donne! , ·77 Iowa 221, 42 N.W . 176 (1889} 
(issue of plaintiff's ownership for a public purpose as against 
defendant• s condemnation for public purpose could be raised 
on appeal, and therefore injunction would not lie} . 
Longstreet v. Town of Sharon, 200 Iowa 723, 205 N.W. 343 
(1925); Witham v. Union County, 198 Iowa 359, 196 N.W. 605 
(1924); Burgess v. Bremer County, 189 Iowa 168 8 178 N.W. 
389 (1920). 
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damages. 83 An examination of the authorities usually cited for the issu-
ance of an injunction shows that they fall into two categories, and that 
when understood in the context of these categories, they do not sup-
port the position that only the damages may be raised on appeal. A 
number of the cases are ones in which a clear breach of a specific 
statute was involved instead of situations in which conduct might be 
found illegal or fraudulent in the light of evidence and application of 
non-statutory principles; 84 moreover, it seems clear that in these 
83. See cases cited in footnote 81, supra, which cover a wide variety 
of non-damage issues which were declared to be proper for an 
appeal including the issue of alleged private instead of public use, 
which was the problem in Stellingwerf v. Lenihan, supra. However, 
on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case, the condemnor in pre-
paring its brief was content to rely on. the contention that the trial 
court's discretion in dissolving the temporary injunction should not 
be disturbed and did not advance the contention that other remedies 
should be employed. Consequently, none of the authority cited in 
footnote 81 was called'to the attention of the court, and it simply 
accepted the contention in Division V of plaintiff's brief that he 
had no remedy at law as only the issue of damages could be raised 
on appeal. 
84. Plattsmouth Bridge Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 232 Iowa 
1118, 7 N.W. 2d 409 (1943) (taking of property without holding 
condemnation proceedings of any kind); Reed v. Highway Commission, 
221 Iowa 501, 266 N.W. 47 (1936); Hicks v, Highway Commission, 
221 Iowa 509, 266 N.W. 51 (1936) (both this case and the Reed case 
involved attempts to round a corner by taking a dwelling house in 
clear violation of a statute expressly forbidding such action. But-
terworth v, Highway Commission, 210 Iowa 1231, 232 N.W. 760 
(193 O) (attempt to round a corner which would isolate a farmhouse 
in violation of statute; Hoover v. Highway Commission, 207 Iowa 
56, 222 N.W. 438 (1928)(ponstruction of a highway through an 
orchard in plain violation of a statute expressly forbidding such 
construction); Grant v. Cowan Township, 190 Iowa 1188, 181 N. W. 
63 7 (1921)(this case comes closer than any other to supporting the 
decision in Stellingwerf; however, the facts of the case involved an 
action of township trustees which the court held clearly went beyond 
their statutory authority, Thus, the case may still fit into the cate-
gory of those in which a clear and readily apparent violation of an 
express statutory provision has been shown). 
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cases the fact that the violation is a plain one is a significant factor in 
those decisions . 85. The cases which specifica,lly declare that damages 
are the only is:sue on appeal are ones in which the court was faced with 
error in the sheriff's jury proceeding and the intent of the courB6'as ap-
parently to hold that such error was not reviewable on appeal. Con-
sequently, it vyould appear that the line of cases represented by the 
dictum in Stellingwerf v. Lenihan, supra,· is particularly vulnerable to 
attack, and that in view of the serious consequences to the condemnor 
whenever an injunction is issued, every effort should be made to attack 
it by showing the availability of other remedies, such as appeal, cer-
tiorat.i , or mandamus . 
The position which probably should be adopted is that all issues 
may be raised on appeal except those which might go up on certiorari; 
85 . "So , where individuals, composing a commission or board or other 
arm of the state, violate the clear provisions of the state Constitu-
tion or statute, and attempt to appropriate private property for pub-
lic use without authority , the r~ghts of the owner may b e protected 
by the courts through the agency of an injunction or some other 
suitable means .•. •.• Clearly the power ·of the courts .to restrain 
state officials from violating plain provisions of the statute and 
Constitution is in no way derogatory to the general and well- re-
cognized rule that the state cannot be sued without . its consent. " 
(Italics Added). Hoover v. Highway Commission , 207 Iowa 56, 
222 N.W. 438,440 (1928) . , '"l'o deny the appellee the right to 
. injunctive relief, in view of the plain language of the statute, 
would be to in effect repeal the statute by judicial pronoun.cement . " 
(Italics Added) Butterworth v. Highway Commission , 210 Iowa 
1231 , 23 2 N. W. 760 (193 0). It would seem then that injunctions 
ou_ght to be confined solely to the situation where a plain violation 
of statute is involved; such was not the case in the Stellingwerf 
case , supra, where further facts and interpretation of an additional 
statute were necessary . 
86 . Longstreet v. Town of Sharon, 200 Iowa 723 , 205 N. W . 343 (1925); 
Witham v. Union County , 1.98 Iowa 359, 196 N.W. 605 (1924); 
Burgess v. Bremer County, 189 Iowa 168, 178 N. W . 389 (1920) . 
For a discussion of this type of case, see Section 9(a)(4), supra. 
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such an appeal would try all issues r. damage and non- damage, at one 
time and would avoid multiplicity of suits., Injunctions should be avail-
able only for clear violations of statute, manifest fraud, etc. , 8 7 and a 
heavier burden of proof should be placed on the plaintiff in an action 
for injunction. 88 If a suitable case for injunction arises, it would 
seem that the proper time for issuance is the time at which the con-
demnor pays over the money because only on the occurrence can any 
damage result to the plaintiff; until such time , any damage would be 
purely conjectural . The acceptance of this position would enable the 
condemnor to defer taking the land until the issue can be tried on appeal 1 
and thus :v0id ·an injunction which might tie his hands for a much longer 
period of time. 
Although there is some doubt that a permanent injunction may be 
granted in the situation where a fact determination must be made, it 
is clear that a temporary injunction or a stay may be obtained .pending 
a hearing on the issuance of an injunction . 89 , Such a temporary injunc-
tion may be necessary in order to prevent the issue from becoming moot , 
since once the land has been taken, adjudication on the issue of injunc.:,.:· .. ; 
tive relief is terminated. 90 Of course , once a determination is properly 
87 ., The following language from Beidenkopf v . Des Moines Life Ins. 
Co., 160 Iowa 629 , 142 N'. W . 434,438 (1913) is noteworthy, 
"Even where the technical right to injunctive relief is otherwise 
clearly established, it will be denied where the issuance of the 
writ may occasion inconveniencE? to the public and serious loss 
to the defendant , while the injury to the plaintiff can readily be 
compensated in damages." Also see Browneller v. Natural Gas 
Pipe Line Co . , 233 Iowa 686 , 8 N. W .2d 474,481 (1943) . 
88 . This view is suggested by the discussion of the oourt in Porter 
v , Board of Supervisors of Monona County , 23 8 Iowa 13 99 , 28 
N. W . 2d 841 (194 7) and Heinz v . City of Davenport , 23 0 Iowa 7, 
296 N.W. 783 (1941) . 
89 . Stellingwerf v . Lenihan, 249 Iowa 179, 85 N. W. 2d 912 (1957); 
Porter v. Board of Supervisors , 238 Iowa 1399, 28 N.W. 2d 841 
(194·7). 
90. Porter v. Board of Supervisors of Monona County , 23 8 Iowa 
1399 , 28 N.W. 2d 841 (1947); Welton v. Highway Commission , 
2 0 8 low a 14 0 1 , 2 2 7 N. W . 3 3 2 ( 19 2 9) • 
' I 
I ( 
} 
1 
I I 
. j 
) 
\ 
I 
li 
1 
II 
l. 
1 
69 
made in a suit for injunction , the matter is res judicata . 91 
c . Mandamus 
When the condemnor fails to hold a preliminary assessment , as out-
lined by Chapter 472 of the Iowa Code (1958), the lancbwner cannot 
institute eminent domain proceedings but must resort to mandamus or 
injunction when the condemnor takes possession of his property. 92 
Mandamus will lie to compel the institution of conctemnation proceed-
ings where there has been a taking of private property for public use 
without compensating the owner. 93 Such cases usually arise in 
situations in which tHere .is Ci. q.u·estton.:of :W.hether a l:ak~nq :Withinlthe 
meaning of the Constitution has occurred and consequently the con-
demnor fails to institute condemnation proce edings . However , mandamus 
will not lie to compel the state to determine an alleged debt owed by it. 94 
d . Certiorari . 
As a general rule , certiorari is not available to review mere 
91. Hoover v. Highway Commission, 201 Iowa 1, 230 N.W. 561 
(1930). 
92 . Hunting v . Curtis , 10 Iowa 152;. Nichols, Ibid , Section 468 
(2d ed . ) . Under Iowa Code Section 306 (1958) appeal is the 
exclusive remedy on establishment of roads. Thorp v. Witham, 
65 Iowa 28, 18 N. W. 659; Gibson v. Union County, 208 Iowa 
314, 223 N.W. 111. See Slough v. Chic. & North Western Ry . 
co., 71 Iowa 641, 33 N.W. 149. 
93 . Anderlik v. Highway Commission, 240 Iowa 919 , 38 N.W. 2d 605 
(1949); Baird v . Johnston, 230 Iowa 161 , 297 N. W . 315 (1941); 
Dawson v. McKinnon, 226 Iowa 756, 285 N.W. 258 (1939). 
94 . Bachman v . Highway Commission, 23 6 Iowa 77 8 , 20 N. W . 2d 
18 (1945); Long v. Highway Commission, 204 Iowa 376, 213 N.W . 
532 (1927) . 
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irregularities or technical lack of compliance with the law . 95 However , 
as noted in Section 9(a)(4L supra , certiorari is one of the remedies 
available for an error which goes to the jurisdiction of the condemnation 
proceedings . The feeling is that where the error is basic , the land-
owner is entitled to two "days in court"; (1) a properly constituted 
evaluation proceeding, and (2) a right to appeaL 96 Certiorari also 
lies in the situation where an appeal has not been taken and thus allows 
review of issues of law raised by the sheriff's jury proceedings . 97 
Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 3 08 has abolished the requirement that 
no other plain , speedy and adequate remedy exists as a prerequisite 
to the issuance of certiorari, and the court has h~ld that the elimi-
nation of this requirement indicates a purpose to broaden the scope 
of review by certiorari . 98 However, where a valuation issue is 
presented along with a legal issue, then appeal is apparently the pre-
ferred remedy. 99 
e. State Condemnation in the Federal Courts 
Although the remedy has not often been utilized in Iowa , the 
95. Jacobs v . City of Chariton , 245 Iowa 1378, 65 N. W. 2d 561 
(1954); Massey V n City Council , 239 Iowa 527 , 535, 31 N.W. 2d 
875, 880 (194 8); Jenney v . Civil Service Commission, 200 Iowa 
1042 , 1046 r 205 N.w •. 958 (1925) . 
96. Miller V o Palo Alto Board of Supervisors, 24 8 Iowa 113 2 , 84 N. W . 
2d 38 (1957) (failure to properly swear jurors); Abney v . Clark , 
87 Iowa 727,-730 , 55 N.W. 6 , 7 {1893)(failure to appoint jurors at 
the proper time). 
97 . Miller v. Palo Alto Board of Supervisors , 248 Iowa 1132, 84 N. W . 
2d 38 (1957). 
98 . · Miller v. Palo Alto Board of Supervisors , 24 8 Iowa 113 2 , 84 N. W . 
2d 38 (1957); Massey v . City Council , 239 Iowa 527, 31 N. W . 2d 
875 (1948). 
99 . Reter v . Davenport , R. I. & N. W . Ry. Co .. , 243 Iowa 1112 , 54 
N-.w. 2d 863,870 ' (1952) . 
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federal courts are available for the trial of condemnation issues. 100 
Federal Rules of Divil Procedure 71A1 01 Provides a complete procedure 
to be followed for t~ial of qondemnation ca~es in the federal courts. 
This procedure is tope uniformly followed except that .if the state law 
. provides that trial _shall be by j~ry or qy jury and commission, that 
pro vis ion shaU b~ follow ect. 10 2 · For some time it has been accepted 
' . 
law that the federal co~rts may try a s~ate con<;lemnation case even 
though the state is the condemnor, provide_d, of course, that the neces-
sary jur~sdictional requirements are fulfilled. 103 Two possibilities for 
bringing a condemnation ~nt0 federql court exist: (1) removal to federal 
court from state court, and (2) commencin9 an ori~inal action in the 
federal district co~rt. Removal to fe<;leral court has been upheld even 
after a valuation by commis.sioners. app0inted under state lp.w has been 
made and the award h9-s been qppealed to th~ state court for trial de novo 
under a stat4te almost ideqtical to Iowa's. 104 However, the removing 
party .must comply with the federal statl.Jte on removal, 105 which requires 
100. Some of the a~vantages which might resu~t from use of the federal 
courts are: (1) the greater control over the. jury possessed by a 
federal judge, (2) the great~r power of the federal courts in direct-
ing verdicts 1 {3) the possibil~ty that a feqeral-court 111ay have a 
superior class of j4rors, (4) the possibil~ty that· the federal docket 
may not be as congested, (5_} the greater consic;ieration given to 
motions beca\_.\se of the requirement of written briefs; (6) the 
availability of-better tested discovery procedures. rederal inter-
pleader might al~o be adv~mtageous in securing a nation-wide 
service of process. 
101. See Paul, Condemnation Procec;l.ure under f'ederal Rule-71A; 43 
Iowa L. Rev. 231 U958); Comment, 38 L. Rev. 575 (1953). 
102 . F. R. C.P. ?lA(k). 
103 . Mississippi & R. River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.s. 403 
(1878)(the state contended unsuccessfully that condemnation was 
a state funct~on and_ ~hat no agency of the federal government, in 
eluding the federal courts, 'might interfere therewith). . 
104. Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Min. Co., 196 U.S. 
239 (1905). 
105. 28 ~~s.c. Section 1441(a)(195·2). 
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that the moving party be a non-resident defendant. In s pite of Section 
472.21 of the Iowa Code (195-8) which ·declares that the condemnor shall 
be defendant, the federal statute has twice been interpreted by the U. 
S . Supreme 'Court to mean that the condemnor is the plaintiff , not the 
defendant. 106 Although there is 'some reason to doubt the correctness 
of this position, 107 it -would seem that , barring a somewhat unlikely 
reversal of the present position, a condemn·or may not remove to federal 
court . As far as possibility (2), · supra·, is concerned , the validity of 
commencing an original a.ction · in the federal district court ' is still an 
106. Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co. v . Stude , 346 U. S . 574 (1954); 
Mason City & Ft . D. R. Co. v. Boynton , 204 U.S. 570 (1907) . 
The reasoning of Holmes, J. in Boynton was that the condemnor 
was responsible for the · initiation of· the action, and therefore, 
should be regarded as plaintiff. 
107 . In the Boynton case the court took the position that federal sub-
stantive law must take precedence over what apparently was re-
garded as the substantive law of Iowa on labeling plaintiffs and 
defendants and fixing burden of proof; ·the decision seems to be an 
effort to utilize state procedural law but fo.llow federal substantive 
law under the then-prevailing doctrine of Swift v . Tyson . However, 
since Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins , 3 04 U ~ S. 64 (193 8) and the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this doctrine has 
been completely reversed. Therefore, it would dertainly be open 
to contend that, since in the Boynton · case ·the· court apparently 
.treated the Iowa law as substantive, it should be regarded as 
substantive today and hence should control the action . This 
position would· be analagous to that taken by the federal courts on 
the Iowa contributory negligence rule , which is given · suhstahHve 
treatment and therefore is applied in actions in federal court. This 
argument does not seem to have been advanced in the Stude case , 
however; consequently some attack on the present position of the 
court is probably · still possible . It is worthy of .note that the dis-
sents of Frankfurter and Black, J.J., did not object to the majority 
opinion on the removal question. Consequently, it would appear 
somewhat unlikely that the present doctrine is headed for early 
reversal. 
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open question in federal law . 108 In the Stude case, the court upheld the 
dismissal of an action which, in conformity with Iowa practice , had been 
labeled an appeal instead of an original action as would have been proper 
in federal court in spite of well- reasoned dissents by. Gardner, C . J. , in 
the court of appeals 1 09 and Frankfurter and Black, J. J. , in the Supreme 
Court. The dissenters seemed confident that an original action correctly 
labeled would succeed and should be treated as a suit for declaration of 
money owed; 110 however, the majority of the court explicitly left the 
question open, although indicating a preference for a count in declara-
tion of money owed. 
SECTION 10 . SETTING.ASIDE THE VERDICT 
Generally the rule in condemnation proceedings is that verdicts of 
the district court jury will not be reversed unless there is a showing of 
passion or prejudice. 111 A number of Iowa cases have taken the pos i-
108 . Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co . v . Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954). 
109 . 204 F. 2d 116 . 
110 . The assumption of the dissent was that since an original action in 
federal court would lie, the mislabeling of the action as an appeal 
should not bel" a bar to the relief sought . 
111. "Where there is a disputed fact question as to the value of the pro-
perty taken by eminent domain and there is competent evidence from 
which the jury could reach the verdict it did, this court will not in-
terfere." Miller v . Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co . , 239 Iowa 1257, 
34 N. W . 2d 627,630 (1948); Not excessive: Hostert v. Highway Com-
mission , __ Iowa __ , 93 N. W. 2d 773 (1958); Danker v. Iowa Power 
& Light Co., 249 Iowa 327, 86 N.W.2d . 835 (1957); Cutler v. State, 
224 Iowa 686, 278 N . w. 3 27 (193 8); Cory v. State , 214 Iowa 13 6, 
241 N.W. 693 (1932); Wheatley v. City of Fairfield, 213 Iowa 1187, 
240 N. W . 629 (193 2) (same rule applied to a valuation by trial court 
without jury}; Kerry v. Tysseling, 239 N.W. 233 (no Iowa report); 
Besco v. Mahaska County, 200 Iowa 684, 205 N , W . 459 (1925); 
Longstreet v . Town of Sharoin, 200 Iowa 723, 205 N. W. 343; Koster 
v. Sioux County, 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993; City of Albia, 140 
· Iowa 196~ Dudley v . Minnesota & N.W. Ry. Co., 77 Iowa 408, 42 
N.W. 359; Hempstead v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa 303, 3 N.W . 123 
(change of grade case); Sherwood v. Reynold , 213 Iowa 539, 239 
N.W. 137; Nottoosmall: Trachtav. HighwayCommission, 249Iowa 
374, 86 N.W. 2d 849 {1957); Neddenmeyer v. Crawford County, 190 
Iowa 883, 175 N.W. 339; Ideal Cream Separator Co . v. Des Moines , 
167 Iowa 517, 149 N.W. 640 (change of grade); U.S. v. Foster, 
145 F. 2d 873 {1945). 
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tion that a "condemnation case is one in which the amount allowed is 
peculiarly within the province of the jury ;'112 thus going one step beyond 
the rule normally applied for reversing an excessive verdict. While the 
Iowa court has never discussed the reasons why a more rigorous rule 
should be applied to a jury verdict in a condemnation case 0 the reason 
would appear to be the fact that, within the discretion of the trial ,court, 
the jury may examine the land condemned in p erson. 113 However , in 
spite of the strong ·presumption in favor of the reasonableness of a jury 
award in condemnation ·cases in Iowa, it is Clear that where passion 
. • 1 . 
. "- • ' 
.112. "A condemnation case is one in which the a mount allowed is 
peculiarly within the prow1nce of the jury , and unless the same 
be shown to be so extravagant as to be wholly unfair and unreason-
able , this court has repeatedly refused to interfere with the verdict 
of the jury . " Longstreet v. Town of Sharon , 200 Iowa 723 , 727 , 
205 N.W. 343 , 344 (1925); Korf v. Fleming , 239 Iowa SOl e 32 N.W. 
2d 85 (1948); Stoner v. Highway Commission , 227 Iowa 115, 287 
N.W. 269 (1939). 
113 . Cf. 29 C.J.S . Section 310, p . 1342. The merit in this reasoning 
is not entirely apparent as it would seem that actually seeing the 
land in a condemnation case-is no more valuable than hearing the 
individual witnesses in a negligence case , in which a lower stan-
dard would seem to be applied. Since the principal function of a 
jury in a condemnation case is to place a value on the land and 
since ordinar.ily the jury must rely heavily on expert appraisers , it 
would seem that the testimony of the witnesses rather than the 
visual appearance of the land would ordinarily be the determining 
factor. Under this assumption, the condemnation case takes on a 
strong resemblance to the negligence case , and it would appear 
that the condemnor might well contend that the same standard for 
overturning a jury verdict on grounds of excessiveness Ol.lght to 
be applied to condemnation verdicts as is applied to negligence 
verdicts. Remittiturs in negligence verdicts are, of course , 
familiar to Iowa law. 
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or prejudice clearly exists, the award vvill be found excessive.114 
Such a finding may be made either by the trial court in directing a 
remittitur 115 or by the Supreme Court on appeal. 116 In the case of 
114 . "It is the well- settled rule of law in th.is state that if the verdict 
appears to be so excessive as to indicate pas sion and prejudice 
in ordinary negligence cases, t he verdict should be set aside. 
The same rule applies to condemnation proc eedings. ". Luthi v. 
Highway Commission, 224 Iowa 678, 276 N. W . 5 86 {193 7}; 
Stortenbecker v . Iowa Power & Light Co., Iowa , 96 
N. W . 2d 468,473. (1959) (award excessive ev;n though within 
the testimony of the witnesses); Campb.ell v . Highway Commission ; 
222 Iowa 544, 269 N. W. 20 (193·6); Jenkins v. Highway Commission, 
208 Iowa 620, 224 N.W. 66 (1929); Parrott v. Chicago Great Wes-
tern Ry . Co., 127Iowa 419, 103 N.W . 352 (1905). The inade-
quacy of an award has also been held to be grounds for reversal. 
Adkins v . Smith, 94 Iowa 759, 64 N.W. 761 (1895); Walter v. 
Houck, 7 Iowa 72 (1858) . It is suggested that there is no conflict 
between these cases and .the decisiqn::; holcling awards not exces-
sive . As discussed above, the meaning of the Iowa standard has 
never been thoro1.1ghly discussed by the court, but as a practical 
matter 1 where the .award· is somewhere between the amount of 
damage testified to by plaintiff and defendant• s witnesses, the 
court will generally not . interfere with the jury verdict. However, 
in the Luthi; Jenkins, and Campbell cases, supra, .. the verdicts 
were within the range of testimony and yet they were reversed. 
It is clear that valuation splitting, while not encouraged by the 
courts, is not reversible err or . · Cory v . State, 214 Iowa 222 , 
242 N. W . 100 (1932). 
115. Nicks v . Chicago & St .• Paul Ry. Co . , 84 Iowa 27, 50 N.W~. 
222 (trial court reduced the damages from $1500 to $1000). 
116 . Cases cited in footnote 114, supra. 
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Hall v. City of West Des Moines (1953) 117 the trial court ordered a new 
trial on the assumP,tion that the verdict, while it might not show evidence 
of passion or prejudice, was still so large as to indicate that the jury 
had failed to comprehend the issues involved # and therefore justified 
an order for a new trial . It would seem that this decision would fur-
nish the condemnor, or the condemnee in the case of a grossly 
inadequate award, a new line of attack in the form_ of a motion for a 
new trial on a verdict which appears to be out of line but which is not 
necessarily so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice . It is 
clear that 8 in deciding whether there is pasS.ion or prejudice ., each case 
must be considered separately and that comparison with prior cases 
in which the -verdict has been found excessive is improper . 118 
117. 245 Iowa 222, 62 N.W . 2d 734. At 738 of 62 N.W.2d , the court 
says," ••• • but the trial court has the right to scan the course of 
the trial and the verdict returned; and if for any reason which may be 
supported by the record ,he thinks justice has not been done , he has 
the unquestioned right to order a new trial, even though such rea-
son may not in itself amount to reversible error." See also Wilson 
v . Highway Commission , 249 Iowa 994 , 90 N.W . 2d 1_61 (1958). 
The allegedly excessive verdict may have been a contributing factor 
in granting a new trial in Maxwell v. Highway Commission, 223 
Iowa 159, 271 N. W. 883, 888 (193 7). An inadequate award may also 
be the basis for granting a new trial. See Steensland v. 'Iowa-
Illinois Gas & Electric Co ., 242 Iowa 534 1 47 N. W. 2d 162 (1951) 
(inadequate award constituted one ground for granting a new trial 
by trial court but while the order tor new trial was affirmed , the 
court on appeal did not reach the inadequacy argument). See 
also Stortenbecker v. Iowa Power & Light Co . , Iowa , 96 
N.W.2d468,473 (1959) . 
118. Hall v. City of West Des Moines, 245 Iowa 458 , 62 N . W. 2d 
734 (1954); Schoonover v. Fleming, 23 9 Iowa 53 9, 3 2 N . W. 2d 
99 (1948) . 
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SECTION 11 . COSTS, ATTORNEY FEES, AND INTEREST 
a. Costs 
The condemnor must, of course, pay all costs incurred in the asses-
sment by the condemnation commission.ers . 119- This is also the case as 
to the costs on appeal unless on the trial of the appeal the same or a 
less amount of damages is allowed than was allowed below . 120 How• . 
ever , if the award remains .the same or is decreased, the assessment ' 
of costs is apparently left to the discretion of the court. 121 Where 
the condemnor appeals, the court has apportioned the award in order 
to avoid .the inequity of destroying the award through the assessment 
of costs . l ~~ However, in a similar case the court allowed the asses-
sment of all costs to the landowner , 123 If the landowner appeals and 
the awardUs.~deoreased, apparently the court may tax all the costs of 
the appeal to him. 124 Where both parties appeal, the discretion of 
the court seems to remain the same as in the ordinary case in wh,ich both 
parties appeal. 125 Where the plaintiff appeals to. the district court · 
and the defendant files an offer to confess judgment for a statEd:s:um , 
and the plaintiff fails to recover a largE;Jr pUm, the cost accruing sub-
119. Iowa Code Section 4 72.33 (1958} . 
120. Iowa Code Section 472.33 (1958}. 
121 . Strange Bros . Hide Co. v. Highyvay Commission, Iowa 
93 N. W. 2d 99, 102 (195 8}; Jones & Price v. Mahaska County Coal 
Co . , 4 7 I ow a 3 5 , 41 ( 18 7 7) • 
122 . Jones & Price v. Mahaska County Coal Co., 47 Iowa 35,41(1877); 
accord , Noble v . Des Moines & St. L. R. Co., .61 Iowa 637, 17 
N. W . 26 (1883}. 
123. Strange Bros. Hide Co . v. Highway Commis.siqn, Iowa , 
93 N. W . 2d 99, 10 2 (195 S)(landowner eros s - appealed but. in other 
sections of the opinion this cross-appeal was treated as a nullity 
and only the condemnor's appeal was regarded as relevant. It is 
important to note that this decision, while discussin9 the prior 
cases of apportionment extensively, does not involve true appor-
tionment . Although the court does divide the costs of the se~arate 
appeals, there is no apportionment of costs in the one case in 
which the award was decreased; instead all costs are assessed to 
the landowner for .that appeal). 
124. Jones & Price v. Mahaska County Coal Co., 4·7 Iowa 35,41 (1877) 
(dictum)(apparently the court might also apportion the costs in such 
a situation) . 
125 . Strange Bros. Hide Co . v. I{ighway Commission, ___ Iowa __ , 
93 N.W. 2d 99 , 102 (1958L 
78 I ' 
sequent to such offer shol.lld be tp.xed to the plaintiff. 126 Thi$ result 
follows from the application of Iowa Code Sections 677 . 4 1 617. 5, and 
677 , 10 {1958) to condemnaHon appeal$. 127 Where. the allowance of 
an amendment by_the defendant may reduce the .amount of damages 
allowed on appeal, the defendant must contribute to the costs . if the 
amount allowed is less as a result of the amendment. 128 
b. Attorney Fees 
(1). Liability for Attorney:-,2feEis· 
No c;l.istinc.Hon. in the awarding of attorney fees with regard to which 
party appeals has been made . l49 , Basically there are two Code pro-
visions, Iowa Oode ·sections 472 ; 33 and 472.34 (1958), which affect 
the awarding of attorney fees. Section 4 72.33 (1958) provides that 
reasonable attorney fees . shall be awa-~;d~d unles:;; on trial of the appeal 
the same or a less amount of damages is awarded than was allowed by 
the sheriff ' s jury .·130 Where two trials are neqessary and .the amol).nt 
reaeivea. :0)1 iappeabiis:(9r~'at~r, in both cases than the amount awarded13 by the sheriff's jury I attorney fees may be recovered for both trials. 1 
The fees al~owed may be incurred only in the preparation and prosecu ... 
126. Tiltonv. IowaPower&LightOo. 1 Iowa 1 94N.W . 2d782 
(1959); .Draker v. Iowa Electric Co., 191 Iow.a 1~~6, 182 N.W. 896, 
900 (1921); Harrison v. Iowa Midland R. :co . , 36' Iowa 323 (1873). 
127. Tiltonv.IowaPower&LightCo , , Iowa · I 94N.W. 2d 
. 782 (1'959). . ' ____,..._ ..,.....,... 
128. DePennin<;1,v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 239 Iowa 9501 33 N . W. 
2d 503 (1948). 
129. The position taken _by the court on costs was rejecte<;l by it as ap-
plied to attorney fees · in Wor111ely v . Mason City & Pt. D , R. Co., 
120 Iowa 684, .95 N. W. 203,204 (1S03). . 
130. Wormely v . Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co,, 120 Iowa 684, 95 N.W. 
203 (1903); accord, Mellichar v~ Iowa City, 116 Iowa 390, 90 N,W. 
.86 (1902). It ~should be no~ed that the clause :vvhich formerly ex-
cepted the State from payment o~ attorney fees. has been removed 
by Acts 19.55, 56 General Assem}:)ly.,· Chapter 226, Section 1. 
131. McCaskey v. Pt. Dodge, D.M. & So . Ry . Co., 154 Iowa 652, 
135 N.W. 6 (1912). 
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tion of the appea1. 13 2 Moreover where the. appeal from the sheriff's jury 
does not involve the issue of valuation, attorney fees are not allowed . 133 
Attorney fees are not recoverable for the preparation and prosecution of 
an appeal to the Supreme Court.134 A different rule is followed where 
the plaintiff declines to accept an offer to confess judgment made by 
the condemnor and ·the jury awards-damages in an amount smaller than 
the rejected offer . In such a case, attorney fees incurred after the 
offer is rejected may not be recovered . This r esult follows from a two 
step reasoning process: first, the confession of judgment sections of 
the Iowa Code which tax the 11 costs" of the action from the time of the 
offer to the defendant, I ow a Code Sections 6 7 7 . 4, 6 7 7. 5 and 6 7 7 . 1 0 
(195 8);. secondly, for this purpose, attorney fees are treated as 
"costs".135 In this manner the Draker136 rule as to costs, as under-
stood in its dtdinary meaning, can be applied to attorney fees where an 
offer to confess judgment is made and rejected . Iowa Code Section 
4 7 2 . 3 4 pt0Yi¢l~_d.- <u-rltil:< .. l9.515 !.tlrat~iih i.the:· ~~~t.; ofva·l:Dlan~:tonm~ntoQflltha ).: ~ ~1 ~ 
condemnation by the condemnor after f ;t!na] (ietermination of the appeal, 
attorney fees should be allowed to the plaintiff; however, this provision 
has had little effect on the courts in limiting the recowery c;:>f attorney 
fees on abandonment to the situation where the appeal has finally been 
determined, and the court consistently allowed recovery of attorney fees 
132. Hall v. Wabash R. Co., 133 Iowa 714, 110 N.W. 1039 (1907); 
Wormely v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co., 120 Iowa 684, 95 N. W. 
203 (1903) . Accord, Iowa Electric Co . v . Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 
220 N. W . 333 (1928); Mellichar v. Iowa City, 116 Iowa 390, 90 
N.W . 86 (1902). 
133. Reter v . Davenport, R.I . &. N.W. Ry. Co., 243 Iowa 1112, 54 
N.W. 2d 863 (·1952). 
134 . Wilson v . Fleming, 239 Iowa 918, 32 N.W.2q 798 (1948); Iowa 
· Electric Co. v. Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 333 (1928). But 
See exception under Iowa Code Section 472.34 (1958) to be dis-
cussed subsequently. 
135. Tilton v . Iowa Power & Light Co., Iowa~' 54 N.W. 2d 
782 (1959) . 
13 6. Draker v . Iowa Electric Co . , 191 Iowa 13 76, 182 N. W. 896, 
900 (1921) 0 
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even where. abandonment took place before the appeal was tried.1 3 7 
In 1955 the statute was amended by eliminating the provision referring 
to final determination of the appeal by allowing recovery where abandon-
ment occurs "at any time after the appeal is taken ••• nl38 However, in 
spite of or. because of this statute, two problems still exist in this area 
which perhaps should be approached with some care: (1) whether re-
covery of attorney fees in the event of abandonment is still limited to 
those fees incurred in the appeal only, 13 9 and (2) whether in the event 
of abandonment after an appeal in which the damages awarded by the 
13 7. Tfillv'dimi:tiai~a:se'raHow,ing.lgttlobne.:y, fees OJJ!, abandonment appears to 
be Mellichar v •. Iowa City, 116 Iowa 390, 90 N.W. 86 (1902) in 
which fees were allowed although the appeal had not yet been tried. 
No mention was made of the predecessor of Iowa Code Section 
472.34 (1958) which then limited recovery to the situation where 
abandonment took place after "final determira tion of the appeal". 
Instead recovery was .allowed under the predecessor of Iowa Code 
Section 472.33 (1958) apparently as a matter of justice and equity. 
In Ford v. Board of Park Commissioners, 148 Iowa 1, 126 N.W. 
103 0 (191 0) the court for the first time considered. the predecessor 
of Iowa Code Section 4 72.34 ·. (195 8) but made no mention of the 
clause limiting recovery to cases in which a final determination of 
the a,ppeal had been ma,de and went on to allow attorney fees 
although the appeal had not yet been tried at. the time of abandon-
ment. Iowa Electric Co. v. Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 333 
(1928) discusses both cases and reaches. the same result. 
138. At:ts 1955, 56th GeneralAssembly, Chapter 226, Section 2. 
13 9. It would appear that the amendment of Iowa Code Section 4 72. 34 
(1958) was designed to make the statute conform to the cases dis-
cussed in footnote 13 7, which had no statutory basis. However, 
the statute, as it now stands, does not explicitly limit recovery 
to those fees attributable to appeal alone, which the prior cases 
did. Insofar as the statute is deemed to supersede the cases, 
it would seem to be open to argument that all attorney fees might 
be recovered in the event of abandonment. However, the general 
principle of allowing recovery only for fees on appeal where there 
is no issue of abandonment would seem to be so well established 
as to prevent recovery in the abandonment situation for fees other 
than those relating to appeal. See cases cited in footnote 82. 
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sheriff's jury are .decreased, attorney fees may still be awarded . 140 It 
does s.eem clear, however, that fees may be recovered for an aQpeal to 
the Supreme Court when abandonment occurs after such appeal. 141 
{2) Determination of the Amount of Attorney Fees 
Iowa Code Section 4 72.33 (195 8) provides that reasonable attorney 
fees are 11 to be taxed by the court... In making its determination, the 
court is not required to hear testimony concerning the value of the 
attorney services rendered; however, admission of such evidence is 
within the sound discretion of the court, and it is not error to hear such 
testimony. 14 2 In Kelly, Shuttleworth & McManus v . Central Nat. Bank 
&Trust Co . , 217Iowa724, 248N.'W. 9,15 {1933)thecourt, indis-
cussing the factors which should be employed in valuing an attorney's 
services, ...:Stated: 
"In fixing the compensation for attorneys on a 
quantum meruit basis , there are certain elements 
that should be taken into consideration. First, 
the amount involved; second, the character of the 
140. Iowa Code Section 472 . 33 {1958) as interpreted by theWormely 
case, supra, disallows recovery of attorney fees where·the amount 
of the award is reduced on appeal. No such provision ~s contained 
in the abandonment statute, Iowa Code Section 4 7 2 . 34 {195 8). 
Iowa Electric Co . v . Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N. W. 333 {1928) 
discusses the Wormely case as though it applied in the aban-
donment situation, although no reason is given for so doing. 
Since the amendment specifically allows recovery at any time 
after the appeal is filed, a point at which the fact of an. increase 
or a decrease could not possibly be known, it would seem that 
the statute may well allow recovery ot attorney fees regardless 
of the amount of recovery on appeal where abandonment occurs. 
141.· Wheatley v. City of Fairfield, 221Iowa 66, 264 N.W. 906 (1936) . 
142. Wilson v . Fleming, 239 Iowa 718, 31 N.W . 2d 393 {1948); Hall 
v. Wabash Ry . Co . , 133 Iowa 714 1 llO N. W. 1039 (1907). 
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question in the case and the standing of the 
attorneys; t,h;i.rd, the time occupied; and fourth, 
the result accomplished. u143 
The local practice of the bar may also serve as a guide in deter-
mining a proper figure. The decreased purchasing pow er of money is 
also an item which may properly be considered in arriving a t a figure 
for attorney fees. 144 T,he evidence of services rendered may include 
a'n item for preparaqon not required by statute but which is nevertheless 
in accordance with sound legal practice . 145 · There is doubt , however·, 
as to whether expem:ses')af:.attotrre¥si·suph as meals, .travel expense, 
etc. may properly be introduced into evidence . 14 6 · If proper and im-
proper evidence are intermingled by the court, the condemnor is 
entitled to a reversa1. 14 7 On the other hand, where the award of fees 
by the trial court is manifestly less th,an the evidence indicates , the 
court will reverse. 148 It is clear that in allocating attorney fees, the 
143. Accord . Tilton v . Iowa Power and Light Co . , __ Iowa __ , 94 
N.W. 2d 782 (1959); Danker v. Iowa Po}Ver and Light Co . , 249 Iowa 
327, 86 N.W. 2d 835 (19.57); Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iowa . 718 , 31 
N.W.2d 393 (1948); In re Dehner's Estate, 230 Iowa 490, 298 N.W. 
656 (1941). For a discussion of the factors involved in such a deter-
mination, see Annotation, 143 A. L. R. 672 . 
144. Wilson v . "Fleming, 239 Iowa 718, 31 N. W . 2d 393 (194-8) . 
145. Mellichar v • Iowa City, 116 Iowa 3 90, 9:0 N. W. 86 (1902). 
14 6. Although all expenses are allowed in stockholder's suits, see 
Graham v. Machine Works, 138 Iowa 456; State ex rel Weede v . 
Becktel, 244 Iowa 785, . it can )Je reasoned that these suits are 
peculiarly. liberal actions in the allowance of attorney fees and 
exp~nses. See Swinehart v. Highway Commission, No. 12620 
Dist. Ct. Ada·ir Qounty, Iowa (195 8). i 
147 . Iowa Electric Co . v. Scott, 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 333 
(1928). 
148. In re Dehner's Estate , 230 Iowa 490 , 298 N.W. 565 (1941); 
accord . Tilton v. Iowa Power & Light Co . ,_._ Iowa __ , 94 N. W. 
2d 782 (1959) (court recognized the pJ;"inciple but held that the fees 
allowed, while smaller than the maximum amount which would have 
been upheld, were not manifestly inadequate in amount) . 
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court. detenr~nes the value of such services without the intervention 
of a Jury. 
c o Interest 
In those instances where the amount of the appraisement on appeal 
is as large or larger than the initial assessment by the sneriff' s jury, 
interest is allowed as a part of the cost from the time when the condem-
nor took possession of the property • 150 This same rule applies even 
though the amount be decreased , if the condemnor prosecuted the ap:-
peal.151 However, when the landowner appeals, and the original 
award is reduced, he can recover no interest on such reduced amount.152 
When the condemnor appeals and the landowner subsequently appeals, 
the court has held that the cr-oss- appeal is of no effect , and the condem-
nor must pay interest from the date of the original award even though 
the subsequent award is lower.153 When interest is allowable, the 
court should fix the time from which such interest should be computed 
14 9o Richardson v. Centerville, 13 7 Iowa 253, 114 N. W. 103 9 . 
150o Harris v. Green Bay Levee & Drainage Dist. , 246 Iowa 416 , 68 
N.W.2d 69 (1955); Hayes v . Chic. etc. Ry. Co. , 64 Iowa 753, 
19 N. W. 245; Guinn v. Iowa etc. Ry. Co . , 131 Iowa 680, 109 N.W. 
209; Welton v. Highway Commission, 211 Iowa -625, 233 N. W. 876; 
Daniel v . Chicago etc . Ry. Co., 41 Iowa 52, Beal v. Highway Com-
mission , 209 Iowa 1308, 230 N.W. 302; Hartshornv. Burlington 
C. R. & N. R. Co., 52 Iowa 613; Lough v. Minneapolis & St. 
Paul Ry. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 N.W. 77 (overruled in part in 
Harris v. Green Bay Levee & Drainage Dist. , supra); Also see 
Note , Attorney fees as an element of just compensation , 12 Iowa 
L. Rev. 286 (1927). 
151. :Noble v. Burlington & Wo R. Co., 61 Iowa 637, 17 NoW . 26. 
152 . Hayes v . Chicago , R. I. & P. R. Co., 239 Iowa 149, 30 N. W o2d 
143 (1948); Welton v o Highway Commission, 2p Iowa 625, 233 N o 
Wo 876o See also Noble Vo Burlington , 61 I6wa 637, 17 NoW. 26. 
No interest is allowed in such a situation by established practice. 
153 o Strange Bros o Hide Co . v o Highway Commission, Iowa 
93 N. W . 2d 99 (195 8). This case leaves unanswered the question 
of whether an appeal by the landowner followed by a cross-appeal 
by the condemnor in a case in which the award is decreased would 
require interest . It is suggested that the court's decision seems 
to turn on the original cause for impounding the money; if th-e 
original cause was the lanctlwner' s appeal , he should have no 
right to interest just as in the ordinary case of a single appeal by 
the landowner o 
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by a proper order • 154 The amount of interest to be awarded should be 
fixed by the court and not by the jury ,155 
SECTION 12. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS 
The general statute of limitations cannot be interposed as a bar 
or defense to an appeal. It is the accepted rule that an action to 
assess damages for a taking can be brought long after the general 
statutory period. 156 However, this proves of little aid to the injured 
landowner for if the party who illegally appropriated the land chooses 
to remain in possession, eminent domain is no remedy to dislodge or 
remove him, and resort must be had to ordinary civil remedies within 
154. Reed v. C. M. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 25 Fed. 886, 
155. Harris v. Green Bay Levee & Drainage Dist., 246 Iowa 416, 
68 N.W.2d 69 (1955); Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 
239 Iowa 149, 30 N.W.2d. 743 (1948);Bea1 v. Highway Commis-
sion, 209 Iowa 1308, 230 N.W. 302 (1930), 
156. Hartley v. K. & N. w. Ry. Co., 85 Iowa 455, 52 N.W. 352 
(1892); Gates v. Colfax & Northwestern Railway Co., 177 Iowa 
690, 159 N.W. 456 (1916). 
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the time prescribed by law. 157 Further, under the provisions of Chapter 
4 7 2 , Iowa Code (195 8), the landowner cannot institute eminent domain 
proceedings except by mandamus, 158 and therefore, the question 
whether time has barred redress for the wrongful act is invariably pre-
sented in a common law action instituted by the landowner. 
157. Adverse: possession is a defense to .ejectment and injunction. 
Mosier v. Vincent, 34 Iowa 478; Baldwin v. Herbst, 54 Iowa 168, 
6 N.W. 257; Onstatt v. Murray, 22 Iowa 457; Ewell v. Greenwood, 
26 Iowa 377; Sherman v. Hasting, 81 Iowa 372; Hanger v. City of 
Des Moines, 109 Iowa 481; Whetstone v. Hill, 130 Iowa 637, 105 
N.W. 193; Kensinger v. Hanler, 195 Iowa 651, 192 N.W. 264; 
Hann v. Missler, 132 Iowa 709, 109 N.W. 211; Davis v. Town 
of Bonaparte, 137 Iowa 197; where a public work of a permanent 
character is erected without condemnation proceedings by a party 
vested with the power to appropriate private property for a public 
use, the right of action accrues when the work is constructed, 
and an action to recover damages for the injury on the theory of 
a permanent trespass is barred after the statutory period as in 
the ordinary civil cases. Fowler v. Des Moines Ry. Co., 91 
Iowa 553, 60 N.W. 116; Nichols, Ibid., Section 345 (2d ed.); 
New York Ins. Co. v. Clay County, 221 Iowa 966, 267 N.W. 
79, held that a mortgagee's action against the county for removal 
of gravel from the mortgaged property without the consent of the 
mortgagee, being an action for the impairment of security, was 
therefore barred by the five year statute of limitations. Special 
enactments which limit the time to a much shorter period than 
provided in the general statute of limitations in specified types 
of condemnation have been held constitutional. Taylor v. Drain-
age District, 167 Iowa 42, 148 N.W. 1040; Pratt v. Des Moines 
R. Co., 72 Iowa 249,33 N.W. 666 • 
• ~ 158. See Section 9(c), supra. 
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DIVISION III 
COMPENSATION 
SECTION 13 o GENERAL RULE" AS TO THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
In determining the value of the land actually taken, the measure of 
damages is the market value thereof. 1 However , the taking of land may 
have a broader impact on a tract as a whole , and in this situation the 
measure of compensation is the difference between the fair and reason-
able market value of the whole tract before the taking and the fair and 
reasonable market value of what remains after such appropriation2 dis-
regarding any benefit which may result by reason of the taking or use of 
the condemned parcel. 3 In short, the question is how muph less is the 
tract as a whole worth with a p iece taken out of it than it was worth 
before the dismemberment, excluding all considerations of possible 
benefits. 
1. See Section 14(a) , i nfra . 
2. Hall v. City ofWest Des Moines, 245 Iowa 458, 62 N.W.Zd 734 
(1954); Wilson v . Fleming, 239 Iowa 918, 31 N. W . 2d 393 (1948); 
Maxwell v . Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 159, 271 N. W . 883 
(1937); Randell v. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N. W . 
685 (1932}; Gregory v. Kirkman Ind . School Dist ., 193 Iowa 579, 
187 N. W o 553 (correct and concise instruction as to the measure 
of compensation}; Walter v o Platt , 168 N. W o 808, 184 Iowa 203; .. 
Klopp v. Chic . etc . Ry o Co., 142 Iowa 4 74, 119 NoW . 3 73; Wat-
kins Vo Wabash Ry. Co., 137 Iowa 441, 113 N oW. 924 (an in-
struction which limits recovery to the value of the land actually 
taken and ignores a depreciation in value of the farm as a whole 
where there is competent evidence of such depreciation is er-
roneous) . Actually nearly every condemnation opinion begins 
with a restatement of the rule as stated and only representative 
modern cases have been cited in this footnote. 
3 o Iowa Constitution, Article I , Section 18. 
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a . Time of Measurement of I)amages 
I I 
General sf,eaking , the damages are to be determined as of the time 
of the taking ., but in these cases the term · "taking" is used in a rather 
broad and inaccurate ' sense. 5 - A more critical and careful analysis ap-
pears to be that damages are to be assessed as of the time when the 
sheriff's commissioners make their appriasement if the condemnor pro-
ceeds un'der the assessmet:J.t with reasonable diligence , and the values 
as they existed at that time are to control on appeal. 6 However, .it 
has been held that when the land is not subject to marked fluctuation , 
it is not error to admit evidence of the value of such property at the 
time of trial, although the sheriff's jury appraisement occurred over 
two years previous to that date• 7 
b . Benefit Excluded 
Article I, SecHon 18, of the Iowa C onstitution expressly excepts 
from consideration any benefit that might b e derived from the improve-
ment . This prohibition has been construed with extreme liberality so 
4. Millardv, Mfg. Co., 200 Iowa 1063 , 205 N. W . 979; Weltonv. 
Highway Commission , 211 Iowa 625 , 233 N.W. 302 (1930} . 
Orgel, On 'Valuation Under Eminent Domain; Section 63, p . 210; 
Nichols, On Emiment Domain; Sections 436 and 437 (2d ed.} . 
5. ".Taking" means in its proper usage the actual appropriation of the 
land by the condemnor , This may occur long after the appeal or 
it may never occur o Grear v. Des Moines etc. Ry o Co. , 20 Iowa 
523; Iowa Electric Co . v. Scott , 206 Iowa 1217, 220 N.W. 33; 
Ford v. Board of Park Commissioners , 148 Iowa 1, 126 NoW. 
103 0 . 
6. Ellsworth etc . Vo RYo Co ., 91 Iowa 386 , 389 , 59 N.W. 78 (1894}; 
accord, 20 C . J ~ 832 . 
7 . Koster v. Sioux County , 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993 (1923}. See 
also Maxwell Vo Highway Commission , 223 Iowa 159 ,. 271 N oW . 
883r ~ ,· (193 7} (no error although trial a month after sheriff's 
jury appraisement); Ellsworth 'etco v . Ryo Co. , 91 Iowa 386 , 
59 N. W o 7 8 (1894) (evidence at time of trial held prej'udicia1) o 
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as to prevent the setting off of benefit in allotting damages to the whole 
tract when only a part thereof has been taken. In other words, the 
Supreme Court of Iowa has made no distinction between the exclusion 
of benefit whether with reference to the land actually taken or damages 
to the remainder. 8 
SECTION 14. WHAT CONSTITUTES SEPARATE PARCELS 
a. A Jury Question 
The rationale for the rule as to the measure of damages is that one 
who owns a thing is entitled to it unimpaired. Those who take from it 
must respond in damages for the injury. The taking, in some instances, 
may not ddmi~ish the value of the whole beyond the value of the portion 
appropriated, However, in the usual case the injury to the property as 
8. Deaton v. Polk County, 9 Iowa 594; Isreal v, Jewett, 29 Iowa 475~ 
Frederick v. Shane, 32 Iowa 254; Gist v. Castner, etc. Drainage 
Dist., 13:Z Iowa 711, 115 N.W. 474; Bland v. Herenbaugh, 39 
Iowa 532; Britton v. Des Moines, 59 Iowa 540, 13 N.W. 710; 
Haggard v. Algona School Dist., 113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 777; 
Slater v. Mount Pleasant Plank Road, 1 Iowa 386; Gregory v. 
Kirkman Ind. School Dist., 187 Iowa 553, 193 N. W. 579; Ned-
dermeyer v. Crawford County, 160 N.W. 330; see also Witt v. 
State, 223 Iowa 156, 272 N.W. 419 (1937) (where it was held 
that the omission of the phrase that the benefit shall not be 
considered from one specific instruction was n.ot prejudicial 
error when such phrase occurred three times in the instruction). 
Some jurisdictions permit benefits to be set off against damages 
to the remainder but not against the value of the land taken 
under a constitutional provision like the one in Iowa. 
9. Nichols, Ibid. Section 238 (2d ed.) "The burden of proof is on the 
landowner to show that the taking of a part of his property Will 
cause damage to the remainder." In re Platte Valley Irrigation 
Dist,, 275 N.W. 593 (Nebr, 1937) (tract of 46,000 acres of 
contiguous land. Point in this case is reached where damages· 
to remainder becomes remote, speculative, and inconsequential). 
89 
c;i whole is far in excess of the value of the part taken , and therefore 
damages must be allotted for injury to the entirety to effectuate full 
and complete redress. 1 0 
Th~s, in eminent domain proceedings when a parcel of land is con-
ctemned, it becomes important to determine the size and kind of entity 
which will be affected thereby. There are few definite rules that can 
be la~d down. 11 Under the Iowa decisions , the question of whether an 
entire tract should be considered as a whole or a portion of it sepa-
rately is a questioy
2
of fact which -in disputed cases should be sub-
mitted to the jury. 
Although the landowner in his appeal only describes a . portion or 
pa,rt of his ~and, such description does not preclude him from proving 
and recovering damages to his whole farm because of the appropriation 
10. See Walter v. Platt , 184 Iowa 203, 168 N. W . 808. 
11 . Nichols, Ibid. , Section 241 ( 2d ed . ), Elliott , On · Roads and 
Streets, Section 288. 
12 . Ellsworthv. Chic . etc. Ry . Co. r 91 Iowa386 , 59N.W. 78, 
(1894); Paulson v . Highway Commission, 210 Iowa 651, 231 
N. W. 296 (1930) (whether non-contiguous .tracts used for stock 
raising should be considered together in estimating damages for 
changing location of the road held for the jury); Hoyt v. C . M. & 
St. Paul Ry. Co., 117 Iowa 296, 300, 90 N.W. 724 (distance of 
forty rods between an eighty acre plot and a forty acre plat 
raised a jury question of whether the tracts constituted one farm. 
Yet, when one witness testified that the lands were used to-
gether as a unit and his testimony was stricken out because of 
improper estimate r .it was not reversible error to confine the 
consideration to the eighty acre tr-act alone); Hoeft v. State , 
221 Iowa 694 , 266 N.W. 571 (1936) (properties had different 
uses, separate sets of buildings and separate mortgages); 
Westbrook v. Ry. Co., 115 Iowa 106, 88 N. W. 202; Paulson 
v. Highway Commission , 210Iowa 651 , 231 N.W. 296 . 
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manner ,18 even though the legislature has expressly provided. 
Such an act may be said to be unconstitutional because no 
public use is and no public necessity can be subserved by 
the transfer. This limitation, however , has no application 
when the state takes over the enterprise. 19 
When an easement is taken over , land already devoted 
to public use, unless actual damage is shown by the abutter , 
only a nominal damage is awarded to him since there is no 
presumtpion that the two easements are conflicting . The rule 
has been enforced even in the case of the crossing of a rail-
road by a highway or another railroad, and is frequently 
applied when a telegraph company acquires the right to lay 
its wires along a railroad location . 20 
5 
Different problems are involved when an easement cross-
ing is involved. The great weight of authority is that where 
there is a natural way or where a highway already exists and 
is crossed by a railroad company under its general license of 
building a railroad, and without any specific grant by the 
legislature to obstruct the highway or waterway, the railroad 
company is bound to make and keep its crossing at its own 
expense in such condition as shall meet all the reasonable 
requirements of the public as changed conditions and increas-
ed use may demand. 21 This duty may require the building of 
an overhead crossing or underpass when it is the only feasible 
and reasonable type under the circumstances, and such duty 
18. Nichols, Ibid. Section 352 (2d ed . } 
19 . Nichols, Ibid. Section 364, Section 353 (2d ed.) Diamond 
Jo Line v. Davenport, 114 Iowa 432 , 87 N.W. 399. 
20 . Nichols, Ibid . Section 242 (2d ed.} 
21. M . C. & Q . R. Co . v . Board of Supervisors, 144 Iowa 10, 
121 N.W. 39; C . & N. W . Ry. Co. v . Drainage District 
142 Iowa 607, 121 N. W. 193; Chicago B. & Q . R. Co. v. 
People, 200U. S. 561; LakeErie&W. Ry. Co., 28N.W. 
3 (Minn.) (1886}; Elliott , Roads & Streets (4th ed . ) 
Sections 1010- 1014. 
6 
may be enforced by mandamus. 22 
However, if the railroad company has built its line prior to 
the establishment of the highway, the rule is different. In the 
absence of express legislation, the railroad company cannot be re-
quired to construct a crossing over its right-of-way in order to 
prolong or connect a street established after the location and ac-
quisition of the right-of-way. 23 In this latter instance, the extent 
of its statutory duty in Iowa is to construct a grade crossing, 24 or 
pay its proportionate :Share of the cost of a viaduct if the city pro-
ceeds to have one built under Iowa Code Section 3 87 (195 8). 
SECTION 2 • USE FOR CONDEMNED PROPERTY MUST BE PUBLIC 
NOT cPRIVATE25 
a. Constitutional Requirement 
Article I, Section 18 of the Iowa Constitution provides that 
"private property shall not be taken for public use (emphasis sup-
plied) without just compensation •.• ,." This provision in the 
Constitution has been held to limit acquisitions of property by the 
22. Fort Dodge v. M. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 87 Iowa 389, 54 N.W. 
243; Newton v, Chi. R.I. & Pac, Ry. Co., 66 Iowa 422, 23 
N.W. 905; In the Albia case, 102 Iowa 624, 71 N.W. 51, it 
was conceded that if the highway had been established before 
the building of the railroad .track and that an overhead cross-
ing was the only kind safe and feasible, the railroad company 
would be bound to construct and m<~intain {luch overhead cross-
ing. 51 C. J. 65 7, Section 34 7; Elliott, Roads & Streets (4th 
ed,) Section 1011-1014; Nichols, Ibid. Section 5.4(2) (3d ed. 
(1950) 
23. Albia v.C.B. & Q.R. Co., 102 Iowa 624, 71 N.W. 51. See 
also M. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. C.R.G. & N.W. Ry. Co., 114 
Iowa 502, 87 N.W. 410. 
24. Albia v. C.B. & Q. R. Co., supra at 628. 
25. Also see Section 4 (f), infra. 
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of the right-of-way. 13 Further, the fact that the condemnor omits a 
portion of the claimant's land which will be affected by the appropria-
tion in the sheriff's jury proceedings does not prevent the claimant 
on appeal from recovering for injury to his entire tract, 14 but such 
misdescription in the condemnation notice or commissione:s' return 
of the tract that will be damaged by the taking will not invalidate the 
assessment, and such appraisement will stand unless the complaining 
13. "The land described in the petition and notice is one hundred 
twenty acres and the plaintiff's farm consisted of 318 acres, and 
on the trial, plaintiff was allowed to prove the damages to the 
entire farm. The defendant, the railway company, assigned this 
as error and insisted that the inquiry should be limited to the pre-
mises described in the notice of appeaL Held: no error." Dudley 
v. Minn. etc. Ry., 77 Iowa.408, 42 N-.w. 359. "We think it is 
immaterial that the defendant gave notice of the appr.Msemeht of 
damages to part only of a tract of land. If the tracts specified 
are merely parts of a body of land which should be treated as an 
entirety, the commissioners are appointed by the sheriff to deter-
mine the damages to the whole, and the same rule should be follow-
edinthedistrictcourt." Ellsworthv. Ry. Co., 91 Iowa386,390, 
59 N.W. 78. 
14. Cook v. Boone Suburban Electric Ry. Co., 122 Towa-437, 98'..N.W. 
293, "The fact that a railroad in condemnation proceedings des-
cribed only that portion of a farm which was north of another 
railroad previously constructed across it from the east to west 
could not deprive the owner of the farm, on her appeal from the 
;award of sheriff's jury, of her right to establish and recover' 
damages to her entire farm, when in fact such northern portion was 
a part of thewhole." McCall v. Highway Commission, 217 Iowa 
1054, 252 N. W. 546 (1934). Although the condemnor describes 
and has damages assessed by the sheriff's jury on property to 
which the claimant has record title, the claimant may on appeal 
show equitable ownership of other lands which compose the whole 
farm, and thus recover on the basis of injury to the entire farm. 
91 
party corrects such an error by an appeal. 15 
, On appeal, it is error to allow evidence as to damages per acre with-
out definite proof as to the number of acres in the several tracts or to 
allow evidence of damages to certain tracts indefinitely referred to 
without showing their bearing or connection with the case . 16 
- b , Physical Separation and Separate Ownership 
In the case of a partial taking where two or more parcels of land are 
involved, separately owned by different persons, yet used together as 
a farm, such tracts are not to be combined in the assessment of damages. 
p·arcels may be considered together in assessing damages oniy-when 
there is unity of ownership, 1~7. an:d." wher'n the~.-C!aimar'lt hais1 the same estate: 
15 . Where notice by the owner of adjacent tract to the sheriff demanding 
the appointment of commissioners to assess damages as an entirety, 
and the notice to the defendant railroad and the commissioners • re-
turn described both tracts, and it was shown that the plaintiff never 
acquired title to one of the tracts, it will be presumed that the 
sheriff! s jury in estimating the damages considered only the tract 
owned by the plaintiff;, but if more was included, the error could 
be corrected on appeal. .Hall v. Wabash RY. Co., 141 Iowa 25 0 
119 N.W . 927o 
16. Ball v. Railway Co ., 71 Iowa 306 , 32 N.Wo 354. 
17. 11 We have had our attention called to no case, nor have we been able 
to find one where a court has squarely held that where two or more 
tracts of land are involved separately owned by different persons, 
they may be combined in one condemnation proceeding. It is quite 
apparent that the larger the tract of land involved, the greater the 
damage will be; and it is our opinion that where different tracts 
are -involved and owned by different persons, and the improvement 
touches or affects only one tract, it would be wholly inequitable 
to allow other parties owning individual different tracts to attach 
their land to the tract through which the improvement runs and 
thereby secm:: e .·clainag'es ~to wliich--t bey .are hot entitled, or thereby 
share in the damages suffered by the tract of land through which 
the improvement runs o " Duggan v o State, 214 I ow a 23 0, 24 2 N. W. 
98, 99 . Nichols, Eminent Domain, Section 241, p . 744. 
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or-interest in all the land under consideration. Thus , . if the claimant owns 
a life estate or a one- third interest in tract A and the fee in tract B, the 
parcels cannot be considered together in assessing ·damage~;. 18 but if he 
is the owner of a life estate or one- third interest . in both-tract A and B, 
they may be so considered. 19 Further, it is improper to permit the jury 
in assessing damages to tract A owned by the claimant to consider ad-
vantages to such tract by reason of an adjoining tract B owned· by the 
claimant and another . 20 However, in Cutler v. Highway Commission, 
18. Dugganv. State, 214_Iowa230 , 242N.W. 98,99(inthiscase80 
acres were owned jointly in fee by Wm Duggan and Mary Duggan . 
Mary Duggan was the owner in .fee of an 80 acre tract lying conti,.. 
guous to the first tract. The tracts were used .together as a farm. 
Held, that they could not be considered together in assessing 
damages); Nichols , Ibid., Section 241 (2d ed.) ("also it is some-
times held n~cessary that an owner hold the entire tract by the 
sameestateorinterest"). Tellmanv. Lewisburg , etc. Ry . Co . , 
133 Tenn . 554 , 182 . .8'; W. 597 (a wife when a raHroaa condemned 
a way through land. owned by herself and husband as tenants by 
the entirety could not recover damages to a tract of land owned by 
her individually lying across a turnpike from the other tract) and 
used in connection with it); Conness v. Indiana R. R. Co. , 193 
Ill. 464, 62 N . E. 221; Glendenning v. Stahley, 173 Ind . 674, 
91 N . E. 234; Westbrook v. Muscatine North, etc. Ry. Co . , 115 
Iowa 106 , 88 N . W. 202; Cutler v. State, 224 Iovya 686, 278 N . W . 
327 0 
19 . Westbrtdok \tmMuscatin~ .North~tc. :RyC:_x<ao:: , 115 Iowa 108, 88 
N.W. 202 . 
20 . Cutler v. Highway Commission , 224 Iowa 686, 27 8 N . W . 3 27 
{193 8} . See Gorgas v. Phil . H . & p ... Ry .• Co . , 20 Atl. 715; 
Medina Irrigation· Dist . v . Seekatz, 237 Fed . 805; Grats Harbor 
.BoiDm Co . v. Lownsdale , 54 Wash. 83, 102 Pac. 1041,. 104 Pac. 
267; in Westbrook v . Muscatine North Ry . Oo ., 115 Iowa 108, 
88 N. W. 202, the fact that one of the life tenants owned the land 
between the tracts under consideration .and therefore had control 
over a private way located thereon was p,eld admissible on the 
question whet her t he tracts constituted one farm. 
93 
224 Iowa 686, 278 N.W. 327 (1938), it was held that the admission of 
such testimony was not prejudicial error. 
Even where unity of ownership exists, the problem is still complex. 
The physical .location of the land should first be examined . 21 Political 
boundary lines have little weight in these cases .-22 Actual physical 
separation by intervening space between t he .parcels is ~very important 
factor although it is not necessarily a conclusive test. 2 Further, the 
fact that parts of the property were acquired at different times will not 
defeat recovery for injury to the whole. 24 , . ~ t. _. 
c. Different Uses 
Under the Iowa cases unity of use has been one of the chief 
21. Ham v. Wisconsin, etc. Ry . Co . , 61 Iowa 716, 17 N.W. 157 . 
22 . 20 C.J. 739; Elliott, On Roads & Streets,· Section 288 (4th ed . ); 
Duggan v. State, 214 Iowa 230, 242 N.W. 98; Hall v. Wabash, 
141 Iowa 253, 119 N.W. 928; Cook v. Railroad Co . , 122 Iowa 
437 , 98 N.W. 293; Peden v. Ry. Co., 78 Iowa 131, 42 N.W. 625 . 
23. Fleming v . Chic. etc. Ry. Co . , 34 Iowa 353 (separated by a street, 
the decision._appears to have laid down a stricter rule than is now 
followed;ny"·the .. Iowa authorities. QUoting at p . 357, 11 The rule 
established by these cases then is to ascertain the fair market 
value (leaving out of view all the time any benefit resulting from 
the improvement) of the premises over which the road passes, 
and the like value of the same premises in their condition after 
the right of way is taken . It is not within the rule to consider 
the value of other premises belonging to the same .party, not 
touched by the road at all"}. 20 C . J. 73 7 ( If the several parcels 
have no relationship except that which arises out of common 
ownership, the necessary unity does not exist) ~ 
24. Cox v. Mason City Ry. Co., 77_Iowa 20, 41 N. W. 475. 
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criteria. 25 . Thus, two parcels physically distinct and separated by a 
highway, 26 or a street or alley, 27 or by a railway right of way, 28 
or by intervening land, 29 but devoted to one actual and permanent use 
have been held to constitute a single tract within the meaning of the 
rule. 
Where an owner actually uses parts of what would constitute a 
single tract for different or separate purposes, the parts may be held 
to be .independent though they are not physically separated. 3 0 
25. 20 :c. J. ·73 7 . The following rather verbose rule is laid down in Hoyt 
v. C . M. & St. P.R. Co., 117 Iowa 296,300, 90 N.W. 724 (to con-
stitute unity of property between two contiguous tracts but prima 
facie distinct parcels of land, there must be such connection or 
relation of adaptation, convenience, and actual permanent use 
as to make the enjoyment of the parcel taken reasonably and sub-
stantially necessary to the enjoyment of the parcel left in the most 
advantageous and profitable manner in the business for which it 
isused. ) Ellsworth etc. v . Ry. Co., 91 Iowa386, 59N.W. 78 
(rather large tract of unimproved land) • 
26. Ham v. Wisconsin R. Co., 61 Iowa 716 , 17 N.W. 157. 
27. Haggard v. Ind. School District of Algona, 113 Iowa 486, 85 N·. W. 
777; Renwick v . Railroad Co., 49 Iowa 664, 672. 
28. Cook v. Boone Ry . Co. , 122 Iowa 437, 98 N.W. 293. 
29. Paulson v. Highway Commission, 210 Iowa 651, 231 N.W~ 296 
(where space intervening was about one-half mile, held, question 
for jury whether the land should be considered as one tq:~.ct); Hoyt 
v. C . M . & St . P. Ry. Co., 117 Iowa 296,300, 90 N.W. ,724; 
Westbrook v. M. N. & s. Ry. Co ., .115 Iowa 106, 88 N.W. 202 . 
30. Hoeft v. State, 221 Iowa 694, 266 N. W. 571 (1936) (properties 
had different uses, separate sets of buildings and separate mort-
gages); ·Haines v. St. Louis Ry . Co., 65 Iowa 216, 21 N. W. 573 
(city line divided property and affected uses of the land);. West-
brook v. Muscatine, etc. Ry. Co., 115 Iowa 106, 8~ N,W. 202 . 
u 
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d.. Contem~lated Use 
Where the owner of property has not actually made a division al-
though such a division would most advantageously utilize the land, the 
property will not be considered as separate in law. 31 Even a contem-
plated plan of division and offering for sale of parcels in lots will not 
destroy its character as a single tract. if it continues to be used by the 
owner as a single .tract . 3 2 However, where the property is separate but 
the landowner shows a possibility of combining the damaged .property 
with the separate property, it is correct to consider this possibility in 
determining da~~ge although damage to the separate property may not 
be considered. 
e. Several Tenements 
Where there are several tenements or buildings leased to different 
tenants on one lot, the estate may be considered as one parcel , 34 but 
this principle does not apply when the buildings leased are upon 
••• c '.1 l. 
31. Doud v. Mason City , etc . Ry. Co ., 76 Iowa 438, 41 N. W . 65; 
Fleming v . Chic. D . & M. Ry. Co. , 34 Iowa 353,354,357,358; 
Gray v. Ry. 'Co. , 129 Iowa 68 , 105 N.W. 359. The fact that part 
of the land is river bottom and that different parts of it might be 
used more advantageously for different purposes does not preclude 
its being t-egarded as one tract if the owner has treated the land as 
an entity. 20 C.J . 738. 
32. Cummins v. Des Moines R. R. Oo., 63 Iowa 397, 19 N.W. 475; 
Walter v. Platt , 184 Iowa 203, 168 N. W . 809; Gray v . Iowa Cent. 
R ~ Co . , 129 Iowa 68, 105 N.W. 359 . 
33. Cutler v. State , 224 Iowa 686 , 278 N.W. 327 (1938)(landowner 
wished to combine 80 acres of the damaged tract with 80 acres of 
abutting property and the jury was allowed to consider tMs pos-
sibility). 
34. Whitney v. Boston, 98 Mass . 312 (The fact that the estate was 
occupied by several distinct buildings or tenements , each leased 
to O.ifferent parties was held not to so sever it that the premises 
were to be regarded as separate estates disconnected from each 
othe~. Cooper v. Manhattan Ry . Co., 85 Hun 217 (N . Y. ) , 3 2 
N.Y.S . 1054; White v. Fifth Avenue Bridge Co. , 189 Pa . 500, 
42 Atl. 136; 20 C . J. 738, Section 190. T.he fact tha,t ' there are 
two buildings on a tract does not preclude it from being regard-
ed as one parcel , but two buildings on adjoining lots cannot be 
regarded as one , a lt hough both are operated as a hotel under a 
single management . 
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separate lots. 3 5 
f. ·unoccupied .Land Not Devoted to Use of Any Character 
When li!md is unoccupied and so not devoted to use of any character, 
and especially when it is held for purposes of sale in building lots , a 
physical division. into blocks by roads and streets creates independent 
parcels as a matter of law . 3 6 However, in case the complainant is the 
owner of the whole block, he may recover for the injury to such tract, 
and is not confined to the damages to the lots actually touched or ap-
propriated for the public i(nprovement. 3 7 
SECTION 15. ITEMS OF DAMAGE 
a . Recovery for the Actual Parcel Condemned 
(1) Distinction Between Items of Value and 
Items of Damage 
In orderly procedure to establish just compensation, the landowner 
should first introduce evidence showing the value or worth of his pro-
perty as a whole before the appropriation . The rule of admissibility is 
extremely liberal. Broadly speaking, the true rule seems tp permit the 
, proof of all the varied elements of value, that is, all the facts· which 
the owner would properly and naturally press upon the attention of a 
buyer to whom .he was negotiating a sale, and all other facts which 
would naturally influence a person of ordinary prudence to purchase . 3 8 
With the items of value before the jury, the landowner should then pro-
ceed to show how the property was damaged or depreciated by the taking. 
' ' · 
35. Minn. etc. Ry. Co. v. Doran, 15 Minn . 230; Hoeft v . State, 221 
Iowa 694, 266 N-.W. 571 (1936}; Nicho1s , . Ibid .· , Section 241 
(2d ed. ). 
36. Nichols, Ibid. , Section 241 {2d ed); 20 C.J. 739; Fleming v. Chic. 
etc. Ry. Co . , 34 Iowa 353. 
37 . Cox v. Mason City Ry. Co., 77 Iowa 20, 41 N.W. 475; see also 
Cummins v. Des Moines. Ry . Co . , 63 Iowa 397, 19 N.W. 268 . 
Contra; Wilcox v. St. Paul Ry. Co., 35 Minn. · ~3 9, 29 N. W. 14 8. 
38. Koster v. Sioux Cit y , 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993; Ranch v. 
Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 563, 111 N.W. 1027; Randell v. Highway 
Commission, 214 Iowa 1 , 241 N.W . 686. (1932). 
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But as will be seen, in the actual cases the distinction between 
items of value and items of damage has not been retained. They have 
been grouped indiscriminately together as pertinent factors pertaining 
to~e condition of the property as a whole before and after the taking. 
\.. , 
(2) ~ineral Deposits 
. Where the market value of the land condemned is increased by the 
presence of mineral deposits, the landowner is entitled to considera-
tion of this added value. 39 However, as indicated subsequently in 
subsection (c) only market value figures may be made the basis for 
damage and not the estimated profits from the removal of the deposits. 4 0 
(3) Buildings and Improvements on the Premises 
Even though the strip condemned is vacant land, the owner may in-
troduce evidence of the exi stence of buildings and improvements on the 
remaining property, and he is entitled. to recover compensation for the 
pwper,tY..rta~-e~,:·9n:; J};le iba,s iiSt\that. tiltl.)fl:.f. ,i=rup'art :,ohgr.l i.:ilml\lr.m.v.e~:b tr\a<iJ't.,41o:' , ; t. • · ~ ~ 
However, it is not error to exclude the value of a house not located on 
the premises. 4 2 
When structures and permanent fixtures are located on the. parcel 
so~ght, the rule is that the condemnor in the absence of agreeement 
··t· :::.i:~J. t ~.l ~~ .1.i. :J~·.1v. ~- - l' t . ': -~t t c--:: .. :. t :.! .... Jll,_: :·· _lt!.i.l.·'".:ri:~ ~- Lt1 :!.t ,; 
3 9. Nedrow v. Michigan- Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 245 Iowa 763, 61 
N. W. 2d 68i (1954); Hall v. City of West Des Moines, 245 Iowa 
458, -62 N.W. 2d 734 (1954}; poud v. Mason City & Ft. Dodge 
Ry. Co., 76 Iowa 438, 41 N.W. 65 (1888). 
40. Nedrow v. Michigan- Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 2&5 Iowa 763, 61 
N.W.2d 687 (1954} . 
41. Randell v. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 .N.W. 685 (1932}. 
Orgel, On Valuation Under Eminent Domain, Section 51 {principle 
is universally accepted}; Illinois etc. Ry . Co. v. Humiston, 208 
. Ill. 100, 69 N. E. 880 (1904). 
42. Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 239 Iowa 149, 30 N.W •. 2d 
743 (1948}. 
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with the landowner must take them as incidental to its appropriation. 43 
Although the early decision of Hollin<JSWorth v. Des Moines &. St. Louis 
Ry. Co . , 63 Iowa 443, 19 N. W. 325 (1884) contained language that may 
have occasioned some doubt on t his score , the principle has not been 
seriously questioned s ince that opinion. In Ranck v. Cedar Rapids ,:·.: 
134 Iowa 563, 111 N. W . 1027 (1907) andCutlerv. State , 224 Iowa 686, 
43. 20 C . J. 799 , 800; Nichols , Ibid., p. 693 (2d ed.); Lewis, on 
Eminent Domain/ Section 726 (3d ed.); Orgel,· Ibid ., p. 151; 
Moran v. Highway Commis sion, 223 Iowa 93 6 , 274 N. W. 59 
(193 7) (holding compensation must cover total loss of a well -
located in the right- of- way); Kemmerer v. Highway Commission, 
214 Iowa 136, 241 N·.W. 696 (1932) (appellee (t he landowner) was 
under no legal obligation to consent to the removal of his improve-
ments to some other point on t he farm, nor should his refusal to do 
so be made as a basis for denying him damages resulting from a 
separation of such improvements from the rest of the farm)'; State 
v. Miller , 92 S.W.2d 1073 (Texas 1936) (condemnation proceed-
ings are in the nature of enforced suit in which the agency ap-
propria'ting land stands in position of buyer and consequently 
must either take and pay for land w ith permanent improvements 
thereon or reject the land in toto, and cannot insh;t on removing 
the improvements to other land and pay simply for land appropriat-
ed . In determining what improvements pass with title to condemn-
ed land, the same rule applies as governs between ordinary vendor 
and vendee. The state could not,0tl)ver condemnee• s protest, re-
move residence building from the land condemned for highway 
purposes onto anot her portion of condemnee' s farm and pay con-
demnee solely for the land taken, together with costs and 
damages occasioned in moving building , but was required to .pay 
condemnee for the building); City of Los Angeles v. Klinker, 25 
· P . 2d 826 (1934}; City of Kansas v. Morse, 105 Mo. 510, 16 S.W. 
893 (1891); Finn v. Providence Gas &. Water Co., 99 Pa . 631 , 
(1882); Forney v. Fremont E. &. M. V. R. Co. , 36 N. W. 806 , 
23 Neb. 465 (1888~ Matters of William, 202 App. Div. 738, 195 
N.Y. S. 82 (1922); U.S . v. Seagren , 50 F2d 333, 75 A.L. R. 1491 
(1931}; Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758; Matter of 
City of New York, 256 N. Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931}; City of 
Detroit v. Loula, 227 Mich. 189 , 198 N.W. 837; Highway Com-
mission v. Haid, 59 S.W.2d 1057 (Mo. 1934}. 
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278 N.W. 327 (1938) the rule a ppears to have been conc eded by, the 
taker. In Des Moines Wet Wash .Laundry C o . v • Des Moines, the 
court paid lip- service to this general propos ition although its considera-
tion was, in no way necessary for the determination of that case . 44 
The proper measure of damages is the market value of the land 
with the building upon it, and the owner, ther efore, receives nothing 
for the building unless it increas es the market value of t he land. 
Accordingly, evidence of the structural value of the building is not 
admissable as an independent test of value. When, however, it is 
shown that ·the character of ·the building . is well adapted to the location, 
:the structural cost of t he building , aft er making proper deductions for 
depreciation by wear and t ear, is a r easonable test of the a mount by 
which the building enhances t he market value of the property. 45 As in 
. other cases of determining market value , not only t he character and 
condition of the building but also the uses t o which it might be put are 
44. 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N.W. -486· (1924L "It i s generally held in con-
demnation proceedings, t he property being taken in tr.i.vitum that the 
controlling principle i s analogous t o vendor and vendee- -if fix-
tures pass to the condemnor, they must be paid for, but if the 
owner elects to take the fixtures, a differ ent n.1.le must obtain." 
See also 1930 Attorney General Reports 184, "We are therefore 
of the opinion that where a tract of land i s taken for .highway 
purposes under eminent domain statutes of this state, and there 
are buildings erected. and fixed to t he real estate so as to be a 
part of it, the value of the buildings mu st be cons idered in deter-
mining compensation to b e awarded the owner in the absence of 
an expressed agreement with the owner to the contrary." 
45. Evidence of cost of t he building is admissible as an a id to the 
jury in arriving at its pr esent value and the val u e of the entire 
property. Corcoran v. Des Moines, .205 Iowa 405, 215 N.W. 
9.48 (1927); Faust v. Hosford, .119_Iowa 97 , 93 N.W. 58 (1907); 
Ranck v. City of Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 5 63, 5 69, 111 N. W. 
1027 (1907) (evidence as t o the material used and the durability 
of the structure i s admissible); c f •. Randell v . Highway C ommis-
sion, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 685 (1932). 
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matters for consideration. 4 6 
I 
Where the owner of the land that is about to be taken by con-
demnation proceedings commences the erection of structures, it may 
be in such bad faith that the court will regard such structures as 
personal property and not allow compensation for them . 4 7 
Portable buildings, not affixed to the soil, need not be considered 
in determining damages . 48 
(4) Trees , Shrubbery and Crops 
The value of trees on. the lan<;i has been considered a proper ele\.. 
ment to take into consideration. in determining the market ·value of the 
strip b.ondemned. 4 9, Also, the value of the crops lost by the condem-
nation is an. item for th~ jury to weigh -in arriving at the correct 
valuation of the land taken. 50 The general accepted rule both in Iowa 
and other. jurisdictions seems to be that the value of crops or trees 
.destroyed -in a. taking is provable not as separate and distinct items 
46. Nichols, Eminent Domain , VoL I, Section 227, p . 695; Ranck v. 
City of Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 563,571, 111 N.W. 1027 {1907) 
(showing the purpose for which the building is adapted and its 
potentialities). 
47. Nichols, .Ibid. , p . 696; 20 C.J. Sec. 248, p. 302; Elliott, On 
Roads and Streets, Vol. I, Sectl:on 294 (4th e.d . ). 
48. Nichols, On Eminent Domain, p. 694; Whitely v . Baltimore, 
113· Md . 541, 77 At!. 882; Kansas City, etc. Ry. Oo. v. Second 
· Imp. Co., 256 Mo. 386, 166 S.W. 296. 
49. Kukkuk v. City of Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444,.456, 187 N.W. 
209; Maxwell v. Highway Commission, 265 N. W. 899 (no Iowa 
report as opinion withdrawn); Adkins v. Smith,U34 Iowa 758, 64 
N.W • . 761; Ranck v. Cedar Rapids, .134 Iowa 563,566, 111 N.W. 
10.27 (1907) . 
50. Bracken v . City of Albia, 194 Iowa 596 , 189 N.W. 9·72; Lance v . 
c ·. M. & St. P. R. Co., 57 Iowa 636, 11 N.W. 612 . 
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of damaye , but merely as t ending to show the market value .b f the land 
taken. 5 
(·5) Fencing 
The Iowa decisions hold that the owners of premises taken s hould not 
be allowed a fence as a fence in the assessment of damages, a nd t hat 
it would not do to say that a proprietor w ould. have to fence his land, 
and therefore, he would be allowed s ome d efinite price for some par-
ticular kind of fence. However, if by t he establishment of the rsad, 
the land is thrown open and left in a mere unfenced consition, this fact 
should be considered in arr iving at t he depreciated value of the remain-
ing premises. 52 Further , t he need of additional fence .whi'Gh w ould be 
required after the appropril.ation '-ama t he fact that such fence will require 
repair and replacement in the future i s admissible to show the additional 
burden on the remaining .Property which has a tendency to diminish .its 
market value. 53 In both of the s ituations where. the property has been 
51. In regard to crops, 20 C.J. 798; Bracken v . City of Albia, 194 
Iowa 596, 189 N.W. 972; Lance v . C. M. &. St. P. R. Co., 57 
Iowa 636, 11 N.W. 612 • . In regard to trees, Adkins v. Smith, 
94 .Iowa 758, 64 N·.w .. 761; Ranck v . C ity of Cedar Rapids, 134 
Iowa 563, 111 N .W. 1027; Maxwell v . Highway Commission, .265 
N.W. 899 (no Iowa report as opinion withdrawn) , "The appellant 
also objects to the admiss ion of the testimony as to the .value of 
timber or trees cut and destroy ed from t he appropriated strip . 
Such testimony i s always admissible to prove one of the e l ements 
of · damage • • • The value of trees grow ing on the land has .been 
considered a proper e lement to take into consideration in such 
cases . " 
52 . Dean v. State, 211 .Iowa 143 , 233 N oW o 36, 3 8; Henry v . 
Dubuque R. R. Co. , 2 Iowa 288; Randell v . Highway C ommission, 
214 Iowa 1, 241 N-.w. 685 (1932) . 
53. Maxwell XI. Highway C ommission, 223 I6wa.159 l / 271 N·.wo 
883; Dean v. State , 211 I6wiH43~ , 2'3"3 N. W. 3 6,3 8; Randell v. 
Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N. Wo 685 , 693. 
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left open and unfenced , or where additional fence will be required by 
reason of the condemnation "what a hypothetical fence desired by the 
owner would cost ,is, · 1Jl1.enef0ne;, out of the question and cannot be 
admitted in evidence. 54 But the cost of removal and replacing an 
existing fence is admissible. 55 However, such cost cannot be re-
covered as a separate and distinct damage. It is merely a factor 
to consider in determining the extent of the landowner ' s injury. 56 
(6). Condemnation Is Regarded as Total 
~I I( 
It should be noted that the courts recognize a .vital distinction be-
tween introducing evidence of the possible or actual constructed 
improvements as b earing on the conditon of the remaining property and 
the introduction of such evidence for the purpose of diminishing dam-
ages on a theory that certain revocable privileges are given to the 
landowner in the condemned parcel. In the former instance such 
evidence is admissible , but in the latter it is not. 57 
The rule is well settled in most jurisdictions that if lli.e condemnor 
takes the property , he takes it as it is . 58 In the absence of consent 
54 . Dean v . State, 211 Iowa 43, 233 N.W. 36,38; Kennedy v. 
Dubuque R. R. , 2 Iowa 51; Hanrahan v. Fox , 47 Iowa 102; Randell 
v. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa l, 241 N.W. 685, 692 (1932) 
(where it is said that evidence of the value of a hypothetical ad-
ditional fence probably necessitated by condemnation of a strip 
for highway is inadmissible as speculative , indefinite, and mere 
guess- work) . 
55 ~ Randell v . Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1 , 241 N. W. 685 , 690 
(1932). 
56 . Randell v. Highway Commission , 214 Iowa l , 241 N.W. 685 , 691 
(1932). 
57. Moran v. Highway Commission , 223 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 59, .61 
(1937) . 
58 . Orgel, On Valuation Under Eminent Domain , p . 151; 22 C .J. 768 , 
"The possibility that the appropriator will not exercise or t he fact 
that there is no present intention of exercising to the full extent 
the rights acquired should not be considered in the reduction of 
damages since the presumption is that the appropriator will 
exercise h i s r ights and use and enjoy the property taken. to the 
full extent . " Nichols , Ibid., Section 226 {2d ed.), "Privileges 
which are merely permissive and subject to revocation by the 
condemning party at any time cannot be availed of in reduction 
of damages . " In reState Highway Commission , 256 Mich . 165 , 
23 9 N. W. 317 (1931) . 
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of the landowner, he cannot confine his appropriation to just that portion 
of the owner• s assets which are useful for the .proposed improvement and 
allow the remaining assets of the landowner to remain on the condemned 
land unpaid for. It has been held in Cummins v. Des Moines & St, 
Louis Ry . Co., 63 Iowa 397,403, 19 N.W. 268, that the condemnor 
cannot have damages assessed on the theory that it will in· fact use 
but part of the condemned land, and therefore that the posses_sion and 
occupancy of the builc;iing situated on the right- of- way will not be Qlsi:-:-.··-:. .· . . 
turbed. In Moran v. Highway Commission , 223 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 
59 (1937) it was held that evidence of the actual precaution taken by 
the highway commission to preserve a well on the right-of-way for 
the use of the adjacent owner was inadmissible and that damages should' 
be assessed on the assumption that the well was appropriated by the 
commission . 59 
However, where a specific reservation is made, . the condemnor is 
entitled to a' reduction in damages. 60 This principle, as correctly 
understood. and applied, merely permits the condemnor, by stipulating 
against future changes, to avoid a present assessment for possible or 
. potential injuries to the remaining property because of future and 
likely alterations in the construction or operation of the improvement. 61 
59. Accord, De Penning v . Iowa Power & Light Co . , 239 Iowa 950, 
33 N~ w·. 2d .503 (1948). 
60 . DePenning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 23.9 Iowa 950, 33 N .W. 2d 
503 (1948) (reservation allowed even by amendment on appeal); 
see also Moran v. Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 
59, 62 (193 7) (dictum). 
61 . · Orgel, On Valuation, Section 59, p. 198, 11A number of courts 
have held that a taker may avoid liability for potential damages 
resulting from future change in the construction or operation by 
stipulating against such changes thereby making him liableUn 
a new action in case he later violates this stipulation ... Leading 
case McKelvey v. Allegheny County, 238 Pa. 580, 86.Atl. 521 
(1913); East Side Levee District v. Jerome, 306 Ill. 577, 138 
N.E. 192. 
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It is in no way intended to abrogate the doctrine that the condemnor must 
take the property as it is, nor does it obligate the landowner to accept 
offers by the appropriator of certain privileges or rights in the condemned 
land in reduction of damages, 62 
What has heretofore been said does not apply to voluntary agree-
ments between the condemnor and landowner whereby some rights or 
privileges are granted or reserved with reference to the condemned 
propertJ. Such binding stipulations may be properly considered in the 
trial. 6 
Statutory provisions that the condemnor may take less than full 
possession and thus minimize damages are not repugnant to the con-
stitution. 64 
b, Recovery for Damages to the Property as a Whole 
In determining the amount of damages it is proper for the jury to 
62. Orgel, On Valuation, P. 151 (1936); 20 C.J. 768, "Nor can the 
landowner be compelled to accept ••• offers by the appropriator 
to allow him certain rights and privileges ••• in the condemned land 
.;; .in payment or reduction of damages"; Kemmerer v. Highway 
Commission, 213 Iowa 1313, 241 N.W. 696 (1937) ("appellee is 
under no legal obligation to consent to the removal of his improve-
ments to some other point on the farm". See also Jeffery v. Chic. 
Ry. Co., 138 Wis. l 120 N.W. 847; Toledo A.A. & N. R. Co. ,v, 
Munson, 57 Mich. 42, 23 N.W. 455; Nichols, Ibid., Section 205 
(2d ed, )(compensation must be paid in money for the land actually 
appropriated). 
63. 20 C.J. 767; Bartel v. Woodbury County, 174 Iowa 86, 156 N.W, 
303 (cattle pass offered In the supervisors and accepted by the 
landowner as a part of the damages); Agne v. Seitsinger, 85 Iowa 
305, 52 N.W. 228 (privilege of attaching fence to bridge being 
reserved to the grantor of an easement cannot be subsequently 
revoked without compensation), 
64. Draker v, Iowa Electric Co., 191 Iowa 1376, 183 N.W. 896; 
Taylor v. Hudson, 147 Mass. 609, 18 N.E. 582; Sixth Ave. R. 
Co. v. Kerr, 72 N.Y. 592; Washington Cemetery v. Prospect 
Park, 68 N.Y. 592; McGregor v. Equitable Gas Co., 131 Pa. 522 
19 Atl. 933, 
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take into consideration all pertinent factors pertaining to the condition 
of the fflroperty as a whole before and after t he taking of the condemned 
strip. 5 Some of the factors to be considered are: (1) noise, air con-
tamination, and deprivation of privacy, 66 (2) proximity of the improve-
ment, ~7 i: (3) increased danger of injury or destruction of property, 68 
(4) the burden of additional fence, 69 (5) added Q.ifficulty of transport-
ing stock across the right- of- way, 70 (6) the statutory duty on the 
65. For a general discussion of the problems in this area see Cromwell, 
Some Elements of Damage in Condemnation, 43 Iowa Law Review 
191 (1958); Note, Methods of Proving Land Value, 43 Iowa Law 
Review 279 (1958) . 
66. Schoonover v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 539, 32 N.W.2d 99,101 (1948); 
Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 718, 31 N.W. 2d 393 (1948}; Ham v. 
Wis. I. & N. Ry. Co., 61 Iowa 716, 17 N . W. 157; Dimmick v. 
C. B. & St. L. Ry . Co., 58 Iowa 637, 12 N.W. 710; Simmons 
v . M. C . & Ft . Dodge Ry. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 129. 
67. Richardson v. Centerville , 137 Iowa 253, 114 N.W. 1071; Cum-
min~ v. D.M. & St. L. Ry . Co., 63 Iowa 397, 19 N.W. 268; 
Haggardv. Ind. SchoolDist., 113 Iowa486, 85 N.W. 777. 
68. Schoonover v. Fleming, 23 9 Iowa 53 9 , 3 2 N. W. 2d 99, 101 
(1948); Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 718 , 31 N.W.2d 393 (19~8); 
Small v. C. R. I. & P. Ry . Co., 59 Iowa 599, 13 N.W. 754; 
Dudley v. Mand . N. W. Ry. Co., 77 Iowa 408, 42 N. W. 359; 
Fleming v. C. D. & M. Ry . Co., 34 Iowa 353. 
69. Nichols, Ibid., p. 734 (2d ed.). See Dean v. State, 211 Iowa 43, 
233 N. W. 3 6, 3 7; Max;well v. Highway Commission, 27.1 N. W. 883. , 
(Iowa 1937); Randellv. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 
N . W. 685; Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 718, 31 N.W. 2d 393 
(194 8). 
70. The factor of transporting cattle across a highway may be consider-
ed as an element of damage, but estimated costs of such transporta-
tion are too speculative to be admitted in evidence. Trachta v. 
Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W.2d 849 (1957); Korf 
v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W. 2d 85,93 (1948); Randell v. 
Highway Commission , 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 685 (1932). See 
also Neddermeyer v. Crawford County, 190 Iowa 883, 175 N.W. 
33 9. 
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abutting owner to destroy weeds along a highway, 71 (7) annoyance 
and inconvenience , 72 (8) evidence of a general advance in price of 
property in the immediate neighborhood , although at tribut able to the 
very public improvement for the use of which the condemnation is 
being made, 73 (9) the d i stance of the farm from market and t he kind 
of road to market ; 74 (1 O) the destruction of springs or wells as a 
result of the construction of the p1.,1blic work for which the land is 
taken, 75 (11) the c ost and expense of equipping a new location, 76 
71. Randell v . Highway Commission , supra , note that no cost figur e 
for performing such duty may b e shown however . 
72. Korf v . Fleming , 239 Iowa 501 , 32 N. W. 2d 85 (1948); Schoonover 
v. Fleming , 239 Iowa 539 , 32 N. W . 2d 99 (1948); Haggard v . Ind . 
School Dist ., 113 Iowa 486 , 85 N .W. 777;· Maxwell v . Highway 
Commission' , 271 N . W . ,883, . , , "One of t he elements of t he 
damages is the trouble and expense and inconvenience in cross-
ing the highway in the operation of the farm". Besco v. Mahaska 
County , 200 Iowa 684, 205 N. W . 459 (1925). 
73 . In Ranck v , Cedar Rapids Ry . Co . , 134 Iowa 563 , 572 , 111 N.W. 
1027 , and also in Snouffer v. Chic . & N. W . Ry . Co., 105 Iowa 
681, 75 N. W . 501 , it was stated that evidence of a general ad-
vance in price of property at the date of t he condemnation in t he 
immediate neighborhood of that sought to be condemned although 
attributable to the very public improvement for the use of which 
the condemnation is being made is admissible on the question of 
the owner's damage. But see Section 15(c)(6), infra . 
74 . Welton v . Highway Commi ssion, 211 Iowa 625 J 233 N. W. 876 
(1931); see however Moran v . Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 93 6, 
274 N. W . 59 , 62 (1937) where the exclusion of such evidence was 
held no error. 
75. Nichols , Eminent Domain , Section 23 8; Winkleman v . Des Moines 
Ry . Co . , 62 Iowa 11 , 17 N. W . 82 (the spring in thi s case was on 
the right- of- way and was destroyed by the building of an embank-
ment thereon. See Moran v . Highway Commission , 223 Iowa 93 6 , 
274 N.W. 59 (destruction of well) . 
76. Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v . Des Moines , 197 Iowa 1082 , 
198 N. W . 486 , 490 (1924) (leasehold case); contra , Fiorini v. 
City of Kenosha , 208 Wis . 496 , 243 N. W. 761 (Wis . 1932}; 
U . S . v . Inlot , 26 Fed . 482 , 489 (1873); Chicago v . Cunnea , s29 
Ill . 288 , 160 N. E. 559 (1928} (holding that the cost of securing 
or r enting a new location could not be considered) . 
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(12) the fact that one tract is cut off from convenient access to another, 77 
(13) the possibility of water damage as a result of the new facility, 78 
(14) the danger of hunting in the condemned property , 79 (15). the danger 
to crops and occupants by construction of electric line, 80 (16) the l oss 
of. lateral support. 81 
c . Valuation Factors Which May Not Be Considered 
(1), Specific Items of Damage May Not Be Introduced 
While as pointed out in the two previous subsections almost 
innumerable items of damage may be int roduced in order to show t he 
effect which condemnation will have on the market value of the pro-
perty, witnesses may not assign specific cost figur es of those items 
of damage. 82 The rationale for this rule, which is rather strictly en-
forced, appears to be the fear that such costs are entirely too specu-
77. Bell v. Chic. etc. Ry . Co., 74 Iowa 343, 37 N.W. 768; Wilson 
v . Fleming, 239 Iowa 718, 31 N.W. 2d 393 (1948). 
78. Wheatley v. Fairfield, 213 Iowa 1187, 240 N. W. 628; Trachta 
v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W.2d 849 (1957). 
79. Wheatley v. Fairfield, 213 Iowa 1187, 240 N.W. 628 . 
80. Evans v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 205 Iowa 283 , .218 N.W. 
66. 
81. Kukkuk v . Des Moines , 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209; accord, 
Hathaway v. Sioux City, 244 Iowa 508, 57 N.W.2d 228 (1953). 
82. Trachta v . Highway Commission , 249 Iowa 374, 86 N. W .2d 
849 (1957); Nedrow v. Michigan.:..Wisconsin Pipe Line Co . , 245 
Iowa 763, 61 N.W.2d 687 (1954); Hayes v. Chicago, Ro I. & 
Po Ro Co. e 239 Iowa 149, 30 NoWo 2d 743 (1948); Wilson Vo 
Fleming, 239 Iowa 718 , 31 N.W. 2d 393 (1948); Maxwell v. 
Highway Commission , 223 Iowa 159, 271 N. W. 883 (1937); 
Randell v. Highway Commission , 214 Iowa 1, 241 N. W. 685 
(1932):. Dean v. Highway Commission , 211 Iowa 143, 233 N. W. 
36; Welton v. Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625 , 233 N.W. 
876; Kosters v. Sioux County , 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993; 
Ranck v . City of Cedar Rapids , 134 Iowa 563, 111 N. W o 1027 o 
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lative to constitute the basis of the award. 83 In addition, they are apt 
to lead the jury to simply add up figures which, wheru totaled, may have 
no relation to the market value of the condemned property. The only ex-
ception to the rule appears to be where a fence, including the same 
posts, wire , etc., is bodily moved to the new location; ini:this case, 
the cost of the operation may be introduced. 84 
(.2) Contingent , Remote and Speculative Items 
Contingent , remote and speculative items of damage or value should 
be excluded from the jury' s consideration, 85 and the trial court' s ad-
mission of such unallowable matter may be reversible error. 86 How-
ever , it often happens that in spite of the judge's d1Iigence, matters 
of such evidence filter into the trial of the case. Under such circum-
stances, the jury should be instructed to disregard such testimony. 87 
However , the inclusion of a large number of items of damage in an 
instruction has not been regarded as emphasizing speculative items 
83. Trachta v. Highway Commission , 249 Iowa 3 74, 86 N. W. 2d 849 
(1957); Randell v. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 
685 (1932); Dean v. Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 143, 233 
N. W. 36. 
84. Trachta v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W.2d 849 
(1957); Randell v. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 
685 (1932). 
85. Trachta v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W. 2d 849 
(1957); Randell v. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 
685 (1932); Koster v. Sioux County, 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 
993; Pingery v. Cher okee, 78 Iowa 438, 43 N.W . 285; Simons 
v. Ry. Co ., 128 Iowa 139,152, 103 N.W. 129. 
86. Maxwell v. Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 159, 271 N.W. 883 
(1937); Randel v. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 
685 (1932); Koster v. Sioux County, 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993. 
87. Wilson v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W. 2d 161 
(1958); Duggan v. State, 214 Iowa 230, 242 N.W. 98,99; Welton 
v. Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625, 233 N.W. 878, 883. 
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of damage. 88 As a general rule, the trial court has a high degree of 
discretion in admitting evidence as to various items of damage and 
appellate courts are reluctant to reverse because of inclusion or ex-
clusion of individual items of damage. 89 
In addition , the condemnor may not introduce evidence as an in~ 
dication of plaintiff's damage showing that the plaintiff has purchased 
land to replace the condemned land because of the presence of so many 
additional and speculative factors in the purchase of land. 90 
(3) Interference with Trade or Business 
Although an owner is permitted to show that he is running a 
lucrative business and that the property is adap.table to such 
business as elements bearing on the market value of the premises, 91 
it is a w.ell settled rule that the owner is not entitled to recover the 
anticipated profits of his business which are lost by the taking of his 
land and according to the prevailing rule, he is not entitled to recover 
even for the loss of profits during the period necessary for the removal 
of his business to a new location. The loss of profits is an item that 
88. Kemmerer v. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 241 N. W. 693 
(1932). 
89. Trachta v. Highway Commission , 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W.2d 849 
(1957); Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 239 Iowa 149,152, 
30 N.W. 2d 743 (1948) and citations; Randell v .. Highway Com-
mission, 214 Iowa 1, 241 N.W. 685 (1932); Ranck v. City of 
Cedar Rapids , 134 Iowa 563, 111 N.W. 1027. 
90. Schoonover v. Fleming , 239 Iowa 539 , 32 N.W.2d 99 , 105 (1948). 
91. Maxwell v. Highway Commission , 223 Iowa 15 9, 265 N. W. 899 , 
904, 271 N.W. 883; Ranck v. Cedar Rapids , 134 Iowa 563, 111 
N.W. 1027. 
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is too remote and speculative and authorities quite universally so 
hold . 92 However , an exception appears to exist where agricultural 
land i s involved . 93 Losses occasioned by the temporary obstruction 
of the highway incident to the construction of the improvement may 
not be consider ed . 94 Damages to the business property r e sulting from 
92. Nedrow v. Michigan- W i sconsin Pipe Line Co ., 245 Iowa 763, 61 
N.W. 2d 687 (1954); Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W. 2d 
85 , 96 (1948); Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. Des Moines , 197 
Iowa 1082 , 198 N.W . 486; Nichols, Eminent Domain, Section 133, 
p. 244; 20 C . J. 799 , 764; Orgel , On Valuation Under Eminent Do-
main , Section 72, p. 321; but cf. cases involvi ng special problems 
in determining market value , e . g. leases (discussed in subsection 
(d)(3), infra . ); Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N. W. 2d 85 
(1948); Des Moi nes Wet Wash Laundry v. Des Moines , 197 Iowa 
1082 , 198 N.W. 486 . 
93. Wilson v . Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W. 2d 161, 
169 (195 8)(dictum); Korf v. Fleming, 23 9 Iowa 5 01, 3 2 N. W. 2d 
85 , 96 (1948); Maxwell v. Highway Commission, 223 _Iowa 159, 
265 N. W. 899,904 , 905 (1936) rehearing 271 N.W. 883 (1937); 
Ranck v . Cedar Rapids , 134 Iowa 563 , 111 N.W. 1027 (1907). 
94 . Wilson v. Highway Commission , 249 Iowa 994, 90 N. W. 2d 161, 
169 (1958); 20 C.J. 780; Orgel; On Valuation Under Eminent 
Domain , Section 77; Pemberton v . City of Greensboro, 208 N.C. 
466 , 181 S. E. 258 (loss of anticipated business profits occasion-
ed by temporary c losing of business street for the purpose of making 
public improvement held not property w ithin the constitutional pro-
vision prohibiting the taking of property w ithout compensation); 
Oldfield v . City of Tulsa , 41 P. 2d 61 (Okla . ); Sheeley v. Chippe -
wa County, 258 N.W. 373 (Wis.); Graham v. Sioux City, 219 
Iowa 5 94 , 25 8 N. W. 902 (testimony of increased rent in securing 
another location inadmissible); United States v. Inlots, 26 Fed. 
Cas. 482,489; Fioriniv. C ityofKenosha, 208Wis. 496 , 243 
N. W. 760 (1932}; Louisiana Highway Commission v. Bourdiaux, 
19 La . App. 98 , 139 So. 521 (1932). 
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an alteration· in the flow of traffic are also not compensable. 95 Further-
more, losses arising from competition of the condemning party do not 
constitute an element of damage . 96 
Similar to the rule excluding recovery of profits is the nearly 
universally accepted principle that good will i s not property in 
the constitutional sense, and hence payment need not be made. 97 
However, he is permitted to show that the property is more valuable 
because of the presence of a long- established business. 98 
(4) Past Negligence or Illegal Conduct 
Anticipated or past negligence of the taker :iJ:ni:blo..e._con~stmxl:H0:n li>r 
95. Wilson v. Highway Commission , 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 
(1958); Highway Commission v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869 , 82 N.W. 
2d 755 (1957). 
96. Prosser v. Wapello County , 18 Iowa 327. 
97 . Nichols, Ibid., Section 1331 (2d ed . 1950) "An established 
business or what is called "good will" has never been held to be 
property in the constitutional sense." Orgel, On Valuation, 
Section 75, "there is a general agreement in these American cases 
that the owner may not receive compensation for the loss of good 
will apart from the market value of the land taken even though 
there is no doubt that the good will has been substantially damage-
ed. n Jahr , On Eminerit Domain, Section 115 . Accord, Des Moines 
Wet Wash Laundry v. Des Moines , 197 Iowa 1082 , 198 N.W. 486, 
489. For a discussion of the r easons behind denying recovery for 
good will, see Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1 , 93 L. 
R. 1765, 69· S. Ct . 1434, 7 A. L.R. 2d 1281 (1949) • 
. 98. Ranck v. Cedar Rapids , 134 Iowa 563 , 5 71, 5 72 , 111 N. W. 1027 
(witness permitted to testify that the business had been establish~ 
ed for over 16 years , and that long establishment increased the 
value of the property); Kafka v. Davidson, 135· Minn. 369, 160 
N. W. 1021 , 1023 (-qompetent for plaintiff to prove that the 
market value of the premises for use as a cigar store had been 
enhanced by their long use for that purpose). 
) 
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maintenance of the improvement, or trespasses on adjacent property, 
or improper or unlawful uses of the condemned strip are inadmissible 
items of damages in these proceedings. 99 
(5) Removal of Personal Property; Exception - Fixtures 
A taking of real estate does not affect the ownership of personal 
property kept on the premises taken, and the owner is entitled to re-
move such property. 101 Further, the owner may not recover the cost of 
removing or damages to such property resulting from its removal, since 
such loss is not a constitutional taking. 10 la This rule is accepted in 
99. Bennet v. Marion, 106 Iowa 628, 76 N.W. 844 {187f!}); Kukkuk v. 
Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 187 N.W. 209 (cannot recover for pos-
sible negligence of the taker); Doud v, Mason City Ry. Co., 76 
Iowa 438, 41 N.W. 65 (nor trespasses on adjacent land); Fleming 
v. Chic. R. Co., 34 Iowa 352; Grear v. Ry. Co., 43 Iowa 83 
(obstruction of a public highway should not be considered in the 
estimation of the damages to which the owner of adjacent land is 
entitled for the appropriation of right-of-way by a railroad company). 
See also Miller v. Ry. Co., 63 Iowa 680,685, 16 N.W. 567; King 
v. Ry. Co., 34 Iowa 459; Guinn v. Ry. Co., 125 Iowa 301, 101 
N.W. 94; Bracken v, City of Albia, 1.g4 Iowa 596, 89 N.W. 972; 
Duggan v. State, 214 Iowa 230, 242 N.W. 98; Welton v. Highway 
Commission, 211 Iowa 625, 233 N.W. 876 (1930); Riddle v, Lodi 
Telephone Co., 175 Wis. 360, 185 N.W. 182, 20 C.J. 778, 
100. See also Compensation to Lessees, Sections 21 and 22, Division 
IV, infra. 
101. Nichols, Ibid., Section 228 {2d ed.), 
lOla. See Section 2l{b), infra, for a discussion of statutory changes 
in Iowa affecting personal property. Sec. 3, Chapter 318, 58th 
G.A. (1959) added the following to Iowa Code Section 472.14 
relating to appraisement and assessment of damages by condem-
nation commissioners: "in assessing the damages the owner or 
tenant will sustain, the commissioners shall consider and make 
allowance for personal property which is damaged or destroyed or 
reduced in value, " 
113 
most jurisdictions in the United States. 102 
There have been cases , in which pure ly personal property has been 
involved , where removal expenses have been a llowed under gr oad con-
102. Cases in support of this proposition a re: Kansas C ity Sout hern 
Ry . Co. v. Anderson, 88 Ark . 129, 113 S.W. 103 0 , 16 Ann . Cas. 
784 (1908); Colorado M. Ry . Co . v . Brown , 15 Colo. 193, 25 
Pac . 87 (1870); United States v . Inlot , 26 Fed . Cas . 482 , Ca s. 
No. 15 , 441 (1873); in re Post Office Site in lbrough of Bronx~ 
210 Fed . 832 (1914); Edmonds v . Boston, 108 Mass . 535 (1871); 
Springfield So. Western Ry. Co . v . Schweitzer , 173 Mo. App. 
650, 158 S.W. 1058 (1913); Central P'ac. R. Co . v. Pearson, 35 
Cal. 24 7 (1865); Matter of N.Y . West Shore & Buffalo Ry. Co . , 
35 Hun 633 (N. Y. 1885); Blecker v. Phil. & Reading R. R. Co . , 
177 Pa. 25 2, 35 Atl. 617 (1896); Braun v . Met . West Side El R.R . 
Co . , 166 Ill. 434 , 46 N. E. 974 (1897); GirshornBros. Co. v. 
U.S., 284 Fed. 849 (1922); Newark v . Cook , 99 N.J. Eq. 527, 
133 Atl. 875, aff'd 100 N . J. Eq . 582, 135 Atl. 915 (1927); St . 
Louis v. Railroad Co . , 266 Mo. 694, l-82 S.W. 750 (1916); 
Matter of New York & Hudson R.R. Co. , 35 Hun 306 (N. Y. 1885); 
Matter of People v. Johnson & C o. , 219 App. Div. 285, 219 N.Y. S. 
751 (1927); Aff'd 245 N.Y. 627 , 157 N . E. 885 (1927) cert. denied 
275 U. S. 571; InreSmithSt. Bridge , 234App . Div. 583 , 255 
N.Y.S . 801 (1932); Kalfa v . Davidson , 135 Minn . 389, 160 N . W . 
1021; In reNew York etc. Bridge, 4 N.Y.S. 222; Ranlet v . Con-
cord R.R. Corp., 62 N.H . 561 (1883); Pause v. C ity of Atlanta, 
98 Ga . 92 , 26 S . E. 489 (1895); Fiorini v. C ity of Kenosha, 208 
Wis. 496, 243 N.W. 761 (1932); U.S. v. Meyer, 190 Fed . 688; 
Cobb v. Boston, 109 Mass. 438; William v. Commonwealth , 168 
Mass. 364, 47N.E. 115; Emery v. BostonTerminalCo. , 178 
Mass . 172, 59 N . E. 763; New York etc . Ry. Co. v. Blacker, 
178 Mass. _386 , 59 N . E. 10.20; ?Miss'0uh ·-Raciflp , Ry1. Co. v. 
Porter , 112 Mo. 361 , 20 S .W. 568; St . Louis etc . R. R. Co . v. 
Knapp- Stout, 160 Mo . 396, 61 S.W. 300; Fitzhugh v . Chesa-
peake etc. Ry . Co. , 107 Va . 158, 59 S.E. 415; North Coast 
R.R. Co . v. Kraft Co ., 63 Wash . 250 , 115 Pac. 97; See Nichols, 
Ibid., Section288(2d ed . ); 20C . J. 782. 
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stitutional provisions, affording compensation for taking or damaging 
property; 103 even under such br@ad pneibirli_,sJu:Ds·, .. how·e:v-er·; ;,compens;;t-
1: ' h 1A' • . 11 d ' d' ~ 04 ' . ' • wn as ueen genera or, en:1:e. _,, , • · . . ·' 
The decisions allowing recovery for removal of personal property 
have been based mostly on statutory grounds. The leading case of 
Blincoe v, Chocta o. & w, R. Co,, 160 Okla. 286, 83 Pac, 903, 
4, L. R. A. (N.S.) 890 is illustrative. A railroad company condemned 
a lumber yard, Evidence of the cost of removal of such lumber was ex-
clu(ied by the trial court, The appellate court agreed that the con-
stitutional provision did not include such consequential damage, but 
in this case the applicable statute directed the "commissioners to 
consider the injury which such owner may sustain by reason of such 
railroad", In view of this statute, the court held that removal costs 
should have been allowed, The constitutional provision in this case 
was in the form of the Fifth Amerldment in terms· requiring compensation 
only for property taken, In City of Richmond v, Williams, 114 Va. 
698, 77 S. E. 492, the same result was reached. In upholding an 
allowance for the cost of removal of lumber when a lumber yard was 
involved, the court based its conclusion on reasonable statutory con-
struction, although the Constitl\tion of Virginia forbade the taking or 
103, Nichols, Ibid,, Section 228 (Zd ed.) These constitutions apply 
to the "taking or damaQing" of property, damaging being a much 
broader concept than taking. 
104, E.G. Blecker v. Phila, & Reading R.R., 177 Pa. 252,258, 35 
Atl. 617; see also St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Knapp'- Stout, 160 Mo. 
396, 61 s.w. 300; Orgel, On Valuation Under Eminent Domain, 
Section 69. States having such constitutional provisions are: 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi; Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming, 
,115 
or damaging of property without just compensation. 105 
In St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Knapp- Stout Co., 160 Mo. 3 96 , 
.61 S.W. 300, precisely the same question was before the court as 
in the Oklahoma and Virginia cases, that is, whether t he owner whose 
land was taken for public use could recover t he expense necessarily 
incurred in removing lumber lying on the premises. The court denied 
this item despite the fact that t he· Missouri Constitution provided 
compensation for damaging of property. 
Damages for the removal of personal property have been denied 
on two grounds; first , that the owner• s necessity of incurring removal 
costs does not enhance the value of the property taken, that is, such 
costs have no perceptible hearing on the market value;. 1 06and second-
' ! l (_ ,{ IIi~ 
105. "Our statute requires the commissioners to ascertain what will 
be just compensation for the land and other property proposed to 
be condemned •. •• " The words "other property" which are added 
must apply to something other than land or they are wholly superi-lv:m,; 
fluous . 114 Va . 702,.703. 
106. Orgel, On Valuation Under Eminent Domain, Section 67, "We 
recognize the .pain and necessity of removing might stimulate the 
owner to hold out and secure a better price. Hi s very reluctance 
to sell may increase his success as a negotiator', but neither a 
court nor an expert appraiser would be likely to be influenced by 
such subtle physchological factors in the bargaining process. 
Whether the reluctance of the buyer to move to a new premise 
offsets this factor is a problem for economic theorists who are 
interested in the long run ''normal'' values. For the court and 
the appraisal experts it is a question of no professional interest, 
since the effect of these counter- balancing forces is reflected in 
the prices actually established in the real estate market ." St. 
Louis v. St. Louis Ry . , 266 Mo . 694, 182 S.W. 750 (1916), 
"If he whose land is condemned. had voluntarily sold his land to 
a private purchaser , ordinarily no thought would occur to either 
one ••• that the seller should be compensated by the buyer for the 
removal from the premises of personal goods and chattels. That 
one is a voluntary sale and the other an involuntary sale does 
not peculiarly detract from the force of the argument." 
I 
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ly, that such damages are speculative, uncertain and contingent. 107 
A closely related problem is that of attempted assessment of 
costs of removing property to an owner who abandons property on 
the condemned premises. In this situation the owner is at liberty 
to abandon such property as he chooses and need not PaY for the 
resulting removal by the condemnor; however, the owner of the 
property must pay for removal where the abandoned property is 
delivered to him at his direction.108 
, (6) Necessities of Public May Not Be Considered 
It is clear that the measure of value must be the market value to 
an ordinary purchaser and not the peculiar value which the property 
may have to the condemnor, Thus, in United States v. Foster, 131 
F. 2d 3 (8th Cir, )(194 2), the court held that the value of Iowa land 
acquired for the Burlington Ordnance Plant could not be computed by 
taking into account the necessities of the public but rather that the 
value of the land was the value to the owner or the loss caused to 
him by its taking. 
107, In re Post Office Site, 210 Fed. 832 (2d Cir.)(1914); Sto Louis 
v. St. Louis Ry. 1 Ibid. 1 "At first glance it is to be conceded that 
there exists a difficulty in finding a reason for not compensating 
the owner of personal chattel who is compelled to remove them to 
a point at least beyond the edge of the right of way. It is equally 
clear, on the other hand, there is no logical reason that can be 
found for compensating him for the expense of removal beyond 
such point. This is so for the reason that A might desire to move 
his chattel only into the next adjoining house while B might desire 
tp have his taken several blocks or even several miles, and C 
on the other hand, his business being broken up, may desire to 
remove his goods to some other place or city. No logical reason, 
therefore, can be found for the condemnor paying more than suf-
ficient to move the personal property off the right-of-way. A 
rule which would require the condemnor to do more than this 
would be variant and indefinite and consequently speculative •• 
the removal just to the boundary of the premises would be a cost 
de minimus". 
108, American Salvage Co. v. Housing Authority, 14 N.J. 271, 102 
A. 2d 465 (1954). 
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d. Recovery for Special Factors in Land Valuation 
(1) Most Advantageous or Potential Use by Owner! 09 
In determining the market value of a piece of real estate for the 
purpose of taking by eminent domain , it j.s not merely the value of the 
property for the use to which it has been applied by the owner that 
shoulp be taken into consideration, but the possibility of its use for 
all purposes , present and prospective , for which it is peculiarly 
adapted and to which it might reasonably be applied. Prospective 
uses can be considered even though the owner had no present inten-
Uon of devoting it to such uses . 110 In Kukkuk v. Des Moines, 193 
Iowa 444,45 7, 187 N. W. 209, the owner was allowed to testify that 
• I 
his place was properly located for city lots. He was permitted to 
testify as to what would be the value of an ordinary size city lot locat-
109. See also Section 14(d)~, supra. 
110. Walters v . Platt, 184 Iowa 203, 168 N.W. 808 (availability for 
cemetery lots); Fleming v . C. D. & M. R. Co., 34 Iowa 353;, 
Ranck v . Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 56~ ;,566, 111 N.W. 1027; 
Doud v . Mason City, 76 Iowa 438,439, 41 N. W . 65 (although 
no attempt by the owner had been shown to mine the coal under-
neath the land, its uses for mining could be shown). 20 C. J. 
76.9; McLean v. Chicago, Iowa & S. Dak., 67 Iowa 568, 25 N.W. 
782 (owner allowed to state the land was adapted to use for re-
sidential purposes, but after the condemnation, was unfit for that 
use); Hubbell v. Des Moines, 183 Iowa 715 , 167 N. W . 619; 
Lough v. Minn. & S. P. R. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 N.W. 77 _(error 
to limit witnesses to consideration of one special use); Orgel, 
On Valuation, Section 29; 11 The fact that the owner may have 
been ignorant or too uninterested in money values to take advan-
tage of the full possibilities of his property would be treated by 
the court as entirely irrelevant"; Sherman v. St. Paul R. Co., 30 
Minn. 227 , 15 N. W. 23 9; Omaha So. Ry . Co. v. Beeson, 3 6 
Neb. 361, 54 N.W. 557 (adaptability of the land for city lots 
shown althol!gh at the time used exclusively as farm land); 
Nichols, Eminen:tDomain, Section217, p. 661, Section219, p. 
665; Preston v. City of Oedar Rapids, 95 Iowa 71, 63 N. W. 5 90 
(witness testified to market value for commercial purposes. Held 
no error since premises were adapted for use as stores or offices}. 
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ed on his tract. 111 The rule r ecognized in most jurisdictions is that a 
witness may not himself translate the adaptability of the land for a 
specific purpose into a statement of its money value if devoted t o t hat 
use. The measuring stick is t he market value of the land, not its 
value. for the best use. possible, a nd such guesses , predictions , and 
prophesies registered in terms of dollars and cents. t end to c onfuse 
the jury as to t he true s t andard of measuremento 112 In Doud v. Rall-
rpad Company, 76 Iowa438, 41 N.W. 65, it was held that it was pro-
per for the' owner to prove the presence of undeveloped mineral depos its 
in the land taken by eminent domain. 113 Fitness of the l and for rais-
ing a cert ain crop may be shown , alt hough such crop has never been 
raised on the land, and a large outlay would be nec essary t o devote 
it to such use. For illustration , in Belle Fourche Valley Ry. Co. v . 
Belle Fourche Land and C attle Co., 28 S.D. 289, 133 N. W o 26 1, the 
court said that the owner should be allowed . t o show t he peculiar fit~ 
ness of the property for the grow ing of apples , alt hough no orchard 
existed on the place, a nd it w ould involve a considerable amount of 
capital to change its use. Of course, such an argument may defeat 
111. See Everett v . Union Paco Ry. Co . , 59 Iowa 243 0 246, 13 N. W • 
. 109 , which held similar evidence incompet ent , but probably ex-
cluded it on the grounds t hat there was no evidenc e t hat neigh= 
boring land had been l a id out in lot s and , t herefor e, it was too 
remote and speculative a use; LaMonte v . St. Loui s , D. M. & N. 
R. Co. , 62 Iowa 192, 17 N. W. 465 (evidence of value as r e= 
sii.dential property too remote t o be considered; land located 2 
miles beyond the city limits of Des Moines). 
112. Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domaino Section 30, "It has been 
held_ in most cases t hat a witness may not himself translate that 
adaptability int o a statement of its money value o Eo g. , a properly 
qualified witness may express an opinion that the property has a 
fair market value of $10, 000.00, and he may explain b ot h on 
direct and on cross.., examination r t he_ peculiar qualities of the 
property , whfch led him t o conclude that it i s worth t his amount . 
·But he is not ordinarily permitted to tes t ify that the property has 
a value of $10 , 000.00 for building lot purpo ses or for the best 
use. See also in thi s particular, Sacrament o R. R. v. Hulborn, 
156 Cal. 408 , .104 Pac. 979 (1919); Tracy v . Mt. Pleasant, 167 
Iowa 435, 14 6 N. W. 78, 83; (Ever ett v . Union Ry. Co., 59 Iowa 
243, 13 N.W. 109; St at e v . Oklahoma Ry . Coot 153 Okla. 76, 
4 P. 2d 1009 (1932). 
113. See also Section 15 (a)(2), supra. 
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. itself because of the cost involved . 
Inasmuch as compensation awarded when land is taken by eminent 
domain is the market value of the land for any use to which it is adapt= 
ed or for which it is available, its peculiar adaptability for public as 
well as private use may be shown and be taken into consideration.114 
A use for which a piece of property is available need not be ex-
cluded from consideration merely becaus~ the availability depends 
upon extrinsic conditions , the continuance of which:.is not within the 
control of the owner. Thus , a lot near a railroad station may be es-
pecially valuable for the site of a retail store , altho11gh the company, 
if it saw fit , might move the station away. In fact , it is not neces-
sary that the extrinsic improvement which will make the property especial-
ly available for a particular purpose be in existence when the land is 
taken , if the possibility of its being constructed in the immediate 
future is so strong as to have an effect upon its present market value . 115 
(2) Illegal Uses and Zoning Restrictions 
Although a landowner is entitled to have the highest and most pro-
fitable use to which his land may reasonably be adapted considered in 
determining its market value , this general rule is subject to the qualifi-
cation that value may not be based on an illegal use of the property. 116 
However , a use which. is presently illegal may be considered in deter~ 
mining the value of the property i!f \ the restrictive law is malum prohibi= 
tum rather than malum in se , and if there is a reasonable probability 
114 o Lacy Vo Mt. Pleasant , 165 Iowa 435 , 146 N·.W. 78. ,But see 
United States v. Foster , 131 F o 2d 3 (8th Cir. 194 2). 
115 o Nichols, Ibid . , Section 219 (2d ed.). 
116o Jahr ; Law of Eminent Domain, Section 79; Nichols , The Law of 
Emi nent Domain , Section 12.3143(2) (3d ed o 1950); Orgel , Valua-
tion Under the Law of Eminent Domain, Sections 33 , 34 (2d ed. 
1953) . 
1 
1 
il 
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that the presently illegal use will be made legal in the future.117 
Since zoning regulations fall within the malum prohibitum category , 
the value of the property for other uses than that to which it is present-
ly zoned may be shown if a likelihood of a change in t he existing 
zoning regulations is indicat ed. 118 This is especially true where the 
existing zoning regulations represent an attempt by the condemnor to 
acquire land cheaply by limiting its pot ential uses through fraudulent 
zoning. 11 9 
(3) Potential or Prospective· Use by the· Condemnor 
One of the most important elements which may be considered in 
.fixing the market value of the condemned property is t he potential or 
prospective use of such land by the condemnor, and the effect of that 
use upon the adjacent property. 120 Although the proposed improvement 
will only occupy a small portion of the condemned strip and the great-
est burden will be on other lands, still the a butting owner is entitled 
to damages on t he basis of general inconvenience and depreciative 
effect of the whole improvement on his property. In other words, in 
Iowa apparently no distinction has been made between structures on 
the condemned strip and those just outside in allocating damages for 
117. Nichols , Ibid., at Sections 12 .3143 (2), 12 ~'322 (3d ed.1950); 
See also, McMahon v. City of Dubuque , Iowa , 225 Fed 2d 154, 
certioraridenied, 358U. S. 833, 79rS. Ct. 53,3 L.Ed . 2d70. 
118. Hall v . C ity of West Des.· Moines, 245 Iowa 458 , 62 N. W. 2d 
734 (1954) . Also see cases cited ih Comment , Evidence of 
Prospective Change in Zoning Ordinance , 43 Iowa Law Review 
299 (1958),footnote 8 . 
119. See cases cited in Comment , 43 Iowa Law Review 299 (1958) 
in footnotes 10 and 11 therein. 
120 . Hostert v. Highway Commi ssion , __ Iowa_, 93 N.W. 2d 
. 773 (1958); Ranck v. Cedar Rapids , 134 Iowa 563, 111 N. W . 
1027 (1907); Nichols, Eminent Domain , Section 23 7, p. 724; 
Orgel, On Valuation Under Eminent Domain, Section .59, p. 
123; see also Lewis v. Omaha & C . B. Ry . Co., 138 N.W. 
1092, 158 Iowa 138; Randell v . Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 
1, 24 1 N.W. 685 . 
121 
potential or prospective use by the condemnor. 121 
In estimating the damages, the assumption should not be made that 
the use most disadvantageous to the owner will necessarily be adopted. 
The true rule seems to be that the jury should consider only such uses 
as are reasonably likely to have a perceptible effect upon the present 
market value. 122 
121. Haggard v. Independent School District, 113 Iowa 486, 85 N.W. 
777 (1901); Minn. etc. Tractor Co. v. Harkins, 108 Minn. 4 7 8, 
122 N. W. 45 0. But cf. Kucheman v. Chic. etc. R.y ._ .Co. , 46 
Iowa 3 66. 
122. See Henry v . Mason City Ry. Co. , 140 Iowa 201, 118 N.W. 311, 
(additional tracks laid in the street not contemplated in the origi-
nal assessment); Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Kline, 220!11. 334, 
77 N. E. 229 (1906) (it was held that the trial court erred in ad-
mitting testimony that a right-of-way on which the railroad 
company had proposed to lay two tracks might be later used for 
the construction of six tracks. The trial court had instructed the 
jury to estimate the damages for the most injurious use which might 
be reasonably possible and lawfully made of the right-of-way, con-
sistent with evidence. On this point the appellate court said , 
"this instruction was erroneous in calling upon the jury to assess 
prospective damages upon the presumption that the right-of-way 
would be put to the use most injurious to the owners of the farm, 
in not con.fining the jury to such damages as might reasonably be 
expected to incur in the intended use of the property. The jury 
was authorized to include all such remote and speculative damages 
as might result from the most injurious use to which the right-
of-way could be lawfully put , although there was nothing from 
which the jury could infer that anything was intended except 
the construction and operation of the double track railway". 
The possibility of future injuries should not be given any more 
consideration by the jury than the weight accredited to such 
evidence by a willing buyer or seller. Orgel ,- On Valuation Under 
Eminent Domain , Section 59; Maxwell v. Highway Commission , 
21Z3. N. W. 8B3 (evidence of the amount of travel contemplated is 
a necessary and proper element for consideration); Nichols, Ibid., 
Section 237 (2d ed.),Pierce v. Chic. etc. Ry . Co., 137 Wis. 550, 
119 N. W . 297 (court informed the jury that they should not con-
sider any remote or speculative or improbable users , but were to 
confine their consideration to the actual facts of the case);_R.iddle 
. ·" , , , , (99rrtin'1esf ~qn · fc;>-llqw-incg _: Pa~.~) ·. 
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v. Lodi Tel. Co., 175 Wis. 360, 185 N.W. 182; Missouri Power 
& Light Case, 32 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. App. 1930); McDougal v. 
Southern Pac. R. Co., 162 Cal. 1,3, 120 Pac. 766 (1912), "for 
such injuries the plaintiff may recover in one action not only the dall1'" 
ages occasioned up to the time the action was begun, but also all 
that she can show with reasonable certainty that she will suffer in 
the future. But all is necessarily given to her if she receives as 
damages the difference between the value of the entire parcel as 
it was just before the defendant took permanent possession and 
its value immediately after the works of the defendant were com-
pleted and put in operation, taking into consideration all the injurious 
consequences to the part of the land taken reasonably Probable from 
such work and operation"; Taft v. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 526, 
33 N.E. 1046 (1893) where Holmes, J. said at p. 549, "there was 
no evidence that such a building was to be expected and certainly a 
jury should not be told to increase the damages by considering what 
would be the most disagreeable use to which the land lawfully could 
be put by the'condemnor"; Nichols, Ibid., Section 154 (2d ed.), "as 
a practical matter, however, damages are given only for such use of 
the highway as is probable, and if a landowner is damaged by the 
unanticipated rails and wires of a modern street, he is much more 
compensated by the rise of land value due to the increase in 
population that such improvement indicates." 
123 
In Iowa there is one line of cases that allows damages for injury 
to the remaining land on the basis of the most disadvantageous use 
conceivable under the easement taken. In them all evidence of how 
the improvement w ill be constructed arid its present or immediate effect 
on adjacent property is excluded. 123 Stoner v. Highway Commission, 
227 Iowa 115 , 287 N.W" 269 (1939) is a modern Iowa case demonstrat-
ing a rather liberal approach in allowing evidence concerning the most 
disbdvantageous use to which the condemned property might be put. 
In that case plaintiffs showed evidence of loss of peace and quiet by 
the conviviality of various types of passers- by who were attracted by 
trees left in the right- of-way. 
(4) Damages for Trespass to Property 
Where a party having power and authority to proceed under 
eminent domain proceedings , appropriates land. without condemnation 
or grant from the owner and then subsequently institutes proceedings 
under the statute to perfect its title and assess damages , the measure 
of damages is the value of the land at the time of the seizure or ap-
1. 
123 . Klopp v. C . M. & St. Paul Ry. Co. , 119 N.W. 373 , 142 Iowa 
4 74 {1909) (a railroad company condemning land for a right-of- way 
cannot reduce the damages by showing a present intention not to 
use more than one track. The material point affecting the damages 
being the right of the company to maintain as many tracks as it 
saw fit); Accord , Purdy v . Waterloo C. F. & N. R. Co., 172 Iowa 
676, 154 N.W. 881; Lewis v. Omaha & G.B. & Q. Ry. Co. , 
15 8 Iowa 13 7 1 13 8 N. W. 1092. See Orgel , On Valuation Under 
Eminent Domain , p . 196 1 where the author stated in regard to the 
Klopp case that the court apparently conceived the. basis of com= 
pensation as the sale .price of the right to inflict the injury 
caused by the most damaged use permissible to the taker , and 
seemed to abandon depreciation in market value as the measure 
of damage to the remainder); see also, East St . Louis Ry. Co. 
v. Illinois Trust Co . 1 24 8 Ill. 55 9. 
I J 
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propriation with interest thereafter. 124 However, such a rule does 
not preclude a subsequent purchaser of the premises from instituting 
and recovering damages for a continuing trespass. 125 This latter 
rule concerning the right of subsequent purchasers is unfair inas-
much as it gives such purchasers in the usual case a gratuity 
since one who purchases a tract of land with a railroad or other 
structures in actual public use standing on it would naturally take 
the structures into consideration in fixing the price. 12 6 
124. Van Husen v. Omaha B. & T. Ry. Co., 118 Iowa 366,382, 92 
N. W. 4 7; Daniel Chic. Ry. Co., 41 Iowa 52. Upon the con-
demnation of land for railroad purposes damages should be 
allowed as of the time of entry by the company on the land plus 
statutory interest. The Iowa rule is misconstrued in Nichols, 
Ibid., Section 43 8 (2d ed.). 
125. Donald v. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co., 52 Iowa 411, 3 N.W. 462, 
"The defendant insists that the right of action accrued to Gregory, 
plaintiff's grantor, when the land was first taken, the trespass 
first committed and that as the right of action has not been as-
signed to the plaintiff, he cannot maintain the suit; but as the 
railroad company was a trespasser when the plaintiff acquired 
the land and continued to occupy it as such, the defendant is 
liable in this action for its trespass upon the plaintiff's pro-
perty after he becomes owner. Plaintiff may recover under the 
cases cited for the value of the land appropriated and other 
damages. These damages are for injuries sustained by plain-
tiff's grantor. It is not important to inquire what were the rights 
of plaintiff's grantor. They are not involved in this action." 
See also, McGinnis v. Wabash R. Co., 137 Iowa 376, 114 N.W. 
1039 (1908); Clark v. Railroad Co. 132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 309 
(interest allowed only from the time the grantor received title). 
The grantor may also bring suit for damages while he was owner. 
Clark v. Ry. Co., supra. 
126. Nichols, Ibid, Section 443 (2d ed.) is contra to Donald v. St. 
Louis Ry. Co. , 52 Iowa 411. See also Pomeroy v. Chic. etc. 
Ry. Co. , 25 Wis. 641. 
125 
In these cases of illegal taking the courts have held. that the con-
demnor should be exempted from the strict enforcement of the principle 
of the law applicable to private trespassers , and should not be ob-
ligated to pay the additional value which its own improvement confer-
red on the land. 12 7 This result is probably reached on a theory that 
public welfare and convenience should override common law penalties 
for private gain. 128 
' SECTION 16. DUTY OF LANDOWNER TO REDUCE DAMAGES 
At the outset it is important to realize that there are two distinct 
theories for allowing damages in condemnation cases: (1)": the con-
stitutional theory requiring that damages be paid for an actual taking 
and that benefit of the improvement to the landowner be ignored as pro-
vided in Article I1 Section 18 of the Iowa Constitution; and (2) the 
ordinary tort theory of damages which takes into account any benefit to 
the plaintiff and which includes , of course , a duty to mitigate damages. 
In the ordinary condemnation case the constitutional theory is, of 
127. Daniel v. Chic. etc . Ry. Co . c 41 Iowa 52; Chic. etc. Ry. Co. 
v . Des Moines· Union Ry . , 165 iowa 3 5, . 144 N. W. 54; Van Husen 
v. O.B. & T. R. Co., 118 Iowa 366 , 92 N.W. 47; Titus Loan and 
Investment Co. , v. Natural Gas Co ., . 223 Iowa 944, 274 N. W. 68 
. (;193 7). 
128. Nichols , Ibid ., Section 3 20 (2d ed. )(taking a critical view of 
this point); see Elliott , On Roads and Streets, Section 294; See 
alsoAtchinson&W. R. Co. ,v. Livingston , 238N. Y. 300, 14 
N. E. 589; 34 A.L.R. 1082; Lewis , Eminent Domain, Section 759; 
Orgel, Ibid. , Section 93; on failure of the company which. is 
already in possession and use of the pr emises for right-of-way 
to pay the amount assessed, it may be restrained by injunction 
from. further using the premises. Henry v. Dubuque and P.R. 
Co. , 10 Iowa 540; Richards v. D. M . Valley R. Co . , 18 Iowa 
259; .Irishv. BondS.W. R. Co. , 44 Iowa 380. 
126 
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course, applied and in such cases there is no duty to mitigate dam ..... 
ages. 129 However, in cases involving a change of grade, in which 
the courts have rejected the constitutional theory of damages and 
required that benefit to the landowner be considered in offsetting 
damages, 130 the landowner is required to mitigate damages. 13l 
The key factor in distinguishing the cases on the duty to mitigate 
damages seems to be whether or not benefit to the landowner is to be 
considered. 13 2 Thus, in summary, where the constitutional theory 
129. Schoonover v. Fleming, 23 9 Iowa 53 9, 3 2 N. W. 2d 99 (194 8); 
Wilson Vo Fleming, 239 Iowa 718, 31 N.W.2d 393 (1948)(plain~ 
tiff had no duty to move buildings to lower damage, and it would 
be error to admit such evidence); Kemmerer v. Highway Commission, 
214 Iowa 136, 241 N.W. 693 (1932) (holding that the landowner 
had no duty to contract with the Highway Commission to move his 
buildings to another location in order to reduce damages). 
130. See Division VII, infra, dealing with change of grade. 
131. Corcoran v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 405, 215 N.W. 948 
(1927) (plaintiff not allowed to recover the cost of building a new 
house to replace a house torn down as a result of a change of 
grade but was required to take reasonable steps to prevent damage 
to the old house). 
13 2. "Defendants appear to argue that the rule should be the same as 
in tort cases, but in condemnation cases there is a contitutional 
provision that benefits cannot be considered, which is not the case' 
as to damages in tort cases." Schoonover v. Fleming, 23 9 Iowa 53 9, 
3 2 N. W. 2d 99, 105 (194 8). This case gives strong support to 
Kemmerer v. Highway Commission, 214 Iowa 136, 241 N.W. 693 
(1932). It also dismisses as irrelevant certain dictum in Des Moines 
Wet Wash Laundry v, City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 
N. W. 4 86 (1924) which might have indicated support for the doc-
trine that a landowner had a duty to mitigate damages. The Des 
Moines case is also strictly limited by WUson v. Fleming, 23 9 
Iowa 718, 31 N.W. 2d 393 (1948). However, in the Wilson case 
counsel's brief failed to call the Corcoran case, supra, to the 
attention of the court. Consequently, it may still be open to dis-
pute this rule on the basis of the Corcoran case, although the 
latter case may readily be distinguished on the basis set out in 
the text above. 
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i s employed, benefit to the landowner is ignored; and hence, there is no 
duty to mitigate damages; however , where the tort theory is utilized, 
benefit must be considered 1 and the landowner must mitigate damages. 
SECTION 17. PERSONS ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION 
(Note: Among those generally entitled to compensation are lessees . 
Because of the breadth of the subject matter involved in C ompensation 
to Lessees, it is treated separately in Division IV of t his Work. ) 
a. Compensation to Lienholders 
In Iowa the rule is firmly established that the mort gagee is entitled 
to notice and compensation in eminent domain proceedings . 133 If he has 
not been joined in such proceedings 1 he may later , in case the mortgagor 
defaults on the mortgage , assert his right against the condemned land134 
133. See Section 6(dL supra. 
134. The weight of authority seems to be in accord with this proposi-
tion . 20 C . J. 856; Nichols , Section 122 (2d ed. ); Sever v. Cole, 
38 Iowa 463 (1873); Jackson v. Ry . Co. 1 64 Iowa 292, 20 N .W . 
44 2; Titus Loan & Investment C o. v. Natural Pipe Line Co. 1 2 7 4 
N.W. 68, 223 Iowa 944 (1937); Birk v . Jones County, 22 1 Iowa 
7941 266 N. W . 553 (193 6); Vein v. Harrison County, 209 Iowa 
5 80, 228 N. W . 19; Kellogg v. Illinois Central Ry . Co., 204 Iowa 
3.681 213 N . W . 253 1 215 N.W. 258; Rieck v . Omaha, 73 Neb . 
600, 103 N.W. 283; Northwestern Mutual Life Co . v. Nordhues , 
129 Neb . 3 79 1 261 N. W. 687 . If the error is discovered pr ior 
to the payment of the award to the mortgagor , the condemnor may 
secure permission to pay the award. into court . Calumet Ry. Co. 
v . Brown, 136 Ill. 322 1 26 N.E. 501. See also, Phil. etc . R. 
Co. v. Penn. etc. Ry . Co . , 151 Pa . 569, 25 Atl. 177 (1892). 
On the general topic see "Protection of Right of Mortgagee in 
Eminent Domain ," 110 A.L . R. 542. 
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or the award if it still remains in the hands of the sheriff.l35 
Prior to default on the mortgage, if the condemnor's possession 
involves excavation, fills, appropriations of gravel, soil and mat-
erials from the premises, or other acts that impair or damage the 
mortgagee's security, he may maintain an action for such if he has 
had no notice. 13 6 
In case of foreclosure when. only a part of the mortgaged property 
is taken, the condemnor is entitled to require the mortgagee to look 
to the remaining land as first and primarily liable for the debt. The 
decree of foreclosure should direct the sale of the remainder or that 
being insufficient ,to payyt!ttec-mortr\!lege"debt;t then the sale of the con-
demned portion either with the remainder or independent of it as shall 
be most advantageous. 13 7 Still a sale of the condemned land pursuant 
135. In both Shaefer v. Shaefer, 75 Iowa 349, 39 N.W. 697, and 
Sawyer v. Landers, 56 Iowa 422, 9 N.W. 341, the mortgagor 
was in default. Sawyer v. Lander, Ibid. , holds that the mort-
gagee who is not made a party to the proceedings for condemna-
tion of a right-of-way for a railroad over the mortgaged property 
may waive the omission and assert his claim to the award in the 
·hal'lds' of:t'he 'sli.eriff; and such claim, where it is shown that the 
property is insufficient to pay the mortgage debt and the mort-
gagor is insolvent, constitutes a lien thereon superior to that of 
a prior attachment levied by a creditor of the mortgagor. 
136. New York Ins. Co. v. Clay County, 221 Iowa 966, 267 N.W. 
79; Kulp v. Trustee of Iowa College, 217 Iowa 310, 251 N.W. 
703, 20 C. J, 1187; ordinarily a mortgagee not in possession 
has no such interest in the mortgaged property as entitles him to 
sue. Aggs v. Shackeford County, 85 Tex. 145, 19 S.W. 1085 
(1892); Rieck v, Omaha, 73 Neb. 600, 103 N.W. 283 (1905); 
Jackson v. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa 292,296, 20 N.W. 442 ("The 
original entry under the mortgagor's interest was lawful. After 
the execution of the sheriff's deed, the railroad was a mere 
trespasser"). 41 C.J. 652; Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. 
Rutledge, 165 So. 563, 122 Fla. 154 (good case on impairment 
of security); Bates v. Humboldt County, 277 N.W. 715, 224 
Iowa 841 (1938). 
137. Severv. Cole, 38Iowa463 (1873); Jacksonv. Ry. Co., 64 
Iowa 292,296, 20 N.W. 442; Titus Loan & Investment Co. v. 
Natural Pipeline Co., 223 Iowa 944, 274 N.W. 68 (1937); Orgel, 
Ibid., Section 113', Morgan v. William, 318 Mo. 151, 1 S.W. 2d 
151. 
1.29 
to such judgment does not pass title to the improvements erected by 
the condemnor, and the condemnor may remove them. 13 8 
In some jurisdictions the court has allowed the condemnor to avoid 
foreclosure by paying the amount of t he original award over again . l39 
' But the general rule appears to require h im to r edeem or condemn again. 
If he fails to do either, he will be liable t o ejectment. l40 Portionate 
redemption by the condemnor has been both affirmedl41 and denied.l4 2 
When the condemned portion has been sold independently of the re-
mainder as most advantageous to the intere'st of the mortgagee, then 
portionate redemption should b e allowed . On the other hand, when 
the remainder and the condemned parcel are lumped together and sold 
as one entire tract , recondemnation seems to be the only method of 
determining how much the mortgagee was injured by the appropriation 43 or taking. In Titus Loan & Investment Co. v . Natural Pipe Line Co . 1 
13 8. Titus Investment & Loan Co . v. Natural Pipe Line C o . , 223 Iowa 
944, 274N.W. 68(1937);Accord, St. LouisK. &s.w. Ry . Co . 
v.· Nyce, 61 Kan. 394, 59 Pac. 1040. There appears to be a con-
flict on this point. Orgel, Ibid, Section 113 1 p. 389; contra, 
Phil. etc. Ry. C o . v. Bowman, 23 App . Div. 170, 48 N. Y. S . 
901, 57 N.E . 1122. 
13 9. Orgel, Ibid., Section 113. 
140. Jacksonv. Ry. Co. 0 64 Iowa 292, 20 N.W . 442; Severv. Cole, 
38 Iowa 463 (~873) . 
141. See 42 C.J. 351; Dows v. Congdon, 16 How . Pr. 571 (N . Y.). 
142. New York Mut. Life . Ins . Co. v. Easton , etc. Ry. Co . , 38 N. J. 
Eq. 132; see Jackson v. Ry. Co . , 64 Iowa 292,296, 20 N.W. 442 
(where a railway company took a voluntary conveyance from the 
mortgagor, and it was intim<ated that the company 's right of re-
demption after foreclosure was the same as the mortgagor); First 
Trust Joint Stock Land Bank v. Ulch (Clay County No. 10464) (it 
was held that the condemnor must redeem the whole tract or in-
stitute condemnation proceedings) . 
143. 223 Iowa 944, 274 N.W. 68 (1937); als o see Douglas v. Bishop , 
27 Iowa 214. 
I 
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this contention was conceded by the condemnor. 
On revaluation it has been held in some states that the appraisal 
should be made as of the date of the original taking rather;,than the 
date of the foreclosure. 144 However, in these cases the foreclosure 
was checked by the court before the sale of the condemned parcel. 
Once the sale has been consummated, correct principle requires that 
damages should be assessed to the foreclosure purchaser as of the 
time of the issuance of the sheriff's deed. 145 Iowa goes further than 
most jurisdictions and holds that the holder of a certificate of tax sale 
is entitled to notice of proceedings to condemn the larid embraced in 
his certificate, and cannot be deprived of his interest without compen~ 
144. Orgel, Ibid., Section 113; Seaboard All-Florida Ry. Co. v. 
Leavett, loS Fla. 600, 141 So. 886 (1930); Kennedy v. Milwaukee 
& St. Paul Ry. Co., 22 Wis. 581. 
145. Rieck v. Omaha, 73 Neb. 600, 103 N.W. 283; Lehigh Coal Co.' 
v. Central R. Co., 25 N.J. Eq. 379; Aggs v. Shackelford County, 
85 Tex. 145, 19 S.W. 1085 (1892) (prior to default on the mort-
r ,- .. ·gage, thei:,JlH!)rtgaqfee drras:~nc\ elaJm'·ag'ai.hstl:tha'con'ciemrlCD~ WhO hais1 
t':: ·paido·tneow1Ue~);,<A.dcond,vJacJ,:son'v~ Ry. Goc. ,:.64,I6wtl 292,296, 
20'N(•V',!'i'c442 {wM}Entl\e;ofii~inaberiltry upo11' .the Pr,e!ni.sesiby t)Hh ... 
railway company was lawful, its occupancy of them after the 
execution of the sheriff's deed was without right. From that 
time it was a mere trespasser, and the rightful owner of the 
premises had the right to maintain is action for possession). In 
Titus Loan & Investment Co. v. Natural Pipe Line Co., 223 Iowa 
944, 274 N.W. 68 (1937) the damages to the holder of the sheriff's 
deed were not assessed as of the time of the taking. A purchaser 
at a foreclosure sale is not entitled to compensation for damages 
caused by the condemnation of the property previous to his pur-
chase. 20 C.J. 863. See also, Donald v. St. L. K.C. Ry. Co. 
52 Iowa 411, 3 N.W. 462 (a purchaser may maintain an action 
for damages occasioned by the trespass of the condemnor since 
his purchase. 
131 
sation. 146 
Yet, when the condemnor has failed to join the holder of the certi-
ficate of tax sale , it acquires the right to redeem the land from such 
sale, and when it has not been served notice of the expiration of the 
period of redemption, the tax deed does not operate to extinguish 
that right. 14 7 Whether the right of redemption extends to all the 
land embraced in the certificate or is confined to the land condemned 
or appropriated has not been judicially determined. 148 
b . . C~mpensation to Judgment and Tax Lienholders 
Although the rights and interests of a judgment holder in eminent 
domain proceedings have not been considered by the Supreme Court of 
Iowa, it is thought that the court will regard the lien created by a 
judgi'Jlent as merely pertaining to the remedy and hold that it may be 
cut off by condemnation without compensation. The general rule is 
that the holder of a judgment lien has no proprietary interest in the 
land which would entitle him to be made a party to the proceedings or 
to recover compensation from the condemnor: However, it has been 
customary in this state to serve notice on holders of large judgments 
146. Cochran v. Ind. School Dist., 50 Iowa 663, 665. Accord, 
Garmoe v. Sturgeon, 65 Iowa 14 7 , 21 N. W. 493; Vien v. 
Harrison County, 209 Iowa 580, 228 N.W. 19; contra, 
20 C.J. 855. 
14 7. Garmoe v. Sturgeon, 65 Iowa 147, 21 N. W. 493. 
14 8. Garmoe v. Sturgeon, supra. 
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as a precautionary and expeditious practice.l~ 9 
In condemnation proceedings the status of a tax lien has been held 
to be analogous to that of a judgment lien. 150 This is true when a 
governmental agency exercises the power of eminent domain . lSl 'ii'he 
leading decision on this point is Gasaway v. Seattle, 52 Wash. 444 , 
100 Pac. 991 (1909).152 In this case the 'city of Seattle condemned 
14 9. Authorities holding that judgment holders are not entitled. to com-
pensation under eminent domain: 20 C. J . . 855, Section 290; Elliott 
On Roads and Streets, Section 245, p. 4 04; Orgel, Ibid . '· Section 
114, p. 394; Watson v. N.Y. C ent. R·. Co., 47 N.Y. 157 (1872); 
Gembelv. State, 59 Ind. 446,452 (1877) . InSherwoodv. Lafayette 
109 Ind . 411, 10 N.E. 89 (1886) the court said, "There is a clearly 
defined distinction between a mortgage and a judgment lien; the 
one is a specific lien created by contract and protected as a con-
tractual obligation , while the other is a statutory lien, general 
in its character and subject to legislative control". School Dist. 
v. Werner , -43 Iowa 643, holds that a judgment lien on land con-
stitutes no property in the land itself, and the judgment debtor 
has a right, previous to levy, to cut timber and firewood, which, 
if not removed, are his personal property and do not pass by ex-
ecution sale . 
150 . 20 C.J . 855,;, Nichols , Ibid., Section 122 (2d ed.}. 
151. Ind. School Dist . v . Hewitt, 105 Iowa 663, 75 N . W . 497 (In 
this decision land was condemned for a school site. Prior to the 
acquisition a lien for tax~s had attached and the premise was 
sold for taxes to the defendant nearly two months prior to . said 
condemnation. Two years later the defendant procured a tax deed . 
He claims title under this deed . The court held that title could 
be quieted against the defendant's interest . 
152. Alexander v . Plattsmoutho 30 Neb . 117, 46 N.W . 213. This 
case is probably the only one presenting facts similar to the 
Washington decision. But in this Nebraska case it was un.: 
necessary to pass on the merits of the action. The suit was based 
on impairment of security, not foreclosure of a tax lien. The 
court dismissed the action on two grounds: first, the value of the 
part of the lot not taken by the city exceeded the amount of the 
tax lien; secondly , the suit was barrep by the statute of limita-
tions. 
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certain lands. At the time of instituting such proceedings, there had 
been levied by the county certain taxes which were then due , delin-
quent and unpaid. The county in the proceedings was not made a 
party, and so far as the record shows , it had no actual notice of the 
condemnation suit. Thereafter , the county brought an action to 
establish and foreclose its lien for taxes , and after the usual pro-
ceedings the treasurer of the county deeded the several tracts of 
land to the plaintiff's grantor. The plaintiff , on acquiring all in-
terests in the tax deed, sought to establish them as superior and 
paramount to the rights of the city in the condemned land. The Sup-
reme Court dismissed the plaintiff's action, holding that the t ax lien 
was cut off by eminent domain despite the fact that the Washington 
statute provided for notice to all persons having an interest in the land 
so far as known by the city officers or appearing from the records in 
the office of the county auditor. 
However, the taxes may be paid out of the award even though the 
holder of such lien was not made a party to the proceedings. 153 
When a private corporation, possessing the power of eminent 
domain, acquires the property, it has been held that the lien for taxes 
of the state is pro~erty and compensation must be paid for the taking 
of such interest. L 4 
c. Compensation to Purchasers 
Where the vendor had agreed to sell and the purchaser to buy under 
a binding contract , and title is to be transferred at a future date , the 
purchaser is a proper party to the condemnation proceedings even 
though title has not passed and entitled to the award subject to the 
153. Nichols, Ibid. , Section 122 (2d ed . ); In re Sleeper , 62 N.J.Eq. 
67 , 49 .Atl. 549; 20 C . J. 855; Carpenter v. New York, 44 App. 
Div. ,230 , 60 N.Y. Supp. 633 , 51 App. Div. 633, 64 N.Y. Supp, 
839; Phil. R. Co. v. Penn. S.V. R. Co., 25 Atl. 177, 151 Pa. 
569. 
154. State v . Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 75 Neb. 4, 105 N. W • . 983 . 
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lien of the vendor. 155 However , the holder of an option has been held 
not to have an interest in the land which will entitle him t o compensa-
tion. 156 
If one who is an owner at the time the proceedings t o condemn are 
commenced and when damages are asses s ed, subs equently parts with 
his title without reservations before the title to the condemnor becomes 
vested by actual payment of the damages , the right to damages passe s 
to the succeeding owner as an incident to the land , and the one who 
owns the land at the time when the title to the easement therein be-
comes vested is entitled to the assessed damages . 15 7 Where the 
vendee of the land under an executory contract i s in possession and 
having made the payments agreed upon is entitled to a deed although 
he has not yet received one, it is generally held that he is the owner 
in respect to eminent domain proceedings, 15 8 
d. Compen~_~!_!.on to Life _I~r!an!_?_ 9.D-.sl. ~~maindermen 15 9 
Where a life estate is vested in one and a fee in another , compen-
satiol"} must be made to both in proportion to the damages suffered to 
155 . Wolfe v. Iowa Ry. Co., 173 Iowa 277, 178 Iowa 1, 155 N·. W . 
324; 20 c .J. 860; Cotes v. Davenport, 9 Iowa 227;;, Millard v. 
N.W. Mfg. Co. , 200 Iowa 1063, 205 N. W. 979 . 
156. 20 C.J. 849; Taggart Paper Co. y. State, 187 App . Div. 843 , 
176 N.Y.S. 97; Wolfe v •. Iowa Ry. Co ., Ibid . , {discusses the 
distinction between an option and a contract to purchase). 
157. Griffeth v . Pocahontas County Drainage Dist. , 182 Iowa 1291 , 
166 N.W. 570,571 {1918}; Obst v . Covell , 93 Minn . 30, 100 N. 
w. 650 {1940}; Nichols, Ibid., Section 5. 21 {3d ed. 1950). 
158. Nichols, Ibid . , Section 5. 21{4}{3d ed . ){1950}; Cotes v. 
Davenport , 9 Iowa 227. 
159 . See Stoyles , Condemnation of Future Interests , 43 Iowa L. 
Rev. 241 {1958). 
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th~ r~sp~ctive parties, 160 In other words, the life tenant is compensated 
for his life estate, and the remainderman for his remainder. 161 
When the duration of the present estate is impossible of ascer-
tainment as in the cases of determinable or conditional fees, the 
courts usually disrepard completely the contingent interest of pos-
sibility of reverter, 62 
However, in cases of contingent remainder after a !He estate, the 
probl~m is not so easily solved. When such contingent remainders 
are contingent as to event, that is, when the persons who shall take 
q.re d~signat~d, but their possibility of taking is dependent on ex-
trinsic Jeatures or happenings"' ,they may be deemed such "owners" as 
' ,_. 
' '· 
160. Elliott, On Roq.ds & Streets, Section 302; 20 C.J. 854; Nichols, 
Ibid,, Section 5. 22(1)(3d ed. 1950). 
161, Iowa has two decisions involving life estates: Gates v. Colfax 
Northern Ry. Co,, 177 Iowa 690, 159 N. w. 456, and Westbrook 
v, M.N. & S. Ry. Co., 115 Iowa 106, 88 N.W. 202. 
162. Orgel, Ibid., Section 117; 30 C. J. 854; Lyford v. Laconia, 75 
N, H, 220, 72 Atl. 1085 (1909); Fifer v. Allen, 288 Ill. 507, 81 
N.E. 1105 (1907); Dutch Church v, Croswell, 210 App. Div. 294, 
206 N.Y.S. 132 (1924); Cincinnati v. Bobb, 4 Ohio Dec. 463 
{1893); Lancaster School Dist. v. Lancaster County, 295 Pa. 112, 
144 Atl. 901 (1929); Joint School Dist. v. Bosch, 219 Wis. 181, 
262 N.W. 618 {1935)("Where land was dedicated to a school 
district, which had exclusive right to use of the property for 
school purposes and which had no intention of abandoning pro-
perty, was condemned for highway purposes, damages were pay-
able to the school district for entire value of the land as improved, 
the vq.lue of the fee owner's contingent remainder being nominal"). 
InChicagoW.D. Ry. Co. v. MetropolitanRy. Co., 152 Ill. 519, 
38 N.E. 736,738, the land sought to. be condemned was under a 
lease of 999 years, and the court held that the lessor's interest 
was entitled to only nominal damages. The American Law Insti-
tute has suggested that a distinction be drawn between the cases 
where the termination of the present estate is improvable within 
a reasonably short period of time and those where such termina-
tion is likely. Restatement of the Law of Property, Tentative 
Draft No.2 (1930), Sections 61,73; see also Nichols, Ibid. 1 
Section 119 {2d ed.). 
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are entitled to compensation. 163 In certain cases 1 the likelihood of 
the fortuitous event occuring may be so remote that such interest 
may deserve no greater consideration than the mere possibility of 
reverter 1 in which case no notice or joinder as a party is required. 164 
When the interests are contingent as to person, as in the case of 
a gift over after a life estate to a person or a class not yet in being, 
such interests may be recognized by impounding the award as a sub-
stitute for the realty and subjecting it to like charqes and trust . 
There is one decision which sanctions the view here advocated . In 
Millerv. Ashwell, 122N.C. 759 1 16S.E. 763, awillwasinvolved 
which gave to Mrs. E. A. Smith a life estate and remainder to such 
children of hers or their children that survived her. The court render-
ed judgment awarding the life tenant the present value of her interest 
and required the residue to be invested by the clerk of the court to be 
distributed on the death of the life tenant. 165 
f. Compensation for Contracting Parties 
Where the condemnor appropriates property which is the subject of 
a contract between itself and the property owner, it has been hel~ 
that compensation is due to the contracting party for the value of the 
remainder of the contract. 166 This is also the case where the con-
163. Nichols, Ibid. 1 Section 5. 22(2} (3d ed. 1950); a contingent re-
' " '- ::.· '.maindernran·."ii:S ~ .E:mtitted --to·.--cmnp·ensafoori:iorvtth1el .vcrfu e.1ofttha :'~in­
:': 1~ .~· geht inter:e:st.\at·-the .. time ~6£·Jthe'. ifakifllg;,-w:ith iirtl.ereilst ~ - CharLes etc . 
Ry. Co. v. Reynolds , 69 S.C. 481 1 48 S.E. 476; but see Chesa-
peake etc. Ry. Co. v. Bradford, 6 W.Va. 220 (holding that it was 
an error to award compensation on the theory that they had a vest-
ed fee in remainder). 
164. Nichols, Ibid., Section 5. 221 (3d ed. 1950}. 
165. In this case the court said that the money becomes the equiva-
lent of the land and is subject to like trust and charges. 
166. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. B_rooklyn 1 166 U.S. 685 (1897). 
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demnor expropriates one party's rights under the contract and enforces 
the former owner's rights against the other party to the contract, 167 
However, where the performance of a contract between two independent 
parties is frustrated indirectly through the actions of the condemnor, 
no damages to the contracting party are allowed on the theory that the 
injury is too remote.168 
f. Compensation to Holders of Right of Redemption 
The rule recognized in this jurisdiction is that the right of redemp-
16 7. Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 
(1924). 
168. Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923) 
(property owner had a favorable contract entitling it to steel from 
a mill whose total production was seized by the United States); 
accord,, Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. United States, 290 U.S. 89 
(1933) (the federal government took land on which improvement 
assessments had been made and paid the assessments; however, 
such assessments were insufficient to retire the improvement 
bonds and an additional assessment was prevented because 
title to the land had passed to the federal government. Held, no 
taking); cf., Peck v; Chicago Railway Co., 270 Ill. 34, 110 
N.E. 414(1915)(no recovery for loss of rents where tenants 
moved out due to severe damages to property); Burt v. Merchants' 
Insurance Co., 115 Mass, 1 (1874) (compensation is not to be 
based on contracts affecting the land but upon the value of the 
land as a whole; query whether this case is valid in Iowa where 
a separate valuation of interests in land is allowed), 
l 
1 
1. 
I 
r 
\ 
ll 
' II 
1 J 
IJ 
-13 8 
tion is not property within the purview of Article I; Section 18 of 
the Iowa Constitution. In Wissmath v . Mississippi River Power Co . , 
162Iowa 846 , 162 N. W . 846 , it was held that when the appropr iation 
or taking occured during the period of redemption , the plaintiff could 
not recover damages for injury to such right when he failed to redeem. 
The court , however 1 by way of dictum stated that if he had exercised 
his right o he would be entitled to compensation for such wrong. 
g. Compensation to Easement Holders 
When a private easement of passage is taken by the public auth-
orities for a street or hlghway , the owner of such easement is entitled 
to no more than nominal damages .169 This same rule has generally 
169. Nichols , Ibid. 1 Secti6rt:l4l (2d ed.), "If howeverthe public use 
does not interfere with the enjoyment of the exi sting prior ease-
ment as is usually the case when a private way is taken for a 
public street, the owner of the r~ght-of-way is not entitled to more 
than nominal damages." Orgel , Ibid. , Section 109 , p. 370 , foot-
note 24 , II The courts are in acoord o o • that where land is taken for 
street purposes the easement owner sustains no damages and is 
entitled to no compensation. 11 Appeal of Sowers, 175 Minn. 168, 
220 N. W . 419 (in this case the plaintiffs had an easement of way 
one rod wide over the land of another. The easement was taken 
for a public highway and widened to four rods wide . It was held 
that the plaintiffs -had no cause for complaint. The court viewed 
the public appropriation as of no injury to the plaintiff's right 
saying, 11 In this case all the appellant had in thi s strip of land 
was the privilege of using it. The inclusion of this strip . in the ' 
public road did not take from them the right to use this strip of 
land . Their privilege now extends to four rods instead of one. 
The broadening of the easement to the public generally did not in 
law destroy or take away their privilege. They did not own the 
property 1 nor could they appropriate it for any use other than a 
right-of...,way. Now they will not have the burden of maintenant:e. 11 ) . 
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been applied to the owner of the fee. 170 However, it has been held 
that where a city is denied the use of a useful street to which it has 
an easement, 171 compensation is due. 
h. Compensation to Holder of Dower Rights 
The acc;:epted rule is that if property has been taken pursuant to 
condemnation proceedings, the inchoate dower right of the other spouse 
is thereby cut off without notice, and such other spouse is not entitled 
to compensation.l72 In Caldwell v. City of Ottumwa, 198 Iowa 666, 
200 N, W. 33 6, 33 7, the court held that even if the husQ,and forged his 
wife's name to the deed conveying the land to the city for park pur-
poses, the city could take the land without any allowance for the wife's 
dower right saying that the voluntary conveyance was the legal equiva-
lent of condemnation proceedings ,173 However, after the husband's or 
wife's death, the inchoate interest materializes, and .if the property 
170. Orgel, Ibid., Section 109, 18 C.J. 115;, U.S. v. Certain Parcels 
of Land, 54 F. Supp. 667 (D. Md. 1944); Cossey v. State, 43 
N.Y.S.2d 908 (1943). 
171. u.s. v. Wheeler Township, 66 F. 2d 977 (8th Cir. 1933); Town 
of Bedford v. U.S., 23 F. 2d 453 (1st Cir. 1927). 
172. Nichols, Ibid., Section 120 (2d ed.); Orgel, Ibid., Section 115; 
Lewis, Eminent Domain, Section 522. 
173. Iowa cases having some bearing on this general proposition: 
Jocimsen v. Johnson, 173 Iowa 553, 156 N.W. 21 (A dedication 
of a street or alley vests in the city a mere easement, and the 
wife of the grantor need not be joined); Chicato & S. R. Co. v. 
Swinney, 3 8 Iowa 182 (A husband can convey a right-of-way over 
the homestead without the concurrence and signature of the wife to 
the deed). Involves Iowa Code Section 561. 13 (1958), See also, 
Stokes v. Maxson, 113 Iowa 122, 84 N.W. 949; Maxwell v. Me 
Call, 145 Iowa 687; 124 N.W. 760; Bower v. Walker, 182 Iowa 
804, 166 N.W. 269; Ottumwa C. F. & St. P. Ry. Co. v, McWil-
liam, 71 I ow a 164, 3 2 N. W. 315 • 
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is taken , although no definite assignment i s made to the surviving 
spouse , she or he has such a proprietary interest in the condemned 
land as to entitle her or him. to compensation and notice of .the pro~ 
ceedings . 174 
J, Compensation for State Property 
The property of a state is protected by the Constitution and the 
federal government cannot take such property for the uses for which 
Congress may authorize the power of eminent domain without compen= 
sation to the state. 175 This limitation also applies to all private 
or municipal corporations and extends to easements as well as property 
held in fee by the state . 17 6 
k. Compensation for Separate Interests . 
In determining compensation for separate interests the nearly uni-
.versal rule is to ascertain the entire compensation as though the 
prop.erty belonged to one person1 and then apportion this sum among 
174. 
175. 
176 . 
Nichols, Ibid.; Section 120 (2d ed . ) . 
Nichols , Ibid. 6 Seotion 130 (2d ed.). 
State ex rel. Board of Railroad Comm •rs v. Stanolind Pipe Line 
Co. , 216Iowa436 1 249N.W. 366 (propertyofastatesuchas 
a highway , q.lthough defined as public rather than private , and 
although only an easement, is within the protection of the con~ 
stitutional clause forbidding the taking of private property for 
public use w ithout just compensation). Nichols , Ibid. , Section 
130 (2d ed.); "Public highways are the property of a state for 
public uses of its people , and a state may therefore collect 
compensation from a corporation using them under authority of 
Congress for the telegraph poles of an interstate line". 
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the different parties according to their respective rights.177 The Iowa 
court so far has neither approved or discountenanced such method of 
measurement.,. but from the result reached in Simmon v. Mason City Ry. 
Co., 128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 129,. a different rule applies in those 
- ' cases involving a landlord and tenant relationship, namely to first ap-
praise the value of the separate interests if possible178 , and then by 
combining them, arrive•O?t,the value of the whole,l79 The chief objec-
tion to this latter mode of allocating damages is that it leads to the 
plying on of false valuations by multiplying interests through contracts 
so that the final payment is in excess of what the property is actually 
worth. 180 
177. Orgel, Ibid., Section 107; Nichols, Ibid., p. 707; State v. 
Anderson, 176 Minn. 525, 223 N.W. 924; Fiorinie v. City of 
Kenosha, 208 Wis. 496, 243 N.W. 761,762 {1932) (the total 
amount of recovery in the case of condemnation is the difference 
between the value of the land affected considering it as a whole 
before and after the taking. This measure must cover both the 
ownel's interest and the lessee's interest). 
178. Ruppert v, Chic. etc. Ry. Co., 43 Iowa 490 (damages ought to 
be awarded separately if an owner's interest can be ascertained). 
179. 20 C,J. 998. 
180. Orgel, Ibid., Section 116, 118 (2d ed.). 
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COMPENSATION TO LESSEES 
SECTION 18_.  GENERAL RULE AS TO LESSEES 
It seems clear that the lessee is orsiinarily recognized by the courts 
as an "owner" whose interest is guarded by the constitutional prohibi-
tions against taking property without just compensation.! The basic 
problems seem. to arise in determining the method of evaluating the . 
damages to a lessee. It is apparent from the cases that the lessee's 
damages are not to be confined to the amount of his rental obligation 
. on the property condemned . 2 The ordinary rule where the entire pro-
perty is taken. is that the damage to the lessee is equal to the rental 
value of the property less the rent reserved . 3 Where only a part of the 
.leased property . is condemned, the rule is· that damages are equivalent 
to " . .• the net value of the annual use of the premises before the de-
fendant appropriated the right-of-way and took the land and what it was 
worth afterwards" . 4 
The principal difficulty in employing the market value conceptions 
as the key factor in determining the amoupt of compensation to be 
1. · Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v . Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082 , 
198 N.W. 486 (19 24); Cheisa & Co . v . Des Moines, 158 Iowa 
347, 138 N . W. 922' {1912); Werthman v. Mason City & Ft . Dodge 
Ry. Co., 128 Iowa 135, 103 N.W. 135 (1905); Storm Lake v. Iowa 
Falls & S.C. R. Co . , 62 Iowa 218, 17 N .W. 489 ·{1883); Renwick 
v. Davenport & N.W. R. Co., 49 Iowa 664 (1879); Batcheller v. 
Highway Commission, __ Iowa __ , __ N . W . 2d __ (Opinion 
February 9, 1960) . 
2 . Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N .W . 2d 85,94 (1948); Des Moines 
Wet Wash Laundry v ~ Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N. W . 486 
· (1 ~24); Werthman v. Mason City & Ft . Dodge Ry . Co ., 128 Iowa 
135, · 103 N . W. 135 (1905) . 
3. Korf v. -Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W. 2d 85,94 (194~); Des 
Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 1088 , 
198 N.W . 486 (1924) • 
4 . Werthman v. Mason City & Ft. Dodge R. Co., 128 Iowa 135, 13 8, 
103 N . W. 135 , 136 (1905); Korf v. Fleming , 239 Iowa 501, 32 
N . W. 2d 85, 94. (1948); Wilson v. Fleming , 239 Iowa .718, 31 
N . W . 2d 393,402 (1948); Batcheller v. Highway Commission , 
Iowa __ , __ N. W . 2d _ (Opinion February 9, 1960) . --
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awarded to the lessee is that market value of leaseholds is frequently 
difficult to determine. The Iowa court, at least, has been inclined to 
maximize the difficulties inherent in evaluating a leasehold. In Des 
Moines Wet Wash Laundry v, Des Moines5 the court allowed the intro~' 
duction of evidence as to the cost of removal of machinery located on 
the premises as an indication of market value and stated that the 
strict rules as to market value should be departed from in evaluating 
leaseholds. In Korf v. Fleming, 6 the court went so far as to allow 
the introduction of evidence concerning profits to aid in the determina-
tion of the value of the lease. 
Another basic element of the Iowa position on compensating les-
sees is the procedure followed in awarding damages. Most juris-
dictions allow the condemnor to proceed against the fee holder and 
then provide for a right of action against the fee holder by the lessee 
to recover the latter's share of the total damage to the estate condemn-
ed. However, the Iowa court has upheld trial court instructions allow-
ing separate valuation by the jury where the case is tried on the theory 
5. 197 Iowa 1082,1088, 198 N.W. 486 (1924). This case is examined 
in detail in relation to the position which it seems to have taken 
on removal costs in•Sectib'm 22(bL: in:fra. It is submitted that the 
determination of market value is by no means as difficult as the 
court has thought; certainly a carefully planned case for the con-
demnor composed of expert opinion based on the conventional 
factors in determining the market value of the fee would go a long 
way toward minimizing the court's tendency to admit evidence of 
factors which are excluded in determining damages to a fee. 
6. 289 Iowa 501, 32 N.W. 2d 85,94 (1948). See also, Highway 
Commission v. Wilson, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N. W. 2d 161, 169 
(1958). 
I } . 
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of separate evaluation of the interests involved . 7 In both of the cases 
upholding the separate award instructions, the court pointed to the fact 
that the whole trial had .been conducted on the basis of separate awards 
and consequently the instruction was in accord wit h the manner in which 
the case had been tried. As a result, it would still seem possible to 
try the cases jointly if the proper procedure were followed from the out-
set of the trial. The Iowa joinder rules appear to be inapplicable as 
they apply only to multiple defendants. However, the interpleader 
rules, as set forth in Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 35 and Iowa Rules 
of C ivil Procedure 3 6 would seem to furnish a method for accomplish-
ing a single condemnation of the separate interests. In an inter-
pleader action the liability of the condemnor for the entire legal interest 
in the land would be determined in the first stage of the proceedings . 
The condemnor would then be dismissed from the action, and in the 
second state. the holders of interests would contest the division of the 
total award • . It would seem that this procedure would have several ad-
vantages for the condemnor . In the first stage of the proceedings the 
only issue would be the value of the land when viewed as a fee simple 
estate; and therefore , the issues would be exactly the same as in any 
other type of condemnation action. Under separate condemnation, how-
ever, each party is free to exaggerate the value of his interest without 
causing any resulting dimunition:.in the value of the other interests; a s 
a consequence the sum of the separate awards is likely to be in excess 
of the award for a fee simple estate . Secondly , when interpleader is 
used, the condemnor will not be involved in the highiy complicated 
issues as to the value of the separate estates . These issues, as the 
remainder of this chapter indicates , are very difficult, and it is not at 
all clear that they would be resolved favorably to the condemnor. How-
ever, in separate condemnation, the condemnor must oppose every 
theory which would increase the value of an estate. For example, he 
would be forced to enter t he complex question of what fixtures are com-
pensable as far as t he lessee is concerned. In interpleader , such 
7 . Korf v. Fleming , 239 Iowa 501 , 3 2 N. W . 2d 85, 93,99 (1948}; Wil-
son v . Fleming , 239 Iowa ·718 , 31 N. W. 2d 393 (1948}. See also, 
Simons v . Mason City & Ft . Dodge R. Co ., 128- 139, 103 N.W. 
1~9 (1905}. Batcheller v. Highway Commission , __ Iowa __ , 
N . W . 2d (Opinion February 9 , 1960). 
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issues would be raised in the second stage when the lessor and.lessee 
are ~isputing the proportionate share of the total award which each 
should receive. Consequent ly, these parties, not the condemnor, 
will have. the responsibility of developing the Iowa law in the area. 
All in all, ·it would seem that the sanction by the Supreme Court of 
th~ interpleader procedure for dealing with separate interests in 
. land would be highly desirable, at least from .the condemnor's 
point .of view. 
SECTION 19. TYPES OF LESSEES ENTITLED TO COMPENSATIONS 
a . . Long Term Interests 
The rule seems to be well esta,blished that the lessee from ,year to 
. year , or for years, is entitled to compensation for ·the value of his 
particular leasehold interest. 9 · Where a lease of the type above men-
tioned also contains an option for renewal, the lessee is entitled to 
the market value of a lease containing such an option. 10 However, 
where the tenant has a mere expectancy that the lease will .be renew-
ed based on past conduct of lessee and lessor , the lessee is entitled 
to no additional compensation over the value of· the existing .lease . 11 
With regard to a . tenant who has a . leasehold for which compensation 
. must be paid, it seems to be possible for the condemnor to wait out 
the lease and avoid compensating the lessees even though the con-
demnation procee~ings are begun before the .expiration of the lease. 12 
8. On this general topic see Note ; Condemnation and the Lease, 43 
Iowa L. Rev. 279 (1958). 
9. Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. Des Moines, 197 ·Iowa 1082, 
198 N.W. 486 · (1924); Cheisa & Co . v. Des Moines , 158 Iowa 
347, 138 N.W. 922~ (1912); Simmons v . M. C. & Ft. Dodge Ry . 
Co . , 128 Iowa 13 9, 103 N. W. 129, (1905); Renwick & Shaw v. 
Pavenport Ry . Co. , 49 Iowa 664; (1879) aff'd 102 U.S. 180: (1.880). 
10. Nichols , Ibid., Section 5. 23 (4)(3d ed. 195 0); see also Batcheller 
v. Highway Commission, Iowa __ , __ N. W . 2d __ (Opin-
ion February 9 , 1960) . 
11. Nichols , Ibid., Section 5.23(4)(3d.ed. 1950) . 
12. Gafney Press v. State, 206 Misc. 1079, 135 N.Y.S. 2d 512 
· (1954); Los Angeles C ounty Flood Control Di·strict v ~ Andrews , 
_52 Cal. App. 788, 205 Pac. l085 ·(1922); City of Cincinnati v. 
Schmidt, 14 Ohio App. 427 · (1921); Schreiber v . Chicago & E ~ R. 
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b . Short Term Interests 
However, a tenant by sufference , or from month to month, has no 
interest in the land entitling him to compensation; the same is true of 
a tenant at will . l3 This result is based on the theory that such a 
tenant has no right of action against the landlord for the disturbance 
of his possession of the premises. 14 Even if damages were allowed, 
they would inevitably be extremely small in view of the fact that the 
condemnor would have to pay only for the value of the unexpired term 
which w ould , of course , be extremely short and in view of the fact 
that he could undoubtedly wait out this . short period and avoid damages 
altogether. 15 An expired lease, of cour se , is not a compensable in-
terest even though t he parties continue the relationship without lease 
because there i s no property right present . 16 The existance of a con-
tract for a lease is also not regarded by the courts as sufficient to 
establish a compensable interest in the land . 17 
13 . U.S. v. Certain Lands , 39 F. Supp . 91 {E.D.N . Y. 1941); U . S . v . 
Inlot , 26 Fed . 482 {1873); Petry v. Denver, 123 C olo. 509 ,514 , 
233 P. 2d 867,869 (1 951) (d ictum); Emerson v. Somerville, 166 
Mass . 115 , 44 N. E. 110 {1896); Tate v. Highway Commission, 
226 Mo . App . 1216, 49 S . W . 2d 282 (1932); Shaaber v. Reading , 
150 Pa . 402 , 24 Atl. 692 (1892); Canadian Pac . Ry. Co . v . Brown 
Milling & Elevator Co ., 18 Ont. L. Rep . 85 , 15 Am . Cas . 709 
(1909); but see, in re Gratiot Avenue, 294 Mich. 569 , 293 N. W . 
755 (1940) . For a case involving admission of parol to prove that 
a month- to- month lease was actually intended to be for a term of 
years because of special circumstances, see People v. Ganohl 
Lumber Co . , 10 Cal. 2d 501 , 75 P. 2d 1067 {1938) . 
14 . Nichbls, Ibid ., Section 5. 23(3){3d ed. 1950). 
15 . See cases cited in footnote 12 , supra , since those cases refer to 
waiting out a term of years, which is clearly compensable , it would 
seem that the rule would extend a fortiori to a tenancy from month 
to month. As to the negligible amount of damages, see In re 
Gratiot Avenue , 194 Mich . 569 , 193 N.W. 766 (1940), which im-
plies t hat apart from removal cost s t here would be no damage at all . 
16 . U . S. v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F. 2d 172 (9th Cir . 1950) 
(strong case) . 
17 . Nichols , Ibid., Section5 . 23{7) (3ded. 1950); McGrathv. Boston , 
103 Mass . 369 {1869); Strickland v . Penn . R. Co. , 154 Pa . 348, 
26 Atl . 431 (1893) . 
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c. Cancellation Clauses 
Many times leases contain clauses permitting one or both parties 
to cancel the lease upon specified conditions. When such a cancel-
lation actually occurs, it has been held that the lessee is entitled to no 
damages. 18 However, what happens when neither party elects to cancel? 
It is clear that the condemnor cannot compel either party to exercise 
his power to terminate, 19 and from this authority it is probably safe to 
infer that the power to cancel does not run from the lessor to the con-
demnor. 20 However, the value of a lease subject to a cancellation 
clause is not, of course, as great as one without such a clause. Con-
sequently, it would seem that the estimates of the value of such a 
lease should be limited to market value of leases subject to similar 
cancellation clauses. At least one case has so indicated, 21 and it would 
seem that this authority presents the condemnor with a valuable oppor-
tunity for reducing the award where such a cancellation clause is present. 
18. Newman v. Commonwealth, 336 Mass. 444, 146 N.E.2d 485 
{195 7); cf. City of Ladue v. St. Louis Public Service Co. , 168 
S.W. 2d 966 (Mo. 1943). 
19. Syracuse Grade crossing comm. v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 
197 Misc. 192, 97 N.Y.S. 2d 279 (1940); Batcheller v. Highway 
Commission, Iowa __ , __ N. W. 2d (Opinion February 
9, 1960). 
20. See Queensboro Farm Products v. State, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 989 (1956) 
aff'd 5 App. Div.2d 967, 171 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1958). In this case 
the state's contention that damages should be awarded for only a 
3 0 day lease, which was the length of the notice required for 
cancellation, was rejected; in a sense, the condemnor's argu-
ment amounted to a contention that the cancellation clause was 
exercised as of the date of condemnation. See also Batcheller 
v. Highway Commission, supra. 
21. Syracuse Grade crossing Comm. v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 
197 Misc. 192, 97 N.Y.S.2d 279,291 (1940)(dictum); but see, 
Qlueensboro Farm Products v. State, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 989. (1956) 
aff'd 5 App. Div.2d 967, 171 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1958). It is be-
lieved that the latter case can be distinguished from the former 
since the language of the court in the Queensboro case indicates 
that the contention of the condemnor was that compensation 
should be limited to the value of a leasehold equivalent to the 
notice period of the cancellation clause. The language of the 
Syracuse Grade Crossing case, however, suggests that the 
· standard of value should be the market value of a lease subject 
to a cancellation clause. 
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where the tenant has made the improvements, but they are of such a type 
that will revert to the lessor at the termination of the lease.. It seems 
clear that the lessee may not recover the value of improvements which 
will revert to the lessor. 25 · However, he may recover for any increase 
in the market value of the lease which results from the improvement; 26 
this added value may or may not be equivalent to .the actual cost of the 
fixture. It would seem that the same rule should be applied in the first 
two situations where the fixtures belong to the lessor originally. 
b. Where Fixtures Remain Property of Lessee 
(1) By Operation of Law 
This section deals with types of improvements which, when made 
by the le$see to the realty belonging to the lessor, will remain the 
property of the lessee. Generally, such improvements are known as 
trade fixtures. 
Basically, there are three more or less distinct views as to such 
property. The position most favorable to the condemnor is that trade 
fixtures, !4eing personal property b2 fperation of law, are not a com-
pens able !tern of damage as such. The lessee is entitled to compen-
sation for the value added to the leasehold by the improvements for the 
25. In re City of New York, 250 )'>.pp. Div. 197, 293 N.Y.S. 850 (1937). 
26. Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Bohne, 415 IlL 253, 
113 N.E. 2d 319 (1953); Marfil Properties v. St<tte, 9 Miflc, 2d 878, 
168 N.Y. S. 2d 234 (195 7); accord, Allen v. City of Boston, 13 7 
Mass. 319 (1884). 
27. Potomac Electric Power Co. v. U.S., 85 F. 2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 
,1936) (heavy electrical generating equipment held personalty); 
Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 26 S.E. 489 (1896); Schreiber v. 
Chicago & E. R. Co., 115 IlL 340, 3 N.E. 427,430 (1885); Bales 
v. Wichita, Midland Valley R. Co., 92 Kan, 771, 141 Pac. 1009 
{1914); Mayor of Baltimore v. Gamse & Bro., 132 Md. 290, 104 
Atl. 4 29, 431 (1 918); Springfield Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Schweit-
zer, 173 Mo. App. 650, 158 S.W. 1058 (1.913); accord, Futrovsky 
v. U.S., 66 F. 2d 215 (D.C.Cir. 1933)(dictum at 216 framed par-
tially in terms of the N.Y. rule); cf. Gershon Bros. Co. v. U.S., 
284 Fed. 849 (5th Cir. 1922). -
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unexpired portion of his term. 28 The theory behind this view is that 
the -lessee would have to remove the property at the end of the term 
or abandon it to the landlord; consequently, the condemnor should 
not be compelled to take the property and pay ·therefor. 29._ However , 
the lessee , when making the improvements, contemplatE?d that they 
would be of value to him for the total period of his lease; therefore, 
this line of cases allows him to recover for the market value of his 
lease, as improved , for the balance of t he l easehold period . Clearly 
this is all the lessee expected when he entered into t he leas e and 
improved the property. 
For additional cases in this area, see Section 22 , dealing with 
the denial of removal costs where trade fixtures are involved. As 
explained in that section , the. theory behind t he allowance of removal 
costs i s predicated on a finding as to whether the property in question 
_has been "taken" by the condemnor; hence , the cases often are almost 
exactly in point . 
The second view is only a variant on the basic principle of the first 
rule, and is the pr esent position of the NeW York courts. rn this regard , 
it is important to note-that the New York position has undergone consid-
erable change as a result of the decision in the case of In re Whitlock 
28. Pause v. Atlanta , 98 Ga . 92 , 26 S . E. 489 (1896); . Bales v. 
Wichita , Midland Valley R. Co ., 92 Kan • . 771, 141 Pac. 1009 
(1914); Mayor of Baltimore v. Gamse & Bro. , 132 Md . 290 , 104 
Atl. 429,431 (1918}; Consolidated_IceCo. v ; PennR. Co. , 224 
Pa . 487, 7-3 Atl. 937 (1909} . 
29. Mayor of Baltimore v . Gamse & Bro., 132 Md. 290, 104 Atl. 
429 , 431 (1918); accord , In re Harlem River Drive , 113 N. Y. S . 2d 
292 , 295 (1952) (this case represents the second, or N. Y. rule , 
but contains an excellent statement of the reasoning applicable 
to both first and second rules). 
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Avenue, 278 N.Y. 276, 16 N.E. 2d 281 (1938); prior cases which do 
not fit into the new position should be viewed with suspicion. 30 In 
addition:, several other jurisdictions, among them Iowa, have relied 
30. The early lower court cases in New York took the view that the 
condemnor appropriated the entire premises, including trade fix-
tures and therefore must pay for all the property taken. See In 
re Wilcox, 65 App. Div, 197, 151 N.Y.S. 141 (1914); In re 
Block Bounded by Avenue A, 66 Misc. 488, 122 N.Y.S. 321 (1910); 
In reAppointment of Park Commissioners, 17 N.Y.S.R. 371, 1 
N.Y.S. 763 (1888). However, the Court of Appeals remained 
silent for some time on the matter. In In re Waterfront on North 
River, 192 N.Y. 295, 84 N.E. 1105 (1908), that court allowed 
damages to a lessee for trade fixtures in an action by the lessee 
against the lessor. However, at 1107 of 84 N.E., the court noted 
that the award, which included damages for trade fixtures, might 
have been too high. In Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 
758 (1914), a much-cited opinion for the proposition that title to 
trade fixtures passes to the condemnor, the court held that title 
to machinery, shafting, elevators and conveyors belonging to the 
lessee passed to the condemnor and the lessee was, therefore, en-
titled to compensation. This case was regarded by some courts as 
establishing the proposition that the condemnor took all trade fix-
tures; the Iowa court seems to have based its position on fixtures 
on the Jackson case as well; see Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 
718, 31 N.W.2d 393,398 (1948). That this was not the case was 
indicated by the Court of Appeals in the case of In re Allen Street 
and First Avenue, 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377,380 (1931). There 
the court dealt with the related question of a situation in which 
the property in question would have been realty but for an agree-
ment between the landlord and tenant. While denying the con-
demnor the benefit of this agreement, the court declared that a 
different rule might apply where property remained personalty with-
out any agreement between the parties, Although there was some 
subsequent recognition of this exception in lower :court cases 
(see In re City of New York, 250 App. Div. 197, 293 N.Y.S. 850 
(1937)); In re Triborough Bridge, 249 App. Div. 579, 293 N.Y.S. 
223 (1937), aff'd without opinion, 274 N.Y. 581, 10 N.E. 2d 561 
(1937), the distinction was first recognized by the Court of Ap-
peals in InreWhitlock Avenue, 278 N.Y. 276, 16 N.E.2d 281 
(193 8) and seems to have been followed unswervingly in subsequent 
cases. See Queensboro Farm Products v. State, 161 N.Y. S. 2d 
989 (1956); aff'd 5 App. Div. 2d 967, 171 N.Y.S. 2d (1958); In re 
Horace Harding Expressway, 151 N.Y.S.2d ~4BU,956) modified 
4 App. Div. 2d 683, 164 N.Y.S. 2d (1957); In re Harlem River 
Drive, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 292 (1952); In reCross-Bronx Expressway, 
195 Misc. 842, 82 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1948). 
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to a considerable degree in establishing their own rules on ·f ixtures upon 
the New York doctrine before it became fully developed by the Whitlock 
Avenue case , suPra . Consequently , t hese cases should be viewed with 
considerable skepticism; it w.ill be noted that most of these cases fall 
under the third rule which will be discussed subsequently . 
The basic difference between the first vi ew and that of the New 
York courts lies in the type of property which is treat ed as within the 
category of trade fixtures . The New York courts t ake the posit ion that 
the law as to what property passes to t he condemnor is governed not by 
the law on trade fixtures as between landlord and tenant as in the first 
rule , but by the law on fixtures as between vendor and vendee . 31 New 
York contends w ith considerable accuracy that a condemnation proceed-
ing is most closely analagous to a sale, andtherefore the rule as to 
what property passes to the condemnor should be governed by the law as 
to vVendor- p\lrchaser in a situation of volunt ary sale . 3 2 The error in this 
reasoning seems to lie in the fact that it ignores the presence of the 
leasehold . This rule only provides an answer to the quest ion what must 
a purchaser take as between the vendor and vendee . It does not answer 
the question what does the purchaser take:t. when he purchases land, sub-
ject to a lease . According to 36 C.J.S. , Fixtures· l8 and42(b), a l~ssee 
31. In re Whitlock Avenue, 278 N. Y . . 276, 16 N. E. 2d 281 (193 8); Jack-
son v. State, 213 N. Y. 34 , 106 N. E. 758. (1914); Queensboro Farm 
Products v. State , 161 N. Y. S.2d 989 (1956) aff'd 5 App. Div.2d 
967 , 171 N. Y.S. 2d (1958); Syracuse Grade Crossing Comm . v. 
DelawareL. &W. R. Co. , 197 Misc. 192 , 97N.Y. S.2d279 (194·0); 
In reAppointment of Park Commissioners, 17 N.Y.S . R. 3·71 , 1 N. 
Y.S . 763 (1888); accord , U.S . v . Lot 27, 157 F. Supp •. 179 (S.D. N. 
Y. 1958)(following the N.Y. rule); In re Post Office Site, (U . S. v. 
Weiner), 210 Fed. 83 2 (2d Cir.) (1914) (citing the New York posi-
tion; this case is now somewhat in doubt in view of subsequent 
federal decisions); St . Louis v. St . Louis I. M . & S. Ry . Co . , 266 
Mo . 694 , 1·82 f!/. W . 750 (1916) . 
3 2 . In re Post Office Site (U . S . v . Weiner), 210 Fed. 83 2, 834 (2d Cir. 
1914) (containing an excellent statement of the reasoning on which 
the New York rule i s based) . 
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may assert a right to remove trade fixtures as against the transferee of 
the reversion, when such.transferee takes with notice that the fixture 
was annexed by the tenant . Since ,on condemnation proceedings the 
condemnor would almost always have notice of the existence of such 
improvements and would surely take pains to learn of their existence, 
it would seem that in the absence of a contractual assumption of 
ownership by the condemnor the lessee ~auld still have title. How-
ever, this argument does not seem to have been considered by. the 
New York courts. 
In any event, the New York rule still affords t he condemnor . several 
advantages over the third rule , and its adoption in Iowa would by no 
means represent a catastrophe to the condemnor. Even applying the ven-
qor- vendee rule, there are many types of trade fixtures for which no 
compensation is allowed. The New York courts take the position that 
property such as shelving , office furniture, etc . which may be easily 
removed does not pass and if compensation is allowed at all, it is only 
:~:::~33al~a;~i~!~h:0~~~~;t~0:~d~0~o Pt::s u;~~~:dr~:l~y o~ntl~:s (l) 
it is installed. in such a manner that its removal will result in material 
injury to it or to the realty; or (2) where the building in which. it is 
placed was specially designed to house it; or (3) where there is evi-
dence that its installation was of a permanent nature . 34 Mere affixa-
tion of the machinery to the floor for purposes of stability is not suf-
ficient to render the property immovable and therefore compensable. 3 5 
33. In re~Whitlock Avenue , 278 N. Y. 276 , 16 N.E. 2d 281 (1938); In 
. re City of New York, 250 App. Div. 197, 293 N.Y.S . 850 (1937); 
cf. Brazos River Conservation and Reclamation Dist . v . Adkis-
son, 173 S.W . 2d 294 (Tex . Civ. App . 1943) (this case seems to 
take the position that the property , although a .trade fixture , pass-
ed to the condemnor; however, it allowed the lessee only the 
value of the property as it increased the value of the lease for 
the unexpired term). 
34. In re Whitlock Avenue , 278 N.Y. 276 , 16 N. E. 2 281 (1938}; 
In re Horace Harding Expressway , 151 N. Y.S . 2d 946 (194·6) 
modified 4 App. Div. 2d 683 , 167 N.Y.S. 2d 389 (1957) . 
35. In re Whitlock Avenue , 278 N.Y . 276 , 16 N.E. 2d 281 (1938). 
l 
l 
{ 
l 
1 
j 
154 
There are thus two types of fixtures under New York law: (1) mov-
able, and (2) immovable. When the property is classified as movable, 
title does not pass to the condemnor, and he pays only market value 
of the improved leasehold for the remaining term. 36 When the property 
is held to be immovable, then damages for the property itself must .be 
paid, and the question becomes one of deciding to whom they will be 
paid. If they will pass to the lessor at the end of the term under the 
law of fixtures as between landlord and tenant, the lessor is entitled 
to the damages; if not, the lessee recovers their value. 37 An interest-
ing caveat exists in New York to the effect that if the condemnation is 
qualified so that it covers only certain property, damages for other 
non-specified items such as fixtures may be avoided.38 The third 
rule holds that the condemnor takes the entire property, and, with the 
exception of obvious items of personal property such as inventory, must 
pay for everything including trade fixtures. None of the cases seems to 
involve a square holding that trade fixtures pass to the condemnor, 
although as will be seen in Section 22(a), infra, a good number have 
allowed the recovery of damages for removal of .such property. Several 
of the cases are old New York cases now under considerable doubt in 
view of later decisions. 39 See discussion of New York rule, supra, 
3 6. Gf. Application of Bronx River Expressway, 278 App. Div. 813, 
104 N.Y.S.Zd 554 {1951)(improper to base market value of property 
on the amount of the cancellation penalty). 
37. Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (19111); In re Horace 
Harding Expressway, 151 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1956) modified 4 App. 
Div. 2d 683, 164 N. Y.S. 2d 389 (1957); In re City of New York, 
250 App. Div. 197, 193 N.Y.S. 850 (1937); Accord, St. Louis v. 
St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. Go., 266 Mo. 694, 182 S.W. 750 (1916). 
38. Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (1914). 
39. Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (1914)(this case 
might be reconciled with the present N.Y. position but almost 
identical items of damage were held non-compensable in In re 
WhitlockAvenue, 278N.Y. 276, 16N.E.2d281(1938); Inre 
Waterfront on North River, 192 N.Y. 295, 84 N.E. 1105 (1908); 
InreWillcox, 65App. Div. 197, 151 N.Y.S. 141 (1914); Inre 
BlockBoundedbyAvenueA, 66 Misc. 488, 122 N.Y.S. 321 
(1910). 
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this subsection . Other cases involve property which rather clearly 
seems to be realty and because of that , some can be reconciled with 
the present position of the New York court. 40 The Nebraska court 
seems to have held that all property present passes at least to the 
extent that the value of the property is affected by such property . 41 
(2) Effect of Agreement Between the Parties as .to Fixtures 
It is common practice in many metropolitan areas to insert a 
"condemnation clausen in leases. These clauses u sually provide that 
the lessee shall be entitled to no apportionment of the award to the 
lessor for the taking of the lease in the event of condemnation . They 
usually cover both the value of the leasehold and of the fixtures at-
tached thereto . Although the courts had some early doubts on the 
matter, 42 they seem now to quite uniformly hold that the condemnor 
may take advantage of the contractual arrangements and deny recovery 
to the lessee . 43 This is the case even though there are no contractual 
arrangements whatsoever between the condemnor and the lessee . The 
reasoning of the courts seems to be based on the assumption that the 
lessee :~has contracted away his rights to a recovery, since the rights 
are gone4 they cannot be asserted against anyone including the con-demnor. 4 
40. Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198 , 25 P. 2d 826 (1933.) (heavy 
printing presses fixed on special foundations; compare with Poto-
mac Electric Power Co. v . u.s . , 85 F . 2d 243 (D . C. Cir . 1936) 
which reached the ppposite result with regard to similar property); 
Seattle&M. Ry. Co. v. Scheike, 3Wash . 625 , 29Pac. 217 
(1892)(growing crops and buildings--no contention that trade fix-
tures seems to have been considered by the court nor was any 
authority cited). 
41. Bank of Brule v . Harper, 141 Neb . 616, 4 N . W. 2d 609 (1942) 
(court allowed introduction of evidence concerning the value of 
fixtures and equipment and the merchandise as proper items to 
be considered in determining the value of the leasehold interest , 
although not as independent items of damage) . 
42. In re Allen Street and First Avenue, 256 N . Y. 236 , 176 N . E. 
377 (1931) . 
43 . E. g ., U.S . v . Petty Motor Co. , 327 U.S . 372 (1946); U . S . v. 
Advertising Checking Bureau, 204 F . 2d 770 (1953); U . S . v . Fisk 
Building·'" 124 F . Supp . 259 (S.D. N . Y. 1954); U . S . v . 10 , 620 
Sq . Ft., 62 F. Supp . 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); U.S. v. Improved 
Premises, 54 F . Supp. 469 (D . S.N. Y. 1944) . 
44 . U.S . v . Petty Motor Co . , 327 u.s . 372, 376 (1946) . 
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However, in spite of the fact that the condemnor may take advantage 
of a contractual relationship between the lessee and lessor in the form of 
a condemnation clause, there is considerable authority that he may not 
do so with regard to an agreement between the parties which converts 
fixtures which would have become real property when installed by the 
tenant into personal property which he is entitled to remove at the termi-
nation of the lease. A typical agreement of this type will allow the 
tenant to remove building& such as a filling station) at the termination 
of the lease although ordinarily the affixation of a building to the land 
would make it the property of the fee holder. Thus, as between the 
landlord and tenant the property is personal and therefore should not 
pass with the land upon condemnation. However, considerable autho-
rity exists for the proposition that such fixtures will remain realty and 
must be taken by the condemnor. 45 Various reasons have been given 
for refusing to treat fixtures as personalty as between lessea and con-
demnor. It has been argued that the statute requires the condemnor to 
take all real property and that an agreement between lessor and lessee 
cannot alter the effect of the statute. 46 The federal position seems to 
be that the fixtures were inherently real estate and no agreement could 
change its character. 4 7 It has also been urged that the agreement was 
intended to have effect only as between the actual parties and was not 
intended to confer any benefit on the condemnor. 4 8 There seems to be 
45. u.s. v. Seagren, 50 F. 2d 333 (D.C.Cir. 1931); Los Angeles v. 
Hughes, 202 Cal. 731, 262 Pac. 73 7 {1928) {trees and shrubbery 
belonging to nursery); In re Allen Street and First Avenue, 256 
N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377 (1931); In re Triborough Bridge, 249 App. 
Div. 579, 293 N.Y.S. 223 (1937) (dictum) aff'd without opinion, 
2 7 4 N.Y. 5 81, 1 0 N. E. 2d 5 61. 
46. In re Allen Street and First Avenue, 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 
377 {1931). 
47. U.S. v. Seagren, 50 F. 2d 333 (1931 D.C. Cir.). 
48. In re Allen Street and First Avenue, 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 
377 {1931); In reAppointment of Park Commissioners, 17 N.Y. 
S.R. 371, 1 N.Y.S. 763 {1888). 
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no indication in the reports that an attack has ever been made on this 
doctrine on the grounds that it is inconsistent, by analogy at least , 
with the doctrine that the condemnor may take advantage of a con-
demnation clause despite the fact that he is not a party to the 
agreement . Most of the cases which allow the lessee to recover 
in _spite of the agreement were decided before the final develop-
ment of the rule on condemnation clauses, and therefore there is 
some reason to believe that a successful attack could be made by 
the condemnor on the doctrine denying the condemnor the right to take 
advantage of agreements between lessor and lessee which convert r eal 
into personal property . It is :submitted that there is no sound reason 
for allowing the lessee something more than he originally contracts 
for; he expected at the time the lease was executed that the fixtures 
would remain his property and that removal would be necessary; he 
should not receive an addition to his rights simply because the land hap,-
pens to be condemned . 
There is some authority for the proposition that the condemnor may 
have the advantage of the agreement betwej:in the parties as to the 
character of fixtures. There is , as observed above, the analogy to the 
cases allowing the condemnor to have the benefit of a condemnation 
clause between the parties . 49 . Some cases have held that the condemnor 
is entitled to treat property as personalty where the parties have agreed 
that it should be so regarded as between themselves, 50 while one case 
has allowed the condemnor to take advantage of a privately imposed 
building restriction which decreased the market value of the property. 51 
49. See cases cited in footnote 43 1 supra I this division. 
50 . Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm . v. Hedberg-
Freidheim Co . , 226 Minn . 282, 32 N.W . 2d 569 (1948); In re 
Harlem River Drive , 113 N.Y .S. 2d 292 (1952); Consolidated Ice 
Co . v. Penn . R. Co . , 224Pa . 487, 73Atl. 937,939(1909) . 
51. Allen v. City of Boston, 137 Mass. 319 (1884). 
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SECTION 21. PERSONAL PROPERTY 
a. Does Not Pass to Conde mnor - No Re moval Cs:>s t s. 
Personal property of the le s see, of course, does not pas s to the 
condemnor, and there ca n b e no claim for compensation for s uch a 
"taking". As a consequence 0 the court s seem a lmost universa lly to 
deny recovery for remova l of personal propetty to lesse e s . 52 It w ill 
be remembered tha t the same pr inciple i s followed w ith re g a rd to owners 
in fe e . 53 The oft- cited r eason for the rule is tha t re moval costs of 
personal property are too speculative because different property owners 
would move to locations at varying distances from ·the conde mned s ite; 
as a consequence dama ges could not be uniform. 54. It s hould be noted 
that the disallowance of rerrnbvai::.d:os.ibr ·ilir.~~Br.:mnal property i s not in -· 
consistent with the allowa nce of such costs for ·fixtures. In the latter 
case the property actually passes to the condemnor in the view of the 
court; removal costs are simply in lieu of payment o{full ma rket va lue . 55 
b . Statutory Changes in Iowa by 58th G.A . (19591 
Section 472 . 14 , Iowa Code of 1958, relating to the a i; praisement 
and report of assessment of damages by the commissioners was amend-
ed by Section 3, Chapter 318o Laws of 58th G.A., to add ther eto the 
following: 
"In assessing the damages the owner or tenant will 
sustain, the commissioners shall consider and ma ke 
allowance for personal property which is dama ged or 
destroyed or reduced in value. " 
The question arises as to what is meant by n nd includ ed in the 
phrase "personal property which is damaged or d e stroyed or reduced tn 
value". This would appear not to affect fix tures which ha ve been at-
tached to and become a part of the real estate since suc h ite ms are 
realty and would be included in the previous appraisal of damages . 
52 . E. g. Gershon Bros . Co. v. u.s., 284 Fed. 849 (5th Cir . 1922) . 
St. Louis v . St . Louis I. M. & s. Ry. Co., 266 Mo . 694, 182 
s .·w. 750 (1916); In reCross-Bronx Expressway, 195 Misc. 842, 
82 N . Y. S. 2d 55 (1948); In re Smith St. Bridge, 234 App. Div . 
583, 255 N.Y . 8. 801 (1932); N . Y. Cent . & Hudson R. Co . v . 
Pierce , 35 Hun 306 (N.Y . 1885); Matter of New York , Y.l . S . & 
B. R. Co., 35 Hun 633 (N . Y. 1885). 
53 . See 15(c)(5), supra . 
54. St . Louis v. St. Louis I . M. & S . Ry. Co. o 26 6 Mo. · 694 , 182 
s.w. 750 (1916) . 
55 . See Discussion in Section 22, infra . 
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Nor would the above terms appear to apply to chattels which are 
merely used or kept on the premises taken by the eminent domain. pro-
ceedings. 
Some other states provide that payment must be made for property 
taken or damaged for the purposes of public use but the cases examined 
seem to refer only to real estate which is taken or damaged with the 
particular type of damage referring to consequential injuries because of 
the taking or use of other real estate . 
The Michigan courts have allowed damages consequential to the 
taking of real estate which reduced in value personal property in the 
nature of trade fixtures . 
In re Slum Clearance City of Detroit , 52 N . W . 2d 195 {1952), the 
court held that it was proper for the jury to have submitted to it and to 
award damages for removal costs of trade fixtures . Regarding trade fix-
tures, the court said, 
"We believe that this should also include spare 
motors, parts , machinery, equipment, etc. , 
which constitute replacements specially adapted 
to the full enjoyment of the realty." 
This case involved the taking of the premises owned by a plating com-
pany and the premises included plating tanks and solutions contained 
therein which were carefully compounded, were expensive, and had to 
be maintained at certain temperatures under strict chemical control. 
Some of the solutions could only be moved in glass lined or rubber lined 
containers, and some solutions could not be moved at all. In the fur-
naces and melting pots were about 50, 000 pounds of molten tin and mol-
ten lead which in order to be moved would have to be cast into bars and 
cooled and then remelted at a new. location . The owner offered to prove 
that its plating solutions were of two sorts: one of which could not be 
moved at all or which could not be moved except at an expense greater 
than the value , and a second type which could be moved at considerable 
expense. The owner also sought to show that the molten metal could not 
be moved except by solidifying and casting it into pigs . The owner also 
sought to show that its total loss and expense of removal would amount 
to about $28 , 000 . The trial court excluded this evidence , and the Sup-
reme Court said: 
"Appellant should have been allowed to have the 
jury consider the evidence of loss or moving expense 
as a .part of the appellant ' s proof of damages for the 
taking . " 
160 
The Michigan Supreme Court arrived at the above result without a 
statute such as Iowa's recent amendment. The basis for the court's 
thinking was that whenever private property is taken, the damages 
should be sufficient to put the owner in as good a condition as he 
would have been if the injury had not occurred. The question of the 
tahks and items attached to and which had become a part of the realty 
as ordinary fixtures was not involved. The court below instructed the 
jury that as to fixtures which were a part of the realty and which the 
owner elected to take from it could be considered by the jury as follows: 
"You may consider the value of the fixtures to 
have been decreased to the extent of the cost of 
detaching them and reattaching them elsewhere, 
and you should make an allowance in your award 
by such an amount as representing the damage to 
such respondents claiming compensation for the 
diminished value of their fixtures. You are not, 
however, to add the costs of transporting severed 
trade fixtures to a new location, as such costs 
are considered too speculative." 
The Michigan court in allowing the dimunition in value of trade 
fixtures seems to permit a measure of that dimunition in value to the 
extent of the cost of detaching them and reattaching them elsewhere as 
being the amount by which their value is decreased. Costs of trans-
portation are not included, and this rule would appear to include all 
personal property which is attached to or built into the realty although 
not a fixture technically and would include personal property which is 
especially adapted for use on the premises involved such as built-in 
items or items for which a building alteration must be made in con-
nection with installation. This rule does not appear to include mis-
cellaneous personal property and chattels not affixed to the realty as 
trade fixtures or not parts or repairs pertaining to such attached trade 
fixtures. 
Regarding the application to trade fixtures of a tenant, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court in Re the L:J.ying l()ut, Establishing and (jpening of 
the John C. Lodge Highway in the City of Detroit, 65 N.W. 2d 820, 
the court quoted from In re Widening of Bagley Avenue, 226 N.W. 
688, wherein it was held that while as between landlord and tenant, 
fixtures or trade fixtues might be stated in the lease to be personal 
property; nevertheless, as between landlord and tenant and third 
parties, including a condemnor, such trade fixtures might "properly 
be considered as a part of the realty". The court held in that case: 
11 Since the value of the fixtures as severed 
will be decreased to the extent of the cost of 
detaching and reattaching them elsewhere, the 
cost of such removal is to be considered in 
awarding damages . 11 
16J. 
This case also held that a condemnation clause in the lease pro-
viding that in the event of condemnation the lease should be void did 
not prevent the tenant having the right to intervene in the condemnation 
and obtain damages for the decrease in value of his trade fixtures as 
set forth above. T-he reasoning was that as between the landlord and 
tenant their lease controlled their respective rights and obligations 
toward each bther , but that the decrease in value of the tenant's trade 
fixtures was a matter in which the landlord was not concerned and no 
provision in the lease granted the condemnor immunity from having to 
pay the tenant for such decrease in value. In the quote from Widen-
ing of Bagley Avenue ~ supra , the following language appears: 
11 Our review of the record is convincing that the 
'fixtures' herein involved were not stocks of goods 
nor in the usual acceptance of the term , purely 
personal property; but that they were what is 
properly denominated 'trade fixtures' and which 
although as between landlord and tenant might be 
personal property , as to third parties they may be 
properly considered as a part of t he realty. 11 
The above statutory change by the Iowa Legislature no doubt as 
to tenants requires the application of the Des Moines Wet Wash case55a 
and provides that the dimunition in value of trade fixtures of tenants is 
an item of damage to be determined and measured by the cost of detach-
ing and reattaching elsewhere without taking into account transporta-
tion expense. 
55a. 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N .W . 486 (1924). 
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SECTION 22. REMOVAL COSTS 
a. Foreign Authority 
This section deals with t he contention which is often made that the 
condemnor is liable in damages for the removal costs of fixtur es belong-
ing to the lessee . At the outset, it is imperative to analyze the reason-
ing employed by courts which have allowed removal costs to the lessee. 
They first determine whet her or not t he fixture involved would pass to 
the condemnor. If it would, the courts then reason that since the con-
demnor has no use for the fixtures, the lessee should b e allowed to 
remove them. 56 As a consequence of such removal, t he condemnor 
pays only the removal costs and not the value of ·the fixture which l;le 
would otherwise have t o pay; thus , the doctrine is based essentially 
on a theory of minimization of damages. 57 Assuming -that the doctrine 
is correct, its application turns on whether or not the fixtures passes 
to the condemnor . 58 Thus it may be seen that the reasoning and auth-
ority involved in determining the initial question, as discussed in 
Section 20(b), supra, will be valid in determining the removal cost 
issue . Likewise, the removal cost cases will be authority for the ques-
tion of determining what property passes on condemnation . The cases 
have been separately discussed, however, .in order to permit more care-
ful analysis of the exact factors involved in determining each question . 
56 . Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. Des Moines, 197_ Iowa 1082, 198 
N. W . 486 (1924); In re Gratiot.Aven.ue, 294 Mich . 569, 293 N.W. 
755 (1940). 
_57 . Springfield Southwestern Ry. Co . v. Schweitzer , 173 Mo . App . 
-650, 158 S . W . 1058 (1913); See also Des Moines Wet Wash 
Laundry Co. v. Des Moines , 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N. W . 486 
(1924); query whether this reasoning. is valid in Iowa, whf.ch re-
jects the minimization of damages position . See Section ll, 
infra , which makes it clear that the minimization theory in Des-
Moines Wet Wash has been rejected; if so, has the rationaliza-
tion of this case also been destroyed? 
58. ~,Potomac Electric Power Co . v . U.S . , 85 F. 2d 243 (D.C. 
Cir . 193 6) . 
1613 
Since the key issue in determining whether removal costs are to be 
awarded is whether the fixtures would pass to the condemnor, the same 
three rules5 9 will apply to determine whether or not removal costs are 
to be awarded . 
The first rule is that no removal costs far trade fixtures are allow-
ed because no property has passed to the condemnor. The majority of 
cases adopting this view. have been tried in the federal courts. At one 
time it appeared that the federal courts might allow removal costs, 60 
but the principal case taking this view has b een rejected as a prece-
dent in later decisions. 61 The rule now seems to be firmly establish-
ed in the federal courts that removal costs of such fixtures are not 
allowed . Neither is recovery allowed for alleged depreciation in the 
value of trade fixtures as a result of the moving. 63 It should be noted, 
however , that the federal courts do allow removal costs where only part 
of the leasehold term is condemned . 64 A number of state courts have 
59. See discussion in Section 20(b){1) , supra. 
60 . National Laboratory & Supply Co. v. u.s ., 275 Fed. 218 (1921). 
61. See U . S . v. Fisk Building , 124 F. Supp . (S . D.N .Y. 1954) com-
menting on National Laboratory & Supply Co. v. U.S. , supra. 
62 . U . S. v . Petty Motor Co. , 327 u .s. 372 (1946); U . S. v. 425 4031 
Sq . Ft. of. Land, 187 F. 2d 798 (3d Cir . 1951); Potomac Electric 
Power Co . v. U.S . , 85 F.2d 243· (D. C. Cir. 1936); U.S . v. Fisk 
Bldg ., 124 F . Supp. 259 (S . D.N.Y. 1954); U.S. v. 40,558Acres 
ofLand, 62F. Supp. 98(D. Del. 1945); U. S. v. 10,620Sq . Ft., 
62 F . Supp. 115 (S . D. N.Y. 1945); U.S. v .. Entire Fifth Floor , 54 
F.Supp . 259 (S.D.N. Y. 1944); U.S. v. Meyers, 190 Fed. 688 
(D. Conn . 1911); Thermal Syndicate, ~td. v. u.s. , 81 Ct . Cl. 
446 (1935); William Wrigley, Jr . Co . v. U.S., 75 Ct. Cl. 569 
(1932). 
63 . U.S . v. Entire Fifth Floor, 54 F. Supp . 259 (S.D . N. Y. 1944). 
64 . U . s. v. General Motors Corp ., 323 u . s. 373 (1945). There 
can b e no doubt , however , from this opinion and from subsequent 
cases that this holding is confined to these facts. See discus-
sion in Section 23 (aL infra, dealing with partial condemnation. 
,. 
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also taken the position that removal costs may not be r ecovered. 65 The 
reasoning behind the cases supporting this rule is clear; s ince the les-
see would have had to remove the fixtures at t he t ermination of the 
lease and since he is compensated for t he value of t he lease for the 
remainder of the term, there is no injustice in compelling him to re-
move fixtures without compensation when condemnation occur s. 66 
The second rule, it will be remembered, is that t aken by the New 
York courts . On the is sue of what fixtures pass t o t he condemnor, New 
York takes the position that only immovable property need be taken by 
the condemnor; hence 8 .it would seem that removal cost s could be al-
lowed for such property . No case has. been found taking t h i s position , 
perhaps because lessees found it too embarrassing i n trial court to 
introduce evidence to the effect t hat the fixtur e was immovable and 
then t o submit a b ill for moving it . Removal costs have been allowed 
where the .fixture would have b een realty but for an agreement between 
the parties •·67 However, t he New York courts have frequently denied 
recovery for removing movable property . 68 
65 . Mayor of Baltimore v. Gamse & Bro., 132 Md. 290 , 104 Atl. 429 
{1918); Springfield Southwestern Ry. Co . v . Schweitzer, 173 Mo . 
App . 650 , 158 S. W. 1058 (1913); Ranlet v. Concord R. Corp , 62 
N. H . 561 (1883); New Jersey Highway Aut hority v. J. & F.· Hold-
ing Co., 40 N. J . Sup . 309 , HP A. 2d . 25 (1956); accord, Minsk 
v . Fu_ltonCounty, 83 Ga . App. 520, 64 S . E. 2d 336 (1951). 
66 . William Wrigley , Jr . Co . v. U . S . , 75 Ct . Cl. 569 (1932); 
Mayor of Baltimore v . Gamse & Bro., 132 Md . 290, 104 Atl. 
429 (1918) . 
67 . In re Allen Street and First Avenue , 256 N. Y. 236, 176 N. E. 
3 77 (1931) . See related discussion. in Section 20(:0)(2), supra. 
68 . In re Harlem River Drive, 113 N.Y. S . 2d 292 (1952); In reCross-
Bronx Expres sway , 195 Misc. 842 , 82 N.Y. S . 2d 55 (1948); N . 
Y. Cent . & Hudson R. Co . v . Pierce, 35 Hun 306 (N . Y. 1885); 
Matter of New· Yor-k W . S. & B. R. Co., 35 Hun 633 (N. Y. 1885) 
(disallowing damages for the removal of 413 wagon loads of pro-
perty including heavy presses , lithographic stone , and machi-
nery) . 
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A number of courts have allowed removal costs. Some have done so 
on the theory that the fixture would pass to the condemnor unless remov-
al took place . 69 Others appear to have done so in following constitu-
tional or statutory directions that all damages are to be compensable . 70 
Removal costs have also been allowed when only part of the leased pro~· 
perty is taken with the result that a move to one extent or another is 
required. 71 There is some authority for the position that the consent of 
the condemnor to the removal by the lessee is necessary in order to jus-
tify recovery. 72 This would clearly seem to be the correct position as 
otherwise the condemnor might be forced to pay removal costs i n excess 
of the value of the fixtures in cases where removal costs were high or 
where the market value of the machinery was low . 
A closely related problem to that of allowing removal costs to the 
lessee is that of attempted assessment of costs of removing property to 
a lessee who abandons property on the condemned premises. In this 
situation the owner is at liberty to abandon such property as he chooses 
and need not pay for the resulting removal by the condemnor; however , 
69. · Des Moines-Wet Wash Laundry Co u v. Des Moines 6 197 Iowa 
1082 , 198 N. W . 486 (1924); In re Gratiot Avenue, 294 Miph. 
569, 293 N.W. 755 (1940); accord " James McMillin Printing Co. 
v. Pittsburghe C. & C . R. Co. e 216 Pa. 512 , 65 Atl. 1091 (1907) . 
70 " Chicaog , M. & St. P . Ry . Co . v. Hock, 118 Ill. 587, 9 N.E . 
205 , 206 (1886} citing as authority St. Louis , V. & T. H . R. Co . 
v. Capp, 67 IlL 607 (1872) which is weak authority for the pro-
position because the recovery in that case was based on a 
broad damage provision of a contract between the railroad and 
the city of Vandalia and hence not on any general condemnation 
principle . 
71. State v. Morrison{ 83 Ariz. 363, 321 P. 2d 1025 {1958); Phila-
delphia & R. R. Co . v. Getz, 113 .Pa ; 214 e 6 Atl. 356 (1886). 
72 . St. Louisv . St. Louisi.M. &S. Ry . Co . , . 266Mo. 694,182 
s.w. 750 , 754 (1916). 
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the owner of the property must pay for removal where the abandoned 
property is delivered to him under instructions given by him. 73 
It is significant that some courts which allow removal costs do 
so only as one element tending to indicate market value. 74 Why 
this should be so does not seem to have been explained. Probably 
it is a misapplication of the general rule for treatment of items of 
damage in condemnation cases; individual estimates of damage are 
allowed only as items tending to indicate value and not as items of 
absolute injury. However, the reasons for applying this general rule 
to removal costs are somewhat obscure. Any accurate relationship be-
tween the market value of a lease and the cost of removing fixtures 
from it would seem to be purely fortuitous since the fixtures may. b's 
few< .. 'or many iac:Coq:lilug1.:t;o the type of business carri!;ld on and sincere-
moval may be costly or inexpensive depending upon the location of the 
building, or the size of fllitl!lres required for the particular business 
and a host of other highly variable factors. 
b. The Iowa Position Examined 
The Iowa position on removal costs is defined exclusively by Des 
Moines Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 
N.W. 486 (1924). · In that case the city of Des Moines condemned land 
on which a laundry was located, The lease had three and one-half years 
remaining of a seven year term. The tl'ial court gave an instruction which 
allowed .the jury to consider, among other items of damages tending to 
prove market value, the costs of removal of the lessee's fixtures, which 
73. Accord, American Salvage Co. v. Housing Authority, 14 N.J. 271, 
102 A. 2d 465 (1954) (fee instead of a leasehold was condemned). 
74. Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Des Moines, 197 Iowa 
1082, 198 N.W. 486 (1924); In re Gratiot Avenue, 294 Mich. 569, 
293 N.W. 755 (1940); James McMillin Printing Co. v. Pittsburgh, 
C. & W. R. Co., 216 Pa. 504, 65 Atl. 1091 (1907); North Coast 
R. Co. v. Kraft Co., 63 Wash. 250, 115 Pac. 97 (19ll). 
16V 
covered plumbing, steam fittings, and machinery. 
The case is an extremely confusing one because it represents a 
combination of fragments of inconsistent doctrines and because it em-
ploys some rather strange views of the market value concept. Probably 
the basic error of the case and the one which makes the case most dif~ 
ficult to .interpret in the Ught of subsequent developments in the law in 1 
other jurisdictions as to removal costs , is the failure of the court to 
analyze the type of property involved and to characterize it a s fixtures, 
meaning property attached to the realty which retains its character as 
personalty . As pointed out in the preceding subsection, a determina-
tion of the character of the lessees fixtures is .necessary in order to 
determine whether removal costs are allowable. The court recognizes 
the theory75 but fails to apply it by deciding whether the property pass-
ed to the condemnor. The court says simply, "the machinery must be 
regarded as fixtures • • , _t!.' 76 The city's brief and argument77 contained 
the contention that removal costs could not be allowed because the pro-
perty was personalty; there was no argument , however , that the property 
was personalty because, as a trade fixture , it constituted an exception 
to the ordinary classification of fixtures .as realty. Because of this 
omission and because of the uncertainty as to what the court meant by 
"fixtures" 7 8 it is entirely possible that a trade fixtures argument could 
be developed at the present time within the meaning of this case. It 
should be remembered that in 1924, when this case was decided, neither 
the New York courts nor the federal courts had yet worked out the dis-
tinctions between "fixtures" and "trade-fixtures" which determine 
75 . See discussion of St. Louis v. St . Louis I. M. & S. R. Co ., 266 
Mo • . 694, 182 S . W. 750, appearing on pp. 1089- 90 of 197 Iowa . 
76. 197 Iowa at 1082~88. 
77 . State Law Library Abstract Volume 243 8, p. 129 . 
78. See discussion of the ambiguity of the term "fixtures" in· In re 
Allen Street and First Avenue , 256 N.Y. 236, 176 N.E. 377, 
380 (1931). 
{ 
j 
168 
whether removal costs are to be allowed. 79_ Since neither of these juris-
dictions recognized the significance of this characterization, it is not 
at all surprising that the Iowa court also failed to discuss its signifi-
cance. However, it would certainly be open to argue that the time has 
now come for recognition of the characterization problem. 
The second major failing of the case is its deficient .understanding 
of the market value concept as applied to leasehold condemnation. 
First of all, it allowed removal costs only as an element of damage 
tending to show the market value of the lease. Although, on its face 
at least, this result may be favorable to the condemnor; it should be 
perfectly apparent that removal cost has very little relation to the 
value of the lease. The costs of removing fixtures from a commercial 
site will vary with the amount of machinery required for the business. 
Yet the same property would have equal value on the market regardless 
of how many machines the current lessee chose to employ in his par-
ticular business. Even assuming that two laundries were to occupy 
79. See discussion Section 20(b)(1), supra. Compare the decision in 
Jackson v. State, 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (1914). holding that 
machinery passed to the condemnor, with that of In re Whitlock 
Avenue, 278 N.Y. 276, 16 N.E •. 2d 281 (1938). which holds that 
what must have been similar machinery to that in the_ Jackson case 
did not pass to the condemnor. Since machinery was covered by 
the holding in Des Moines Wet Wash, and since it would be highly 
desirable from the condemnor's point of view to have machinery 
treated as removable, it would seem that a similar turnabout is 
need in Iowa. Note, however, that Jackson v. State, supra, was 
not reversed; instead, the court adopted new. criteria and moved 
in a new direction. Both the steam fittings and the fixtures might 
come within the category of immovable property and hence be con-
cbinpensable under the New York rule. See criteria set forth in In 
re Whitlock Avenue, supra. Unfortunately, in Des Moines Wet 
Wash the court simply does not seem to have been aware of the 
problem of characterizing property affixed by the Jessee. It is 
interesting to note that the Iowa court regards its position on fix-
tures as based on the Jackson case; see Wilson v. Fleming, 23 9 
Iowa 718, 31 N.W.2d 393,398 (1948). Note also the court's 
awareness of conflicting authority and its reluctance to extend 
the Wet Wash decision. 
:a:.6·e 
identical buildings and were to perform the same quantity of work , the 
two businesses would undoubtedly have different removal costs be-
cause the am~unt of equipment required would vary with the work pat-
terns adopted, the differing efficiencies of the type of machines select-
ed, and the varying levels of ability possessed by the ma'nagement and 
employees of the business. Yet the value of the lease on the open mar-
ket would not necessarily vary because of these factors. Consequent-
ly, it is unrealistic ;to relate removal costs to market value . When re-
moval costs are correctly allowed, they are awarded in lieu of a taking 
of the property by the condemnor. 80 They should be allowed in totruor 
not at all . 
Moreover, the court passed over what is undoubtedly the most re-
alistic method of compensating the lessee for fixtures of the type here 
involved. The court quoted the following passage from Pause v . Atlanta, 
98 Ga. 92, 26 S.E. 489 (1896) at 1088 of 197 Iowa, 
"The .increased value of the premises for rent in 
consequence of the putting in of such fixtures 
and improvements may properly .be considered in 
computing damages to the leasehold estate." 
I 
As will be seen below, this formula comports as nearly as ·possible vyith 
the expectation of the lessee at the time the lease was executeq; how-
ever the court ignored this test and went on to use removal cost as an 
indication of market value. 
The court also rejected the argument that removal costs should not 
be allowed because the lessee will have to remove anyhow at the end 
of the lease ; 81 The court said it could not assume the lease would 
have terminated earlier. This objection misses the point, of course, 
because it overlooks . the expectations of the lessee at the time the 
lease was executed and awards him something else . The lessee pro-
posed to install improvements at the beginning of his term yvhich would 
add t,o the value of the lease for ·the entire seven years; at the end of 
that period he knew he would have to remove the improvements at his 
80 . See discussion in Section .22(a), supra. 
81. 1087 of l97Iowa 
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own expense or abandon them. His expectations were that tl").e increased 
value of the lease to him would justify the cost of installing and remov-
ing them. If the court had applied the test of Paus e v. Atlanta, supra, 
the lessee would have received exactly what he expected to receive. 
When the condemnation proceedings were brought, he had had. th,ree and 
one-half years of enjoyment of the .lease as improved; under the quoted 
formula he would have received compensation for the remaining three 
and one-half years of the lease, the value of the lease being computed 
with recognition of the value added by the improvements. The lessee 
would thus receive seven full years of the enjoyment of the lease as 
improved. Consequently, bearing the removal costs cannot be regarded 
as a hardship since it is entirely in accord with the lessee's expecta-
tions. 
· SECTION 23. PARTIAL CONDEMNATION 
.a. Condemnation of Part of the Leasehold Term 
A rather .peculiar type of condemnation, which was used by the federal 
government during World War II and the Korean emergency, is condemna-
tion of .part of the term of the leas.ehold. The federal government fre-
quently used this device to condemn office or warehouse space for a 
specified period with yearly options of renewal on the part of the govern-
ment. The underlying fee interest was, of course, not disturbed. The 
Supreme Court allowed removal costs to the lessee where the lessee's 
term outlasted the termination of the condemned term. 82 It seems clear 
from the court's reasoning that the recovery was allowed only because 
the lessee would have to move back to the premises; moving out was 
originally contemplated by the lessee and is, therefore, non-compens-
able at the time of condemnation . 83 Where the term taken by the 
82. U.S. v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). 
83. U.S. v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); U , S. v. 425,031 
Sq . Ft. of Land, 187 F. 2d 798 (3d Cir . 1951); U . S. v. Fisk Build-
ing, 124 F . Supp. 259 (S . D.N . Y. 1954); contra, U.S. v. Certain 
Parcels of Land, 102 F. Supp . 854 (S.D. N. Y. 1952) aff'd sub 
nom. U.S. v. Knickerbocker Printing Corp., 212 F. 2d 884 (1954) 
(this case is clearly based on an improper interpretation of U.S. 
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 {19.45). 
17·1 
government extended past the expiration date of the lessee• s term, no 
removal costs were allowed. 84 The type of condemnation involved in 
these cases is extremely rare, but it is important to note that the 
General Motors case85 is not authority for the general proposition 
that a lessee is entitled to removal costs and applies only in the 
special situation of a partial condemnation of a leasehold term. 
(b) Condemnation of Part of the Leasehold Property 
Sometimes the condemnor will take only a portion of the leased 
property . In such a case the measure of damages is the decrease in 
value of the leasehold property as a whole. 86 · There is authority for 
the proposition that an issue of fact arises on partial condemnation as 
to whether the lessee has not been totally evicted, in which case a 
different measure of damages is apparently employed. 87 
(c) Severance Damages 
The principle behind the allowance of severance damages is that 
~hey are to compensate the. lessee for a special type of damage caused 
to his remaining property when a partial condemnation occurs. A typical 
example is a case in which a leased factory is cut off from some of its 
components as a result of condemnation of the land on which ·they are 
84. U . S. v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); U.S. v. 425 , 031 
Sq. Ft. ofLand , 187F.2d798(3dCir . 1951); U.S . v . FiskBuild-
ing, 124 F. Supp . 259 (S . D . N. Y. 1954) . 
85 . U . S . v . General Motors Corp., 323 U . S. 373 (1945) . 
86 . State v. ·Morrison, 83 Ariz . 363 , 321 P.2d 1025 (1958); Renwick, 
Shaw & Crossett v. D. & N. W. R. Co., 49 Iowa 664 (1879) 
aff'd, 1.02 U.S. 180 (1880). Also see cases cited in footnote 
4, supra, this division. 
87 . Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Getz, 113 Pa. 214, 6 Atl . 356 , 
(1886). 
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situated, resulting in over capacity of the factory, which still remains 
on uncondemned property. The courts seem to recognize the principle 
of severance damages as applied to lessees, but there are no strong 
cases to this effect. 88 However, it is clear that the damage will not 
be allowed where only consequential injury is indicated 89 or where 
the condemned land iS leased 1 ano the injured property iS held in 
fee.90 
88. See U.S. v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F2d 172 (9th Cir. 
1950); U.S. v. Certain Lands, 79 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 
194 8}; see also, Batcheller v. Highway Commission, Iowa 
_, __ N.W. 2d (Opinion February 9, 1960). 
89. U.S. v. Certain Lands, 79 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
90. U.S. v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F. 2d 172 {1950 9th 
Cir.). 
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DIVISION V 
EVIDENCE 
This Division is designed to deal with specific problems of evi-
dence relating to condemnation . It is not an attempt to restate the 
rules as to substantive admissibility of evidence discussed in 
Division III. That Division should be consulted in determining what 
types of damages are compensable and hence may or may not be intro-
duced as evidence . Neither does this Division attempt to analyze 
the rules of Iowa evidence which apply generally to all types o£ cases . 
For such authority the general case law should be examined . 
SECTION 24 . EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT OF THE COMMISSIONERS' 
AWARD 
The amount of the commissioners' award should not be admissible 
in evidence on the trial of the appeal; presumably the reason for this 
position is that the commissioners' award is a composite hearsay 
statement. However, while the rule seems to be recognized in Iowa, 1 
there is considerable doubt as to the effect of admitting such testimony. 
Apparently the court may cure any error committed in admitting the 
evidence by a proper instruction to the jury not to consider the com-
missioners' award . 2 Also it has been held that there is no prejudicial 
error in instructing the jury not to consider the amount of the commis-
sioners' award althoug~ a statement of the amount of the award accom-
panied the instruction . · Neither is it reversible error to state to the 
jury the amount of the award on the voir dire, although the Supreme 
Court has disapproved the practice . 4· A related question rises in con-
nection with a line of questioning of a witness who was a member of 
l. Gregory v. Kirkman Consol. Ind . School Dist., 193 Iowa 579, 
187 N. W. 553,554 (1922) ("The jury was not entitled tc;> consider 
the award previously made in the condemnation proceeding ."). 
2 . Gregory v. Kirkman Consol. Ind . School Dist., 193 Iowa 579, 
L87 N . W. 553,554 (1922) . 
3. Bell v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 74 Iowa 343, 37 
N .W . 768,770 (1888) . 
4 . Simons v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co . , 128 Iowa 139, 103 N.W. 
129, 133 (1905)(there is some dictum to the effect that this 
error might be prejudicial in some cases however) . 
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the preliminary award correctly expressed his judgment as to the 
damages suffered. The Iowa court has hel d that while it is not 
error to disallow such questioning, 5 neither i s it error to permit it. 6 
SECTION 25. EVIDENCE OF· SALES BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES 
a. Price Paid by the Landowner 
The sale price for the land in question seems to be universally 
regarded as admissible in determining value in condemnation proceed-
ings. 7 The basic issues in this area center around the remoteness of 
the sale in question. The Iowa rule allows the trial court to admit 
5. Winklemans v. Des Moines N . W . R. Co . , 62 Iowa 11 , 17 N.W. 
82, 84,85 (1883 ). 
6 . Moranv. Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 59,62 
(193 7). It is difficult to see what value this line of questioning 
would have unless it were accompanied by testimony as to the 
amount of the commissioners ' award. In this connection it would 
be· interesting to examine the record in the Moran case to deter-
mine whether the amount of the award was introduced; if so, the 
result would be a tacit abandonment of the rule against intro-
ducing the amount of the commissioners' award in evidence. 
7. Nichols, Ibid. Sees. 12.311(1) , 21.2 (3d ed. 1950); Hall v. West 
Des Moines, 245 Iowa 458, 62 N.W. 2d ·734, 740 (1954)(dictum); 
Nedrow v . Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 245 Iowa 763, ·· 
61 N.W.2d 687,693 (1953) commented on in Hall v. West Des 
Moines, supra , at 740 of 62 N . W. 2c;i; Millard v. Northwestern 
Mfg . Co., 200 Iowa 1063, 205 N . W . 979, 9.81 (1925); Ranck 
v. Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 563, 111 N . W . 1027,1028 (19.07); 
accord., Hayesv. Chicago; R.R. I. &P. Ry. Co . , 239Iowa 
149, 30 N.W. 2d 743,746 (1948) (dictum); Kirkwood v. Perry 
Town Lot & Improvement Co., 178 Iowa 248, 159 N.W. 774 
(1916); Wiley v. Dean Land Co ., 171 Iowa 75, 153 N.W. 145 
(1915); Beans v . Denny , 141 Iowa 52, 117 N.W . 109~,1.093 ~ 
(1908) . . 
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such evidence within its discretion8 although some guide may be 
obtained by analyzing the length of the intervening period in the 
various cases. 9, Where significant improvements have been made 
since the last sale, the court has held the evidence of prior sale 
too remote. 1 0 
b. Evidence of Prices Paid for Similar Land 
The majority rule in this country allows the introduction of evi-
dence as to the value of similar property. 11 This rule is known as 
the "Massachusetts Rule" and was adopted by the Iowa Supreme 
8. Hall v. West Des Moines, 245 Iowa 458, 62 N.W. 2d 734 (1954); 
Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co,, 239 Iowa 149, 30 N.W. 
2d 743,746 (1948); Foster v. U.S., 145 F. 2d 873 (8th Cir. 
1944). 
9. Testimony admitted. Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line 
Co., 245 Iowa 763, 61 N. W. 2d 687,693 (1953) (five yeqrs had 
elapsed--see discussion in Hall v. West Des Moines, supra); 
Millard v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 200 Iowa 1063, 205 N.W. 
979,981 (1925)(sale 18 months previous); Kirkwood v. Perry 
Town Lot & Improvement Co., 178 Iowa 248, 159 N.W. 774,778 
(1916) (apparently about three years since sale); Wiley v. Dean 
Land Co., 171 Iowa 75, 153 N.W. 145 (1915)("What a tract of 
land sells for about the time of the transaction under investi-
gation is competent evidence of its market value then •.. "); 
accord, Foster v. U.S., 145 F. 2d 873 (8th Cir, 1944)(sale in 
question was approximately 10 years previous and had occurred 
during depths of depressions; the owner had constructed many 
improvements in the meantime. The court, which cited federal 
rather than Iowa cases, held these objections went to the weight 
and not to the admissibility of the evidence.). Testimony ex-
cluded: Hall v. West Des Moines, 245 Iowa 458, 62 N.W.2d 
734, 740 (1954)(prior sale occurred 8 years previous; court said 
it would have been "better satisfied" if the evidence had been 
admitted but no abuse of discretion); Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. 
& P. Ry. Co., 239 Iowa 149, 30 N.W. 2d 743,746 (1948)(sale 
had occurred 30 years previous); Beans v. Denny, 141 Iowa 52, 
117 N.W. 1091,1093 (1908)(six years had elapsed and improve-
ments had been made). 
10. Beiins v. Denny, 141 Iowa 52, 117 N.W. 1091,1093 (1908). But 
cf. Foster v. u.s. 145 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1944) where it was held 
that the fact of subsequent improvements went to the weight, and 
not to the admissibility of the evidence. Query whether the fed-
eral courf 'ap'pliedTfhe low a rule. 
11. Orgel, On Valuation Under Eminent Domain, Section 137(2d ed. 
1953). 
176 
Court in the Redfield case, a 1959 decision.12 Previous to this case 
the Iowa Supreme Court had held that such evidence was not admis..;. 
sible for the purpose of showing the value of the condemned land. 13 
The reason for the rule may have stemmed from a desire to prevent the 
trial from being burdened with collateral issues which would accompany 
such evidence as to the similarity of the various tracts of land involv-
ed, the type of sale involved, etc .. 14 
The decision in the Redfield case , 15 held that evidence of the 
sale price of similar land was admissible on direct examination of 
the expert witness, if there were sufficient foundation laid to show 
the degree of similarity between the subject land and the similar land. 
Whether or not there was sufficient showing of similarity between the 
subject land and the similar land lay in the discretion of the trial 
judge. 16 If there were sufficient showing 1 the trial court may admit 
direct testimony of the selling price of similar land as substantive 
evidence of the value of the subject land. 17 Such evidence could 
12. Redfield v . . Bighway Commission, 
413 (1959). 
Iowa I 99 N 0 w. 2d 
13. Basch v . Iowa Power & Light Co., Iowa , 95 N. W. 2d 
7.14, 716 (1959); Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 718, 31 N.W . 2d 
393,398 {1948); Maxwell v. Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 
159, 27.1 N.W. 883 (1937); Hubbell v. Des Moines, 166 Iowa 581, 
14 7 N. W. 908 (1914) (containing a thorough discussion of the 
Iowa cases, foreign authority, and textual material on the sub-
ject); Watkins v. Wabash R. Co., 137 Iowa 441, 113 N.W. 924 
{1907); U.S. v. Foster, 131 F . 2d 3 (8th Cir. 1942). 
14. Ogel, Ibid. Section 137 (2d ed. 1953); Hubbell v. Des Moines 1 
166 Iowa 581, 147 N.W. 908 (1914); Watkins v. Wabash R. Co . , 
137 Iowa 441, 113 N . W. 924 (1907). 
15. Redfield v . Highway Commission, Iowa , 99 N. W. 2d 
413 (1959). 
16. Redfield v. Highway Commission, supra. 
17. Redfield v. Highway Commission, supra. 
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possibly be used to rehabilitate the witness on redirect, 18 and prior to 
the decision in the Redfield case, the Iowa Supreme Court had held 
that it was not reversible error to exclude such testimony where the 
witness had already testified as to values generally • 19 In a proper 
situation, evidence of a formula used in reaching a prior sale in lieu 
of condemnation may be used for impeaching a witness as constitu-
ting an inconsistent prior statement. 20 
SECTION 26 •. EVIDENCE OF FORCED SALES 
It would now appear that the Iowa rule is that the value of other 
neighboring lands may be introduced as direct evidence of the value of 
the condemned land, and not merely indicative of the basis upon which ' 
the witness formulated his opinion as to the value of land. 21 This rule, 
as adopted in the Redfield case, and known as the "Massachusetts 
Rule", destroys the old rule as found in the Maxwell case. 22 It be-
comes necessary to extend the principle as to whether or not there 
can be direct testimony of a direct witness as tp sale price of other 
similar lands, and how to apply this rule on the sale which is essen-
tially a "forced sale". An early Iowa decision indicated that there 
might be the possibility of introducing evidence of a sale betweE3n 
the condemnor and another private party if there were certain proofs of 
18. Stone v. Delaware R. Co., 257 Pa. 456, 101 Atl. 813 (1917) 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
(it will be remembered that Iowa follows the Pennsylvania rule. 
See Hubbell v. Des Moines, 166 Iowa 581, 593, 147 N.W. 908, 
917 (1914). 
Moran v. Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 59 
(1937). 
Basch v. Iowa Power & Light Co., Iowa 
' 
95 N.W. 2d 
714,716 (1959). 
Redfield v. Highway Commission, Iowa 99 N .• w. 2d 
413 ,(I959)i- .. ' 
See Footnote 13, supra. 
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similarity of the land in question that had previously _been sold . 23 
However, the most forceful objection is that a sale to the con-
demnor is essentially a 11 forced sale" and the price which the con~ 
demnor is willing to pay, and the landowner is willing to accept, may 
be above or below a re~listic market appraisal, depending upon such 
factors as the urg<;:lncy of the condemnor's need for the land, the fear 
of litigation by either party, etc •• 24 The Iowa cases have adopted 
this reasoning and applied it not only to evidence of sales made to the 
condemnor25 but also to "forced sales" ari·sing from other situations 
which may not accurately reflect market value . 26 
23. King v. Iowa Midland Railway Company, 34 Iowa 458 , 461 
(1872) . 
24. Nichols, Ibid. Section. 21.33 (2d ed. 1950). 
25. U. S. v. Foster, 131 F. 2d 3 (8th Cir. 1942) (appeal from S . D. 
Iowa); Simmons v . Mason City & Ft. D . R. Co., 128 Iowa 139, 
103 N. W. 129, 133, 134 (1905); Basch v. Iowa Power & Light 
Co . , Iowa , 95 N. W. 2d 714, 717 (1959). Steensland 
v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co . , 242 Iowa .534, 47 N.W. 2d .. ·_.~, 
162, 164 (1951) (defendant• s lawyer asked how many condemna-
tion proceedings were necessary in the county in order to show 
· that plaintiff was the only holdout; held, sufficient grounds for 
new trial); Richardson v. City of Centerville, 13 7 Iowa 253, 
114 N. W. 1071 (1908). 
26 . Nichols, Ibid. Section 21.32 (3d ed. 1950); accord, .Dobler v. 
'Sw;ason} , 238 Iowa 76, 25 N.W.2d 866,_872 (1947) . ("The 
price obtained for land sold on . execution sale is hardly a 
measure of value and especially in estimating the value of 
other land ...... ) • 
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SECTION 27 •. EVIDENCE OF OFFERS TO BUY .OR SELL 
Most jurisdictions in the country have rejected e v idence d>f. 
offers made to the landowner for the sale of his property. 27 The 
reason seems to be that such offers are so easily manufactured as 
to make their admission dangerous. 28 The Iowa Court seems to 
have followed the majority rule although the issue does not seem to 
have arisen in a condemnation case . 29 
The general rule as to offers to sell is that such offers are ad-
mis sible, not as admissions, but simply to contradict the landowner's 
present testimony that his land is worth more . 3 0 This seems to be the 
rule of the one Iowa case which has dealt with the problem as a con-
demnation issue. 31 The cases dealing with the problem in a non-
condemnation situation seem to have adopted inconsistent positions . 3 2 
One specific ground for refusing to admit a real estate listing by the 
27. Nichols, Ibid. Section 21.4(1) (~d ed . 1950) . 
28. Nichols, Ibid. Section 21.4(1) (3d ed. 1.950) . Morril v. Bentl?Y, 
15 0 low a 6 7 7, 13 0 N . W. 7 3 4 , 7 3 7 ( 1911) , 
29. Morril v. Bentley, 150 Iowa 677 , 130 N . W. 734,737 (1911}; But 
~'Faust v. Hosford , 119 Iowa 97, 93 ·N . W . 58 (1903). On 
valuation of personal property also see , Rottlesberger v . Hanley, 
155 Iowa 638 , 136 N.W. 776 , 780 (1912); Citizens National Bank 
v. Converse, 105 Iowa 669 , 75 N . W. 506 (1898} . 
30. Nichols, Ibid . Section 2l.4(2)(3d ed. 1950}. 
31. Fosterv. U. S., 145F.2d873 {8thQir. 1944}(nolowacases 
cited therein). 
32. Admissible: Joy v. Security Fire Ins. Co., 83 Iowa 12, 48 N . W. 
1049 (1891); Inadmissible: Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank 
v . Danson c 206 Iowa 897 , 220 N.W. 102 (1928); Pickett v. 
Comstock, 209 Iowa 968, 229 N . W • . 249 , 251 (1930} (evidence of 
offer submitted by t he offerer). 
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owner is remoteness in time . 33 In addition , the offer to sell must have 
been made by the present owner and not a predecessor in title . 34 Als o , 
a refusal to pay a price asked is no indication of market value. 35 
SECTION 28 . EVIDENCE OF OTHER VALUATIONS 
a . Assessed Valuation 
The general rule is that a valuation made by a public offi c ia l for 
the purpose of taxation is not relevant t o a id t he jury in a sses s ing the 
value of land . 3 6 However , t here is cons iderable doubt as to whether 
this is the rule in Iowa . It has been held t hat the asses sor' s written 
statement of valuation may not be introduced t o indicate the value of 
the land; 3 7 however , the principal objection of the court s e ems to have 
been the hearsay character of t he evidence . 3 8 Subsequent Iowa .ca.ses 
have held that wh:ere -t_he·igr<!IIi>·enty bwneri·:P~:Sigr-ned;~he ;_a:sS..eSiliion';s· :'va1;-
uatiop, it may be introduced as an admi ssion and a s contradicting hi s 
testimony as to the value of the propert~t:; ~ 9 It w ould seem t hat the 
assessor's valuation ~i'gure would always be admi ssible as an admis-
sion because under Iowa Code Section 441. 12 (195 8) the property 
owner is required to subscribe an oath to the assessment rolls . Thus , 
it would appear that in appropriate cases the assessor' s· valuation , 
which is required to be at actual value by Iowa Code Section 441 . 13 
(1958), may be used as .an effective means of reducing the cost of 
condemnation. 
33 . Korfv. Fleming , 239 Iowa .501 , 32 N. W . 2d 85 , 90 (1948) . 
34. · Korf v. Fleming , 239 Iowa 501 , 32 N.W. 2d 85, 90 (1948) . 
35. Morrison v . Culvera s Estate , 216 Iowa 676 , 24 8 N. W. 23 7 
(1933}; Pickett v . Comstock , 209 Iowa 968 , 229 N. W . 1 249 (1930). 
36 . Nichols, Ibid . Section 22 . 1 {3d ed . 1950) . 
37. Dudley v . Minnesota & N.W . R. Co., 77 Iowa 408 , 42 N. W . 
359,360 (1889) . This case is erroneously citedqy Nichols for 
the broader proposition that an assessor• s valuation is not ad-
missible; Section 22 . 1 (3d ed . 1950) . 
38. It is not clear why the valuQ.tion figure , even if unsigned by the 
owner, could not come in under t he official records exception t o 
the hearsay rule . See In re Clarke• s Estat e, 228 Iowa 75 , 290 
N.W . 13 (1940) . 
39. Nedrow V. Michigan;...Wisconsin Pipe Line Co ., 245 Iowa 763 , 
61 N.W. 2d -687 , 693 (1953); Duggan v . State , 214 Iowa 230 , 
242 N. W . 98 (193 2); Welton v . Highway Commission 1 211 Iowa 
625 , 233 N. W. 876 , 882 (1930); Haggard v . Ind . School Dist . , 
113 Iowa 86 , 85 N. W . 777 , 780 (1901) . 
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b. Insurance Valuation 
The value of insurance carried on the property may not be shown 
as substantive evidence of its value. 40 However, it may be used 
for impeachment purposes in disputing plaintiff's testimony as to the 
value of his land. 41 
SECTION 29. BUSINESS PROFITS AS EVIDENCE OF VALUE42 
The general rule is that neither realized nor the estimated future 
profits of a business are admissible in evidence as to the value of 
the land. 43 The reason for this rule is apparently the frequent lack of 
correlation between value of property and such a highly variable factor 
as business profits; even more speculative, of course, are anticipated 
profits. 44 However, an exception seems to have .been recognized in 
Iowa where income from agricultural land may be introduced to indicate 
the value of the land. 45 This is also the case where the court faces 
40. Maxwell v. Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 159, .271 N.W. 883 
887 (1937); Holmes v. Rivers, 145 Iowa 702, 124 N.W. 801,803, 
(1910). 
41. See Footnote 40, supra. 
42. See Section 15(c)(3). supra, 
43, Nichols, Ibid. Section 19, 3 (3d ed. 195 0); Nedrow v. Michigan-
Wisconsin Pipe Line Go. , 245 Iowa 763, 61 N. W. 2d 687 (1954); 
Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W. 2d 85,96 (1948); Des 
Moines Wet Wash Laundry Go. v. Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 
198 N.w. 486 (1924). 
44. See excellent discussion of anticipated profits in Nedrow v, 
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Go., 245 Iowa 763, 61 N.W. 2d 
687 (1954). 
45. Wilson v, Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 
161,169 (1958)(dictum); Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 
N. W, 2d 85, 96 (1948)(very broad statement of rule admitting 
evidence of income); Maxwell v. Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 
159, 265 N.W. 899,904,905 (1936)rehearing 271 N.W. 883 
(1937); Ranck v. Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 563, 111 N.W. 1027 
(1907). 
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the difficult issue of valuing the damage to a leasehold estate. 46 
SECTION 30. EVIDENCE OF RENTAL .VALUE 
Evidence of the rent derived from real estate is admissible as 
showing its actual value . ~ 7 The theory behind the acceptance of 
such evidence is that it indicates the highest use of the real estate. 48 
However , since this does not follow automatically where the evidence 
is introduced by the condemnor, he must first show that the present 
use is the highest available. 49 Testimony is also admissi.ble as to 
the rental value of the property based on the value of s i milar proper-
ty. 50 
SECTION 31. VIEW OF THE PREMXSES ~ ASiEVIDENCE 
In Iowa the Court may at its discretion permit the jury to view the 
premises or refuse to allow them to do so . The ruling of the trial 
judge on this matter is final and will not be disturbed on appeal. Sl 
According to the rule in this jurisqiction such a view is not evidence. 
46. Korf v. Fleming , 239 Iowa 501 , 32 N.W. 2d 85,96 (1948); Des 
Moines Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Des Moines , 1.97 Iowa 1082 , 
198 N 0 w 0 4 86 (1924) 0 See in this connection Division IV I 
supra. 
47. Nichols, Ibid. Section 19.21 (3d ed. 1950); Orgel , Ibid. Section 
1?9 (2d ed. 1953). 
48. Nichols, .Ibid. Section 19.21 (3d ed . 1950). 
49. Nichols , Ibid. Section 19.21 (3d i3d. 1950); Orgel , Ibid. Section 
18 2 ( 2d ed. 195 3) • 
50. Orgel , Ibid. , Section 180 (2d ed. 1953). 
51. !)raker v. Iowa Electric Co., 191 Iowa 1376 , 182 N . W. 896 (where 
permission to view the premises was granted); King v. Railway Co. 
34 Iowa 458, 462; Clayton v. Chic. etc. Ry . Co. , 67 Iowa 23 8 , 
25 N.W. 150 {where itwasrefused). 
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Its sole purpose is to enable the jury to understand and properly apply 
the evidence and not to make them silent witnesses in the case. 52 
. SECTION 32. EVIDENCE OF THE PIAN AND CONSTRUCTED 
IMPROVEMENTS 
The numerical weight of decided cases in this jurisdiction holds 
that the nature of the proposed use by the taker is admissible, not to 
bind it to its original plan, or to modify the legal rules in regard to a 
taking, but to show more accurately the damages that the remainder 
will probably sustain by the improvement. It is under this latter 
principle that the Supreme Court of Iowa has held that the plans of the 
proposed improvement, 53 or photographs of, 54 or testimony in regard 
52. Guinn v. Railway Co., 131 Iowa 680, 109 N.W. 209; Close v. 
Samm, 27 Iowa 503 (the purpose of the view was to enable the jury 
better to understand and apply the testimony and not to make them 
silent witnesses in the case); see also Nichols, Ibid. Sections 
18.31 (3d ed. 1950); Orgel, Ibid. Section 129 (2d ed, 1953). 
53. Maxwell v. Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 159, 265 N.W. 899 
(1936) rehearing 271 N.W. 883 (1937) (held, no error to allow the 
chief engineer of the highway commission to introduce the plans 
of the improvement and to testify as to the width of the pavement 
upon similar trunk highways); Ellsworth & Jones v. Railway Co., 
91 Iowa 386,391, 59 N.W. 78. See also St. Louis Ry. Co. v. 
Mitchell, 47 Ill. 165 (1868)(but it was held in the case of Jack-
sonville R.R. Co. v. Kidder, 21 Ill. 134 that i1n assessing 
damages for the condemnation of lands, the plans of the company 
for the construction of the road were admissible in evidence to 
enable the jury to fix the damage with more precision); New York 
Central R.R. Co. v. Domproff, 63 Misc. 211, 116 N.Y.S. 924 
(where the course of a stream will be changed as a result of con-
demnation proceedings by a railroad company, the fact that the 
company is to construct a culvert in their new structure to permit 
water from the old channel to pass off may be considered in re-
duction of damages). 
54. Trachta v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W.2d 849, 
858 (1958); Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W. 2d 85 (1948); 
Maxwell v. Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 159, 265 N.W. 905 
(1936} rehearing 271 N.W. 883 (1937). 
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to the actual finished project55 can be properly considered by the 
jury. Such evidence is admissible as present matter that neces-
sarily and proxi'mately affects the market value of the farm or tract 
as a whole after the taking. 56 
SECTION 33. VALUATION TESTIMONY BY THE OWNER 
. Ordin,ari!_Y an ow~~r ~~slestify as to the valu.e of his propenti.y,' .. be-
fore and ·afteiL c·ondemnatwn : The opposing party 1s left to cross-
55. Koster v. Sioux County , 195 Iowa 214, 191 N.W. 993,994,996 
(the highway had been constructed before the trial in the district 
court and witnesses were able to describe its condition and the 
condition of the farm with the highway actually thereon); Cummins 
v. Des Moines etc. Ry . Co ., 63 Iowa 397 , 401,403, 19 N.W. 
268 (the landowner was permitted against the condemnor's ob-
jections to prove on the trial that the track or road bed of de-
fendant ' s railway as constructed through the premises is in a cut 
about four feet deep); Kemmerer v. Highway Commi ssion, 214 Iowa 
136, 241 N. W. 693 (evidence of an actual constructed cattle Pass 
presented at the trial); Kuk kuk v. Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444 , 449 , 
187 N. W . 209; Guinn v. Railway Co. , 131 Iowa 680, 109 N.W. 
209 (1909)(one of the witnesses in estimating damages took into 
consideration the character of the crossing which had been con-
structed); see also Maxwell v . Highway Commission, 265 N. W. 
899,905 (1936} r ehearing 271 N.W. 883 (1937). Nichols Ibid. 
Section 4 63 (2d ed.). 
56. Maxwell v . Highway C ommission, 223 Iowa 159, 265 N.W. 899 
(1936} rehearing 271 N .W . 883 (1937) . 
57 . Nichols, Ibid. Section 18 . 4 (2)(3d ed. 1950); Appeal of Dubuque-
Wisconsin Bridge Co., 23 7 Iowa 1314, 25 N. W . 2d 3 27, 33 0 
(1946); Olsen v . Lohman, 234 Iowa 580 , 13 N.W.2d 33"2 ~ 339 
(1944); Millard v. Northwestern Mfg . Co., 200 Iowa 1063 , 205 
N. W . 979 , 981 (1925); Kirkwood v. Perry Town Lot & Improvement 
Co., 178 Iowa 248 , 159 N.W. 774 (1916); Leek v. Chesley, 98 
Iowa 593 , 67 N. W. 580 (1896); Sater v. Burlington & Mt. Plea-
sant Plank Road Co., 1 Iowa 3 86 (1855). 
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examination to bring out the basis on which the estimate was 
based. 58. Although usually the fact of ownership is sufficient to 
qualify the witness, 59 in some cases further proof of qualification 
is necessary before the owner may testify; 60 in the absence of such 
proof, the evidence may be excluded. 61 Where an agent of a cor-
porate owner testifies to the value of the land, it is necessary that 
he qualify as to his knowledge of the value of the property. 62 Evi-
dence of a valuation of the property made by the owner may be intro-
duced against him for certain specialized purposes. 63 
SECTION.34 •. QUALIFICATION OF NON~PARTY WITNESSES 
Non-party witnesses may be roughtly divided into two categories, 
expert and non-expert, although the division is by no means clear 
cut. In order to qualify,an·expert·witness, it must be shown that: 
(l) the witness had had dealings or information which has acquainted 
him with values in the vicinity of the land in question, and (2) he 
must be familiar with the property itself, or at least have examined 
it at or about the time of the taking. 64 However, testimony is not 
58. Sater v. Burlington & Mt. Pleasant Plank Road Co., 1 Iowa 386 
(1855). 
59. Appeal of Dubuque-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 237 Iowa 1314, 25 
N.W. 2d 327,330 (1946)(dictum); Olsen v. Lohman, 234 Iowa 
580, 13 N.W.2d 332,339 (1944). 
60. Millard v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 200 Iowa 1063, 205 N.W. 
979 (1925). 
61. Ryan v. Cooper, 201 Iowa 220, 205 N.W. 302 (1925). 
62. Appeal of Dubuque-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 237 Iowa 1314, 25 
N.W. 2d 327,330 (1946). 
63. See Sections 2 7 and 2 8, supra. 
64. Orgel, Ibid. Section 132 (2d ed 1953); Nichols, Section 18.41 
(1)(3d ed. 1950); also see Foster v. U.S., 145 F. 2d 873 (8th 
Cir. 1944) dealing with the degree of familiarity required. 
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confined to the opinion of witnesses whos e occup9-tion is dealing 
with real estate . 65 Non-expert witnesses are usually residents 
in the immediate vicinity of the land in controversy; irrespective 
of their occupation, they are competent witnesses if they have lived 
in the neighborhood long enough to become familiar with land values 
in this area . Such witnesses are not supposed to have scientific or 
superior skill to that of the jurors; however, they do have a peculiar 
knowledge of the facts of the case which the jurors do not, and if the 
court is satisfied that such witnesses have enough knowledge to make 
a contribution of some probative force, their testimony will be ad-
mitted for what it is worth . The trial court's discretion is rarely 
questioned in this particular. 66 In regard to farm land, other evi-
dence is not easily accessible. 67 However , it has been held error 
for the court to single out one class of valuation witnesses by occu-
pation or residence such as neighbors or farmers, and by instructions 
magnify their importame to the jury as witnesses simply because of 
their occupation or residence. 68 
·SECTION 3 5. T.ESTIMONY OF NON- PARTY WITNESSES 
Certain of the evidence problems which arise with regard to the 
65. Nichols , Ibid . , Section448 (2d ed.); Orgel , Ibid. Section 130 
(1st ed.); Town of Cherokee v . S. C. & J. F . Town Lot Co . , 52 
Iowa 279,281 , 3 N.W. 42; Evans v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 
205 Iowa 382, 218 N.W. 66, 67; Millard v. N.W. Mfg. Co., 
200 Iowa 1063, 205 N . W . 979 (barber, bookkeeper, and printer 
were all competent witnesses). 
66. Smalley v. Iowa Pac. Ry. Co., 36 Iowa 571; see also Pingery 
v. Chrokee Des Moines Ry. Co. , 78 Iowa 438, 43 N.W. 285; 
Orgel , Ibid. Section 132 (2d ed. 1953)(indicating that lack of 
experience goes not to the competency of the witness but to 
the weight of his testimony) . Accord , Evans v. Iowa Southern 
Utilities Co. , 205 Iowa 382, 218 N.W. 66, 67; Monson v. 
Chicago & R.I. Ry . Co., 181 Iowa 1534, 159 N.W. 679 (the 
rule as to the competency of witnesses on questions of value 
is to be liberally construed) . 
67 . Cf. Smalley v. Iowa Pac . Ry . Co., 36 Iowa 571,575; Nichols, 
Ibid. Section 18.4(4)(3d ed . 1950)(Nicho1s improperly cites 
Ball v. Keokuk & N. W . Ry. Co . , 74 Iowa 132, 37 N.W. 110 
(188£) as authority) . 
68. Simmons v . Ry. Co. , 128 Iowa 139, 103 N . W. 129 (1905) . 
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testimony of witnesses are peculiar to experts. It should be noted 
that the jury has the exclusive power to judge the weight which 
should be given to expert testimony and may, if it sees fit, dis-
believe the testimony of all the experts. 69 One of the general 
rules of evidence permits testimony by experts in response to 
hypothetical questions, However, the general rule in condemna-
tion law appears to be that the courts do not recognize any highly 
specialized expert in this field who may give an appraisal based 
on hypothetical questions without any acquaintance with the property 
taken. 70 But in Iowa such estimates have been admitted in evi-
dence.7l 
The testimony of all witnesses is subject to certain basic re-
quirements which must be observed or the testimony may be stricken. 
In showing qualifications and laying the foundation, the Iowa court 
has held that it is not error to refuse to strike out testimony of the 
witness of sales whose knowledge thereof was acquired by hearsay. 72 
A witness who has given his opinion as to value may state the 
reason for his opinion. 73 He also has the right to detail matter which 
he took into consideration as furnishing the basis for his estimate of 
damages. 74 The estimate should be rejected where the basis for a 
69. Helm v. Anchor Fire Ins. Co., 132 Iowa 177, 109 N.W. 605 
(1906); Hoyt v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 117 Iowa 296, 
90 N.w. 724 (1902). 
70. Orgel, Ibid. Section 134 (2d ed. 1953). 
71. Hickey v. Webster County, 148 Iowa 337, 127 N.W. 658 (1910). 
72. Winkelman v. Des Moines Ry. Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 
(1883); Wiley v. Dean Land Co., 171 Iowa 75, 153 N.W. 145 
(1915). 
73. McClean v. Chic. etc. Ry. Co., 67 Iowa 568, 25 N.W. 782; 
Smalley v. Iowa Pac. Ry. Co., 36 Iowa 571,574. 
74. Kukkuk v. Des Moines, 193 Iowa 44, 187 N. W. 209; Smalley 
v. Iowa Pac. Ry. Co., 36 Iowa 571,574. 
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test as to its reliability is not furnished by a statement of the facts 
on which it is based , or where the .basis of fact does not appear suf-
ficient. 75 However, if on cross-examination it is revealed that the 
witness's knowledge of land values i s very limited, his testimony 
may not be stricken for that reason but goes to the jury for what it 
is worth. 76 
A witness to. be qualified to testify to the market value of a pro-
perty need not be shown to have been familiar with its value for all 
purposes; it is enough if he knows what it is worth for one or more 
75. Orgel, Ibid. Section 131 (1st ed '. ) "A witness even though he is 
qualified may nevertheless be excluded if it appears that he has 
mistaken the substantive value or has based his opinion on an 
erroneous theory of value. Accord ingly estimates have been 
stricken out which were based on "per sonal value" to the owner, 
or value to the taker , or on value for insurance purposes rather 
than market · value". Thornburg v . Doolittle, 148 Iowa 530, 125 
N. W. 1003 (manager of corporation valuation rejected when no 
basis given for estimate); Neddermeyer v. Crawford County, 187 
Iowa 1025, 175 N.W. 339 , 342 (19l9)(where witnesses based 
their estimates of the value of the property on a consideration of 
benefits, the court could strike such testimony. However, a 
failure to do so was not prejudicial in the light of an instruction 
to the jury not to consider benefit by reason of the establishment 
of the ~highway); Britton v . D.M . Q. & S. Ry. Co., 59 Iowa 540, 
13 N. W. 710 (1882)(where it appears on cross-examination that 
witnesses based their estimates of damage wholly or partially 
on improper grounds, the defendant should move the court to 
strike out the objectionable evidence before asking the Supreme 
Court to reverse the error); Western Newspaper Union v. Des 
Moines, 157 Iowa 685, 140 NoW o 367,370 (in an action tore-
cover damages for the erection of a viaduct by the city, it was 
held error to permit witnesses to base their conclusion as to 
the amount of damage sustained on an investigation of viaducts 
in another city; the situation in the two cities had not been 
shown to be the same); Tracy Vo Mt. Pleasant, 165 Iowa 435, 
14 6 N oW o 7 8, 82 (expert in chemistry not familiar with local 
values not competent to testify as to the value of the land for 
water supply) . 
76 . Winkelman v. Ry . Co ., 62 Iowa 11, 17 NoW. 82. 
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purposes 1 and being thus qualified he may testify to his opinion of 
its value on the market. 77 
If some of the bases of the opinion are legitimate and proper and 
a few are not 1 the opposing party may have the court instruct the jury 
as to the i):llproper bases and their effect upon the testimony of the wit-
ness and his estimate. 78 The court may also strike the t e stimony once 
it becomes apparent that the basis for the witness •s opinion was found-
ed on improper items of damage. 79 Whether the improper bases warrant 
an instruction that the estimate should be totally disregarded, or one 
that merely limits or restricts its effect appears to be a matter which 
has .been left largely to the sound discretion of the trial court . 80 
The witness cannot be asked the value of the property taken , or 
the amount of the damages sustained. Such testimony is said to ursurp 
the province of the jury. However , the witness may be interrogated as 
to the value of the entire tract before and the value of such property 
after the taking disregarding benefits . 81 The case of Harrison v. 
77. Tracy v. Mt. Pleasant, 165 Iowa 435, 146 N.W. 78,84 , 85. 
78 . Smalley v . Iowa Ry . Co . , 36 Iowa 571, 574 . 
79. U.S. v . Foster, 131 F. 2d 3 (8th Cir. 1942) . 
80. Slater v. Plank Road, 1 Iowa 386,393 (1855)(the case sanctions 
an instruction that such an estimate should be totally dis-
regarded); Smalley v . Iowa Ry . Co., 36 Iowa 571; Evans v . 
Iowa Electric Utitlities Co. I 205 Iowa 283, 218 N. W . 66168 
(1928)(approving trial court instructions that limit and restrict 
the effect of such estimates but that do not render them entirely 
nugatory). 
81. On this general problem see Nichols , Ibid. Section 23 . 3 (3d ed. 
1950}; Slater v. Plank Road, 1 Iowa 3861393; Henry v . Dubuque 
& Pac. Ry. Co., 2 Iowa 288,310; Dalzell v . City of Davenport, 
12 Iowa 437, 441; Russel v . City of Burlington, 30 Iowa 362 1 
365; Richardson v. Webster City, 111 Iowa 427; . 82 N.W. 92.0: 
Hartley v. Railway Co., 85 Iowa 455 , 467 , 52 N.W. 352; Ren-
wick v. Railroad Co., 49 Iowa 674; Kukkuk v. Des Moines, 
193 Iowa 444,453, 187 N. W . 209 (The first question was impro-
per . The opinion of a witness as to the amount of damages a 
party has sustained is not admissible . . • but counsel for the 
appellant was evidently content with the question as propound-
ed, and made no objection thereto. The motion to strike as 
incompetent, irrelevant 1 and immaterial was not timely, nor was 
it sufficiently specific. There was no prejudicial error here of 
which appellant can now complain. "}. 
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Iowa Midland R. R. Co., 3 6 Iowa 3 23,3 24, contains a very lucid state-
ment on this important distinction. 82 
An opinion based upon what t he defendant could afford to give rather 
than do without the land should be excluded on the grounds t hat the 
market value is the only proper standard of measuring compensation. 83 
Likewise the value of the land to the condemnor must be excluded. 84 
One of the fundamental problems involved in this area is the pro-
hibition against taking into consideration any advantage which may 
result to the owner as a result of the improvement (Article L Section 
18, Iowa Constitution). This provision has been interpreted as pro-
hibiting testimony on direct examination concerning the value of the 
property after the taking where such testimony rna~ include value re-
sulting from the construction of the improvement. 5 Where the 
82 . "Upon the trial plaintiff introduced several witnesses and asked 
them in substance the following question, ' How much less in 
value was the farm immediately after taking the land for right-
of-way, and i n consequence thereof than it was immediately 
before, not taking into account any supposed benefit to result 
from the building of defendant• s railroad?' This question was ob-
jected to and excluded ••• also plaintiff asked a witness the fol-
lowing question , "State your opinion as to the damage the plaintiff 
sustained as the owner of that farm, by reason of the taking of the 
land by the defendant for the construction of its railroad, not 
taking into consideration any supposed benefit resulting from the 
building of the road? • At the instance of the defendant this ques-
tion was excluded . In these rulings the court held no error. A 
witness, however, testified as to the value of the farm immediate-
ly before the right- of-way was taken and immediately thereafter, 
not taking into consideration the benefits to result from the build-
ing. The evidence the court said 11 is in strict accord with estab-
lished authority and no error. Harley v. K. & N. W. Ry. Co . , 
85 Iowa 455 , 466 . 11 
83 . Tracy v . City of Mt. Pleasant, 165 Iowa 435, 146 N.W . 78, Chic. 
etc. Ry. Co. v. Snyder , 120 Iowa 532, 95 N.W . 183; In re 
Niagara , Lockhart etc. Power Co., 133 Misc. 177, 231 N.Y. S . 
72; Nichols, Ibid. Section 218 (2d ed.). 
84 . U.S . v . Foster , 131 F. 2d 3 (8th Cir . 1942). 
85 . Trachta v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N.W. 2d 849, 
860 (19·57); Neddermeyer v. Crawford County, 187 Iowa 1025, 
175 N. W . 339,342,343 (1919). 
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testimony is given, it should be stricken, and such action by the trial 
court is sufficient to cure the error. 86 Objection to the question should 
be made at the time it is asked, and if the question clearly calls for 
an answer emboyding improper testimony and no objection is made, the 
trial court may refuse a later motion to strike the testimony .. 87 How-
ever, if it is not clear at the time the testimony is given that it is 
improper and that. the question gave no indication that such testimony 
would be forthcoming , then when the improper basis for the testimony 
is discovered on cross-examination , the court should strike_ the tes-
timmw . 88 
A different rule seems to apply where testimony calling for a vah~­
ation which includes the improvement as an item of value is elicited on 
cross-examination. The court has held that questions requiring such 
answers are simply to test the witness~·s· ability as an expert and t hat 
any discrepancies could be cleared up 1on redirect . 89 It would seem 
that this holding affords the condemnor an e.xcellent opportunity to 
show a jury the net effect of the condemnation and hence increase the 
possibilities of minimizing damages. 
SECTION 36. CROSS-EXAMINATION .-AS TO SPECIFIC PARCELS 
Although it is an extablished principle that a witness cannot be 
interrogated as to the value of specific parcels composing the entire 
tract or farm on direct examination and that such inquiry must. be con-
fined to the value of the land as a whole before and after the taking, 
there is no such limitation on cross-examination . A witness in such 
86. Trachta v. Highway Commission, 249 Iowa 374, 86 N. W . 2d 
849 , 860 (1957). 
87. Neddermeyer v. Crawford County, 187 Iowa 1025, 175 N. W . 
339,342:., .343 (1919). 
88. See Footnote 87 1 supra. 
89. Dean v . State, 211 Iowa 143, 233 N.W. 36,39 , 40 (1930). 
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latter situation may be asked the value of specific parcels of the 
whole farm or. tract in order to test his skill or knowledge of land 
values . 90 . 
SECTlON 3 7. LIMITING THE NUMBER OF- WITNESSES 
The trial court may in . its discretion limit the number of valuation 
witnesses on each side , and if this discretion be exercised Y-'ithin 
reason, the appellate court will not treat such limitation as ground 
for new trial. Even though some of the witnesses called under such 
restriction do not possess the qualification necessary to express an 
opinion , such witnesses are counted in computing the designated 
number to a side. 91 
SECTION 38. EVIDENCE OF OFFERS OF COMPROMIS.E OR "SETTLEMENT 
Evidence of offers of compromise may not be introduced into evi~ 
dence as indicating an admission of value on the part of the con-
90 . Dean v . State , 211 Iowa 143 , 222 N.W. 36 {193.0); Welton v. 
Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625 I 233 N. w . . 876 , a~n 
( 11 To avoid confusion in this particular it may be said that a 
cross=examiner is privileged to enter the domain of valuation as 
to separate parcels of the farm. The witness here was being ex-
amined in chief by plaintiff• s counsel as to his value of the· farm 
.by parcels. The law of eminent domain does not contemplate 
that in fixing the value of a farm the plaintiff may cut to pieces 
his farm and a piecemeal valuation be taken as the basis of 
valuation before and after the condemnation. 11 ); Lough v. Min-
neapolis R. R. Co., 116 Iowa 31, 89 N. W. 77 .{11 1t was an 
error to allow the railway company to examine its witnesses 
as to the value of a part of the farm crossed by its road, sepa-
rate from the other portions thereof , since the owne;r was 
entitled to have is farm valued as a whole. 11 ). See also 
Cherokee v. S . C . & I. F. Town Lot & Land·Co., 52 Iowa 279, 
2 81 on this problem . The analogy to the main problem in the 
-last paragraph of Section 35, supra , shou-ld be noted. 
91. Prestonv. CedarRapids , 95Iowa71 , 63. N. W. 577 {seven 
on each side); Everett v. Union Pac. Ry. Co . , 59 Iowa 243, 
13 N. W . 109. 
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demnor. 92 Such a result, of course, is in line with the strong public 
policy favoring settlements. However, it is necessary to show that 
. the offer was made when the d~spute was actually pending , which in 
condemnation seems to cover the period fwm the official determina-
tion to build the facility in question to the trial of the case . 93 
It has .also been held prejudicial error to introduce evidence that 
the plaintiff is the only landowner in the county who has refused to 
settle with the condemnor. 94 
92 . Miller v. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. 1 239lowa 12571 34 
N.W.2d .p27 (1948) . 
93. See Footnote 92 1 supra. 
94 ~ Steensland v. Iowa- Illinois Gas & Electric Co~ 1 .242' Iowa 534 a 
47 N.W.2d 162 (1951); accord~ Basch v.Iowa Power & pght Co., 
lowa __ , 95 N.W. 2d 714 , 717 (1959). 
•. ' ,, 
DNISION VI 
TITLE .TO HIGHWAYS AND THE .. LEGAL. RIGHTS ·ATTACHING ·THERETO 
SECTION 39. CONDEMNED EASEMENT 
a. General Rule 
The general rule is that when land for a highway is condemned, the 
highway authorities take only an easement; 1 t he underlying fee remains 
in the abutting owner . Compensation i s made on t he basis that the 
entire interest of the landowner is take n , si.nce ordinarily nothing of 
value will remain to the landowner . 2 Consequently the failure to in-
struct the jury that the fee title remains in the owner is not reversible 
error . 3 Where mineral resources exist which may be extracted without 
interference with the easement, there is some authority for the proposi-
tion that some value remains in the owner; presumably in that event 
he would be entitled to damages only to his surface interest in the 
1. Comment, 43 Iowa L. Rev . 308,310 (1958); Merritt v. Peet, 237 
Iowa 1200, 24 N. W . 2d 757 (1946}{condemnation of road .to gravel 
pit under Iowa Code Section 4 73.4 (195 0}, now repealed and par-
tially re-enacted in Iowa Code Section 306 . 13 (1958); State v , 
F.W. Fitch Co., 236Iowa 208, 17 N.W. 2d 380 (1945}; Dierk-
sonv. Pahl , 194Iowa713, 190N. W . 423 (1922); Dubuquev. 
Maloney, 9 Iowa 450 (1859)(this case involved city streets and 
involves a special exception to what seems to be the general 
rule that a city takes a fee interest in streets; apparently the 
reason was the mineral wealth underlying the land around Dubu-
que which was of importance at the time the city was establish-
ed. See Dubuque v . Benson, 23 Iowa 24 8 (1867) . , (See Sec. 
3 06A. 5 which provides for fee simple title on controlled access 
facilities). (See also Sec . 4 0 infra). 
2. Smith v. Hall, 103 Iowa 95, 72 N·.w. 427 (1897}; Clayton v. 
Chicago , Iowa & Duluth Ry . Co. , 67 .Iowa 238 , 25 N.W. 150 
(1885). 
3. Clayton v. Chicago , Iowa & Dakota Ry. Co . , 67 Iowa .238,240, 
25 N. W . 150 (1885); Cummins v. Des Moines & St. Louis Ry . 
Co. , 63 Iowa397, 19N. W . 268 (1884); Hollingsworthv. Des 
Moines & St. Paul Ry. Co . , 63 Iowa 443, 19 N.W. 325 (1884) . 
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land. 4 However, where the easement interferes with exploitation 
of the resources, the mineral value of the land may be shown as an 
indication of its market value. 5 It should be noted, however, that 
the owner retains no right in underlying mineral resources when a fee 
is acquired; thus it has been held that an action by the city will lie 
for the recovery of damages for the removal of mineral deposits from 
land underlying a fee interest in a street. 6 
Although an offset is allowed for mineral resources where an ease-
ment is condemned, an interest remaining in the landowner purely be-
cause of the good will of the easement holder may not be shown to 
reduce the damage of the owner of the underlying fee. 7 Since such 
rights may be withdrawn at the discretion of the condemnor, they are 
too insubstantial for consideration. Thus, the only offset which 
appears to be available . .is that for underlying mineral resources, the 
extraction of which may be accomplished despite the easement. 
4. Cummins v. Des Moines & St. Paul Ry. Co., 63 Iowa 397,405, 
19 N. W. 3 25 (1884) (dictum); Hollingsworth v. Des Moines & St. 
Paul Ry. Co., 63 Iowa 443, 19 N.W. 326 (1884); but see, Doud v. 
Mason City & Ft. Dodge Ry. Co., 76 Iowa 438, 41 N.W. 65 
(1888) (this rather confusing case seems to have allowed use of 
value of coal as an indication of market value although no inter-
ference with the owner's right of extraction was shown). 
5. Accord, Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 245 Iowa 
763, 61 N.W. 2d 687 (1954); Hall v. West Des Moines, 245 Iowa 
458, 62 N.W. 2d 734 (1954). 
6. Gilchrist Co. v. Des Moines, 128 Iowa 49, 102 N.W. 38 (1905); 
Davis v, Clinton, 50 Iowa 5 85 (1879); Clinton v. Cedar Rapids 
& Mo. R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, (1868); Des Moines v. Hall, 24 
Iowa 234 (1868)o 
7. Moran v. Highway Commission, 223 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 59 
(1937). See also Sec. 16, supra, on the duty to mitigate 
damages. 
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b. Rights Retained by the Underlying Fee Holder 
A railroad company enjoys full, complete, and exclusive possession 
of the right-of-way and may exclude an abutter from entering upon it at 
will. 8 The abutter ,
9 
of course, retains a right of reverter, and such right 
runs with the land. Where abandonment occurs and the easement is re-
condemned, compensation must be paid to the fee holder again1 0 unless 
a reverter to the grantor is specified in the original grant and such, in-
terest is excepted from subsequent conveyances ,J 1 
However, while technically the right acquired by the condemnor in 
a highway is the same as that in a railroad, 12 the underlying fee hold-
er in a highway has certain rights in addition to the possibility of 
reverter. 13 Certain of these rights are absolute while others are only 
permissive . The absolute rights, which include those rights which the 
condemnor may not take away withc;mt paying additional compensation , 
will be examined first. Highway authorities may not deprive the abut-
ting owner of the right of reasonable access, 14 the right to light and 
8. Pierce v . Houghton , 122 Iowa 477, 98 N. W . 306; Smith v . Hall, 
103 Iowa 95, 72 N.W. 427 (1897); Hiskett v. W. St. L. Ry. Co., 
61 Iowa 647, 16 N.W. 525 (1883); Gerald v. Elley, 45 Iowa 322 
(1876); Hougan v. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 35Iowa 558 (1872). 
9. Waddell v. Board of Supervisors, 190 Iowa 400, 175 N.W. 65,68 
(1919); Smith v. Hall, 103 Iowa 95, 172 N.W. 427 (1 897) . 
10 . Remey v. Iowa Cent . Ry. Co., 116 Iowa 133, 89 N.W. 218 
(1902). 
11. Spencer v . Wabash R. Co., 132 Iowa 129, 109 N.W. 453 (1906). 
12. See distinction between city and country highways noted in foot-
note 1, supra; a l so see Kitzman v. Greenholgh, 164 Iowa 166, 
145 N. W. 505 (1914) on easements in unincorporated villages. 
13 . As to t he reversion of abandoned highways see Kitzman v. Green-
holgh, 164 Iowa 166, 145 N.W. 505 (1914) . 
14 . Iowa Code Section 314. 7 (1958)(see discussion of this section in 
Section 5(a}, supra. Also see Section 4(c)(3), supra. 
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air , 15 and the right to lateral support. 16 Closely related to the above 
rights is the right of the abutting fe e owner to the unaltered flow of 
surface water. Iowa Code Section 314 o 7 (195 8) forbids turning the 
natural drainage of the surface water to the injury of the adjoining own-
er o While sometimes such diversion of surface water arises with re-
spect to an alleged constitutional taking in an attempt to secure 
compensation, 17 the usual object of litigation in regard to drainage 
problems and highways is equitable relief . Highway authorities have a 
duty to permit the escape of water in the natural course of drainage , 18 
and an injured landowner is entitled to relief in the form of orders to 
establish culverts in the natural line of drainage19 and to maintain 
existing drainage facilities located on highwa¥s in operating condition . 20 
However, where the interference with normal drainage was reasonably 
to be expected at the time of condemnation in view of the construction 
problems involved , the court may deny relief on the theory that any 
damage now occurring was embodied in the original award. 21 Where it 
15 . See Section 4(c)(4), supra . 
16. See Section 4(c)(6), supra . 
17. See Section 4(c)(5), supra. 
18. Perkins Vo Palo Alto County , 245 Iowa 725, 64 N. W . 2d 562 (1953); 
Owens v . Fayette County , 241 Iowa 740, 40 N.W.2d 602 (1950); 
Droegmiller v . Olson, 241 Iowa 456 , 40 N.W. 2d 292 (1949); Nixon 
v. Welch , 238 Iowa 34 , 24 N. W. 2d 476 (1947); Jacobson v. Camden 
236 Iowa 976 , 20 N . W . 2d 4.07 (1945); Astor v. Starke, 217 Iowa 
166, 251 N . W . 153 (1933); Estes v. Anderson , 204 Iowa 288 , 213 
N.W. 566 (1927). 
19. Nixon v. Welch , 238 Iowa 34 , 24 N.W. 2d 476 (1947); Jacobson v. 
Camden, 23 6 Iowa 976 , 20 N. W . 2d 40v (1945). 
20 o Perkins v. Palo Alto County , 245 Iowa 725 , 64 N . W . 2d 562 (1953); 
Droegmiller Vo Olson, 241 Iowa 456 , 40 N oW. 2d 292 (1949) . 
21. Blunck v. Chicago&. N.W. RYo Co., 142 Iowa. 146, 120 N . W . 
73 7 (1.909) (no natural channel for the surface water existed and 
trestle work would have been required across the entire bottom). 
See also cases cited in footnote 22 , below. 
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was reasonable at the time of condemnation to expect t hat drainage 
facilities would be established, then the landowner will be entitled 
to additional relief if damage occurs . 22 
A related right of the fee holder is to additional compensation for 
the subsequ~nt establishment of an additional servitude upon the con-
demned easement. The meaning of the term additional servitude is, 
of course, crucial in deciding whether or not compensation i s required. 
Generally , the distinction between the compensable and non-compen-
sable of an improvement on an existing right - of- way is thought to turn 
on whether the new facility is simply an expans ion of the pre-existing 
use or is of an entirely new character; only in the latter case is com-
pensation required . 23 Of course , the court may take a broad or 
narrow view of the character of the original easement; thus it is im-
portant to examine judicial treatment of specific types of original ease-
ment grants as well as the type of additional use established on the 
right-of-way. Thus it has been held that the location of a railroad on 
the right-of- way of an existing highway constitutes an additional 
servitude. 24 It has also been held that the erection of unusual struc-
tures which could not reasonably have been contemplated at the time 
of the original taking justifles the award of additional damages. 25 
22. Albright v. Railway , 133 Iowa 644 , 110 N.W. 1052 (1907); Drake 
v. Chicago , R. I . & P. R. Co ., 63 Iowa 302, 19 N.W . 215 (1884); 
Stodghill v. C . B. & Q . R. Co . , 43 Iowa 26 (1876). 
23. Nichols , Ibid. , Section9,. 21 (eded . 1950). 
24. Nichols , Ibid., Section 10 . 31 (3d ed. 1950); M;cClean v . Chicago, 
Iowa & Dakota R. Co. , 67 Iowa 568, 25 N. W. 782 (1885); Kucheman 
& Hinke v . c . c . & D. Ry . Co ., 46 Iowa 366 (1877). But see, Bar-
ney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 , 341 (1876) and citation of the early 
Iowa cases . 
25. Anderlik v. Highway Commission , 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605, 
(1949)(note discussion of Pillings case which seems to further sup-
port the reasonable anticipation theory and to suggest that where 
the improvement could be anticipated , no damages are recoverable); 
Liddick v. Council Bluffs , 232 Iowa 197 , 5 N.W. 2d 361,381 (1942) 
(it should be noted that this was only an alternate ground for the 
decision; however, the Anderlik case, supra, indicates that this 
position will be followed by the Iowa court). Also see Rhodes v. 
Highway Commission , Iowa __ , 94 N. W. 2d 97 (195 9) which 
distinguishes Anderlik, supra, and Liddick, supra, on the reason-
able anticipation theory. It should be noted, however, that the 
Rhodes case involved a purchase and not the condemnation of land. 
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Where the public lays pipes on the easement , t here is substantial 
unanimity that no additional servitude is thereby created si.nce 
liquids may be transported more conveniently by this method than by 
surface travel. 26 In the majority of jurisdictions it seems to be held 
that telegraph and telephone poles constitute an addit ional servi-
tude . 27 The Iowa courts seem to regard such poles as additiona l 
servitudes although there is considerable reason for doubt u and the 
problem. seems never to have been d irectly faced. 28 
An interesting situation is presented where the c it y attempts to se-
cure compensation for the use of its streets on the grounds that an addi-
tional servitude has been established. Thu s far the effort has been 
unsuccessful in cases involving utility poles and their connecting 
wires . 29 The same rule has not been applied in the case of railroads . 3 0 
However , the court in a subsequent case seems to have indicated that ' 
the state may recover damages for the construction of a p ipeline across 
26. Nichols, Ibid. , Section 10 . 4 (3d ed . 1950); Barney v. Keokuk , 94 
u.s. 324 , 340 (187·6) . 
27 . Nichols , Ibid. , Section 10 . 5(1) (3d ed. 1950) . 
28. Weierhauser v . Cole , 13 2 Iowa 14 , 109 N. W . 3 01 (1 906) . Also 
see State v . Nebraska Telephone Co . , 127 Iowa 194 , 103 N . W . 
120 (1905) wh.ere the question was pas sed over . But see Iowa Ry. 
& Light Corp. v . Lindsey , 211 Iowa 544 8 231 N.W . 461,463 (1930) 
("one of the inducements which led the legislature to grant the 
right to construct these public utiliti es on the highways was un-
doubtedly the fact that it saved them the expense of condemning 
and paying for a right- of=way for their lines .•. "). Iowa· Code 
Sections 488 . 4 and 489 . 14 (1958) provide for condemnation of pri-
vate land but do not make clear whether land subject to an ease~ 
ment is private property which must be condemned . Consequently , 
it would appear that the question i s far from definitely settled in 
Iowa. 
29. Des Moines v . Iowa Telephone Co . , 181 Iowa 1282 , 162 N . W . 
323 0 327 {1917) . 
30. City of Clinton v. C . R. & M . R. Co. o 24 Iowa 455 (1868) 
(however , a separate opinion by Cole , J. took the position that 
the city was entitled to compensation). 
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its highway easements . 31 Whether the distinction between the cases 
lies in the type of improvement constructed 6 c"the_;g0vermmeht unit involved 
or simply the dates of the cases is a matter of conjecture. 
The next group of "rights" belonging to the landowner are signifi-
cant, but they are so substantial as to be labelled permissive , the fee 
owner has certain rights to vegetation growing ·_ on the surface of the 
easement. Thus timber standing on the condemned land, other than 
that necessary for the construction and repair of the impn.wement, re= 
mains the property of the owner. 3 2 When the trees do not obstruct 
travel and their removal is unnecessary to properly improve the high~ 
way , 33 they cannot be removed in opposition to the desires of the fee 
holder. 34 The grass and herbage on the right~of·-way likewis e belong 
to the abutter, and he may remove such grass and herbage or pasture 
his animals along the untravelled portion of the highway so long as they 
do not interfere with travel. 3 5 In addition , the abutting owner may sink 
31. State ex . rel. Board v . Stanolind Pipe Line Q 216_Iowa 436, 249 
. Nj .. w. 366 (1933). 
32. Overman v. May, 35 Iowa 89 p 97 (1872); Preston v. Dubuque & 
D.R. Co. , 11 Iowa 15 (1860); Deaton v. Polk County, 9 Iowa 
594 (1859). 
33. See Iowa Code Section 314 . 7 (195 8). Harrison v. Hamilton County, 
284 N.W. 456 (Iowa 1939)(no Iowa report); Rabiner v. Humboldt 
County, 224 Iowa 1190, 278 N.W. 612 (1938). 
· 34 . Waterbury v . Morphew, 146 Iowa 313, 125 N.W. 205 (1910); Bur-
get v . Greenfield, 120 Iowa 432 , 439, 94 N . W. 933 (1903}; Chris-
man v. Deck p 84 Iowa 344 , 51 N.W. 55 (1892); Quinton v . Burton, 
61 Iowa 471, 16 N.W. 569 (1883); Everett v. Co1,1ncil Bluffs, 46 
Iowa 66 (1877}; Bells v. Belknap, 36 Iowa 583 (1873). 
3 5 . Elliott , On Roads & Streets, Section 3 7 6 . 1; Deaton v. Polk County, 
9 Iowa 594 , 596 (1859) dictum (fee owner may maintain trespass 
against one who puts his livestock into the highway to graze) . 
The right to graze livestock on the highway is severely limited 
by the liability imposed on the owner for damage or al,lto accidents 
caused by them. See Iowa Code Annotated, Section 188 . 6 (1949) 
and cases annotated thereunder. 
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a water course below the highway provided he does not interfere with 
public travel. 3 6 The general rule is that springs belong to the owner 
of the fee and that the owner may dig wells in the right-of-way providing 
he does not interfere with the easement. 3 7 A landowner may also bring 
an action against one who obstructs the highway or against one who re-
mains upon it and refuses to depart. 38 In addition, the landowner may 
make reasonable use of the right-of-way for the loading and unloading 
of merchandise and for the temporary deposit of materials.39 While 
permanent structures may not be erected on the surface even in the 
unused portion of the highway, 40 sub-surface structures, such as 
vaults ,and cellars, may be maintained by the fee holder. 41 
It is suggested that the "rights" enumerated in the preceding para-
graph are merely permissive and that onj::e their existence interferes 
with the needs of the public, they disappear. Nichols asserts that not 
only must an interfering private use give way to a new public use, but 
that the fee owner suffers no compensable damage. 42 This view seems 
36. Nichols, Ibid., Section 10. 211(1)(3d ed. 1950). 
37. Nichols, Ibid., Section 10.22 {&d ed. 1950). However, it has 
been held in Iowa that the existence of the right in a landowner to 
continue use of a well now located in the right-of-way was actual-
ly a privilege and not a right and therefore would not mitigate 
damages. Moran v. Highway Commission, 233 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 
59 {1937). While this case does not constitute a rejection of the 
general rule, it does indicate that these "rights" of the fee owner 
are permissive only and consequently are somewhat insubstantial. 
38. Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa 450 {1859). 
39. Nichols, Ibid., Section 10.211 {3d ed. 1950); Haight v. City of 
Keokuk, 4 Iowa 199 {185 6); .£!.. Sikes v. Town of Manchester, 
59 Iowa 65, 12 N.W. 755 {1882){rights of fee holders not invol-
ved). But see Chapter 319, Iowa Code {195 8). 
40. Nichols, Ibid., Section 10.211 {3d ed, 1950); Iowa Code Section 
319.1 {1958). 
41. Nichols, Ibid., Section 10. 211(1){3d ed. 1950); Dubuque v. Ma-
loney, 9 Iowa 450 {1859)o 
42. Nichols, Ibid., Sections 10.211 (2). 10.34 {1, 2) (3d ed. 1950); 
also see Section 5. 85 and following. 
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to be borne out by Moran v. Highway Commission43 which held that a 
landowner's interest in a well left on the right-of-way after construction 
of a highway was only permissive; such permissive privileges cannot 
be considered in reduction of damages . 44 In addition, since at the time 
of condemnation the condemnor must pay for the _property as though a 
fee had been granted, 45 it would seem unjust to require the condemnor 
to pay again. However, it must be oonceded that Dubuque v . Maloney46 
seems to cut the other way in holding that the city had no right to con-
struct a subterranean cistern below the street. This case is a rather 
old one and the interrelationship between the cistern and the necessity 
of importance of supplying water to the public does not seem to have 
been argued. 4 7 
c. Rights of the Condemnor 
The condemnor also possesses some rights in the land which are 
absolute and some which are conditioned upon specific circumstances. 
The condemning authority has, of course, the right to establish a high-
way on the condemned easement and may locate-the road on any portion 
of the easement without reference to the center line. 48 It (a railroad) 
also has the right to lay additional tracks on the original right-of-~_ · : ~­
way, 49 or may condemn additional right-of-way to establish a parallel 
facility. 50 In addition, the condemnor has the right to use the full 
43. 233 Iowa 936, 274 N.W. 59 (1937) . 
44 . DePenning v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 23~ Iowa 950, 33 N.W. 2d 
503 (1948); Moran v . Highway Commission, 233 Iowa 936, 274 
N.W . 59 (1937). 
45 . See footnote 2 , supra, this Division. 
46. 9Iowa4SO(l859). 
47 . See Nichols, Ibid. , Section 10 . 4 (3d ed. 1950). 
48. Stark v. Sioux City Ry . Co., 43 Iowa 501 (187-6). 
49 . Hileman v. C . G. w. Ry. Co., 113 Iowa 591, 85 N.W. 800 
(1901); But cf. , Henry v. Ry. Co . , 140 Iowa 201, 118 N.W. 
310 (1908) where the original grant was construed as authorizing 
only one track. 
50 . Browrreller v . Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. , 233 Iowa 686, 8 N.W. 
2d 474 (1943). 
r 
l 
{ 
l 
l 
I 
l 
J 
203 
width of the right-of-way, and may remove obstructions located in the 
highway. 51 Chapter 319 of the Iowa Code (195 8) provides for removal 
of all obstructions located within the boundaries of the highway; bill-
boards situated on private property may also be removed if they "ob-
struct the view of any portion of a public highway". 5 2 It has also 
been held, however, that highway authorities must allow the location 
of electric transmission lines wholly within the right-of-way where a 
franchise has been granted by the predecessor of the Iowa State Com-
merce Commission. 53 However, the same case did intimate that when 
the public necessity demands, highway authorities may order the total 
removal of such facilities. 54 Highway authorities may, of course, 
erect signs, lights, and structures which further or promote the safety 
and convenience of travel on the road. 55 However, public buildings 
devoted to non-highway purposes may not be constructed on the high-
way. 56 While the highway authorities have a duty to allow water to 
escape in its natural course of drainage, 57 they may concentrate 
51. Quinn v. Baage, 138 Iowa 426, 114 N.W. 205 (1908); Wheller v. 
Ft. Dodge, 131 Iowa 566,570, 108 N.W. 1057 (1906) (city street) 
("The public right goes to the full width of the street and extends 
indefinitely upward and downward ..• "); Perry v. Castner, 124 
Iowa 386, 100 N.W. 84 (1904)(city street) rehearing 130 Iowa 703 
(1906); Mosher v. Vincent, 39 Iowa 607 (1874). The indicated 
cases involve city streets which may or may not have been ease-
ments and if not, are not precisely in point. 
52. Iowa Code Section 319.10 (1958). 
53. Iowa Ry. & Light Corp. v. Lindsey, 211 Iowa 544, 231 N.W. 461 
(1930)(5-4 decision with rigorous dissent upholding the public 
right in the highway as paramount). 
54. 231 N. W. at 465. It would seem open to the highway authorities 
to deny permission at the outset if they may do so later on. How-
ever, the majority opinion takes the opposite position. 
55. Nichols, Ibid., Section 10.6 (3d ed. 1950). 
56, Pettit v. Grand Junction, 119 Iowa 352, 93 N.W. 381 (1903) 
(town hall, jail, etc. held nuisances in street). 
57. See discussion in Section 39(b), supra. 
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the surface water at one point in the natural watercourse by means of a 
culvert or other device,· even though such concentration .may increase 
erosion on the servient estate . 58 Furthermore, the owner of the servient 
estate may not protect his land by obstructing the flow of such water 
where the result is to back water onto the highway . 59 
. One of the most important property aspects of the public ownership 
of the right-of-way is its immunity from encroachment by abutters. An 
abutter acquires no interest in a highway through maintenance of a fence 
extending into the right-of-way . 60 Nor does he acquire any property 
rights in trees located thereon , even though such trees may not arbitra-
rily be destroyed by highway officials under Iowa Code Section 314. 7 
(1958) . -61 Neither does a landowner acquire any rights. in the water 
course formed by a highway ditch as a result of diverting water into 
it . 62 However D a water course along a highway may become the natural 
58. Owens v. Fayette County , 241 Iowa 740, 40 N.W . 2d 602 (1950); 
Herman v. Drew , 216 Iowa 315, 249 N.W. 277 (1933); Hayes v. 
Oyer , 164 Iowa 697 , 146N.W. 857 (1914); accord, Jacobsenv . 
Camden , 236 Iowa 976, 20 N.W.2d 407 (1945). 
59 . Herman v. Drew , 216 Iowa 315 , 249 N. W. 277 (1933). 
60. Richardson v . Derr:y" 226 Iowa 178, 284 N.W . 82 (1939) (see ex-
tensive list of supporting Iowa decisions cited therein); Rabiner v . 
Humboldt County , 224 Iowa 1190, 278 N. W. 612 (193 8}. 
61. Harrison v. Hamilton County , 284 N.W. 456 (Iowa 1939)(no Iowa 
report); Rabiner v. Humboldt County, 224 Iowa 1190 , 278 N.W. 
612 (193 8) . Also see Section 5 (a), supra. 
62. Droegmiller v . Olson, 241 Iowa 456, 40 N.W. 2d 292 (194.9); 
accord, Wheatley v. Cas1s County, 239 Iowa 932, 31 N.W. 2d 
871 (194 8) (this case affirms the basic proposition but involves a 
change in water course made by the highway officials. T-he land-
owner had constructed improvements in reliance on the altered 
channel and alleged equitable estoppel; the court rejected the 
argument saying no damage was indicated. It would seem that it 
may still be possible to use this argument successfully if damage 
can be shown) . 
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water course where the alteration is made by the highway officials at 
the request of the landowner. 63 The basis for all these decisions 
seems to be the principle that neither the statute of limitations or the 
doctrine of prescriptive right can be urged against the public. 64 
The condemnor also has certain more or less permissive rights 
which allow it the use of earth, gravel, timber, etc. found on the 
right-of-way. With respect to railroads, Iowa Code Section 4 71. 6 
(1958) specifically confers the power to use such materials for. the 
construction and repair of the railway and its appurtenances. 65 No 
statute appears to make a specific grant of such power to highway 
officials, but the use of such materials seems to be implied in the 
power to construct highways, 66 
63. Perkins v. Palo Alto County, 245 Iowa 725, 64 N.W.2d 562 
(1953). Compare Wheatley v. Cass County, 239 Iowa 932, 31 
N.W.2d 871 (1948). 
64. Droegmiller v. Olson, 241 Iowa 456, 40 N.W. 2d .292 (1949); 
Wheatley v. Cass County, 239 Iowa 932, 31 N.W. 2d 871 
(1948); Brightman v. Hetzel, 183 Iowa 385, 167 N.W. 89 
(1918); Pettit v. Grand Junction, 119 Iowa 352, 93 N.W. 381 
(1903). Note, however, that a condemnor may acquire a pre-
scriptive right in a landowner's drainage system. Grimes v. 
Polk County, 240 Iowa 228, 34 N.W. 2d 767 (1949). 
65. For interpretation see Winkelmans v. Des Moines N. W, R. Co., 
62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82 (1883); Preston v. Dubuque & Pac. R. 
Co., 11 Iowa 15 (1860); Henry v. Dubuque & Pac. R. Co., 2 
Iowa 288 (1855); Vermilya v. Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 
66 Iowa 606, 24 N.W. 234 (1885), sometimes thought to con-
stitute a restriction on the use of such materials for construc-
tion of appurtenances at a distance from the land condemned, 
deals only with a deed which the court regarded as more rE-
strictive than the title acquired by condemnation. 
66. Nichols, Ibid., Section 10. 2( 2) (3d ed. 1950), But see, Iowa 
Code Sec. 314, 7 (195 8) establishing restrictions on cutting of 
trees on the right-of-way. 
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However, highway authorities may make only reasonable use of 
materials found on the easement . 67 With today' s road construction 
methods it seems unlikely that materials other thi:m earth necessary 
for grading p).lrposes will be necessary, and no cases seem to exist 
in this area other than those connected with destruction of access 
under Iowa Code Section 314 . 7 (1958} and its -various predecessors . 
Where gravel is . needed for highway purposes, specific statutory pro-
visions may be used to condemn gravel pits and roads leading thereto. 68 
SECTION 4 0. CONDEMNED FEE SIMPLE 
The condemnation by the Iowa State Highway Commission of a fee 
simple estate was authorized by Section 5 , Chapter 148, 56th General 
Assembly, Iowa Code Section 306A.5 (1958) which took effect July 41 
1955. Until that time only easements had been acquired as a result of 
condemnation. So far as is known , no case has been decided with re-
gard to the legal relations between the condemnor and adjoining. land-
owners where the condemnor holds a fee estate. Since the statute also 
authorizes condemnation of the "rights of access, air 1 :view , and 
light" and since such clauses may easily be inserted in every condem-
nation, 69 it would seem that all the problems with regard to -these 
rights would be eliminated where the Highway Commission condemns a 
fee . All of the so-called "permissive" rights of the landowner as well 
as his r~ght to the underlying mineral resources would clearly seem to 
be destroyed as the adjoining landowner no longer has any property 
interest in the right- of-way, which was not the case where the-State 
67 . Overman v . May , 35 Iowa 89 (1872)(held that use of stone quarried 
from the bed of that portion of a river spanned by a highway bridge 
for repair of other city streets and construction of culvert was un-
reasonable). 
68. Iowa Code Section 389.43 (1958) allows condemnation by cities 
and towns either within or without the city limits. Iowa Code 
Sections 309 . 63 , 309.66 and Section 306.13 (1958} permits 
acquisition of gravel pits by highway off~cials. Prospecting for 
such gravel pits is allowed by Iowa Code Section 314. 9 (195 8}. 
69. For such a clause as inserted. in a purchase agreement 1 see 
Rhodes v . Highway Commission, Iowa __ , 94 N. W. 2d 97 
(1959). 
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held only an easement . 70 However a the duty which presently exists to 
maintain the unaltered flow of surface water would seem. to apply to 
highway officials even though a fee title is held. This duty, unlike 
the relationships enumerated above , has nothing to do with the property 
rights arising out of condemnation but stems instead from the concept 
of dominant and servient estates in drainage law. Since the duties 
imposed upon highway officials in the easement .situation are similar · 
to those placed upon a private owner of a fee estate , there is no reason 
for supposing the rule is differef).t where highway authorities hold a 
similar estate. 
As indicated above , there is no direct authority on this problem. 
The only relevant cases are those dealing with c ity streets in cases 
where the city holds a fee interest. As indicated by footnote 1, suiipr& , 
this Division, the type of interest held by the city in its .streets varies 
from city to city depending upon the original dedication or the manner 
of platting. Unfortunately in most of the cases the courts do not seem 
to have indicated the state of the title to the streets involved in the 
litigation. This seems to indicate that as far as .the court was concern-
ed very little turned on the type of interest pr~sent ~ In fact Nichols 
asserts that the difference. l;>etween an easement and a fee , both having 
been condemned for highway purposes . was for many years regarded as 
a mere technicality. 71 Consequently it is doubtful whether the limited 
quantity of existing authority is of much value in dealing with problems 
arising under the Highway Commission's new authority to acquire a 
fee interest by condemnation . 
SECTION 41. ACQUISITION OF .. LAND BY PURCHASE 
The general rule concerning title acquired by condemnation is that 
in the absence of a contrary statutory provision , the title acquired is 
no greater than that necessary for the purposes taken . This means 
that in the vast majority of the cases in which condemnation is resort-
ed to the condemnor will take an easement and not a fee title. What 
right is taken when the condemnor purchases land in .lieu of condemna-
tion. 
70. See Des Moines v. Halle 24 Iowa 234 (1868). 
71. Nichols, Ibid. , Section 10. 22 (3d ed . 195 0). See also. Barney 
v. Keokuk , 94 u.s . 324,341 , 3:42 (1876) which discusses the 
Iowa cases and observes that nothing seems to turn on whether 
the city holds the fee or only an easement. 
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First of all I it should be noted that where the voluntary conveyance 
of the landowner is limited to an easement or to a right-of-way, the 
condemnor takes no greater interest than that specified in the deed . 72 
Likewise, there will be no difficulty where the statute allows condemna-
tion of a fee interest , 73 and the purchas e is in lieu of condemnation. 
The issue of what title is acquired by purchase is raised where the 
deed purports to transfer a fee interest or is so interpreted by the 
courts 1 and the statute allows the acquisition of a mere easement 
when condemnation is employed. 
The Iowa law on the subject is a .rather curious blend of c onflicting 
statutes supplemented by a small body of case law . Iowa Code Section 
4 71. 5 {195 8) provides that certain persons and agencies may purchas e 
land in lieu of condemnation but may acquire only such title to the land 
as would have been obtained by condemnation. To whom does this sta-
tue apply? 
Clearly it does not apply to railroad corporations. Thi s type of 
condemnor does not seem to be covered by the language of the statute , 74 
apd the case law appears to be settled that a railroad may acquire fee 
title by deed on an appropriate conveyance. 75 
Is the Highway Commission limited in the rights which it may ac-
quire by Iowa Code Section 4 71. 5 (195 8)? The statute does include the 
word "commission" within the agencies which are controlled by the 
statute. However, it is suggested that the probable intention of the 
statute was a reference to those persons and agencies .granted the power 
72. Smith v. Hall, 103 Iowa 94, 72 N.W. 427 (1897); Brown v. Young, 
69 Iowa 625, 29 N.W. 941 (1886); Vermilya v. Chicago, M. & St. 
Paul Ry. Co., 66 Iowa 606, 24 N. W. 235 (1885). Also note inter-
pretation of the Smith case in Watkins v. Iowa Central Ry . Co. , 
123 Iowa 390, 98 N .W. 910,914 (1904) which was followed in 
Montgomery County v . Case, 212 Iowa 73, 232 N.W. 150,154(1930). 
73. Iowa Code Section 306A.5 (1958) . 
74 . As will be discussed later, Iowa Code Section 471.5 (1958) seems to 
apply only to agencies and persons deriving their power to condemn 
under Iowa Code Section 471.4 (1958). Railroads derive their 
power from a separate and specific grant in Iowa Code Section 
471.6(1958). 
75. Watkins v . Iowa Central Ry. Co., 123 Iowa 390, 93 N.W. 910, 
914 (1904). 
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of eminent domain by the preceding Code provision, Iowa Code Section 
471.4 (19~8}. The Highway Commission derives its power to condemn 
from a specific section of the Code , Section 306 . 13 (1958) which in-
cludes the authority to purchase land . 76 Unfortunately the statute 
uses the word "right-of-way" which in the interpretation.:; pf deeds at 
least has been held to grant an easement only . 77 Cutting. against the 
easement theory , however , is Iowa Code Section 3 06, 16 (195 8} which 
gives the Highway CommisS.ion the authority to sell, subject to the 
approval of the Executive Council , "any tract or parcel of land" which 
is not required for highway purposes. Use of the quoted language in-
stead of "right- of-way" would seem to indicate the sale of land to 
which a fee title existed. Moreover, the value of a mere easement 
would be of such dubious value that the reference must be to property 
held by the Highway Commission in fee . Since this section of the Code 
antedated the only provision authorizing acquisition of a fee by condem-
nation, Iowa Code Section 306A. 5 (1958}, the statute must, therefore 1 
assume that fee title may be acquired by purchase since ordinarily only 
an easement is taken through condemnation . 
The issue of what title is acquired by pu~chase where the Highway 
Commission is involved has probably been rendered moot , at least 
where land for a controlled access highway is being acquired. Iowa 
Code Section 306A. 5 (1958) allows the acquisition of property by "gi_ft , 
devise , purchase, or condemnation" and specifies that "all property 
rights acquired under the provisions of this chapter shall be in fee 
simple ... " (emphasis supplied); consequently, it would seem that a fee 
title is taken by the Highway Commission no matter what method of ac-
quisition is employed as long as land for a controlled access facility 
is involved. 
However, except for the state and its agencies and railroad cor_pora-
tions , it would seem that in accordance with Iowa Code Section 4 71.5 
76. Rhodes v . Highway , Commission, Iowa , 94 N.W.2d 97, 
100 (1959). 
77. See Smith v. Hall, 103 Iowa 95 , 72 N.W. 427 (1897) as interpr et-
ed by Montgomery County v. Case, 212 Iowa 73 , 232 N.W. 150 , 
154 (1930) and Watkins v. Iowa Central Ry . Co., 123 Iowa 390, 
98 N.W • . 910 , 914 (1904) . 
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(195 8) the property interest acquired by purchase may not exceed that 
which would be taken by condemnation . 
As has been indicated by prior footnotes, where the condemnor may 
take a greater right in the land than he would take by condemnation, 
the right transferred depends upon the intent of the parties as manifest-
ed in the conveyance and !interpreted by the courts . Where a "right-
of-way" is conveyed f the courts have held that an easement only has 
been granted. 78 The language of a conveyance is also important where 
a right, not ordinarily present where land is acquired by condemnation , 
is given to the landowner in such instrument . 79 
Where the landowner has executed a voluntary conveyance, he may 
not thereafter institute condemnation proceedings to compel a taking of 
his land in that manner. 80 If the conveyance is alleged to be voidable 
on some grounds, it must first be set aside in appropriate proceed-
ings. 81 However, the condemnor may not protect himself by instituting 
condemnation proceedings to enforce the agreement but must us e speci-
fic performance or an action for damages. 82 
78. Smith v. Hall, 103 Iowa 95 , 72 N.W. 427 (1897); Brown v . Young, 
69 Iowa 625 , 29 N.W. 941 (1886); Vermilya v. Chicago, M . & St . 
P. Ry. Co., 66 Iowa 606, 24 N.W. 235 (1885); cf.Spencer v. Wa-
bashR. Co., 132 Iowa 129, 109 N.W. 453 (1906) (grant of land 
was for "railroad purposes" and the case seems to suggest that 
only a right-of-way was conveyed) . 
79. E.g. Licht v. Ehlers, 234 Iowa 1331, 13 N.W.2d 688 (1944)(hold-
ing that grant requiring the establishment of a cattle pass implicit-
ly required the county to maintain it). 
80. G.B. & St. Louis Ry. Co . v. Bentley, 62 Iowa 446, 17 N . W . 668 
(1883); Chicago r S.W.R. Co. v. Swinnery , 38 Iowa 182 (1874) 
(railway company may compel specific performance of a contract 
to convey a right-of-way after complying with the conditions pre-
cedent, and enjoin an assessment of damages under condemnation 
proceedings). 
81. G.B. & St. Louis Ry . Co . v. Bentley, 62 Iowa 447, 17 N.W. 668 
(1883). See also Morling v . Burlington R. Co. , 67 Iowa 331, 25 
N. W. 268 (1885)(railroad held entitled to equitable relief ·where 
condemnation papers had been lost and plaintiff landowner had 
commenced an action in trespass). 
82. Burnell v. Waterloo, C. F. & N. Ry . Co. , 173 Iowa 441, 155 
N.W. 809 (1916) . 
l 
l 
l 
l 
t 
I 
1 
/ ~ 
\ i 
. j 
l 
DIVISION VII 
CHANGE OF GRADE 
SECTION 4 2. CHANGE OF GRADE AND THE IOWA CONSTITUTION 
The Iowa law on change of grade involves a specialized statutory 
scheme dealing '!Vith the liability of municipal authorities for change of 
grade. Chapter 3 89 of the Iowa Code (195 8) deals with the general 
establishment of streets and public grounds; the spe cific liability of 
the city for change of grade is spelled out in Iowa Code Sections 
389.20-389.22 (1958). For years the cases have been concerned 
with the interpretation of these basic statutes and the results of this 
interpretative process are the principal subject of Division VII; however, 
as a result of new cases which have broadened the constitutional con~ 
cept of a taking, 1 there is now reason for questioning the constitution-
qlity of at least some parts of the underlying statutory scheme upon 
which the case law has been created . 
One of the few cases in which the constitutionality of the change 
of grade statutes seems to have been raised is TalBott Bros. v. Des 
Moines; 2 in that case the court held that the damage yv.hich resulted 
was caused by bringing the street to tne originally established grade, 
and therefore under the statute it was non-compensable. The court 
then turned to the plaintiff's constitutional argument that a ta)<ing had 
occurred by virtue of the loss of lateral support caused by the change 
of grade and that the statute constituted no defense to the action of 
the city. After extended consideration of for.eign authority, the court 
held that the damage suffered by the plaintiff was consequential and 
hence non-compensable. The court saw plaintiff's damage as simply 
the sacr.ifice which a private citizen must make for the public good . 
Against this background Lidoick v. Council Bluffs3 must be 
examined with some care . It should be noted that the fir.st di·vision 
of the opinion deals with change of grade. The court held-that an 
1 . See Section 4 (a), supra. 
2 . 134 ~owa 113, 109 N.W. 311 (1906). 
3 . 239 Iowa 197, 5 N.W . 2d 361 (194.2) • 
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original grade had been established, that the proposed viaduct was a 
change of that grade, and therefore the city was liable un~er the change 
of grade statute for damages. However, the court did not rest with t his 
conclusion, which would have been sufficient; . it w ent on to hold 
against the city on an alternative ground. 4 The court re-examined the 
doctrine of consequential damage and held that the destruction or sub-
stantial interference with the rights of access, light , air or v iew was 
a "taking" within the purview of Section 18, Article I of the Iowa Con-
stitution. 5 The court reached this result by considering property as a 
bundle of rights consisting of those listed above plus the r ight to 
"support of soil" , 6 the interference with which results in a t a king . 
The court observed that , on principle , loss of support and of the rights 
of access, light and air should be treated alike and specifically over-
ruled such parts of Talcott as were contrary to. that c onclusion . 7 
What is the effect of this decision and the reasoning behind it on 
the change of grade statutes? It seems quite clear from Liddick , that 
whenever a change of grade causes substantial. impairment with the 
rights of access, light, air , view8 and lateral support, the statute will 
provide no defense to an action for damages brought by the landowner . 9 
Probably the most sli:g11ificant issue now is the extent to which the r eason-
4 . Any doubts that the second division was dictum were conclusively 
resolved by Anderlik v. Highway Commission( 240)owa 919 , 38 
N. W. 2d 605 (194 9) which followed Liddick where no change of 
grade issue was involved. 
5. 5 N. W. 2d at 3 79 . Also see Iowa Code Section 3 89. 23 (195 8) 
which appears to have codified the Liddick holding on it s facts . 
6. 5 N. W. 2d at 3 7 4 . 
7. 5 N. W. 2d at 3 83 . 
8. These rights are now guaranteed by statute as well . See Iowa Code 
Section 3 89. 23 (195 8). 
9 . In such cases in the future it may be important whether the city pro-
ceeds under the power of eminent domain or under the change of 
grade statute because a different measure of damages is applied. 
Thus where condemnation is employed, no benefit to the landowner 
may be considered under Article I, Section 18, of the Iowa Con-
stitution . However , benefit may be considered under the change 
of grade statute. For example , in a situation in which the city 
sought to establish a viaduct on a controlled-access highway, it 
could condemn the rights of access , air , light , etc . under Iowa 
Code Section 306A.3 (1958) or it could simply pay damages for 
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9-cont. changing the grade under Iowa Code Section 3 89. 22 (195 8). 
The. latter might well be cheaper, and there is clearly an unre-
solved question as to whether the city may make an election as 
to the method of paying damages . A variant on this situation .. 
would be presented where city officials built the viaduct as a 
change of grade in order to use the offset for benefit in com-
puting damages and where the viaduct is built at the instance 
of highway officials, to whom the change of grade statutes do not 
apply. Iowa Code Section 3 89. 23 (195 8), which to some extent 
codifies Liddick, is not specific on this . general problem but seems 
to cut against allowing an offset for benefit. In view of the gen-
eral constitutional rule it would seem that the exception should be 
specifically mentioned which it is not. 
214 
-ing of Liddick, will be applied to other property "rights". It is plain 
. that city officials may not ipterpose the statute as an absolute defense 
to an action for damages; neither may they escape liability by describ-
ing the damages as "consequential" . The question will be whether or 
not a property right recognized by the court has been abridged . The 
usual damages in change of grade cases seem to be for destruction. of 
trees, shrubbery , lawns , etc. as well as the creation of inconven-
ience , all of which result in depreciating the value of the property . In 
classifying property rights the court in Liddick declared: 
11 Keeping in mind, that property is not alone the 
corporal thing, but consists also in certain rights 
~ . therein created and sanctioned by law, of which , 
with respect to land, the principle ones are the 
right of user and enjoyment, right of exclusion, 
right of disposition, and lesser ones, included in 
the right of user and enjoyment, are rights to access, 
light, air, view 1 support of soil , to be protected from 
unreasonable uses of neighboring property, to be pro-
tected in the natural flow of water, it is clear that the 
corporal thing is taken, that property is taken, pro 
tanto, when any one or more of these rights are taken , 
of which property consists. 11 1 0 
The key question for future decision will be whether damages of the 
type suggested above will be regarded as an interference with the. right 
of "user and enjoyment". Since the court classified this right as pri-
mary , constitutional protection would seem to follow a fortiori if such 
damages do fit within "user and enjoyment". In short, it is apparent 
that the change of grade statutes now afford a much more limited pro-
tection than was formerly the case; the extent of this limitation is 
still undetermined however. 
It should be noted , however, that the conclusions suggested in the 
.paragraph above are based on the reasoning of the court in prior cases 1 
10. 5 N. W. 2d at 3 74. 
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particularly Liddick. ·11 There has as yet been no direct holding in a 
fact situation involving a municipal act where the change of.grade 
statutes would excuse liability and the Constitution would impose it. 12 
Jn Hathaway v. Sioux City13 the liability of the city for destroying 
the right of access t o a street was raised on the theory that a taking 
of such right had 0ccurred and also that a change of grade had taken 
place. ::£'he court held for the landowner on the taking theory and did 
not di~Euss the city's liability for the change of grade. In the only 
other post-Liddick case to consider liability of the city for a c hange of 
grade , the argument that a constitutional taking had occurred was not 
made.14 . 
Probably the best argument available to the c ity is t hat based on 
. Iowa Code Section 389.23 (1958). Inasmuch as that provision codifies 
the Liddick case on its facts 8 it i s certainly open to argument that the 
intention of the Legislature was to confine recovery to that specific fact 
situation and none other . However f even on its face, t he statute dea ls 
only with overhead crossings and therefore probably does not provide 
much indication of a comprehensive legislative intent to confine t he 
scope of application of the Liddick opinion. More important , this pro-
vision is only a statute and cannot deprive a landowner of constitutional 
rights, if they exist. Ultimately then, it seems likely that the courts 
will be thrown back to an analysis of the reasoning of the Liddick case 
and a consideration of the relevant policy considerations i n deciding how 
far the constitutional protection of the landowner exists in· this area . 
11. However , the court ' s opinion at the close of Division I at 3 71 of 
5 N. W. 2d contains some rather surprising language . In referring 
to the statutory right to damages for a change of grade, the court 
said , "It is true that the right to recover damages is purely statu-
tory and is not a ' taking' under the constitution •••. " In view of 
the holding in the following division that the city's proposed action 
amounted to a taking, this language is hard to explain unless it 
means simply that damage does not constitute a taking unless it 
results from the destruction of what Division II recognizes as a 
property right. 
12 . However, the overruling in Liddick of Lingo v. Page County , 201 
Iowa 906 , 208 N. W. 3 27 (1926); Pillings v. Pottawattamie County, 
188 Iowa 567, 176 N.W. 314 (1920); and particularly Talcott Bros. 
v. Des Moines, 134 Iowa 113 , 109 N.W. 311 (1906)would seem 
to come very close to such a holding. 
13 . 244 Iowa 508 , 47 N.W. 2d 228 (1953) . 
14. Tillotson v . W indsor Heights , 249 Iowa 684 , 87 N.W. 2d 21 (1957). 
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The remaining sections of this Division deal with the interpretation 
of the change of grade statutes. However , in view of the serious ques-
tions which now exist as to the immunity afforded municipal authorities 
by the change of grade statutes, a certain amount of caution about the 
authority cited herein should be observed. 
SECTION 43. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHANGE OF GRADE 
In Iowa the general constitutional provision affords no remedy to 
abutting owners for a change of grade per se. 15 Furthermore, no 
remedy for the landowner existed at common law. 16 Consequently 
it became necessary to enact a statutory provision in order to prevent 
what was regarded as an injustice in denying recovery to the landowner. 17 
Thus it is important to remember~.t.thatdJa.IP.~Jit:Y>i-fQr tJi 1.C.bsmg~f gflgraqe .p~r: ; se 
is purely statutory and that the city may avoid liability by complying 
with the statutory scheme; however , even a slight deviation from the 
specified procedure for establishing grade will result in liability. 18 
It should be noted , however , that the liability of the city may exceed 
that imposed by statute when, as a result of the change of grade , other 
property rights of the landowner , such as rights of access, air, light, 
etc. are damaged or destroyed. In this situation the Constitution applies 
and the condemnor will be required to pay damages. 19 
15. The statutory provision is the exclusive and sole remedy for such 
change. Creal v. Keokuk, 4 Green 4 7; Cotes v. Davenport, 9 
Iowa 227;, Cole v. Muscatine, 14 Iowa 296; Burlington v. Gilbert , 
31 Iowa 356; Cheisa v. Des Moines, 158 Iowa 343, 138 N. W. 922; 
Russel v. Burlington , 30 Iowa 262. But see Section 42, supra . 
16 . Liddick v. Council Bluffs , 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W. 2d 361 (1942); 
Reilly v. Ft . Dodge , 118 Iowa 633 , 63 5, 92 N. W. 887 (1894); Rus-
sell v. City of Burlington, 30 Iowa 262 (1870); Cole v. City of 
Muscatine , 14 Iowa 296 (1862); Cotes & Patchin v. Davenport, 9 
Iowa 227 (1859); Creal v. City of Keokuk , 4 Greene 47 (Iowa 1853) . 
17. Liddick v. Council Bluffs , 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361,370 (1942). 
18. ~, Tillotson v. Windsor Heights , 249 Iowa 684 , 87 N.W. 2d 21 , 
(195 7) 0 
19 . See Section 42, supra. 
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The general statutory provision allowing a remedy for change of 
grade was enacted in 1872.20 With slight changes in phraseology 
to clarify its meaning it was carried into the Code of 1873. 21 This 
enactment, as one of the conditions to warrant recovery, required the 
improvements to be made "on such street or alley". In the Code of 
189722 the statute was altered into its present form. The substitu-
tion of the word "same" for ., such street or alley" was of no signifi-
cance, but the insertion of the phrase "or lots abutting thereon" 
immediately after such word was important. In Richardson v. Sioux 
City23 it was construed to give the word "on" a more literal meaning 
than as defined in Hempstead v. Des Moines 24 and to afford abutting 
owners redress for injuries to residential parking. 
SECTION 44. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPENSATION 
The statutory remedy for change of grade provides that, "when any 
city or town shall have established the grade of any street or alley and , 
any person shall have made improvements on the same, or lots abutting 
thereon , accor.ding to the established grade thereof, and such grade 
shall thereafter be altered in such manner as to damage, injure or 
diminish the value of such property so improved, said city or town shall 
20. Fourteenth General Assembly Chapter 40 , Section 1 (1872); see 
Slatten v. Des Moines Ry. Co. (1870) , 29 Iowa 48; Des Moines 
City Ry. Co. v. Des Moines, 205 Iowa 495, 216 N.W. 284 . 
Prior to 1872 there were specific charter provisions for various 
cities. Davenport, Section 8 of Chapter 90 (1857); Muscatine , 
Chapter 50 (1855); Keokuk, Chapter 17 (1856). 
21. Iowa Code Section 469 (187-3). 
22. Iowa Code Section 785 (1897). 
23. Richardson v. Sioux City , 136 Iowa 436, 113 N.W. 928. 
24. Hempstead v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa 303, 3 N.W . 123 (1879). 
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pay to the owner of such property the amount of such damage or in:o- · 
jury." 25 
In Vilas v. C . M. & St. Paul Ry. Co. 2 6 the court stated that five 
elements must be present to entitle the abutter to compensation: (1) a 
grade must be established by ordinance; (2) the lot owner must have 
improved his lot with reference to the grade so established; (3) a new 
and different grade subsequently must have been established by ordi-
nance; (4) the municipality must have changed the physical grade to con-
form to the new paper grade; and (5) in consequence thereof the own·er' .. s 
property must have been damaged 1 injured or diminished in value . This 
analysis I although too general to be accurate in all respects I is never-
theless helpful in hastily checking cases arising under the statute. 
a. Establishment of Grade 
(1) A Grade Must Be Established by Ordinance 
It is well understood that the manner in which the grades of streets 
are established is by ordinance. 2 7 Establishing a grade does not mean 
the actual raising or lowering of the surface of the street. It means the 
fixing of a base line or place of reference 1 and certain measurements 
from that plane. Where that has been done by ordinance and the measure-
ments made 1 the owners of property by an examination of the records of 
the council may readily determine the established grade of the street 
adjacent to their property 1 and improve their premises with reference 
thereto. 28 
The ordinance in and of itself must establish the place or reference 
line . An ordinance stating that a permanent grade is hereby established 
and that an engineer is to be employed at once to establish such grade 
is not sufficient. At most 1 it is merely a provision for establishing the 
25. Iowa Code Section 389.22 (1958). 
26. 174 Iowa 1244, 162 N.W. 795. 
27. Iowa Code Section 3 89. 20 (195 8). 
28. Kipple v. Keokuk , 61 Iowa 653 , 6561 17 N.W. 140. 
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the grade in the future . 29 
Such an ordinance must be duly passed, recorded and published in 
conformity with the provisions relating to ordinances of a general and 
permanent character contained in Chapter 3 66 of the Iowa Code 
(195 8). 3 0 The grade cannot be established by the city by the mere 
acts of its officers in lowering or raising the grade , 31 or by the pass-
ing of a mere resolution by the council . 3 2 Further , a municipality can-
not acquire a right to a grade by mere implication from the establishment 
of grades in connecting or neighboring thoroughfares . 33 
(2) Changing the Surface of the Street Without An 
Ordinance Unlawful 
The consequence of changing the surface of a street without estab-
lishing a grade to which the street improvement completed should con-
form is very severe. The rule firmly settled in this jurisdiction is that 
"a city has no authority to change the grade of a street or sidewalk 
except upon the adoption of an ordinance fixing the grade, and in the 
absence of such an ordinance it is liable for any change" . A right of 
action will lie even though the element of reliance on the established 
grade be lacking and even if such alterations are made prior to the es-
29. Blanden v . Fort Dodge, 102 Iowa 441 , 71 N . W. 411. 
30. Tillotson v . Windsor Heights , 249 Iowa 684 , 87 N . W . 2d 21 (1957); 
Peoples Inv. Co. v . Des Moines , 213 Iowa 1378, 241 N.W . 464; 
Walter v. City of Ida Grove , 203 Iowa 1068, 213 N.W. 935 (1927); 
McManus v. Hornaday , 99 Iowa 507 , 68 N. W. 812 (publication 
required) . See Collins v. Iowa Falls , 146 Iowa 305 , 125 N .W. 
226. Formerly a two- thirds vote of the city council seems to 
have been required to adopt; see Iowa Code Section 793 (1897). 
Now <_' a majority is all that is necessary , _Iowa Code Section 
366.4 (1958). 
31. Tillotson v. Windsor Heights , 249 Iowa 684 , 87 N . W. 2d 21 , 23, 
(1957); Brown v . City of Sigourney , 164 Iowa 184 , 145 N.W. 
478. 
32. McManus v. Hornaday , 99 Iowa 507 , 68 N.W. 812 . 
33. Morton v . Burlington, 106 Iowa 50, 75 N . W . 662 • 
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tablishment of any fixed grade. 34 Further, an injunction will lie to 
restrain the city from proceeding with the work, until it has passed 
such ordinance. 35 
(3) Resolution Directing Work 
Once the grade has been established a considera_ble time may elap-
se before any attempt on the part of the city is made to bring the sur-
face of the street to c onformity with the reference line or plane estab-
lished . A resolution of council directing the work to be done is 
necessary to correct procedure; still, as a general rule, a failure to 
formally adopt such resolution in the u sual case before proceeding 
with the work cannot give rise to a right of action to recover damages . 3 6 
/ . 
However , the abutter may institute proceedings to enforce com-
p'1iance with the law in this regard. It may be that in the case of a 
special injury caused by the failure to pass the required resolution an 
action may be maintainable . But such special interference must be 
alleged and proved as a separate cause of action and not as an action 
for change of grade. 3 7 
34 . Tillotson v. Windsor Heights , 249 Iowa 684 , 87 N.W.2d 21 (1957); 
Caldwellv. Nashua , 122Iowa 179, 97N.W. 1000; Brownv. City, 
164 Iowa 411, 145 N.W. 478; Millard v. City of Webster City, 113 
Iowa 220, 84 N. W . 1044. Trustee v . Anamosa, 76 Iowa 538, 41 
N.W . 313; Hunter v. Ottumwa, 150 Iowa 381, 129 N.W. 961; Ec-
kert v. Incorp . Town ofWalnut ( 117 Iowa 629, 91 N.W. 929 (in 
this case no grade was established at the time of the excavation . 
After the work was completed, the city established a grade still 
lower than the surface excavated to . Held: the city was liable 
for damages}; Richardson v. City, 111 Iowa 4 27, 82 N. W. 920. 
The measure of damages in such cases is "the difference between 
what the property was fairly worth on the market before the work 
was done and what it was thereafter" . 
35. Hunter v . Ottumwa, 150 Iowa 281 , 129 N.W. 961. 
36. Collins v . Iowa Falls, 146 Iowa 305 , 125 N .W. 226; Reilly v. 
Fort Dodge, 118 Iowa 633, 92 N. W . 887; Wilbur v. Fort Dodge, 
120 Iowa 555, 95 N.W. 186 . 
37. Reilly v. Ft. Dodge t 118 Iowa 633, 92 N.W. 887 . 
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Furthermore 0 an ordinance fixing the grade is not jurisdictional 
and need not precede -the resolution ordering the improvement. -If pass-
ed so that the work is done with reference thereto and so that the owner 
may not be subject to damages by reason of subsequent change without 
compensation therefor , -it is sufficient. 3 8 
(4} City Cannot Be Required to Bring Surface of Street to 
Established Grade 
Where the natural surface of a street is above or below the estab-
lished grade 4 the property owners cannot require the city to br ing it to 
grade , nor may they sue for damages , but they can require the city when 
it changes the surface of the street to observe the established grade or 
pay damages occasioned by a change. 39 
b. Requirement that Improvements Shall .Have Been Made 
Another requirement for compensation is that improvements mu s t have 
been made on the property in accord with the established grade. The term 
"improvement" has been defined as changes in the condition of property 
by which its value is increased . It is generally employed in the plural 
form and is generally used with reference to real estate. 40 But in the 
change of grade statute the term has been given a more confined and 
restricted meaning in the light of the legislative purpose sought to be 
subs erved. In the case of Des Moines Ry o Coo v. Des Moines41 in 
construing this enactment the court stated that "to improve real estate 
means to grade 0 sod , or prepare the same for the erection of sidewalks o 
buildings and other structures necessary for the convenience and use 
thereof" o A lot has been held to be improved by the er:e.d:tion of build-
38o Peoples Inv. Co. v. Des Moines, 213 Iowa 1378 , 241 N. W . 464 ( · , , ., 
(1932); Allen v . Davenport , 107 Iowa _ 90 8 .77 N. W. 53 2. 
39. Givenv. City, 70Iowa637, 27N.Wo 803; Prestonv . Cedar 
Rapids , 95 Iowa 71 , .82 , 63 N.W. _572. 
40 . Chase Vo Sioux City, 86 Iowa 603 o 53 N.W. 333. 
41. Des Moines Ry. Co. v. Des Moines o 205 Iowa 495 , .216 N.W • 
.284 , 287 0 
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ings thereon , 42 or by grading and filling same . 43 It has been intimated 
that the breaking of land and fitting it for crops was not an improvement 
within the contemplation of this statute . 44 In Des Moines Ry. Co. v . 
Des Moines it was held that the concept was not deemed comprehensive 
enough to embrace street railway tracks built and maintained on the 
street. 45 
c . On the Same or Lots Abutting 
The Iowa statute does not extend its veil or protection to other 
property lying beyond the lots abutting on the street . 46 Vvhether re-
covery is limited to those cases where there is an actual change in 
front of the abutter's property or the statute is to be construed broad 
enough to entitle him to compensation for changes elsewhere along the 
street is a problem which has not been directly determined -in this juris-
diction. Ordinarily an abutter is not entitled to damages for a change 
unless it is in front .of his premises. 4 7 However , in the Pennsylvania 
case of Lewis v. Homestead48 a contrary result was reached . This 
42. Chiesa v. City of Des Moines , 158 Iowa 343, 318 N.W • . 992; 
Conklin v. Keokuk, 73 Iowa 343, 35 N.W. 444. 
43. Chase v. City of Sioux City , 86 Iowa 603, 53 N. W . 333 ("It is 
contended that as the statute uses the words 'on such street or 
alley' when a lot is graded down the improvement is not on the 
land but of. the land. But that is too narrow and technical a 
construction of .the statute. ") 
44. Chase v. Sioux City, 86 Iowa 603, 53 N. W . 333; Brown v. Wyman, 
56 I ow a 4 52, 9 N. W. 3 4 4 • 
45. 205 Iowa 495, 216 N . W. 284. 
46. Iowa Code Section 389.22 (1958). The Supreme Court of Iowa in 
Milan v. Qity of Chariton, 145 Iowa 648 , 124 N.W. 766 (L910) had 
occasion to define the use of the term "abut" as construed in the 
statute relating to the assessment of abutting property for street im-
provements and it is therein said "by the term • abutting property' is 
meant that between which and the improvement there is no inter-
vening land" . 
47 . Nichols, Ibid. Section320(2ded . ); Davenportv. HydePark, 178 
Mass. 385 , 59 N.E. 1030; Putnam v. Boston Ry. Co., 182 Mass. 
351, 65 :N;·E. 790; Rude v. St . Louis, 93 Mo. 408, 6 S.W. 257; 
Fairchild v. St. Louis , 97 Mo. 85, 11 S.W. 60; Canmon v. St. 
Louis, 97 Mo. 92p 11 S.W. 60; Clemans v . Con. Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., 184 Mo. 46, 82 N. W. 1. 
48. 194 Pa. 199, 45 Atl. 123. 
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decision holds that although the statute requires the property for which 
damages from a change of grade may be recovered to abut on_ the street, 
the property need not abut upon the particular portion of the street at 
which the grade is altered. 49 
It will be observed that the statute by its terms provides for redress 
to owners of such property when improvements are made by any person 
on the street in reliance on an established grade . This phase of the 
act has been construed as authorizing recovery for injuries to trees , 
shrubs, and other ornamental plants customarily grown by abutters for 
the beautification of the street and their property in that area of the 
street between the curb line and the sidewalk usually set apart by the 
city in residential sections for the use and improvement of adjacent 
property owners. 50 So far this doctrine has not been extended to cover 
owners other than abutters or to include non-residential areas or unusual 
residential improvements on the street. In Des Moines Ry . Co . v. Des 
Moines5 1 it was held that street car tracks built on the street were not 
within the protection of this statute , and in that decision .there was 
dictum to the effect that the statute protected only improvements located 
"on" , as that word is defined in Hempstead, 52 the street. 
49. Cited in 44 C. J. 44 6. In this case a railroad company was granted 
permission to raise .its tracks, and consequently it was necessary to 
raise the grade of the street adjoining the tracks. The railroad was 
50 feet north of the property in question. The grade -was not altered 
in front of the complainant• s property. The court, however 1 held 
that he could recover for the depreciation in market value of his 
premises due to such change . 
_50. Richardson v . Sioux City , 13 6 Iowa 43 6 1 113 N. W • . 928. 
_51. 2 0 5 I ow a 4 9 5 , 21 6 N. W. 2 84 • 
52. Hempstead v. City of Des Moines, 52 Iowa 3 03 1 3 N. W . 123. 
.. 
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to recover for this second chaHge. 82 
(2) Elements of Damages 
In determining the depreciative effect of the change on the a djacent 
property , the owner usually sets forth a detailed enumeration of parti~ 
cular injuries to his property and improvements . The illustrations t hat 
follow are suggestive only: evidence of the destruction of the trees and 
sod , 83 evidence of the impairment of acces s to the premises , 84 evi-
dence of the deprivation of lateral support , 85 and evidence of the 
existence of sidewalks and pavement which must be replaced after the 
change.86 
However, injuries which might have been prevented by the exerc ise 
of reasonable care and the incurrence of moderate expense87 and highly 
speculative and contingent items of damages 88 will be promptly exclud-
ed. In addition, to warrant a recover-¥ ,~there must be something more 
·' · . . :· • ~ l '\,' i .J~ • ' ! . '""l.: I ••• :~ ... 1.'L .· ; '. ·C II ~ ..... 
82. Buser v. Cedar Rapids , 115 Iowa 683 , 685 , 87 N.W. 404; Meardon 
v . Iowa City, 148 Iowa 12 , 126 N. W. 939 (instruction on this 
point). With reference to the latter case the work was <;lone by the 
city before payment of damages and at this time was clearly illegal 
under Iowa Code Section 789 (.p89'n, the predecessor of Iowa Code 
Section 389.27 (1946) now repealed . . This provision, which pro-
hibits the alteration of grade until damages are paid or tendered , 
first appeared in Iowa Code Section 7 89 (1897) although the Code 
fails to indicate when it was adopted. It does not appear in 
McClain's Code of 1888 in Section 635 which deals with change 
of grade. In any event it was not applicable in either the Conklin 
or Buser cases; although it was applic;::able in Mearqon , the point 
does not seem to have been made . Probably the distinction made 
in the two preceding paragraphs should not longer exist if the 
statutory provisions are followed. The same result should be achiev-
ed today under Iowa Code Sec. 472.25 (1958) which under Iowa Code 
Section 389.24 (1958) is now the applicable section . 
83. Richardson v . Webster City, 111 Iowa 4 27, 82 N. W. 920; Richard-
son v. Sioux City , 136 Iowa 436 , 113 N.W. 928. 
84, Richardson v . Webster City, 111 Iowa 427 , 82 N.W. 920. 
85 • Corcoran v. Des Moines , 2 05 low a 4 05, 215 N. W • . 94 8; Richard-
son v. Webster City , 111 Iowa 427 , 82 N.W. 920. 
86. Corcoranv. Des Moines , 205 Iowa405 , 215 N. W. 948. 
87 . Corcoran v. Des Moines , 205 Iowa 405 , 215 N.W. 948 . 
88 . Western Newspaper Union v . Des Moines , 157 Iowa 685, 140 N. W . 
367 , 369. 
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than inconvenience or slight damage. 89 
(3}. Setting Off of Benefit90 
Evidence of the benefits derived from the improvement may be in-
troduced to lessen the recovery by the abutting owner, 91 and if ·such 
benefits are greater than the injury , no recovery can be had. 92 How-
ever, in Iowa expected benefits cannot be set off against pecupiary 
damages actually incurred in restoring the property to its former r ela-
tive positiono 93 Further, in order to set off the benefits, the advan-
tage created must be of special benefit to the particular tract, and 
not something shared in common with the general public. 94 
(4) When the Action Accrues 
A paper change unexecuted gives rise to no cause of action against 
the city. 95 To warrant the prosecution of a law action for damages the 
city must have authorized and made some actual physical change in the 
surface of the street. 96 As the damages in such cases are indivisible 
89. Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W. 2d 361,371 
(1942}. 
90. See Section 4 2, footnote 9, supra, and Section 45, infra. 
91. Morton v. Burlington, 106 Iowa 50, 75 N.W. 662. 
92. Meyer v. B!!rlington, 52 Iowa 560, 3 N.W. 558; Stewart v. 
Council Bluffs, 84 Iowa 61, 50 N.W. 219; Meardon v. Iowa City, 
148 Iowa 12, 126 N. W. 93 9 (instructions on this topic); McCosh 
v. Burlington, 72 Iowa 26 , 33 N.W o 346; Hunter v. Ottumwa, 
15 0 I ow a 2 81 , 12 9 N. W o 9 6 L 
93 . Nichols, Ibid . , Section 271 (2d ed . ); Western Newspaper Union 
v. Des Moines, 157 Iowa 685, 140 N.W. 367; Thompson v. 
Keokuk, 61 Iowa 187 , 190, 16 N.W. 82. 
·94. Meyer v. Burlington, 52 Iowa 5 60 , 5 62, 3 N. W. 55 8. 
95. Hempstead v. Des Moines , 63 Iowa 3 6, 18 N. W. 6 76; Vilas v. 
C o M. &St. PaulR . Co . , 179Iowa1244, 162N. W. 795. 
96. However, see footnote 98, infra. 
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it has been held that the cause of action accrues when the .project is 
entirely completed or when the city has ceased its operations for such 
a time as to make it appear that the project has been abandoned . 97 
However c a change of grade as required by that statute should f ir st 
be preceded by an assessment of the damages to abutting property and 
a payment or tender to the property owner of such amount, 98 
A change in disregard of this law imposes an obligation on the c ity 
to pay interest on the final recovery of damages as of the date of the 
change;.; even though the statute makes no ment ion of interest , 99 such 
a change is unlawful , and the abutting owner may invoke the aid of the 
court of chancery and enjoin the city from . changing the grade , or by 
mandamus, compel it to appoint appraisers and have the damages asses ... 
sed . 100 
The rules before outlined apply when the city fails to appoint ap-
praisers and neglects to assess and tender the damages as prescribed by 
law. When the statutory procedure is followed , a right to appeal to the 
district court from the award of the sheriff's jury is given through utili-
zation of the same procedure as is employed for condemnation appeals~01 
97. Foley v. Cedar Rapids , 133 Iowa 64, 110 N.W. 158; Buser v. 
Cedar Rapids, 115 Iowa 683 , 685 , 87 N.W. 404; Ashman v . Des 
Moines, 209 Iowa 1247 , 238 N.W. 316 , 229 N.W~ 907. 
98 . Iowa Code Section 472 . 25 (1958) is now applicable under the 
provisions of Iowa Code Section 3 89. 24 (195 8). 
99. Chamberlain v. Des Moines , 172 Iowa 500, 154 N.W. 766; 
Trustees of P.E. Church v . Anamosa, 76 Iowa 538, 41 N.W. 313; 
Gibson v. Des Moines , 156 N.W. 3.74 (no Iowa citation). 
100. Noyes v. Mason City , 53 Iowa 418 , 4:21, 15 N. W, 693 (intimates 
that both mandamus and injunction would lie); Phillips v. Council 
Bluffs , 63 Iowa 576 , 578 , 19 N. W. 672. 
101. Under Iowa Code' Section 389.24 (1958) the provisions of Chapter 
4 7 2 govern change of grade cases. As to the interpretation of 
the former provision, Iowa Code Section 3 89. 28 (1946) see Con-
klin v. Keokuk, 73 Iowa 343 , 35 N.W. 444. 
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g . Who Is an Owner 
In Chiesa v . Des Moinesl02 it was held that a tenant for years 
was an owner within the meaning of the statute, and in this decision 
it was intimated that the scope of statutory protection should be in-
terpreted to include all persons who would have redress H there were 
an actual physcial invasion or taking of property. As a general pro-
position 1 it may be stated that one must own some equit.able or legal 
estate in the abutting land to be entitled to compensation~ and that 
his damages will be confined to the injuries done to the estate , l03 
· SECTION 45. CITY VIADUCTS 
City viaducts seem to have historically been accorded different 
treatment than the ordinary change of grade case . While for years the 
damages to land occasioned by a change of grade were assessed by a 
committee of three appraisers appointed by the mayor and the property 
owner 1 104 the special chapter dealing with viaducts and underpasses 
has prescribed that the proceedings shall be " • . • the same as are 
provided in case of taking private property for works of internal tm-
provement" . 105 This clause has been interpreted as requiring the 
102. 158 Iowa 343 , 138 N.W . 922 (1912) . 
103. Nebraska City v. Northcut, 45 Neb. 456, 63 N . W. 807; Greener 
v. Sigourney 1 89 N. W . 1103 (no Iowa citation); Chiesa v . Des 
Moines, 158 Iowa 343, 138 N. W. 922,924. (1912) ("A tenant for 
life or for years of a city lot or other land certainly has a right 
or interest therein . He is, therefore 1 an owner of the property 
to the extent of that interest 1 and it would seem to follow ot 
necessity that the statute which gives the. right to recover dam-
ages to property includes damages to each and every estate or 
interest therein, legal and equitable . ") In regard to mortgage13, 
see Cotes v. Davenport, 9 I ow a 2 2 7; Moritz v. St. Paul, 52 
Minn. 4 0 9, 54 N. W . 3 7 0 . 
104 . Iowa Code Section 389.23 (1946) . This provision had remained 
the same since its adoption . See Iowa Code Section 469 (1873). 
105 . Iowa Code Section 3 87 . 4 (195 8). 
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same procedure as is employed in eminent domain.106 However, t his 
provision does not explicitly set forth the measure of damages t o be 
employed in compensating a damaged landowner. If t he eminent domain 
standard is applied , then benefits may not be considered; however a if 
the viaduct is to be treated as a change of grade r t hen benefit s to t he 
landowner may be offset against the damage . The ohly case w hich 
considers the _problem on this basis is Western Newspa per Union v . 
Des Moines1.07 This case comes to the curious conclus ion t hat w hile 
benefits may be offset against damages, they may not b e c onsidered 
to such an extent as to preclude recovery. Thi s result obviously lie.s 
somewhere b etween the two standards and con s equently the soundness 
of the decision would seem to be open t o question. Although t he 
vagueness of such a holding in .ppoviding a criter ia for fi nding damag es 
is also somewhat disturrbing g the author ity for the pos ition taken i s 
even more puzzling . The court cites Enos v. Chicago, St . P . & K. C . 
Ry~ Co.108 which does ~nvolve a very similar c lause of a different 
statute. However , this clause is not even quoted in t he Enos opinion, 
and there is no discussion in the opinion of the c oncept of benefit. As 
a matter of factu the word "benefit" is not mentioned. 
It is suggested that no great reliance may be placed in t his cas e. 
Consequently, a more extended inquiry is probably necessary . It w ill 
be remembered that set-off of benefits is allowed only in cases of 
change of grade. No part of the statute explicitly required thi s result; 
the allowance of set-off was solely the result of interpretation by the 
courts of the change of grade statute. In order to determine the differ·-· 
ence between the viaduct and change of grade statutes o it is neces sary 
to examine some of the statutory background for the allowance of s et-
off for benefits in change of grade cases " The original wording for the 
statute in Iowa Code· Section 469 (1873) provided for payments where 
grade was altered " • • • in such manner as to injure or diminish the 
the value of said property. o •• " • Sometime after McClain ' s Revis ed 
Code of 1888109 an amendment was made , 110 so that s ince the Code 
of 1897 u it has covered which "damage" as well as injure or <;l iminish 
the value of the property. On the other hand, the condemnation statutes 
106 . Western Newspaper Union v . Des Moines, 157 Iowa 685, 140 
N.W . 367 , 369 (1913); Globe Machinery & Supply Co . v. Des 
Moines , 146 Iowa 26V., 136 N. W . 518 (1912). 
107. 157 Iowa 685 , 140 N.W. 367 (1913) . 
1 0 8. 7 8. I ow a 2 8 o 4 2 N oW . 5 7 5 • 
109 . Where it appears as Section 633. 
11 0 . There i s no indication of any amendment having been. adopted by 
the Legislature in any of t he Codes . Neit her i s there any mention 
of such an amendment in any of the compilations of the various 
sessions of the. General Assembly for theperiod 1888- 1897 . 
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appear always to have used the single word "damages" unconnected 
with the concept of value to describe an injury for which compensation 
must be paid. 
As noted previously, the change of grade statutes have been held 
to encompass set- off for benefits . The first decision taking this point 
of view appears to be Meyer v . City of Burlington. 111 In that case the 
court referred to the "injure or diminish the value of the property" lan-
guage of the statute and said it did not refer to a cas e in which the 
"value of the property on the whole is increased by it" . .This clearly 
suggests that the cited language was regarded as establishing a sort of 
net harm done view of the injury received. Subsequent cases appear to 
have followed this decision without examination of the reasons there-
for and without considering the effect of the addition of the word "damr-!, . ; ' 
· ages" to the last of compensable injury. 112 Such an interpretation is 
entirely reasonable in view of the language of the statute and the t?r~ 
prevailing concept that a change of grade did not involve a taking. 
However, where the word "damage" has been used alone without 
mention of "value" no set-off has even been allowed.114 
Iowa Code Section 3 87 o 3 (195 8), which is the provision requiring 
payment fur injury caused by the construction of a viaduct or underpass , 
refers only to "damages" o The same is true of Iowa Code Section 
111. 52 I ow a 56 0, 3 N. W. 55 8 ( 18 7 9) • 
112. Liddick v. Council Bluffs , 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942); 
Western Newspaper Union V o Des Moines, 157 Iowa 685, 140 
N. W. 3 67; Meardon v. Iowa City , 14 8 Iowa 12, 126 N . W. 93 9 
(1910); Stewart v. Council Bluffs, 84 Iowa 61, 50 N.W. 219; 
McCash Vo City of Burlington, 72 Iowa 26, 33 N.W. 346 (1887) . 
If "damages had been a factor in these decisions, it would be 
harder to distinguish the wording of the eminent domain and 
change of grade statutes. 
113. Meyer v. Burlington, 52 Iowa 560 , 3 N.W. 558 (1879) . Note 
this view of a taking is now under a considerable cloud. See 
Section 42, supra. 
114. It must be conceded, however, that the fact that the word was 
used in eminent domain statutes , to which an obvious connec-
tion with Article I, Section 18, exists, may be largely respon-
sible for the absence of uncertainty. 
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389.23 (1958) requiring the payment of damages caused by injury to an 
owner's right of access, light, air or view where an overpass is con-
structed . It is suggested that this wording should probably be inter-
preted as excluding set-off in view of the dubious nature of the autho-
rity to the contrary and the statutory history of the sections involved. 
It is also worthy of note that Iowa Code Section 389.23 (1958) re-
quires a city to pay compensation for damages by reas on of any injury 
to an owner's rights of access, light, air and view created by the con-
struction of a viaduct or underpass whether or not the construction 
causes a change of grade . The italicized phrase would seem .to indicate 
that the eminent domain statute is to be employed. 
However , there is some law in Iowa which deals with a viaduct as 
a change of grade. Thus in Liddick v. Council Bluffs 115 the court held 
that a viaduct is a change of grade within the meaning of the change of 
grade statute and that abutting owners are entitled to compensation. 116 
This is an interesting case because it did not follow the usual pattern l :· v .i.< l L. :i. 
for viaduct construction. The city did not proceed under Chapters 3 05 ,. 
381 or 404 of the Iowa Code (1958) but instead, the project was to be 
constru<:;:ted in reliance upon the general -power of the highway commis-
sion. The state and city obviously had to avoid the use of any section 
requiring payment of damages . The property ovvners apparently had to 
rely upon change of grade because it was evidently impossible to force 
the city to act under Chapter 3 87 (195 8) since the railroad was not re~ 
sponsible for the cost of construction, or Chapters 38.1 and 404 (1958) 
because the city was not footing the bill. 
SECTION 4 6. STATE VIADUCTS AND PRIMARY EXTENSIONS 
The state highway commission has authority to improve, construct 
and maintain primary road extensions in cities and towns, 117 and the 
ancillary power to construct or aid in the construction of bridges, via= 
115 . 232 Iowa 197 , 5 N.W. 2d 361 (1942). 
116 . Since this was an action for declaratory judgment, the oourt did 
not face the issue of the measure of damages . Either the change 
of grade or the constitutional standard could _have been used since 
the court also held there was a constitutional taking . 
117. Iowa Code Section 313 .21 (1958). 
l 
1 
1 
) 
I 
1 
r l 
II 
I 
237 
ducts, and railroad crossing eliminations on such extensions. 118 
However, the right to enter on such projects is conditioned on first 
obtaining the approval of the city or town council in regard to the 
effect of the proposed improvement on sewers, waterlines, sidewalks, 
and established street grades. 119 
Where the city consents to such improvement made by another 
authority, it may be argued that the city becomes liable for a change 
of grade.l20 The highway commission has no authority to establish or 
reestablish the grade of a primilry extension through any municipality~21 
By statute such authority is vested solely in the city council. 12 2 In 
Wallace v. Fosterl23 it was held that the Legislature did not intend by 
such enactments to affect the municipality's duties and responsibilities 
118. Iowa Code Section 313.27 (1958). 
119. Iowa Code Section 313.21 (1958). 
12 0. 44 C. J. 4 51, "under a statute authorizing the improvement of roads 
extending through incorporated municipalities by the county road 
commissioners with the consent of the municipalities, a municipa~ 
lity which consents to a change of grade is liable therefor as in 
other cases"; McMullen v. Marlborough, 163 App. Div. 73, 148 
N.Y. S. 505, "under a statute imposing liability upon a village for 
damages occasioned by any change of grade, the change of grade 
need not be made by the village, but may be made by the state 
in the improvement of a state highway"; Marco v. Wilmerding 
Borough, 3 7 Pa. Sup. 185, 44 C. J. 43 5 (a lawful contract by city 
authorities which necessarily results in a change of. grade in a 
highway will be construed as an ordinance of the city providing 
for such change). See also Nicks v. Chic. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 
84 I ow a 2 7 , 3 1, 5 0 N. W . 2 2 2 . 
121. 1922 Attorney General Reports 204, "Neither the highway com-
mission nor the board of supervisors have authority to establish 
the grade of a primary road ext ens ion. " 
122. Iowa Code Section 389.20 (1958). 
123. 213 Iowa 1158, 241 N.W. 9. 
23 8 
in regard to such streets. 124 Such duties and responsibilities include 
the payment of damages for change of grade incident to street improve-
ment. 
This conclusion is strengthened by the statutes conferring authority 
on the cities to improve such extensions, and providing for proportion-
ate reimbursement for expenses incurred out of the primary road fund 
when such project has been approved by the state highway commission 
prior to the letting. 125 In short, whether the improvement is in the 
first instance undertaken by the state highway commission or the city, 
a joint venture is contemplated by the legislature imwhich the city is 
in no way released from its civic responsibilities ,12·6 
If the city in no way approves of the building of the improvement 
and the council remains silent on the matter, it will not be liable for 
changes made by the state highway commission without its authority~ 2 7 
124. Wallace v. Foster, 241 N. W. 9, 11, "The act does not make such 
roads or streets within a city or town a part of the primary road 
system. It does not purport so to do. It does give the highway 
commission authority to improve certain roads and streets of the 
municipality if the city council approves thereof. It does not ap-
pear from the statute that the legislature had any intent to affect 
the municipal responsibility in regard to such streets . The power 
conferred on the highway commission is to improve such streets, 
but the duties and responsibilities of the municipality in relation 
thereto do not appear to have been divested by the legislature" . 
125. 193 2 Attorney General Reports 194 holding that cities and towns 
can receive aid from the primary road fund under the predecessor 
of Iowa Code Sections 391.71-.74 (1958} to assist in resurfac-
ing streets, extensions of the primary road. 
126. Ga_sfor.c:L.v·.: _Qity, of ~:McC.ook ,. -13,3 'Neb .. :· .191, . 214CN .:W: .. 464 (193 7} . 
127. Stritesky v. Cedar Rapids, 98 Iowa 373, 67 N.W. 271, "there 
can be no recovery of damages for change of grade where the city 
has not attempted to change the physical surface of the street, 
and it will not be liable for such change without its authority 
by a street railway company"; see also Waller v . Dubuque, 69 
low a 5 41 , 2 9 N. W . 4 5 6. 
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However, the state highway commission under such circumstances 
could be enjoined from proceeding with the work. 12 8 
The problems heretofore considered have assumed an established 
grade. Where the city has· the right to put a street to a certain grade 
without liability, it is not liable where it is done for it by someone 
.else. 129 
SECTION 4 7. THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PAVE ON ESTABLISHED GRADE 
Iowa Code Section 3 91. 3 (195 8) provides that the construction of 
permanent parking , curbing, paving, graveling, macadamizing or' gutter-
ing shall not be done until the bed therefor shall have been graded so 
that such improvement, when fully completed, will bring the street up 
to the established grade. It was formerly held that the construction 
of such permanent improvement in disregard of an established grade13 0 
or before a grade was established 13 1 deprived the city of the power to 
assess the cost against the abutting property. 
But under the recent statutory amendment as interpreted in Peoples 
Inv. Co. v. Des Moines 13 2 the abutter ~ . s remedy is to present his ob-
jections to the city council, 133 and if the error is not corrected 1 then 
to appeal to the district court. 134 If he does not pursue this remedy, 
his objection is waived under Iowa Code Section 3 91. 56 (195 8). 
128. In the case of Sauer v. Highway Commission, Eq. No. 11036 1 
Jefferson County (Sept. 1937) the commission was enjoined from 
proceeding with the project until such commission secured the 
approval of the city council of Fairfield. 
129. Slatten v. Des Moines R. Co. I 29 . .Iow.a 148 (1870). 
130. Hubbell v. Bennett , 130 Iowa 66 1 106 N.W. 375; Landis v . 
Marion, 176 Iowa 240, 157 N.W. 841. 
131. McManus v . ·Hornaday, 99 Iowa 507, 68 N.W. 812; Walter v . 
City, 206 .Iowa 244, 220 N.W. 92. 
132. 241 N.W. 464, 213 Iowa 1378 (1932). 
133. Iowa Code Section '39l.53-.55 (1958) . 
134. Id. 
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